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1. Summary 
1.1. Scope and approach 
This study considers the effects of the single market programme on the motor vehicles sector. 
The scope of the study includes car and truck manufacturers in the European Union (EU) but 
excludes agricultural vehicles, construction vehicles and two- and three-wheeled vehicles. The 
primary focus is on motor vehicle assemblers, with the impact of the single market programme 
on component suppliers being examined in terms of the changes in sourcing, outsourcing and 
procurement patterns of the assemblers. 
The objectives of this study are to investigate the extent to which the various sector-specific 
single market measures, such as the establishment of whole vehicle and component type 
approval, safety regulations and environmental controls, have affected the EU automotive 
sector. In addition to these sector-specific measures, we have also considered the horizontal 
single market measures which affect the EU automotive sector, such as the liberalization of 
cross-border transport through the abolition of frontier controls. As important as the measures, 
we have also taken account of the higher importance given to conducting business on a pan-
European basis, which resulted from the 'marketing' of the single market. 
Our assessment of the effects of these measures on the EU automotive sector includes an in-
depth consideration of the 'other' explanatory factors which might also have an effect on the 
sector. We have categorized the other factors affecting the industry as follows: 
(a) market conditions; 
(b) German reunification; 
(c) new model launches; 
(d) globalization; 
(e) currency fluctuations; 
(f) over-capacity; 
(g) low returns; 
(h) production and supply chain changes; 
(i) research initiatives and technological change; 
(j) environmental issues. 
A 'hierarchy of hypotheses' helps to distinguish between the effects of the sector-specific 
measures and the horizontal measures of the single market as well as the other factors. The 
hierarchy of hypotheses is illustrated in Figure 1.1. This hierarchy allows a clear assessment of 
each of the expected impacts of the single market programme on the automotive sector. The 
effects of all of the various single market measures and the other factors on the EU automotive 
sector can be assessed. Finding some measurable effect in one of the hypotheses will not in 
itself prove that the single market programme has had an effect. However, if it is found that 
the single market programme has had a measurable effect for a number of the hypotheses, the 
claim that the single market programme has had an effect on the sector becomes more robust. 
Each hypothesis includes significant levels of quantitative desk research, complemented by a 
number of detailed case studies with Volvo, Nissan, Fiat, Renault and Daewoo, ascertaining 
Motor vehicles 
the companies' views of the impact of the single market programme and what further 
measures are necessary to finalize the single market. 
Figure 1.1. The hierarchy of hypotheses 
The SM removed 
administrative 
barriers and this 
facilitated trade 
The single market programme has had an effect 
on the EU automotive industry 
Interviews with other motor vehicle manufacturers, component manufacturers, experts 
involved in vehicle testing, Commission officials responsible for technical regulation in the 
car sector, consumer groups, trade bodies and academic researchers complemented the 
analysis and case study evidence for each of the hypotheses. 
Summary 
1.2. Key results on the effects of the single market programme 
Analysis of intra-EU trade, the number of models and makes available to consumers in 
different Member States and manufacturers' share of national markets establish the impact of 
the single market programme on market access. On the whole, the single market programme is 
having a small measurable effect on market access. Other factors such as the globalization of 
competition, the economic cycle, currency fluctuations and new product launches are all also 
having an effect on market access. Importantly, the implementation of the single market 
appears to be of greater benefit to new entrants into the EU market, particularly the Japanese 
and Korean automotive manufacturers. The single market allows a clearer entry strategy for 
these manufacturers. 
The single market programme is having a small effect on the level of market concentration in 
the EU automotive sector. There are indications of growing market strength among the top 
automotive producers, although market conditions are also having an effect. Profitability in the 
sector is falling, although this is largely because of over-capacity in the automotive sector 
brought on by the recent decline in the economic cycle. The single market is having little clear 
effect on the level of prices for vehicles across the EU. The single market programme was 
expected to reduce the differences in price for the same product across the Member States. 
However, the variance of prices across the EU Member States is actually increasing slightly. 
Pan-European marketing networks are developing primarily as a result of the single market 
programme. The structure of distribution is not changing. The block exemption is one of the 
more dominant factors affecting distribution. 
The single market programme seems to be having little direct effect on production costs, 
although it may be reinforcing recent falls in production costs. Production, supply and 
technology changes are greater influences on production costs. Similarly, EU automotive 
manufacturer productivity has improved, but this is more as a result of a continued long-term 
trend which began well before single market programme implementation. 
Employment in the EU automotive sector is falling, although this is more as a result of the 
recent decline in the economic cycle than of the single market. Cross-border mobility of 
employment appears to be increasing, albeit slowly. The more important change in 
employment in the EU automotive sector is the increase in employee flexibility on the shop 
floor, moving away from previous drives towards capital intensive methods of production. 
The single market programme is playing a part in recent changes in the structure of investment 
by EU automotive manufacturers. Investment in peripheral EU and non-EU regions has been 
facilitated by the single market programme and there is a greater tendency for the EU 
automotive manufacturers to enter strategic alliances. However, the increasing globalization of 
competition and state aids are also important factors changing the structure of investment in 
the EU automotive industry. The single market programme is affecting the structure of supply 
of the component suppliers along with new production and supply chain techniques. 
The most notable effect of the single market programme has been through the costs in 
research, design and development. Large cost savings through RD&D have been a result of the 
single market programme harmonization of whole vehicle type approval across the EU 
Member States. Direct cost savings are in the order of ECU 1 million, per major new model, 
and indirect cost savings may be an order of magnitude greater. 
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As a result of these various impacts, the single market programme is probably having an effect 
on the global competitiveness of the EU automotive industry, with EU manufacturers' share of 
the global market increasing. 
1.3. Key conclusions 
The single market programme has contributed to the ongoing development of the EU motor 
vehicles sector at a time when it was undergoing important changes in terms of increased 
globalization, improved working methods and a deep recession. The single market is not 
making companies expand into new markets, but certainly helped this process by making it 
easier and cheaper for them to do so. The thrust of the single market measures was therefore in 
the right direction, but it did not radically alter business strategies. 
The single market programme has made it easier for new entrants to compete on equal terms 
with indigenous EU producers, and this has increased the levels of competition in the sector. 
This has provided further incentives for companies to decrease costs and increase product 
differentiation, placing downward pressure on prices and increasing customer service levels. 
Consumers, therefore, have benefited from the single market programme as a result of the 
increased choice of products available, increased safety and lower emissions. 
1.4. Future actions required 
We consider that the European Commission should consider putting forward policies (and 
monitoring carefully existing policies) which address the following issues: 
(a) remaining differences in vehicle tax structures between the Member States which 
impose large variant costs on producers, affect RD&D and can affect the distribution 
decisions of specialist marque producers; 
(b) variations and differences in exchange rates affecting location, purchasing and 
distribution decisions of manufacturers and imposing difficulties for the more nationally 
focused manufacturers who have difficulty 'laying off exchange rate risks; 
(c) remaining differences between the standards set within the EU and the other major 
global competitor markets such as the US, Japan and newly industrialized countries in 
the Far East; 
(d) different internal standards set by the manufacturers for component suppliers, although 
progress is being made in this area with the mutual recognition of supplier evaluations 
by German, French and Italian manufacturers; 
(e) differences in the administration of registration between the Member States. 
There are also two factors which we believe may be impeding economically efficient 
rationalization of the industry: 
(a) the definition of the relevant market in competition investigations where national 
pressures can prevent economically efficient restructuring on a pan-European basis; 
(b) the effect of state aids provided by Member States supporting the continuance of too 
many small, nationally orientated, EU-owned players compared with the larger, 
economically more efficient competitors in the North American and Japanese markets. 
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2. Introduction 
2.1. Overview of the study 
On 1 January 1993, the European Union (EU) celebrated the completion of the single market 
programme. Many initiatives had been undertaken, but it was also realized that not all barriers 
had been removed. This led to a decision at the 1992 Edinburgh Summit (Council Resolution 
92/1218) calling for an overall analysis of the effectiveness of the measures taken to complete 
the single market programme. 
To provide this analysis, the European Commission has commissioned 20 studies covering a 
range of sectors to investigate the effects of the single market programme and to assess 
whether obstacles to open competition across borders are still in place. This study is one of 
those 20 projects. Its scope covers the automotive sector and includes car and truck 
manufacturers in the EU, but excludes agricultural vehicles, construction vehicles and two-
and three-wheeled vehicles. The primary focus is on motor vehicle assemblers, with the 
impact of the single market programme on component suppliers being examined in terms of 
the changes in sourcing and procurement patterns of the assemblers. 
2.2. Objectives 
The objectives of this study are to investigate the extent to which the various single market 
programme measures affecting the European motor vehicles industry have resulted in: 
(a) the removal of barriers to trade and the development of true European economic 
integration in the motor vehicles sector; 
(b) increased competitiveness of European manufacturers in the global motor vehicles 
market. 
More specifically, we include in our analysis four key areas: 
(a) barriers to trade - the extent to which the legislative and administrative actions taken to 
implement the single market have eliminated the barriers to trade in the motor vehicles 
industry; 
(b) cost impacts - the extent to which measures taken to liberalize intra-Community trade 
and competition have had a direct impact on the costs for motor vehicle manufacturers 
in Member States; 
(c) sectoral analysis - the extent to which measures taken to complete the single market 
have impacted motor vehicles sector evolution and are now reflected in the structure of 
the motor vehicles market; 
(d) business strategy - analysis of corporate behaviour and strategic responses within the 
motor vehicles sector to the single market to determine its importance in influencing 
corporate strategy. 
2.3. The report 
This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the quantitative data relating to the industry. 
For example, we have produced an in-depth analysis of market shares, trade flows, levels of 
industry concentration and financial performance. We have also carried out five case studies 
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with vehicle manufacturers (Fiat, Renault, Volvo, Nissan and Daewoo). These provide more 
qualitative interpretative information. They are contained in the appendices, but key elements 
have been incorporated into the main report. We have finalized mini-case studies on three 
component supply sectors and the results of these are included in Appendix K. We have also 
carried out a number of interviews with industry experts. 
2.4. Structure of the report 
The structure of this report is designed to provide a full description of our preliminary analysis 
and findings, whilst retaining much of the background detail in the appendices. 
Chapter 3 describes the single market measures which are relevant for the automotive sector. 
In this chapter we provide not only a description of the measures in place, but also a 
contextual overview of the reasons for regulation and the benefits of European as opposed to 
Member State intervention in this area. 
Chapter 4 reviews our methodological approach and introduces the concept that hypotheses 
relating to the single market are linked. 
Chapters 5 to 7 cover the impact of the single market programme on sectoral performance. It 
includes our quantitative analysis of the industry and relates our results to the hypotheses 
specified in Chapter 4. 
These three chapters form the heart of our analysis. The impact on the marketing process is 
covered in Chapter 5. We have covered this in a separate section because it encompasses a 
wide range of different variables (from prices to market shares) and we have collected and 
analysed a significant amount of data in this area. Chapter 6 describes the main changes taking 
place in the other functional areas of automotive assemblers (RD&D, purchasing and 
production). In Chapter 7 we examine the impact of the single market programme on the 
global competitiveness of the EU-owned automotive manufacturers, which forms our final 
hypothesis. 
Chapter 8 describes in more qualitative terms our views on the impact of the single market on 
business strategy. This includes key elements of our case studies covering vehicle 
manufacturers' business responses. 
Chapter 9 presents summaries of findings from the case studies which are presented in greater 
detail in the appendices. Chapter 10 presents our final conclusions, in which we summarize 
our views on the actual impact of the single market programme and provide our views on 
possible policy actions. 
We present much of the background data and analysis in the appendices, which are 
categorized according to the subject matter of each chapter. For example, they contain more 
detailed information on market shares, component suppliers, EU fiscal regimes and strategic 
alliances. 
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3. Assessment of single market legislation 
3.1. Types of legislation 
This chapter describes the various types of European legislation associated with the single 
market programme which have affected the EU automotive industry. There are several 
categories of legislation which need to be considered, including sector-specific and horizontal 
measures which are part of the single market programme, as well as some non-single-market 
policies which significantly affect the automotive industry. Each of these different categories 
need to be considered in the analysis throughout this report. 
The chapter begins by describing the reasons behind the implementation of the single market 
measures. We then describe the actual sector-specific and horizontal measures and their 
expected impact. Any remaining EU legislation which affects the automotive sector but is not 
part of the single market programme is then considered. Finally, we provide an overview of 
the remaining obstacles and/or shortcomings affecting the development of the single market in 
the automotive sector. 
The various categories of legislation can be described in different levels of detail. In this 
chapter, we concentrate on the key groupings and provide greater detail in Appendices A to C. 
3.1.1. The single market measures 
The single market measures we analyse are split between sector-specific and horizontal 
legislation. The sector-specific measures of the single market relate to legislation directly 
imposed on the automotive sector, such as the harmonization of standards across the EU 
Member States. The horizontal measures relate to legislation imposed by the EC to help the 
development of the single market for all sectors. Naturally, these measures will have an effect 
on the automotive sector. We consider the sector-specific and horizontal measures in turn by 
first looking at the reasons behind their implementation, then considering the expected impact 
of the legislation. 
Sector-specific measures 
The sector-specific measures focus on differences in automotive sector legislation on a 
country-by-country basis. Country-specific, as opposed to EU-wide policies, affect automotive 
manufacturers' ability to access the EU marketplace. Different national technical standards to 
improve the safety of vehicles, restrict their weights and dimensions or limit their emissions 
result in different variants of cars being necessary for each country market. The costs of 
variants can be very significant and this increases the costs of entering different markets and 
leads to a sub-optimal industry structure. In addition, the process of gaining approval to sell 
new models of vehicles in each Member State traditionally requires the granting of type 
approval for the whole vehicle. This is a lengthy process, particularly if there are different 
requirements in each Member State. All these requirements impose extra costs on 
manufacturers. 
This process of technical harmonization for vehicles began well before the single market was 
conceived and whilst the later measures became incorporated into the single market 
programme, these must be seen as the final (but critical) measures in a long cycle of 
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harmonization. Table 3.1 shows the sector-specific measures which are often considered as the 
single market part of this harmonization process. 
Table 3.1. Sector-specific measures 
Title 
Whole Vehicle Type 
Approval 
Roadworthiness test 
Mechanical coupling 
devices 
Lateral protection for 
goods vehicles 
Weights and dimensions 
(cars) 
Interior fittings 
Tyres 
Tyre pressure gauges 
Safety glass and glazing 
materials 
Motor vehicle noise 
Air pollution: passenger cars 
Emission of gaseous 
pollutants from diesel 
engines 
Sulphur content of certain 
liquid fuels 
Spray-suppression devices 
Road vehicles: weights and 
dimensions 
Speed limitation devices for 
heavy goods vehicles and 
coaches 
Speed limitation devices for 
commercial vehicles 
External projections on cabs 
of commercial vehicles 
Measure 
92/53/EECof 18 June 
1992 (latest amendment) 
94/23/ECof8June 1994 
(latest) 
94/20/ECof30May 1994 
89/297/EECof 13 April 
1989 
92/21/EEC of 31 March 
1992 
91/662/EECof6 
December 1991 
92/23/EECof31 March 
1992 
86/217/EECof26May 
1986 
92/22/EECof31 March 
1992 
92/97/EECof 10 
November 1992 (latest) 
94/12/ECof23March 1994 
(latest) 
91/542/EECofl October 
1991 (latest) 
93/12/EECof23March 
1993 
91/226/EECof27March 
1991 
92/7/EEC of 10 February 
1992 
92/24/EECof31 March 
1992 
92/6/EEC of 10 February 
1992 
92/114/EECofl7 
December 1992 
Description 
Type approval is carried out by one MS which provides a 
certificate which is valid in all MSs 
States that MSs must carry out periodic roadworthiness 
tests and provide a certificate proving that they have done 
so 
Part of the type approval regime. States that coupling 
devices must conform to certain standards 
Provides technical requirements for side protection of 
heavy goods vehicles and their trailers 
Harmonizes national laws concerning the weights and 
dimensions of cars. Covers maximum dimensions, weights 
and towed weight 
Harmonizes the technical requirements for the behaviour of 
the steering device in an impact 
Harmonizes national type approval for tyres and their 
fitting 
Harmonizes national provisions relating to tyre pressure 
gauges in order to facilitate trade 
Brings into line national provisions and relates to type 
approval in terms of materials used and their installation 
Lays down limits on the noise level of the mechanical parts 
and exhaust systems 
Establishes limit values for emissions from cars 
Technical requirements for diesel engines to combat air 
pollution 
Limits the sulphur content of gasoline and kerosene 
(derogation for Greece until 1999) 
Harmonizes the type approval procedures for spray-
suppression devices 
Lays down maximum weights and dimensions for large 
vehicles 
Limits the maximum speed for heavy vehicles used to carry 
goods or passengers 
Limits maximum speed of commercial vehicles 
Relates to the external projections forward of the cab's rear 
panel 
Assessment of single market legislation 
The sector-specific measures have been developed to ensure that vehicles developed for one 
Member State are compatible with those required in another. Primarily, this has been achieved 
through setting technical standards.1 
The system is complex. In broad terms, it covers three areas: 
(a) In terms of harmonizing safety requirements for vehicles, the type approval regime is 
almost complete. Since 1970, some 45 separate directives harmonizing requirements for 
different product components have been put in place. Up until 1996, Member States still 
had to approve the whole vehicle. To do this, manufacturers referred to the standards for 
specific components which have been covered by the directives and this procedure was 
carried out by each country where the vehicle was sold. To overcome this barrier, the 
concept of a European Whole Vehicle Type Approval was developed which ensures that 
the approval of a new car in one Member State is automatically valid in all Member 
States. The Whole Vehicle Type Approval applies to new models of cars from 1 January 
1996 and to existing models of cars from 1 January 1998. In terms of roadworthiness, a 
directive is now in force requiring in-service testing for all Member States. However, 
Member States have considerable latitude in how this is applied and a number of 
countries have transitional periods (until 1998) to put these procedures into place. 
(b) Harmonization of limits on the weights and dimensions of cars is now complete. 
However, the harmonization of weights and dimensions for trucks has been delayed as a 
result of the higher maximum limits current in the newly acceding countries of Sweden 
and Finland. 
(c) The EU has put in place measures to limit the levels of pollutants from vehicles. These 
lay down different limit values for emissions from petrol and diesel vehicles. They cover 
carbon monoxide, unburned hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides from petrol and diesel 
engines; and specifically for diesel engines, limit values for particulate pollutants. 
Different levels of standards for heavy vehicles have been set over time (Euro 1, 2 and 
3). The European Commission is also currently examining a proposal for a common 
strategy on vehicle scrapping (End of Life Vehicles). 
The intention of the sector-specific measures is to remove sector-specific administrative and 
technical barriers to trade and investment across the EU. The expected impact of the measures 
is that manufacturers will have equal access to each of the Member States, removing any 
advantages that the manufacturers in particular Member States might have had over their EU 
competitors. The removal of automotive sector barriers to trade and investment is then 
expected to increase competition and competitiveness within the EU automotive sector, 
lowering costs and prices to the consumer and making EU automotive manufacturers more 
competitive in the global market. These expected impacts are examined in detail in Chapters 4 
to 9 of this report. 
The EU is increasingly taking an economic approach to regulation, in which all the potential 
costs and benefits of new legislation are considered. This will ensure that decisions on new 
1 In the USA. the approach to standardization is different. There, the standards bodies produce very detailed technical 
standards, but then the industry self-certifies itself to these standards. The sanction used is the civil liability court. This 
may allow US producers to develop new cars much more quickly but also results in producers being less innovative 
because of the high potential liability costs. Asia. Japan. Australia and Canada use the European type approach. 
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regulations take into account the full costs of complying with them as well as the benefits to 
different parties. 
Horizontal measures 
At the horizontal level, action was required at a European level to remove the distortions 
created by different regulations in each Member State. For example, if the administrative 
barriers between any two Member States made it easier to export from one to the other, then 
this would constitute unfair trade. Even if the barriers were equally stringent, if they operated 
in a different manner, then importers and exporters incur extra costs in learning and applying 
different systems between each Member State. Harmonizing such barriers at a European level 
therefore reduces the overall costs of doing business around Europe. Specific areas for 
European action are: 
(a) inefficiencies in the road haulage system between and within the Member States as a 
result of administrative 'barriers'; 
(b) exchange rate fluctuations affecting the profitability and risks involved in trade and 
location decisions; 
(c) different public procurement regimes limiting cross-border transactions in the utility 
markets for vehicles; 
(d) different practices in enforcing intellectual property rights across the Community 
necessitating a series of applications to national patent and copyright offices. 
The main horizontal measures are summarized below: 
(a) The introduction of the Single Administrative Document (SAD) for transport between 
Member States in 1989 harmonized cross-border administrative formalities and provided 
some reductions in border delays. With the completion of the single market in 1993, the 
SAD was no longer needed for Member States as customs checks were removed. Within 
Member States, over a period of time, road haulage quotas and restrictions have been 
liberalized, facilitating the operation of transport companies within and between 
different countries. This has greatly aided the transferral of products across borders: it 
has reduced the cost of sourcing from suppliers in different Member States; eased the 
setting up of pan-European production; and facilitated the transfer of vehicles (i.e. the 
final product) across borders. 
(b) There has been some reduction in the differences between VAT rates which apply to 
cars across the EU. The Community has developed a strategy for the approximation of 
VAT across the Community. This has not gone as far as was initially proposed, and the 
rates are now within an 'interim solution'. Further development in this area is envisaged 
(the definitive arrangement) but not yet agreed. A number of countries still impose extra 
fiscal charges on the purchase of vehicles. VAT and purchase taxes on vehicles in the 
EU are treated differently to almost all other products. The tax is applied in the country 
in which the vehicle has been registered, regardless of where it has been purchased (the 
'destination principle'). Consumers of vehicles cannot therefore take advantage of lower 
tax countries for purchase. The taxes vary substantially and so these differences in taxes 
significantly affect the demand for vehicles in different Member States. Appendix D 
provides an overview of the different purchase and consumption taxes affecting the 
sector, which is summarized in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2. 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germanv 
Spain 
France 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
UK 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
Taxes on acquisition 
VAT 
(%) 
20.5 
25 
15 
16 
18.6 
18 
21 
19 
15 
17.5 
16 
17.5 
20 
22 
25 
Sales tax 
Passenger cars 
based on cc + age 
105% up to 24.400 DKR 
180% on the remainder 
taxable value = price inc. VAT 
none 
12% 
none 
new car: 10-75% 
<2.5 litres: 23.2% 
>2.5 litres: 29.5% 
>21 HP (petrol) 
or 24 HP (diesel) 
5-12 mio LIT 
(abolished 31.12.94) 
none 
petrol car: 45.2% - 3,394 HFL 
diesel car: 45.2% - 1.278 HFL 
based on cc, e.g. 1801:1.327.776 
ESC 
none 
based on fuel consumption 7-14% 
100% 
excise tax based on pollution 
Commercial vehicles 
none 
95% 
none 
none 
none 
new vehicle: 0-30% 
13.3% for LCV: 
otherwise IRL 40-100 
transfer taxes 
none 
none 
none 
none 
none 
none 
excise tax 
Registration 
charge 
2.500 BFR 
1,000 DKR 
54 DM 
8,650 PTA 
88-160 FF & parafiscal 
charge 
8-16% 
New: 230.000 LIT 
Used: 210,000 LIT 
1,128 LFR 
22-93.25 HFL 
5,000 ESC 
Source: ACEA. 1995. 
(c) The public procurement directives have affected vehicle purchasing by the public sector. 
These require public bodies (including utilities) to follow a formal procedure which 
outlaws any national preferences. However, the public procurement directives only 
relate to 'above threshold' contracts, set at ECU 200,000 for regional and local 
government and ECU 125,000 for central government and other bodies (a limit specified 
in the GATT Procurement Agreement). We understand that public procurement 
represents around 10% of the commercial vehicle sector and so is an important factor 
affecting market access. As an example of opening up the market, the authorities in 
Rome have recently purchased German manufactured cars for their local police force. 
(d) The setting up of the European Patent Office and the European Trade Mark Office have 
facilitated companies' ability to receive European patents and copyrights. This area of 
legislation is likely to be strengthened by the proposed directive on harmonizing 
Member States' laws on design protection. 
3.1.2. Non-single-market related policies 
In addition to the sector-specific and horizontal measures described above, there are a number 
of non-single-market measures which need to be considered because of their impact on the EU 
automotive sector: 
(a) The 'block exemption' was not part of the single market programme, and so was not 
considered in detail in this study, but continues to be an important factor affecting the 
industry (and consumers of motor vehicles). The rationale for this block exemption of 
the automotive sector from Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome (on Restricted Agreements) 
was that motor vehicles are consumer durables which require expert maintenance and 
repair, not always in the same place. Manufacturers co-operate with selected dealers and 
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repairers in order to provide specialized servicing. On the grounds of capacity, it was 
argued that such a form of co-operation could not be extended to an unlimited number of 
dealers and repairers. The linking of servicing and distribution was therefore regarded as 
more efficient than a separation between a distribution organization for new vehicles, on 
the one hand, and a servicing organization which would also distribute spare parts, on 
the other.2 This exemption means that manufacturers can develop exclusive and 
selective distribution agreements with their distributors. 
However, a more liberalized block exemption has recently been agreed for the period up 
to 30 September 2002 in which: 
(i) dealers are given greater commercial independence vis-à-vis manufacturers; 
(ii) independent spare-part manufacturers and distributors are given easier access to 
the various markets, notably the outlets provided by the car manufacturers' 
networks; 
(iii) the position of consumers is improved in accordance with the principles 
underlying the single market; 
(iv) the dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable agreements has been made 
clearer. 
(b) The area commonly perceived to support industry restructuring is the EU's trade policy 
('Elements of Consensus'). We cover this briefly below, but again since it is not part of 
the single market programme, it will not form a significant part of our analysis. This is 
an arrangement on motor vehicles (passenger cars and light commercial vehicles below 
5 tonnes) agreed by the Community and Japan in July 1991. It provides that Japan will 
monitor exports into the EU as a whole and to the five previously restricted markets 
(Spain, France, Italy, Portugal and UK) for a transitional period to end by 31 December 
1999. The Elements of Consensus contain forecasts of exports in 1999, linked to 
assumptions about demand in that year. The forecasts for the intervening years are 
worked out through regular consultations between the European Commission and the 
Government of Japan on the basis of demand assumptions. The relevance of this 
measure to the sector is questionable, given that Japanese exports to the EU have been 
steadily decreasing and in 1994 were about 20% below the level forecast. This is a result 
of both the appreciation of the Yen and the growing reliance of Japanese manufacturers 
on their European manufacturing plants. 
(c) The EU has put in place measures to limit the levels of pollutants from vehicles. These 
lay down different limit values for emissions from petrol and diesel vehicles. They cover 
carbon monoxide, unburned hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides from petrol and diesel 
engines; and specifically for diesel engines, limit values for particulate pollutants. 
Different levels of standards for heavy vehicles have been set over time (Euro 1, 2 and 
3). The European Commission is also currently examining a proposal for a common 
strategy on vehicle scrapping (End of Life Vehicles). Furthermore, the Commission 
recently adopted a communication on a strategy for reducing CO2 emissions from 
passenger cars by improving fuel economy (COM(95) 689 final, 20.12.1995). In 
addition, the Commission, in co-operation with the European automotive and oil 
industries took part in the European Auto-Oil Programme. This was intended to provide 
a basis for new and coherent legislative proposals on vehicle emission and fuel quality 
standards, to come into force in 2000/2001, with a view to ensuring compliance with air 
Based on Regulation (EEC) No 123/85 (12.12.1984). 
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quality standards. A cost-effectiveness analysis was a central part of this programme 
which was finalized in April 1996. 
3.1.3. The global context 
The approach to regulation in Europe differs from that in the USA and Japan. This is 
particularly so with respect to type approval. In both the USA and Japan there are different 
standards for components such as windscreens and headlights, and this imposes extra costs on 
global manufacturers. The US system relies heavily on civil lawsuits to encourage 
manufacturers to abide by the standards which have been set, rather than focusing on a 
government type approval system. These civil suits can result in multi-million dollar damages 
and some experts have argued that this imposes a constraint on innovation by US 
manufacturers. However, the lack of a formal government approval process means that 
vehicles can be introduced more quickly than in the EU. 
Whilst the standards for emissions and side impact are converging on a global basis, the way 
in which they operate differs markedly. For example, the side impact test involves a collision 
at the same speed around the world, but at a different height, thus causing extra costs on 
manufacturers. Emission standards are converging, but the way in which they are measured 
vary widely according to the length of time the engine has been running. 
Countries such as Sweden have in the past set very tight safety standards for vehicles 
manufactured in the country. This could have been seen as a burden on the industry. However, 
there is evidence that these higher standards have given them competitive advantage in other 
countries because they have allowed their home producers to enter niche markets where 
customers require high safety standards. 
3.2. Remaining legal or administrative obstacles and/or shortcomings 
We have discussed barriers which have been or are being addressed. The following list covers 
the main remaining obstacles for automotive manufacturers. The list is broken down into three 
categories of obstacles - those which create cost burdens for the industry and restrict market 
access, those which act as a barrier to the rationalization of the industry and therefore the 
global competitiveness of the industry and those issues where concerns have arisen but the 
case for EU action has not been proven. 
(a) Constraints which create cost burdens and restrict market access: 
(i) Despite some attempts to approximate VAT, Member States still have very 
different tax structures for vehicles which impose large variant costs on producers. 
This has major RD&D and production implications and can place some specialist 
producers at a disadvantage because of the variants they specialize in and their 
treatment by some Member States' tax regimes. 
(ii) Exchange rate instability imposes costs of hedging on the EU automotive 
producers both in terms of trade and location decisions. These difficulties are more 
pronounced for the more nationally focused manufacturers, who are less able to 
lay off exchange rate risks through location and sourcing decisions for 
components. 
(iii) Different standards in each global market increase design costs and constrain 
production economies of scale. Moreover, the differences in trajectory of these 
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standards mean that in the long run, more serious problems concerning the global 
competitiveness of the EU automotive industry compared to the US, Japanese and 
Korean industries might arise. 
(iv) Different internal standards within the EU automotive industry remain. This means 
that component suppliers have to deal with different quality standards from 
different manufacturers, reducing their potential for economies of scale. 
(v) Each Member State still has differences in the administration of national 
registration procedures. The requirements of the registration authorities mean that 
different data and presentation of these data is required, imposing an additional 
administrative burden on producers. 
(b) Constraints acting as a barrier to rationalization in the industry: 
(i) The definition of the market in monopoly investigations and the split between 
Member State and Community competition authorities. There have been instances 
of mergers in the automotive sector being blocked by the national competition 
authorities on the basis of a narrow relevant market definition. The single market 
should mean that a wider relevant geographic and product market definition 
should be used, increasing the likelihood of rationalization on a European-wide 
basis. 
(ii) Too great a prevalence of small, nationally orientated players in the EU compared 
with the much larger competitors in North America and Japan. It has been 
suggested that this problem has been maintained through state aids, delaying some 
necessary rationalization of the European industry. 
(c) Issues in which a case for EU action has not yet been proven: 
(i) Member States have different ways of dealing with end-of-life vehicles, affecting 
the demand profiles of consumers in each of these countries both in terms of when 
they buy and what they buy. 
(ii) Differences in the implementation of roadworthiness tests remain both in terms of 
frequency and scope, 
(iii) The need to manufacture left-hand and right-hand drive vehicles to access the 
whole of the EU restricts the entry of specialist producers as well as the entry of 
the full range of vehicles by volume manufacturers. 
(d) Obstacles as a result of having different measures in non-European countries, i.e. the 
benefits to be received by the single market may be mitigated by the global market-
place. 
We discuss these barriers throughout the report and, in our conclusions, summarize the future 
actions we believe are required for the full implementation of the single market. 
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4. Methodological approach 
The central aim of this report is to find out the effect of the single market programme on the 
automotive sector. The key issue in tackling this question is the way in which the research 
should disentangle the effects of the single market programme from the other factors affecting 
the industry. This is neither simple nor straightforward, and in this section we explain in some 
detail our methodology for examining the impact of the single market programme on the 
automotive sector. 
We have structured this chapter in the following way: 
4.1. the other factors affecting this sector; 
4.2. our approach to disentangling the single market programme effects, including our 
hierarchy of hypotheses; 
4.3. the methods used to analyse and test the hypotheses. 
4.1. Other factors affecting the motor vehicles sector 
This section categorizes the other factors affecting the industry as follows: 
Figure 4.1. The other factors 
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4.1.1. Market conditions 
At the same time as the implementation of many of the measures included in the single market 
programme, much of Europe was experiencing recession, particularly during 1991/92. To add 
to the difficulty of factoring this into our calculations, some countries have been hit harder 
than others, and at different times. Some countries' reaction to these adverse market 
conditions will also have an impact on the sector. For example, it is claimed that the French 
government's scrappage incentives were partly influenced by market conditions. 
Market conditions in other parts of the world have also been an important factor. For example, 
North America is a vital market for European-built high value cars. The US safety and 
emissions standards have been a bigger driver than the European standards for some marques 
(for example, in their introduction of high level brake lights). However, those European firms 
present suffered a catastrophic fall in sales between 1986 and 1993. There has been some 
recovery since then, but Japanese firms have taken a strong hold over the luxury car segment 
(particularly with the Lexus LS400). 
4.1.2. German reunification 
The reunification of Germany has been an important factor for the European industry. This is 
likely to have increased sales within Germany at a time when most of the rest of Europe was 
experiencing deep recession. As demand for second-hand cars increased from the eastern 
regions of Germany, sales of new cars (which were predominantly produced in Germany) in 
western regions increased. This factor is therefore likely to have affected the propensity for 
German producers to sell to their national domestic market, rather than to other Member State 
markets. In addition, German reunification has provided new production locations for VW, 
Opel and many component firms. Any analysis of trade flows must therefore take this into 
account. 
4.1.3. New model launches 
Automotive assemblers' success is to a large degree dependent on the success of each new 
model launch. Each new model involves significant sunk costs in RD&D and production 
facilities. We estimate that each new model requires an investment of typically ECU 200-300 
million. If sales do not satisfy this up-front cost, then the company profitability is affected over 
the long-term. Equally, successful new model launches, such as the Fiat Punto, will have a 
significant effect on trade flows. Even if we find that intra-Community trade has increased, 
this may to a large extent be a result of new pan-European model launches. 
4.1.4. Globalization 
Globalization can be considered in three interlinked areas: the interpénétration of markets, the 
spatial extension of production, and the formation of pan-national alliances. Over the past 20 
years, there has been a great deal of exports into markets, particularly from Japan to North 
America to Europe. This has recently decreased as a result of the appreciation of the Yen and 
the increasing FDI into Europe. In other words, new investment locations may increase or 
decrease trade flows. 
New Japanese capacity in Europe is expected to be 2 million units by the year 2000. However, 
the most globally organized companies are GM and Ford. There is growth in European 
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capacity in the 'EU periphery' (for example, in Portugal, southern Italy, former East 
Germany). There is also growth just outside Europe, for example Fiat's investment in Poland. 
Production alliances are a feature of the industry, as are various marketing or 'badge 
engineering' agreements, for example, the Ford Maverick is manufactured at Nissan's Spanish 
plant. Alliances are a means of virtual integration - achieving the benefits of scale without the 
costs of integration. Important alliances in Europe include Volvo and Mitsubishi (Nedcar), 
VW and Ford in Portugal. These can affect trade flows in all sorts of ways. 
4.1.5. Currency fluctuations 
Currencies fluctuate over time, and this affects the price of vehicles (or their profitability) if 
they are traded across borders. If prices can be lowered as a result of currency changes, then 
exports may increase from countries which have devalued to countries which have not. 
Increases in trade between these countries may simply be caused by these currency 
movements, rather than by the single market programme. A clear example of this has been the 
export of cars out of Italy. Consumers in France, Germany and Austria have been crossing the 
border and buying cars more cheaply in Italy. This has had knock-on effects for the dealerships 
in those countries. Whilst the ERM was formed to limit these fluctuations, during the period in 
question there were severe perturbations to the system, the fluctuation bands were widened 
and a number of European countries left the mechanism. We must therefore factor this into 
our assessment. In looking forward to future actions, policy-makers will need to assess 
whether these severe perturbations were a 'one off, or may recur for countries outside a single 
currency. 
The rise of the Yen has pushed up market prices for Japanese-made cars, and is an important 
element in both further attempts at efficiency improvements within Japan and the 
globalization of production. Equally, the strength of the German Mark is a factor in the long-
term movement of productive capital out of Germany. Our analysis seeks to account for the 
impact caused by currency fluctuations. 
4.1.6. Over-capacity 
In Europe, there appears to be an overall surplus of capacity of around 20% relative to average 
demand - though in historical and global terms, this is common. However, there is an 
emerging over-capacity in small sports cars, 4-wheel drive vehicles, standard saloons and 
people carriers (MPVs). Longer term over-capacity may reach 50% by the year 2000. 
Capacity is a moving target, in that available capacity may increase without new plant 
investment as a result of improvements in productivity within existing plant. Capacity is also 
relative to demand. The extent to which capacity of specific models or types of vehicle can be 
changed is also of importance. In the USA, for example, Ford and GM have been converting 
plants which made large saloons into plant to make pick-up trucks. In addition, manufacturers 
have also lowered their break-even points in response to the evolution of the cyclical car 
market. 
4.1.7. Low returns 
Long-term profit trends in the industry show low returns, getting even lower, with highly 
cyclical swings. In Europe, in the last 30 years, only BMW has been consistently profitable. 
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Others have been consistently unprofitable, or of marginal profitability. This is a major long-
term structural problem, as profits are needed to develop new models. 
Some companies are better placed. Volvo has assets following its strategy of selling non-core 
businesses and BMW has substantial cash reserves. Individual or family ownership is still 
important in the cases of Fiat (Agnelli), BMW (Quant), PSA (Peugeot) and Porsche (Piech). 
The French state still controls Renault, although this could be privatized in due course. 
4.1.8. Production and supply chain changes 
Japanese transplants have achieved remarkable production performances, for example in the 
hours required to build a vehicle; in the time required to reach full production after introducing 
a new model; and in the output of vehicles per employee. European industry is catching up, 
partly through radical changes in work organization, teamworking and the elimination of 
demarcations. Elsewhere in Europe, shift patterns, holidays and working time all vary widely. 
In many instances, working time is less than in Japan or the USA. Many of the European 
plants (including Ford and GM) are long-established, with poor layout and access. Newer 
plants (e.g. Fiat at Melfi) are much more competitive. 
Few European assemblers have global purchasing practices (as, for example, with GM and 
Ford), or even well developed purchasing capability across Europe (for example, 
Sogedac/PSA still buys largely in France and Spain). However, Volvo's strategy of seeking 
world class suppliers actively to support its products has resulted in an increase in spending in 
Japan. Assemblers are, however, trying to build these links at a global level. Assemblers are 
increasingly using Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), and Just in Time (JIT) delivery 
techniques to squeeze costs further. Newer plants such as Toyota at Burneston in the UK and 
Fiat at Melfi in Italy have a number of their suppliers alongside the factory to facilitate the 
process. 
4.1.9. Research initiatives and technological change 
Research initiatives can be national (e.g. the UK-based IMI programme) or pan-European (e.g. 
Prometheus, Drive, Eureka). Of particular importance is EUCAR, an umbrella grouping of 
vehicle assemblers to promote co-operative pre-competitive research projects under the 4th 
Framework Programme. These initiatives provide a mechanism to bring in suppliers and 
assemblers, reduce risk, share cost, and provide a clear direction for change. Major topics 
include: new vehicle design and use concepts, innovative drivetrain technologies (e.g. fuel 
cells, gas turbine hybrids, advanced batteries), innovative body materials, advanced telematics 
and vehicle navigational systems and advanced urban traffic management systems. 
Technological advances in other areas are important too - especially in information and 
communication technologies which have a direct impact on the vehicle design process 
(networked CAD/CAM), purchasing (EDI) and vehicle sales and distribution (EDI). 
4.1.10. Environmental impact 
An additional factor driving change in the automotive industry is the growing body of 
scientific evidence on the environmental damage caused by the automotive sector, and the 
economic consequences of that damage. In this regard, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change has given further urgency to the search for a reduction in CO2 emissions from 
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vehicle production and use, ascribing for the first time a human agency to global climate 
change. The European Union committed itself at the 1992 Rio Summit to stabilize CO2 
emissions by the year 2000 to 1990 levels and thereafter to reduce CO2 emissions. In early 
1996, the European Commission released a discussion document on its carbon tax proposals, 
which entail setting fuel economy targets with tax penalties for vehicles which exceed the 
appropriate target. There can be no doubt that some form of carbon tax will have profound 
consequences for the European automotive industry; at this stage the impact will be felt most 
acutely in the RD&D activities. 
4.2. Our approach 
4.2.1. The hierarchy of hypotheses 
We have constructed a hierarchy of hypotheses which, if validated, will help us to disentangle 
and understand the effects of the single market programme. The hierarchy of hypotheses is 
illustrated in Figure 4.2. Proving one hypothesis will not in itself prove that the single market 
has had any effect. However, if evidence is collected which tends to support a number of 
related hypotheses, the claim that the single market has had an effect on the industry becomes 
more robust. In addition, when examining each hypothesis we can consider both the role of 
the single market programme and of other factors (such as those discussed in Section 4.1) in 
bringing about any change. 
The hierarchy of hypotheses often goes down to a level of detail where there is only one data 
set that can be used to test the hypothesis. This is a strength of our analysis, since it often 
means that we can be more sure of whether the single market programme has had an effect. 
However, there are some cases where more than one data set, and hence more than one 
analysis, can be used. Where this is the case, more than one test of the hypothesis is carried out 
to gain a wider picture of the single market programme impact. In any case, a single 
hypothesis, if correct, leads to another which can be separately analysed. The reason for using 
the hierarchy of hypotheses is that more measures allow us to draw firmer conclusions about 
the degree of the single market programme impact (compared with other effects). If we were 
to use just one analysis for, say, the hypothesis that the single market has improved market 
access, it is quite likely that we might come to the wrong (or at least an extremely constrained) 
conclusion. A variety of hypotheses and measures mean that we can state with more 
confidence what we have found and what part the single market programme played in the 
observed results. 
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Figure 4.2. The hierarchy of hypotheses 
The SM removed 
administrative 
barriers and this 
facilitated trade 
The single market programme has had an effect 
on the EU automotive industry 
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There are two key actions of single market programme implementation which are likely to 
have had an effect on the EU automotive industry. These form our central hypotheses: 
(a) the single market programme removed administrative barriers and this has facilitated 
trade; 
(b) technical harmonization led to fewer variants being required for different markets. 
Under these hypotheses, reductions in administrative barriers would be expected to yield 
reductions in the costs of intra-EU trade because delays at borders would decrease and haulier 
costs reduce. Technical harmonization is expected to increase market access because 
producers had to manufacture fewer variants and the regulatory approval process for new 
vehicles was streamlined. The need to produce fewer variants should lead to reductions in the 
costs of production because down-time would be reduced, and in RD&D because fewer 
different variants would have to be designed. 
Because market access was eased, it is expected that producers could sell more of their 
products in other Member States with consequences for product availability and market 
shares. This increases competition in each country and results in higher concentration. The 
variance of prices is also expected to fall across the EU Member States as the market becomes 
more competitive. Companies could also set up European distribution and marketing networks 
to take advantage of these opportunities. 
Because producers could trade more easily between countries, fewer manufacturing plants 
would be required. The structure of investment is likely to change as firms change their 
location decisions and their capacity utilization by extending existing plant and investing in 
new plant. 
Similar causal effects are also expected to have had an impact on the component supply 
industry. In turn, this is expected to have had a knock-on effect on the automotive assemblers, 
with increased competition reducing purchasing and thus overall production costs. 
As a result of all of these hypotheses, it is expected that the EU-owned manufacturers will 
become more competitive in the global market. 
Figure 4.2 shows the key importance of market access improvements to the assessment of the 
impact of the single market programme on the EU automotive industry. As discussed in 
Section 4.1, changes in market access may also be due to factors other than the single market 
programme. If these other factors have a higher weighting than the single market, then the 
downstream effects of levels of competition, prices, and fragmenting market shares must also 
be ascribed to these other factors. 
4.3. Methods used for analysing and testing the hypotheses 
4.3.1. The impact assessment model 
In assessing individual factors and thus validating particular hypotheses, we make use of an 
'impact assessment model' (reproduced in Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3. Impact assessment model 
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This model uses a number of different measurement techniques for assessing the impact of the 
single market programme ('triangulation'). A variety of complementary measures are used to 
assess the single market programme impact and we have tried, as far as possible, to consider 
and remove some of the other factors which could affect these results. For example, within our 
analysis of market access, we have assessed the degree to which each company's dependence 
on domestic sales is correlated to the relative market conditions between the domestic and 
European market. 
Quantitative analysis 
We have used a number of quantitative techniques to assess the impact of the single market 
programme: 
(a) the examination of trends; 
(b) correlation analysis of a number of variables; 
(c) the Elzinga­Hogarty technique; 
(d) concentration ratios and the Herschman­Herfindahl index; 
(e) econometric analysis of the determinants of automotive industry employment. 
Despite the fact that econometric analysis was attempted, there is an underlying data problem 
in trying to examine the impact of the single market programme using this technique. In fact, 
the decision to use a number of techniques has been made because of problems with the data 
available. Despite the fact that the automotive sector is relatively 'data rich' compared to other 
sectors, the collection and presentation of these data by trade associations and government 
bodies means that analysis is more difficult than it initially seems. 
Much of the analysis we would like to carry out is on a national firm or Member State basis. 
However, the very fact that the industry is data rich means that aggregation of these data takes 
time. At the time of publication, the only official (trade association and government) 
aggregate, pan­European data available cover the period up to 1993. Any data following 1993 
on a pan­European basis are strictly unofficial, unverified data. Naturally, carrying out 
econometric analysis using data up to 1993 to assess the impact of the single market 
programme which was implemented in 1993 is a largely fruitless exercise. 
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An example of problems with data consistency and the length of data available is given by the 
EU price data. In any econometric analysis of the impact of the single market programme, the 
price of vehicles is obviously an important factor. Unfortunately, the EU car price statistics 
started in May 1993 and are published only twice a year, giving us only six data points. This is 
far too low to allow statistically significant results. These data could be supplemented by 
alternative sources going back further, but the problem with consistent measurement and 
collection techniques arises once more. Consistency problems are aggravated as over the 
period May 1993 to November 1995, the types of car available have changed as new models 
have been launched and old models ceased to be produced. 
In addition to the data problems confronting the econometrician, there is a methodological 
problem with using econometric analysis to assess the impact of the single market programme, 
even if the data were available. Econometric analysis is most robust where there is a limited 
set of variables which are strongly related to the variable we are trying to explain. However, it 
is clear that there is a multitude of factors strongly related to the EU automotive sector. This 
leaves the econometric analysis attempting to explain the impact of the single market 
programme through the error term, referred to by economists as 'white noise'. Any 
conclusions drawn from an analysis of the error term would be extremely tentative and would 
not stand up to scrutiny. Therefore, we are faced with an industry in which there are large 
amounts of data, but data which are not suitable for econometric analysis. 
For the reasons presented above, we have developed the hierarchy of hypotheses approach to 
the assessment of the single market programme impact. This approach allows us to exploit all 
the information available from the data rich areas of the automotive sector and allows the 
assessment of the other factors on a case-by-case basis. Where possible, quantitative 
techniques have been employed in testing the hypotheses. 
Qualitative analysis 
The impact assessment model also makes use of extensive qualitative data. We undertook a 
series of case studies and a substantial interview programme with major manufacturers, 
component suppliers, trade, research and certification bodies as well as academic researchers. 
These provide explanations, insights and judgements about our hypotheses and are included in 
our analysis. The case studies provide more judgmental views on the effects of the single 
market programme. 
The case studies further show the degree to which company strategy was influenced by the 
single market programme before and after implementation. They also show the extent to 
which companies have changed their business processes and structures and predicted the effect 
of the single market programme before it was implemented (in economic terms rational 
expectations). This economic theory predicts that people will act on expected policy changes 
(and the policy's likely implications) well before the policy is implemented. This smoothes out 
the impact of changes expected to occur in the future. Automotive manufacturers were 
familiar with the single market programme since the Cockfield White Paper (1985)3 and the 
Single European Act (1987). Technical harmonization in the automotive industry predates the 
single market programme by a decade. In addition, measures were implemented gradually over 
European Commission, Completing the internal market, COM(85) 310 final, Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the EC, 1985. 
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the period leading up to 1993. Therefore, manufacturers will have anticipated and acted on 
many of the expected changes well before they were implemented. It is likely, therefore, that 
any changes as a result of the single market programme will have occurred in a smooth fashion 
from well before 1993. 
The model also uses the concept of 'the counterfactual'. If we find that the industry has 
suffered declines in certain areas, then we cannot assume that the single market programme 
has had a zero or negative effect. It could be the case that the single market programme 
improved the position of EU automotive manufacturers and without its support, the decline 
would have been greater. 
4.3.2. Types of data 
As noted in Section 4.3.1, there are a number of problems caused by the data available from 
the automotive sector. Bearing this in mind, we have considered four possible types of data for 
our analysis. These are described in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1. Four approaches to collecting data 
Approaches 
A. Individual 
company 
B. Idealized best 
practice 
C. Aggregate 
industry 
D. Average firm 
Description 
Take a real world example, e.g. 
PSA 
Take best practice performance 
in each functional area; factor-
in single market effects 
Use statistics on the whole 
sector through which 
assumptions on the effect of 
single market will be processed 
Calculate an average firm based 
on available data, use this to 
produce basic model through 
which single market impacts 
should be run 
Positive aspects 
Actual data available, 
consistency and fit of data; 
extrapolation 
Many basic benchmarks exist; 
fit with EU benchmarking 
study: de-politicized 
Uses Eurostat and other 
aggregate sources; closest fit to 
brief 
Can extrapolate back up to 
aggregate; uses mixed data 
sources; de-politicized: 
company confidentiality 
Negative aspects 
Representativeness; lack of 
comprehensive data: cost 
sensitivity; balance and fairness; 
lack of fit with brief 
Micro-level: non-cost data; 
ignores social and real world 
context; cannot extrapolate 
Methodology: explaining an 
error term: historical data; data 
definition and changes; market 
cycles; industry initiatives: lack 
of availability 
Representativeness; meaningful 
averages 
No single type of data is ideal, and so we have used all four types across our analysis, 
depending on their availability and explanatory power. For example, we use many examples 
drawn from our knowledge of existing companies in terms of their prices, models and market 
shares. Aggregate industry data are used in the areas of trade, market size and industry 
concentration. Average firm data are provided in the area of dealership networks and 
productivity. Idealized best practice data are provided for productivity. 
National measures 
In addition to the aggregation problems and restricted length of data available referred to in 
Section 4.3.1, the way that data are collected and reported in the automotive sector creates a 
dilemma in the presentation and analysis of Member State effects of the single market 
programme. Industry data sources often refer exclusively to production and trade by the five 
major producing states in the EU - Germany, France, Italy, UK and Sweden. Output is 
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recorded from these states, even if the production was carried out in another Member State, 
such as Spain or Belgium. For example, VAG's output is recorded under Germany, even 
though a large amount of production is carried out in Spain at the Seat plants. The very 
barriers the single market (and before this the Common Market) sought to remove created the 
situation where many of the EU manufacturers are located throughout the EU as an easy 
means of accessing these markets. Despite the growing internationalization of the automotive 
industry, it is still the case that many firms which were originally based in EU Member States 
rely on their original market for a large proportion of their sales. Throughout this report, 
therefore, because of the way that data are recorded we refer to 'national' output of Germany, 
France, Italy, Sweden and the UK, even though the concept is increasingly irrelevant to the EU 
automotive sector. Where possible, we refer to other EU automotive producing countries, such 
as Belgium and Spain, where production facilities are owned by, for example, Ford and VAG 
respectively. 
4.3.3. The industry process model 
It is important to distinguish between the effects of the single market programme on each 
business process. In order to do this the analysis is broken down into four main groupings: 
(a) marketing, 
(b) production, 
(c) purchasing, 
(d) research, design and development (RD&D). 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the linkages between these four groupings. 
Figure 4.4. Industry process model 
Purchasing Production Marketing 
Agents 
direct Sales 
' 
S 
U 
Ρ 
Ρ 
L 
Y 
SWBBK 
Research Design and 
Development (including 
obtaining type approval) 
IIItlH 
•■tg-'«'"flu 
BSC îflf* Ipil :|pftl 
Consumer 
RD&D 
26 Motor vehicles 
Our hypotheses (described in Section 4.2) are linked to each of these in the following way: 
Table 4.2. Hypotheses and business processes 
Hypothesis 
Improved market access 
Intra-EU trade at an aggregate level will increase 
The number of models and variants available will increase 
The relative share of national sales as a proportion of total sales will fall 
Intra-EU trade relative to individual Member State consumption will increase 
Manufacturer national market shares will fall 
Manufacturer market shares will equalize across Member States 
Competition and market concentration have increased 
Prices will become less variable across the Member States 
Pan-European distribution and marketing networks will be developed 
Production costs will be lower 
Productivity will increase 
Employment levels will fall 
The structure of investment in the EU will change 
Component supply structure has become more pan-European 
RD&D costs will fall 
Global competitiveness of the EU-owned automotive industry will increase 
Business process 
Marketing 
Marketing 
Marketing 
Marketing 
Marketing 
Marketing 
Marketing 
Marketing 
Marketing 
Marketing 
Production 
Production 
Production 
Production 
Purchasing 
RD&D 
All 
affected 
4.3.4. The structure of the analysis 
The chapters which follow analyse the effects of the single market programme for each of 
these hypotheses. We have structured our examination of each hypothesis in the following 
way: 
(a) Expected impact - This describes what effect we expect the single market programme 
to have on the specific area of the automotive industry to be examined. 
(b) Other factors - This describes what other factors are likely to have an effect on each of 
our specific analyses and is key to disentangling the single market effect. 
(c) Quantitative analysis - This sets out the quantitative analysis that has been carried out 
in order to determine the impact of the single market programme and the impact of the 
other factors. 
(d) Actual impact - This takes our findings from the quantitative analysis and from our 
discussions and interviews with trade associations and companies to provide our 
conclusions on their implications on the single market impact. 
We also summarize the findings for each hypothesis in diagrams. Throughout the analysis we 
explain the link between the single market programme, other factors and the hypothesis under 
examination. 
Because of the importance of the changes in market access, we have presented our findings on 
marketing in a stand-alone chapter (Chapter 5) in which we discuss the effects of market 
access in terms of changes in market shares, concentration, pricing and marketing and 
Methodological approach 27 
distribution networks. Chapter 6 covers the other functional areas: production, purchasing, and 
RD&D. Chapter 7 then considers our final hypothesis on the impact of the single market 
programme in considering the global competitiveness of the EU-owned automotive industry. 
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5. Marketing 
Chapter 4 set out the methodological approach undertaken to carry out this study. This section 
examines the hypotheses directly related to marketing. Figure 5.1 below extracts the 
hypotheses related to marketing from the full set presented in Section 4.2 and Figure 4.2. 
Figure 5.1 Hypotheses relating to marketing 
The single market programme has had 
ÉtttetiVe 
30 Motor vehicles 
Section 5.1 examines market access, the first three tiers of Figure 5.1, Section 5.2 examines 
competition and market concentration in the EU Member States, Section 5.3 examines final 
prices across the Member States and Section 5.4 analyses the behaviour of automotive 
manufacturers through pan-European networks. 
5.1. Market access 
5.1.1. Introduction 
This section is an in-depth analysis of the effects of the single market programme on market 
access. Given that one of the main objectives of the single market programme was to improve 
trading conditions across Europe, the measurement of changes in market access is extremely 
important. However, since many of the explicit tariff barriers were removed under the 
Common Market by 1968 (or upon accession of a new Member State), substantial changes in 
market access will have occurred well before the single market programme was implemented. 
In order to investigate fully the impact of the single market programme on market access, we 
have used a wide range of measures. Improvements in market access are likely to be wide 
ranging, affecting different areas of the automotive industry in different ways. Consumers are 
likely to be affected differently to manufacturers, and Member States are likely to respond 
differently to single market measures. In addition, the impact of the single market programme 
is likely to affect the overall competitive environment of the EU automotive industry. 
Therefore, if we were to use just one analysis for the hypothesis that the single market 
programme has improved market access, we would clearly miss a lot of the possible impact. 
For this reason, we have constructed a number of separate hypotheses as shown in Figure 5.1, 
none of which will determine the full impact of the single market programme on its own, but 
as a group will enable more robust and wide-ranging conclusions. 
Many of these analyses are linked but are subtly different from each other, enabling us to 
construct a complete picture in a complicated area. We suggest that readers who prefer a quick 
analysis of the situation first may wish to glance through our intermediate conclusion on 
market access, which we present in Section 4.1.10, before studying each of the individual 
hypotheses. 
5.1.2. Types of data 
The central hypothesis relating to market access is that intra-EU trade has increased. As we 
discussed in Section 4.3.2, this can be measured at a number of different levels - in aggregate, 
on a national and on a manufacturer basis. The aggregate measures can be useful, but more 
detailed analysis and results can be found through the examination of country and 
manufacturer behaviour. The third tier of Figure 5.1 shows the hypotheses which, along with 
the aggregate measure, have been tested to gain a full picture of the impact of the single 
market programme through improved market access. Each of these hypotheses has been 
analysed in turn, starting with analyses of the aggregate level and working down to analyses of 
manufacturers. For each hypothesis, the expected impact of the single market programme is 
assessed. The data gathered is then analysed and the actual impact observed regarding its 
consistency with the expected impact of the single market programme. 
Before we examine each of the specific hypotheses, we have carried out a number of analyses 
of the other factors which are likely to affect our results. We have limited this to the key 
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factors which can be quantified - the impact of changes in relative market conditions on trade 
and the impact of currency fluctuations on trade. These factors are likely to affect a number of 
our hypotheses and so it is important to see what role they are likely to play in our analysis. 
We have done this through correlation analysis. It must be noted, however, that even these 
analyses will not provide definitive conclusions since different companies are likely to react to 
external conditions in different ways. 
5.1.3. Pre-analyses - other factors 
Relative market conditions 
Much of our analysis which follows in this report examines the flow of trade and the relative 
share of manufacturers' output sold in other Member States. Relative economic conditions in 
each Member State may be a factor affecting our results. Correlating an automotive 
manufacturer's relative share of sales in the national market4 with the economic conditions in 
each Member State will indicate the extent to which our results in the following sections are 
being influenced by market conditions. It is expected that there will be a correlation since 
market conditions are a key factor in determining demand in the national and non-national 
markets of a manufacturer. To assess the impact of the recession on the automotive sector in 
each of the Member States, we need a variable which will act as a proxy for recessionary or 
inflationary effects on the economy. The most suitable measure for this is the number of 
registrations in that Member State, since this will be a direct reflection of a number of 
different factors such as inflation, interest rates and the overall health of the economy. The 
decision of consumers to buy a new vehicle will be directly based on these factors. 
It will not be good enough to focus simply on the number of registrations in a Member State in 
isolation as our measure of market conditions, since this would ignore the relative 
attractiveness of the other Member States to manufacturers seeking to maintain and increase 
sales. Recessionary or inflationary conditions of different strengths and at different times in 
each Member State will affect trade between different Member States and will affect a 
manufacturer's share of sales in the national market relative to the rest of the EU. Therefore, 
our measure of relative economic conditions is the share of EU registrations accounted for by 
the single Member State. This measure reflects the relative attractiveness of the national 
market relative to the rest of the EU. For example, if the share of total EU registrations in Italy 
is falling, the recession is hitting harder in Italy than in the rest of the EU and vice versa. This 
relative recessionary effect is likely to have an effect on the national producer's share of sales 
in this market, since it has become less attractive relative to the rest of the EU. The analysis 
which follows examines the relationship between the relative attractiveness of the national 
market against the share of total EU registrations held in this market by the national producer. 
The stronger the relationship between these two effects, the more likely it is that trade between 
Member States has been affected by relative market conditions. 
Figure 5.2 shows the results of this analysis carried out for a number of producers across the 
EU. The left-hand axis shows the manufacturer's share of sales in the national market, the 
right-hand axis shows the relative impact of the recession in that market. Therefore, if the two 
lines closely follow each other, it is likely that relative market conditions in this market are 
We use our definition of the national market as explained in Section 4.3.2. 
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affecting the manufacturer's sales in the national market relative to sales in the rest of the EU, 
and therefore affects trade. The data used for this analysis were Ward's series of 1985­93. 
Unfortunately, this series is yet to be updated. However, this should not affect our analysis, 
since there is no economic reason for the relationship between trade and relative market 
conditions to change immediately after the single market programme was implemented. 
Figure 5.2. National sales as a proportion of total sales and relative market conditions, 
passenger cars, 1985-93 
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Table 5.1 shows the correlation coefficients calculated from the data shown in Figure 5.2. A 
correlation coefficient gives an idea of the relationship between two variables, in this case 
relative market conditions and the dependence of manufacturers on their national market. The 
correlation coefficient ranges between -1 (perfect negative correlation) through 0 (no 
correlation), to +1 (perfect positive correlation). The only problem with using correlation 
coefficients is that there is no benchmark value for what is a 'strong' correlation and what is 
not. Judgement depending on the variables involved therefore has to play a part in the 
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assessment of the correlation coefficients. It is reasonable to assume under this analysis that 
anything above 0.5 is a fairly strong correlation. 
Table 5.1. Correlation coefficients of dependence on national market and relative 
market conditions, passenger cars, 1985-93 
Germany 
0.88 
France 
0.72 
Italy 
0.17 
UK 
0.57 
Source: E&Y. 
Table 5.1 and Figure 5.2 show that: 
(a) There appears to be a high correlation between relative market conditions and the 
domestic share of sales for all of the countries except Italy. We show later in this section 
that currency fluctuations appear to play a more important role in determining Italian 
market share. 
(b) In general, relative market conditions play an important role in determining the extent of 
sales sold outside the national market. 
As the relative impact of recession is felt less in, say, Germany, less of VAG's product is sold 
abroad and vice versa. This is reflected by the line for German registrations over total EU 
registrations rising along with the line for national over total sales. As a volume producer, 
VAG concentrates on sales in its national market when demand is strong in that market. When 
demand is low, VAG looks to foreign markets to maintain sales. 
Currency fluctuations 
The proportion of a manufacturer's sales on the national market is also likely to be affected by 
the exchange rate. As a currency appreciates relative to some currencies, the manufacturers 
concentrate their efforts on their traditional demand base in the national market. If the 
currency depreciates relative to other currencies, the price of a vehicle will be lower in foreign 
markets. There might also be cases where domestic sales are relatively 'insulated' from 
currency fluctuations. 
We have investigated the relationship between the proportion of sales on the national market 
and the exchange rate to assess the extent to which the analysis that follows in the remainder 
of this report is being affected by currency fluctuations. Figure 5.3 and Table 5.2 show 
respectively the relationship between, and the correlation coefficient of, the proportion of sales 
made nationally against the ECU exchange rate for all manufacturers in a sample of EU 
Member States. In Figure 5.3, the left-hand axis shows the ECU exchange rate, the right-hand 
axis shows the proportion of total sales sold nationally. If the two lines representing these 
variables follow closely, it is reasonable to assume that currency fluctuations have affected 
trade. 
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Figure 5.3. Proportion of total sales sold nationally and ECU exchange rate, passenger 
cars, 1985-93 
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Table 5.2. Correlation coefficients of proportion of total sales sold nationally and ECU 
exchange rates, passenger cars, 1985-93 
Germany 
0.42 
France 
-0.42 
Italy 
0.73 
UK 
0.77 
Source: E&Y. 
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.3 suggest that for three of the four EU Member States, there is a 
positive correlation: 
(a) As the Lira has devalued, Italian products have become cheaper, increasing sales abroad. 
The devaluation is highly correlated with a fall in the proportion of total sales sold 
nationally. The same has happened with Rover in the UK. 
(b) As the German Mark has appreciated, VAG's national sales as a proportion of total sales 
have increased and non­domestic markets have become relatively less important. Whilst 
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German reunification has played a part in this increase in domestic sales, our interviews 
with the car companies confirmed that the role of currency fluctuations should not be 
understated, 
(c) The French results are anomalous. The result for France can be explained by the fact that 
the French producers have increased their sales in foreign markets while the Franc has 
remained relatively stable against the ECU. Our case studies, for example, suggested 
deliberate strategies by Renault to develop their northern European markets and that the 
launches of the Twingo and Clio had been particularly successful in France. The success 
of this strategy and the stable Franc might explain the result presented above. 
Naturally, there are a number of factors affecting manufacturers' share of sales sold in non-
national markets and it appears that fluctuations in exchange rates are one of the factors which 
are playing an important part in determining the extent of a manufacturer's sales sold abroad. 
Just as it is difficult to observe and draw conclusions on the impact of the single market 
measures, it is also difficult to draw firm conclusions from the impact of exchange rates alone. 
This is further complicated by the fact that exchange rates have been subject to a wide number 
of macro-economic factors as well as the ERM. Nevertheless, any conclusions regarding the 
impact of the single market on trade should be guarded because of recent currency fluctuations 
coinciding with the implementation of the single market programme. This is confirmed by the 
fact that, in our case studies and interviews with trade associations, exchange rate fluctuations 
have been cited as a major factor in affecting recent trade between Member States. 
This completes our pre-analysis. We now turn our investigation to the hypotheses relating to 
market access. 
5.1.4. Hypothesis 1 : Intra-EU trade at an aggregate level has increased 
Expected impact 
As barriers to entry are removed with the implementation of the single market programme, 
intra-EU trade is expected to increase. Manufacturers might have been prevented from selling 
their full range or maximizing sales because of barriers to trade. Removal of these barriers is 
likely to result in volumes of trade increasing. Our analysis which follows examines intra-EU 
trade at an aggregate level for both passenger cars and commercial vehicles. 
Other/actors 
When examining effects in aggregate, it is likely that there may be some underlying factors 
which will not be observed. For example, German reunification is likely to have increased 
German manufacturers' domestic sales, reducing intra-EU trade. Meanwhile, other Member 
States might be increasing their intra-EU trade. The observed aggregate effect will not show 
these underlying changes. Other factors which are likely to be significant are increasing global 
competition, the relative impact of the recession on each Member State and new model 
launches. New model launches are expected to impact on Member States in different ways 
because of different launch dates and their level of appeal. New launches are likely to occur 
first in national markets and their appeal may well be greater than in non-traditional markets. 
Additionally, it is possible that consumers in aggregate react to economic decline and 
uncertainty by switching to national brands. Furthermore, cars could be bought in one Member 
State and registered in another, affecting our analysis. Finally, foreign direct investment might 
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stimulate and substitute for intra-EU trade flows. New plants in previous export countries will 
end trade flows, but production by this plant might increase trade flows out of this country. 
Quantitative analysis 
Figure 5.4 shows intra-EU trade in passenger cars and commercial vehicles for the period 
1989-93. Unfortunately, as discussed in Section 4.3.1 further suitable official intra-EU trade 
data at this level of aggregation are not currently available. We attempted using SMMT data 
for 1994, but this proved fruitless since it gave inconsistent results compared to the Ward's 
data set. 
Figure 5.4. Intra-EU trade for passenger cars and commercial vehicles as a percentage 
of total registrations, 1989-92 
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Figure 5.4 shows: 
(a) at this aggregate level, the intra-EU trade in passenger cars is very stable; 
(b) commercial vehicle intra-EU trade reached a peak in 1991 and has declined since. 
Because of the anticipated impact of German reunification on our results, we have carried out 
an additional analysis of the intra-EU trade in passenger cars and commercial vehicles for all 
EU Member States other than Germany. The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5. Intra-EU trade for passenger cars and commercial vehicles as a percentage 
of total registrations (excluding Germany), 1989-92 
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Figure 5.5 shows: 
(a) the shape of the charts is very similar to those in Figure 5.4; 
(b) the level of intra-EU trade for Member States other than Germany is generally higher 
than when Germany is included; 
(c) the single market programme does not appear to have had an effect on the level of 
aggregate intra-EU trade for Member States other than Germany. 
Actual impact 
At the aggregate level of our analysis, it appears that intra-EU trade has not been affected by 
the single market programme. Analysis at a country level, and discussions with VDA, the 
German automotive industry trade association, confirmed that whilst most major automotive 
producing countries are increasing intra-EU trade, the reunification of Germany has resulted in 
German manufacturers increasing sales within their newly-expanded national market and 
reducing exports in relative terms. We cover this in more detail in Section 5.1.8. Discussions 
with companies in our case studies revealed that they consider increasing global competition, 
the recent Europe-wide recession and new model launches as far more important determinants 
of the degree of intra-EU trade than the single market programme. The counterfactual also 
applies here, but it is difficult to ascertain how different the observed aggregate changes might 
have been had the single market not been implemented. 
38 Motor vehicles 
Figure 5.6. Summary diagram 1: Hypothesis 1 
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Quantitative Analysis 
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5.1.5. Hypothesis 2 : From a national point of view, the degree of intra-EU trade relative to 
individual national consumption or production will increase 
Expected impact 
The implementation of the single market programme is expected to increase trade between EU 
Member States. Economists argue that the removal of physical and information barriers to 
trade result in more entry into the market. One would therefore expect to see more sales in one 
Member State originating from other Member States. Also, longer term investments in new 
plant should increase trade, for example, the VW-Ford plant in Portugal exports 90% of its 
output. 
We have analysed the ratio of imports relative to consumption in a Member State and the ratio 
of exports relative to the production in a Member State. This analysis is sometimes referred to 
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as the Elzinga-Hogarty analysis. We explain this method in more detail in Appendix J. This 
analysis is recognized by the European Commission as a method of defining markets in 
competition cases and so it is particularly appealing here. The Elzinga-Hogarty analysis 
simply examines imports into a Member State over domestic consumption and exports out of a 
Member State out of total production. It is expected the single market programme will 
increase the degree of imports into a Member State from other Member States and increase the 
degree of exports from a Member State into other Member States. Both imports and exports 
are measured in terms of registrations. This is not a perfect measure of trade since not all 
exports are sold, but data on actual exports are not recorded. Similarly, figures on trade are 
recorded on a major manufacturing country basis. This restricts our analysis to Germany, 
France, Italy and the UK. Nevertheless, this sample of countries will provide a clear indication 
of whether import penetration and export intensities have increased as a result of the single 
market programme. 
Other factors 
As with the aggregate analysis, German reunification is likely to have an impact on the 
Member State analysis of intra-EU trade. The relative impact of the recent recession on 
demand in each of these Member States will also need to be considered. Our analysis in 
Section 5.1.3 suggested that the greater impact of the recession in one Member State relative 
to other Member States will affect the degree of imports into that Member State and the level 
of exports from it. Consideration will also need to be taken of the fact that successful new 
model launches will result in surges of foreign demand. Finally, currency fluctuations are 
likely to affect the attractiveness of one Member State's product relative to another. If a 
country experiences a devaluation in its currency, its products will become cheaper relative to 
foreign products, affecting both imports into and exports from the Member State. 
Quantitative analysis 
Elzinga-Hogarty specify two criteria: 'little in from outside' (LIFO), meaning that imports 
into the Member State are small; and 'little out from inside' (LOFI), meaning that exports 
from the region are small. Figure 5.7 shows the LIFO and LOFI tests separately. In both cases 
we have restricted our analysis to the largest four producing countries - Germany, France, 
Italy and the UK. 
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Figure 5.7. Trends in intra-EU trade by Member State, 1985-93 
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(a) The LIFO chart shows that imports as a percentage of Member State total registrations is 
increasing slightly. This is consistent with our expectation of the impact of the single 
market programme. For example, Italian imports increased from approximately 33% to 
37% between 1990 and 1994. However, the increase in import penetration began well 
before the implementation of the single market programme. 
(b) Italy and the UK have had a consistently higher import penetration than France and 
Germany. 
(c) The LOFI chart shows the share of German exports as a percentage of national 
production declining, Italy's share remaining relatively flat and France's and the UK's 
share fluctuating although trending upward. The only period of relative stability for all 
of these countries is from 1991 onwards, whilst the single market programme was being 
implemented. 
(d) The LOFI chart also shows that the shares of exports as a proportion of national 
production for each of these Member States are converging. This indicates that markets 
are moving together which is also consistent with the expected impact of the single 
market programme, since manufacturers in the same market are expected to react in the 
same way to external influences. 
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The LOFI/LIFO analysis above concentrates solely on the impact of the single market 
programme on the major producing countries. This analysis is complemented below by an 
examination of imports as a percentage of registrations into Belgium and Luxembourg, Spain, 
Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal. The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 5.8. 
Figure 5.8. Imports as a percentage of registrations, selected EU Member States, 
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Figure 5.8 shows that: 
(a) in general, the trend of imports as a percentage of registrations is upwards; 
(b) there does not appear to have been any dramatic change in 1993 as a result of the 
implementation of the single market programme; 
(c) the results for Belgium and Luxembourg appear to have been affected by the fact that 
many manufacturers use these Member States as a distribution centre for the rest of the 
EU. 
Actual impact 
The degree of intra-EU trade appears to be trending up with more exports from the Member 
States. Similarly, imports appear to be trending up gradually as well. The results suggest that 
German reunification reduced the relative level of exports from Germany and reduced the 
relative level of imports into the country. This is consistent with our discussions with 
manufacturers and trade associations who said that reunification expanded the market 
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available to German manufacturers relatively more than other manufacturers because of the 
traditional appeal of the German marques to the former East Germans. Furthermore, the dip in 
(more expensive) imports into Italy directly coincides with the devaluation of the Lira. This 
runs in line with our analysis in Section 5.1.3 which found that currency fluctuations are likely 
to play a part in affecting trade between Member States. New model launches are also likely to 
have affected the quantitative analysis. For example, the launch of Mercedes' new Ε-class in 
1992 sold particularly well in Germany, boosting Mercedes' sales in Germany and reducing 
the level of trade within the EU. 
Figure 5.9. Summary diagram 2: Hypothesis 2 
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5.1.6. Hypothesis 3: Market shares across Member States will equalize 
Expected impact 
If all consumers across the EU could assess the same vehicles available to them based on the 
same price, information and availability then, putting to one side cultural differences and the 
suitability of vehicles for different countries (e.g. weather, road types, etc.), the market shares 
of manufacturers should be exactly the same in each of the Member States. Barriers to entry 
create distortions in price, information and availability, restricting the choice of vehicle 
available to consumers in different Member States and resulting in different Member State 
market shares for manufacturers. The removal of distortions in price, availability and 
information to consumers across the Member States as a result of the single market 
programme should bring manufacturer market shares closer together across the Member 
States. We would therefore expect to see a convergence in manufacturer market share in each 
Member State as the single market programme takes effect. In markets where manufacturers 
were relatively dominant we would expect their market share to decline and in markets where 
they had a relatively low presence we would expect their market share to increase. We explain 
this further in Appendix I. 
This expected impact can be examined through an analysis of variance in market share across 
a number of Member States. 
Other factors 
Despite the expectation that market shares will equalize across Member States, there are other 
factors which will also affect the analysis. For example, new model launches are likely to be 
more popular in some Member States than in others. The differences in consumer taste across 
the Member States will result in different market shares. As with the previous hypothesis, the 
relative impact of the recent recession in each of the Member States will affect EU market 
shares. As the recession bites in a Member State, the national producer is likely to look more 
at the export market for its sales, increasing its market share in these other Member States. 
Currency fluctuations may also play an important part in the determination of market shares 
across the Member States. The counterfactual might also play a part in our analysis in that the 
variance observed might have been greater if the single market programme had not been 
implemented. 
Quantitative analysis 
Figure 5.10 shows the variance in passenger car market share for German, French, Italian and 
UK-based manufacturers in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK. For example, we have looked at the share of 
German exports in each of these other EU Member States over the period 1985-94. The higher 
the variance in market shares, the more disparate the share of sales of German exports in each 
of the other Member States, and vice versa. 
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Figure 5.10. Variations in a manufacturer's market share, 1985-93 
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Figure 5.10. shows that: 
(a) The variance of shares is volatile over the period shown for all Member States, although 
less for manufacturers from the UK and Italy. Relative market conditions, as analysed in 
Section 5.3.1, are probably playing a part in this. 
(b) From 1992, the variance in market share of French and German manufacturers has fallen 
rapidly. For France, the variance in market shares fell by approximately 20% during the 
period 1992-94. The trend in variance for Italy is declining markedly from 1991, but 
rises in the last year of the period, largely due to the devaluation of the Lira. The 
variance for the UK is low throughout the period. 
Actual impact 
Our results for France and Germany are consistent with our expected impact of the single 
market programme. Market conditions also appear to be having an effect on the variance of 
market shares. There has been a definite reversal in the upward trend in variance of market 
share for these countries. Our results for Italy appear to have been affected by currency 
instability. It is also likely that new model launches play a part in the observed variance of 
market shares across the Member States. 
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Figure 5.11. Summary diagram 3: Hypothesis 3 
Actual Single Market Effects 
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5.1.7. Hypothesis 4: The number of makes and model variants available will increase 
Expected impact 
The implementation of the single market programme and the removal of barriers to entry 
between the EU Member States might have affected companies' entry strategies in terms of 
the number of variants and models they trade to certain markets. This will boost consumer 
surplus at the expense of producer surplus through wider product choice. 
Market access improvements are likely to have resulted in reductions in the manufacturers' 
costs of new model launches and variant requirements, increasing the likelihood that wider 
product entry into foreign markets will occur. A greater number of models and variants would 
therefore be consistent with our expectation of the impact of the single market programme. Or, 
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to put it another way, there will be greater total choice (i.e. more models available) and the 
market share of dominant local models will decline. 
Other factors 
The development of more models by the automotive manufacturers is likely to be partly as a 
consequence of increasing competition in the global automotive market, and has been a part of 
automotive history from Alfred T. Sloan's strategies in General Motors from the 1930s 
onwards. A classic response to increased competition is to produce more differentiated 
products. This greater product diversity is also a likely consequence of a more sophisticated 
and knowledgeable consumer in the EU Member States. 
Quantitative, analysis 
Tables 5.3 to 5.10 show the top ten best-selling cars in Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, 
Italy, Portugal, Sweden and the UK in 1989 and 1994 (1995 figures available for Belgium, 
Germany, France, and Portugal). 
Table 5.3. Best selling cars in Belgium, 
Rank Model % of market 
1989 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
VW Golf 
GM Opel Kadett 
Peugeot 205 
Toyota Corolla 
Renault 19 
Renault 5 
Peugeot 405 
Ford Fiesta 
Ford Escort 
GM Opel Corsa 
6.4 
4.9 
3.6 
3.4 
3.3 
3.2 
3.1 
3.1 
2.8 
2.7 
36.5 
1989 and 1995 
Rank Model % of market 
1995 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
VW Golf/Vento 
GM Opel Astra 
VW Polo 
Ford Escort 
Ford Mondeo 
Ford Fiesta 
BMW 3-Series 
Renault Clio 
GM Opel Corsa 
Renault 19 
7.8 
4.6 
3.5 
3.1 
3.1 
3.0 
2.9 
2.7 
2.7 
2.5 
35.9 
Source: AID/FEBIAC. 
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Table 5.4. Best selling cars in Germany, 1989 and 1995 
Source: KBA/AID. 
1989 figures relate to West Germany only. 
Rank Model % of market 
1989" 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
VW Golf 
GM Opel Kadett 
VW Passat 
Mercedes W124 
GM Opel Vectra 
Audi 80/90 
BMW 3-Series 
Mercedes 190 
Ford Escort 
Ford Fiesta 
11.4 
7.6 
5.5 
4.7 
4.1 
3.8 
3.3 
3.3 
2.9 
2.8 
49.4 
Rank Model % of market 
1st half of 1995 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
VW Golf/Vento 
GM Opel Astra 
Audi A4/80 
BMW 3-Series 
Mercedes C-class 
GM Opel Corsa 
Ford Escort 
Ford Fiesta 
VW Polo 
VW Passat 
11.3 
6.8 
4.6 
4.4 
4.2 
3.8 
3.7 
3.6 
3.5 
3.3 
49.2 
Table 5.5. Best selling cars in Spain, 1989 and 1994 
Rank Model % of market 
1989 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Renault 19 
GM Opel Kadett 
Seat Ibiza 
Renault 5 
Ford Fiesta 
GM Opel Corsa 
Citroen AX 
Peugeot 205 
Renault 21 
Ford Orion 
7.8 
7.7 
6.3 
5.6 
5.4 
5.1 
5.0 
4.3 
3.6 
3.5 
54.3 
Rank Model % of market 
1994 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
. 7 
8 
9 
10 
Ford Escort 
GM Opel Corsa 
GM Opel Astra 
Ford Fiesta 
Renault Clio 
Seat Ibiza 
Renault 19 
Peugeot 306 
Citroen ZX 
VW Golf 
6.0 
5.9 
5.6 
5.5 
5.1 
4.9 
4.6 
4.4 
4.3 
3.2 
49.5 
Source: AID/ANFAG. 
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Table 5.6. Best selling cars in France, 1989 and 1995 
Rank Model % of market 
1989 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Renault 5 
Peugeot 205 
Renault 19 
Peugeot 405 
Renault 21 
Citroen AX 
Citroen BX 
Peugeot 309 
VW Golf 
Ford Fiesta 
10.4 
9.7 
7.7 
6.4 
6.2 
6.1 
4.6 
4.1 
3.8 
2.9 
61.9 
Rank Model % of market 
1995 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Renault Clio 
Peugeot 306 
Peugeot 106 
Renault Twingo 
Renault Laguna/21 
Renault 19 
Citroen ZX 
Citroen AX 
Citroen Xantia 
Ford Fiesta 
8.8 
6.2 
6.0 
5.8 
4.6 
4.5 
4.4 
3.8 
3.5 
3.3 
50.9 
Source: AID/industry sources. 
Table 5.7. Best selling cars in Italy, 1989 and 1994 
Rank Model % of market 
1989 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Fiat Uno 
Fiat Tipo 
Fiat Panda 
Lancia YI0 
VW Golf 
Renault 5 
Peugeot 205 
Alfa Romeo 33 
Citroen AX 
GM Opel Kadett 
16.2 
11.1 
9.5 
5.3 
3.6 
3.2 
2.9 
2.7 
2.3 
2.3 
59.1 
Rank Model % of market 
1994 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Fiat Punto 
Fiat Uno 
Fiat Cinquecento 
Ford Fiesta 
VW Golf 
Fiat Panda 
Fiat Tipo 
Autobianchi ΥΙΟ 
Opel Astra 
Peugeot 106 
12.4 
6.0 
4.7 
4.4 
4.4 
4.1 
4.0 
3.5 
3.3 
3.3 
46.1 
Source: ANFIA/industry sources. 
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Table 5.8. Best selling cars in Portugal, 1989 and 1995 
Rank Model % of market 
1989 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Fiat Uno 
GM Opel Corsa 
Renault 5 
Renault 19 
Ford Fiesta 
Citroen AX 
VW Golf 
Peugeot 205 
Seat Ibiza 
Fiat Tipo 
9.0 
9.0 
7.7 
7.3 
5.8 
5.4 
4.8 
3.9 
3.5 
3.4 
59.8 
Rank Model % of market 
1995 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Opel Corsa 
Fiat Punto 
Renault Clio 
Ford Fiesta 
Peugeot 106 
Opel Astra 
Seat Ibiza 
Renault 19 
Citroen AX 
VW Golf 
12.4 
12.4 
7.6 
5.4 
5.0 
4.5 
3.4 
3.3 
2.9 
2.4 
59.3 
Source: AID/ACAP. 
Table 5.9. Best selling cars in Sweden, 1989 and 1994 
Rank Model % of market 
1989 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Volvo 700 
Saab 9000 
Volvo 200 
Volvo 400 
GM Opel Kadett 
VW Golf 
Saab 900 
Ford Sierra 
Toyota Corolla 
Audi 100/200 
13.2 
4.7 
3.9 
3.9 
3.8 
3.7 
3.7 
3.6 
3.3 
3.1 
46.9 
Rank Model % of market 
1994 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Volvo 800 
Volvo 700/900 
Saab 900 
Ford Escort 
VW Golf/Vento 
Ford Mondeo 
Volvo 400 
Saab 9000 
Opel Astra 
Toyota Corolla 
8.8 
6.1 
6.0 
5.8 
5.3 
5.0 
4.4 
3.5 
3.5 
3.4 
51.8 
Source: ANFIA/Industry Sources. 
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Table 5.10. Best selling cars in the UK, 1989 and 1994 
Rank Model % of market 
1989 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Ford Escort 
Ford Sierra 
Ford Fiesta 
GM Cavalier 
GM Astra 
Rover Metro 
GM Nova 
Ford Orion 
Rover 200 
Rover Montego 
7.9 
7.6 
6.5 
5.7 
5.1 
4.3 
3.1 
3.0 
3.0 
2.5 
48.7 
Rank Model % of market 
1994 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Ford Escort 
Ford Mondeo 
Ford Fiesta 
Rover 200/400 
GM Cavalier 
GM Astra 
GM Corsa/Nova 
Rover Metro 
Renault Clio 
Peugeot 306/309 
7.5 
6.7 
6.5 
5.8 
5.2 
5.1 
4.1 
3.1 
2.6 
2.6 
49.2 
Source: AID/industry sources. 
The tables show that the proportion of the market accounted for by the top ten has fallen in all 
cases except in the UK and Sweden. Despite the slight increase in share held by the top ten 
models in the UK, it is interesting that the number of different companies represented have 
increased with the addition of a Renault and a Peugeot vehicle. Moreover, there is a clear trend 
showing that the share held by the top model, whatever that model is, has fallen in virtually 
every case. This indicates that the competition faced by the incumbent manufacturers in 1989 
has increased by 1994/95. Portugal is the exception to this trend, perhaps as a result of a 
particularly successful advertising campaign for the Corsa in this market. 
These results only indicate that more models are available, reducing the share held by the best 
sellers in each of the Member States. We have gathered additional data: 
(a) between 1986 and 1993, the number of models sold in the German market jumped by 
50% from 44 to 66; 
(b) the number of models and variants sold in France has risen by 47% from 515 in 1986 to 
758 in 1993. 
Renault pointed out that there is no contradiction between platform rationalization and model 
proliferation, since many models can be made from the same platform. We discuss changes in 
production techniques later in Chapter 6. 
Actual impact 
Germany and the UK had relatively open markets in 1989, both with a share for the top ten 
makes of around 49%. In comparison, the relatively closed markets (to the Japanese) of Italy 
and France resulted in a larger share for the top ten makes in 1989. By 1994/95, this picture 
has dramatically changed. The relatively open markets of Germany and the UK have seen little 
change in the share held by the top ten makes. In France and Italy, the share held by the top ten 
cars have both fallen to around the 'open level'. This is probably partly because of the single 
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market programme. Therefore, the analysis presented in Tables 5.3 to 5.10 is consistent with 
the expected effect of the single market programme. 
Nevertheless, the results are also consistent with the facts that increasing global competition 
and more sophisticated consumers have resulted in a more diverse production of models. For 
example, 30 years ago, Renault were producing a world car, the Dauphine at similar levels of 
output to the Clio today. The principal change is in the level of competition which has resulted 
in an increase in the number of models in each model class. In the 1950s there was usually 
only one model by class. Now, there are usually four models in each class of car (coupe, 
hatchback, estate and saloon). This has resulted in a decrease in share for each model as they 
become increasingly differentiated. Renault do not believe that the single market programme 
has played any part in the increased numbers of models available. Despite this, the 
counterfactual needs consideration. It is likely that without the development of the single 
market programme some EU Member States would have continued to protect their domestic 
markets for longer. The proliferation of different brands and variants available in these 
Member States is unlikely to have been as well advanced as it now is had the single market 
programme not been implemented. 
At best, the single market programme can be said to have facilitated increasing competition in 
the automotive industry which, in turn, has increased the number of models available to the 
consumer and is likely to have reduced the share held by the top ten models. 
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Figure 5.12. Summary diagram 4: Hypothesis 4 
Quantitative Analysis 
Results show a decline in the share held 
by the top ten manufacturers in all 
markets except the UK (where 'new' 
firms are represented in 1994 compared 
to 1989) 
Other Explanatory Factors 
■ Globalization 
Actual Single Market Effects 
Main drivers on trend is globalization of 
competition according to 
manufacturers. Greater product 
diversity by model has become the 
norm as a result of more sophisticated 
and knowledgeable consumers. There 
does appear to be a convergence 
between the top ten shares in each of 
the Member States 
v' Some small measurable 
effect by facilitating change 
5.1.8. Hypothesis 5: The proportion of EU-owned automotive manufacturers' national sales 
relative to non-national sales will fall 
Expected impact 
As noted in Section 4.3.2, given the method of presenting manufacturing output and sales, for 
ease of analysis we have to treat the national market as the traditional base of the firms 
involved, such as Germany for VAG and France for Renault. For the same reasons, we have 
not examined GM Europe and Ford Europe in this analysis because the definition of national 
and non-national sales for these companies becomes even more confusing. This is not, 
however, to say that any observed effects for the other manufacturers will not also apply to 
these US-owned manufacturers. 
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As the single market programme eases trade between Member States, the relative share of the 
automotive producers' total production which is traded between Member States is likely to 
increase and/or there will be production in new locations. 
Barriers to entry reduce information, price and availability and they therefore restrict 
competition between manufacturers. We would therefore expect the removal of barriers to 
entry with the implementation of the single market programme to have two effects on 
manufacturers' share of their national marketplace relative to sales in other markets: 
(a) the share of national sales as a proportion of total sales falls as new competitors enter the 
market and existing competitors increase sales in the market; 
(b) the national manufacturer might switch its attention from the home market in order to 
both exploit new markets which have become more viable for entry and maintain overall 
sales as competition in the national market increases. 
Other factors 
As with our previous analyses on intra-EU trade, the relative market conditions in different 
Member States and currency fluctuations are likely to play a part in this analysis. Similarly, the 
relative popularity of new model launches is also likely to influence national sales relative to 
non-national sales. The analysis for Germany could also be affected by German reunification. 
Quantitative analysis 
Figure 5.13 shows the change in EU-owned manufacturers' share of national sales as a 
proportion of total sales, over the longer time series of 1984-94 and over the shorter time span 
of 1990-94, for passenger cars. A reduction of national sales as a proportion of total sales 
from 40% to 20% is described as a 50% reduction in share. The main source of data for this 
analysis was Ward's which provided data up to 1993 and was supplemented by new data from 
SMMT for 1994. The countries covered for this analysis are Spain, Germany, France, Italy, 
Sweden and the UK. Data on production from other states such as Belgium were not available. 
Nevertheless, this analysis should provide a clear picture of whether the single market has had 
an effect since a good cross-section of producers and Member States has been analysed. 
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Figure 5.13. EU manufacturers' change in national sales (volume) of passenger cars as a 
proportion of total passenger car sales, 1984-94 and 1990-94 
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The first chart shows that, on the whole, the proportion of sales in Member State national 
markets of EU-based automotive manufacturers has declined over the ten-year period. This is 
consistent with our hypothesized effects of the single market programme. However, close 
examination of the chart for 1990-94 gives a more mixed picture with some manufacturers' 
national market sales as a proportion of total sales increasing. In particular, the German-owned 
manufacturers have increased this proportion. There appears to be a clear distinction between 
the volume/full range producers (Fiat, Renault, PSA, Rover and VAG) whose shares have 
declined, and the specialist producers such as BMW and Mercedes whose shares have 
increased or fallen by less. Other than Germany, there does not appear to have been any 
particular Member State effect (such as the opening up of the relatively more closed French 
and Spanish markets). 
Figure 5.14 shows a selection of EU-owned manufacturers and illustrates the change in the 
relationship between national and non-national sales. The selection of firms shows a number 
of manufacturers from a number of Member States and covers both volume and specialist 
manufacturers. 
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Figure 5.14. National sales (volume) as a proportion of total global passenger car sales 
for a sample of individual companies, 1984-93 
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Figure 5.14 shows that: 
(a) Some shares have fallen significantly such as Fiat, Volvo and Seat, while others have 
increased, such as BMW and VAG. Alfa's share has fluctuated but remains around the 
same in 1994 as it was in 1984. 
(b) For German manufacturers, the likely single market programme impact might have been 
affected by German reunification, reflected by the increases in the share of national sales 
as a proportion of total global sales. Their better performance might also be a reflection 
of better products. 
Actual impact 
There is little evidence to support the hypothesis that the single market programme has 
reduced the importance of domestic sales as a proportion of total global sales for EU­owned 
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automotive manufacturers. We spoke to a number of car manufacturers about these trends and 
their view was that the changes were primarily a result of new product launches. For example, 
Mercedes said that the launch of the new Ε­class played a part in their improved domestic 
market position. However, it is normal in field research for manufacturers to focus on their 
own actions and successes rather than on macro­economic changes. Appendix Ρ provides a 
more detailed description of the results of this research. 
The second chart of Figure 5.14 gives a clear indication that some countries' manufacturers 
have been affected more by the single market programme than others and that other factors 
can have a significant impact on our results. The German­based automotive manufacturers all 
increased their national share of sales relative to total sales. German reunification is likely to 
have played a substantial part in these results. 
Figure 5.15 shows the number of'German' registrations between 1988 and 1994. While much 
of Europe experienced a slump in registrations between 1990 and 1992, Germany experienced 
an increase. As Figures 5.13 and 5.14 show, German manufacturers were the main 
beneficiaries. 
Figure 5.15. Impact of reunification on number of German registrations (data include 
former East Germany from 1992), 1988-93 
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When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 a beneficial Ostmark:Deutschmark exchange rate led to a 
boom in East German demand for second­hand West German cars. This pushed up the price of 
used cars, resulting in increased West German demand for new cars. Following reunification, 
'East' German demand for new cars, particularly small cars, then grew rapidly. German output 
was redirected towards the domestic rather than the export market because the demand for 
German cars allowed the producers to maintain full production capacity despite the recession 
in the rest of the EU. In addition, German manufacturers could recruit dealers more quickly 
than they would in a normal entry strategy into a Member State which did not share the same 
language. BMW and Mercedes confirmed that the 1990 improvement in their domestic 
position relative to the rest of the world was partly as a result of new sales opportunities from 
East Germany. Between 1992 and 1994, Germany experienced the recession which 
reunification had delayed. 
58 Motor vehicles 
Figure 5.16. Summary diagram 5: Hypothesis 5 
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5.1.9. Hypothesis 6: The share of the national marketplace for each manufacturer will fall 
Expected impact — national market share 
As discussed in Section 4.3.2, the national market is the base market of the automotive 
producer even though they may have plants in many other countries around the EU and the 
world. Therefore, on the assumption that the national producer is at least fairly reliant on the 
national market for sales, we would expect national market share to fall. Removal of barriers 
to entry is expected to lead to increased competition for automotive manufacturers in their 
national markets. This will be reflected in lower national market shares as new and old 
competitors no longer face barriers to entry affecting price, availability and information about 
alternative products. The national market may be the relevant market for many EU automotive 
producers, but is likely to become less valid as many of the automotive manufacturers adopt a 
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more global strategy for production and sales. In recognition of this fact, we examine their 
share of both national markets and the wider EU market. 
Other factors 
The other factors which are likely to affect our analysis are the same as in the previous 
hypothesis. Currency fluctuations and the relative impact of the recession in different Member 
States are likely to play a part in this analysis. Similarly, the relative popularity of new model 
launches are also likely to influence national sales relative to non-national sales. The analysis 
for Germany could also be affected by German reunification. In addition, increasing 
globalization of competition will place a downward pressure on national market shares. 
Quantitative analysis - national market share 
The charts in Figure 5.17 show the change in national market share for the major EU 
automotive manufacturers, again over the periods 1984-94 and 1990-94. For example, if a 
company's national share fell from 40% to 20%, then we would describe this as a 50% 
decline. The data used in this analysis were primarily from Ward's, providing data up to 1993. 
These data were then supplemented by new data from SMMT. The countries covered for this 
analysis are Spain, Germany, France, Italy, Sweden and the UK. Data on production from 
other states such as Belgium were not available. Nevertheless, this analysis should provide a 
clear picture of whether the single market has had an effect since a good cross-section of 
producers and Member States has been analysed. 
The chart for 1984-94 shows that nearly all manufacturers' shares fell, some by more than 
half. During the period 1990-94 (as some of the measures in the single market programme 
were being implemented), the picture is more complex, since the German and French 
manufacturers saw some shares increase and some fall, while the Italian manufacturers' 
national shares fell. 
60 Motor vehicles 
Figure 5.17. Change in share of national market for passenger cars (volume), 1984­94 
and 1990­94 
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Figure 5.18. National market shares (volume) for a sample of individual companies, 
passenger cars, 1984-93 
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Figure 5.18 illustrates market share for a sample of EU automotive manufacturers over the 
period 1984­93: 
(a) Fiat Group and PSA Group, volume manufacturers of cars, have seen their national 
market shares eroded during the ten­year period. Much of these losses occurred in the 
last four years, coinciding with both the single market programme and recession. 
(b) It is likely that volume producers, which tend to pitch their production at the peak of the 
business cycle, have excess supply in times of recession. It is possible, therefore, that 
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volume manufacturers may seek to offset the falls in demand in national markets by 
greater sales in non-national markets. 
(c) In contrast, Renault, another volume manufacturer, suffered from a fall in share from 
1986 but has since regained the ground it lost. This may be due to the launch of more 
competitive products such as the Renault Clio. 
(d) The results for VAG are complicated by the reunification of Germany, as discussed in 
Section 5.1.4, which was an important external shock on the performance of German 
manufacturers. 
(e) Mercedes and Rover show a gradual decline over the period. Mercedes said that the 
pick-up in 1993 was related to the anticipation of new German emission regulations. 
This illustrates the impact that rational expectations can have on our observed results, 
since Mercedes acted on anticipated policy changes well before the implementation, 
smoothing out the effect over a longer period of time. 
Appendix H provides the data for these and other companies. 
Actual impact - national market share 
There is some evidence that the national market share of some EU-owned automotive 
manufacturers has declined and this is consistent with the expected effects of the single market 
programme. However, when we interviewed the firms regarding these changes in their 
national market share, their view was that the primary reason for the fluctuations were new 
model launches such as the Citroen ZX, BMW 3-Series and Renault Clio. In our view, the 
single market programme has been one of many facilitators of an increase in global 
competition which have increased the pressure on manufacturers to launch new competitive 
products and maintain national market share. 
Expected impact - EU market share 
With the removal of barriers to trade throughout the EU, EU-owned and EU-based automotive 
manufacturers could increase their share of the EU single market compared with 'foreign' 
competition from outside the EU. The reason for this is that EU automotive manufacturers 
will be able to utilize economies of scale through the exploitation of new markets. On the 
other hand, non-EU-owned manufacturers could benefit most from the implementation of the 
single market because it is now easier for them to implement an entry strategy for the whole of 
Europe. In this case the market share of the EU-owned manufacturers will fall. Both of these 
hypotheses - increasing or decreasing share for EU-owned automotive manufacturers - can be 
tested through examination of EU market shares. 
Other factors 
As discussed earlier, many of the EU-owned automotive companies have been adopting a 
more globalized approach to production and sales as the competition in the automotive 
industry becomes more and more globalized. This could lead to a falling share of the EU 
market held by the EU-owned markets because new markets are presenting new sales 
opportunities. 
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Quantitative analysis - EU market share 
Figure 5.19 shows the share of total sales in the EU of EU-owned manufacturers, US-owned 
manufacturers, Japanese-owned manufacturers and Korean-owned manufacturers. 
Figure 5.19. Share of European passenger car market (volume), 1984-93 
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Sources: Ward's, 1994, SMMT, 1995. 
The European manufacturers' share of the EU market has fallen slightly over the period 
shown. The fall occurred exclusively after 1988, from 69% in 1988 to 64% in 1994. Japanese-
owned manufacturers' share of the European passenger car market has increased over the 
period from 9% to 11% and Korean manufacturers, having entered the market in 1991, already 
have a share of around 2%. 
Actual impact - EU market share 
The Korean and Japanese-owned manufacturers appear to have benefited most from the 
removal of national barriers. The analysis above is not consistent with the hypothesis that the 
single market programme would result in increased share for the EU-owned manufacturers but 
is consistent with the hypothesis that foreign competitors would benefit most from the single 
market programme. However, recent developments in the political structure have had an effect 
with some European manufacturers exiting the market, such as Moskovich, Trabant and Yugo. 
The analysis also reflects increasingly globalized competition - foreign companies are seeking 
sales from new markets, increasing competition for the companies already in the EU. 
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Figure 5.20. Summary diagram 6: Hypothesis 6 
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5.1.10. Conclusions 
Referring back to Figure 5.1 at the beginning of this chapter, we have analysed each of the 
hypotheses relating to market access, starting at an aggregate level and working through the 
national and manufacturer analyses. 
Hypothesis 1 looked at the aggregate level of intra-EU trade. At this level of analysis the 
single market programme does not appear to have had an effect. This is probably because 
some manufacturers and countries had been more affected by factors other than the single 
market programme. 
Hypothesis 2 looked at the effect of the single market programme on intra-EU trade for 
individual countries. We found that the degree of intra-EU trade for a number of countries had 
been increasing well before the implementation of the single market programme. We would 
expect automotive manufacturers to act on the expected impact of the single market 
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programme well before it is actually implemented. Whilst general trends towards pan-
European and global markets undoubtedly account for part of the effect, the single market 
programme appears to have reinforced this trend. 
Hypothesis 3 looked at the impact of the single market programme on market share variance 
across the EU. Despite possible problems caused by cultural diversity and exchange rate 
instability, our results were consistent with expectations for the largest manufacturing 
countries - France and Germany - but were not conclusive in the cases of Italy and the UK. 
The analysis for hypothesis 4 looked at the number of models and variants available in major 
European markets before and after the implementation of the single market programme. Our 
analysis showed that the single market programme has led to an increase in product 
availability and more widely dispersed product popularity. 
Hypothesis 5 looked at the relationship between national and non-national sales on a 
company-by-company basis. The findings were mildly supportive of our hypothesis, although 
German reunification also played a part. The inconsistency of the results made it difficult to 
separate out with any degree of confidence the effects of the single market programme. 
Hypothesis 6 looked at the manufacturers' share of their Member State national markets for 
passenger cars. This showed that the national market share of manufacturers had fallen. This is 
consistent with the expected impact of the single market programme. Since the concept of a 
'national' market is becoming less meaningful as manufacturers locate plants throughout 
Europe, we looked at shares of the EU passenger car market as well. This suggested that the 
market had become more competitive, benefiting the more pan-European US- and Japanese-
owned manufacturers over their EU-owned counterparts. 
In summary, therefore, our analysis suggests that the single market programme has improved 
market access. In much of our analysis, other factors, in particular the business cycle, 
complicated and dominated our results. 
5.2. Hypothesis 7: Competition and market concentration have increased 
Returning once more to Figure 4.2 in Chapter 4, we have already examined the impact of the 
single market programme on market access and on intra-EU trade. The next level in our 
hierarchy of hypotheses is concerned with the impact of the single market programme on 
competition and concentration. 
5.2.1. Expected impact - concentration ratios and the Herschman-Herfindahl Index 
As competition intensifies, manufacturers may look for opportunities to acquire other 
companies in order to: 
(a) ease access to particular product markets or geographic areas; 
(b) increase total productive capacity and gain economies of scale. 
As take-overs increase, market concentration will increase - fewer companies will be in the 
market. In addition, as the single market programme is implemented, the larger, more 
successful companies are likely to gain market share across the EU through the exploitation of 
newly-available economies of scale. This will also increase concentration. We are using two 
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different methods of calculating market concentration: concentration ratios and the 
Herschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI). Concentration ratios examine the total market share held 
by a certain number of firms in a market. The HHI examines the degree of fragmentation of 
market share for all firms in the market.5 The HHI is often used as a measure of concentration 
in competition investigations because it gives a view for the whole of an industry. 
Through these two measures we will be able to assess what is happening to concentration at 
the top end of the industry and for the industry as a whole. 
5.2.2. Other factors - concentration ratios and HHIs 
It is likely that, as global competition increases, levels of concentration will increase as 
companies seek to protect their market position through aggressive acquisition. This would be 
another factor which, regardless of the expected impact of the single market programme, will 
increase market concentration. Market conditions will also have an effect since recession may 
result in more take-overs as companies seek to protect themselves. It may also be argued that 
the single market of the EU is attractive to new entrants, such as the Koreans, because it is 
now easier to implement a clear entry strategy for the whole of the EU rather than having to 
make adjustments between Member States. The analysis also does not allow for the 'hidden' 
concentration, such as VAG's consolidation of the holdings in Seat and Skoda. Other factors 
that are equivalent to barriers to entry, such as high investment costs, could affect the level of 
concentration. 
5.2.3. Quantitative analysis - concentration ratios and HHIs 
Figure 5.21 presents the concentration ratio, the degree of market share in the hands of the top 
companies, for the top three, five, seven and ten automotive companies in Western Europe 
over the period 1989 to 1994. 
There is a trend of small increases in concentration at the individual company level: 
(a) The concentration ratio for the top three companies has increased. Given that no major 
take-overs have occurred in this period, this is an indication of the growing market 
strength of the top producers, probably through the exploitation of newly-available 
economies of scale. 
(b) The concentration ratio for the top five and seven companies have remained relatively 
constant throughout the period. 
(c) The concentration ratio for the top ten companies has also increased. 
The HHI is the sum of the squares of all manufacturer market shares and ranges from zero (zero concentration) to 
10,000 (monopoly, i.e. 1002). The more fragmented the industry, the more firms with low market share and the lower 
the HHI. 
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Figure 5.21. Concentration ratios for major marques, passenger cars, 1989-94 
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Note: The names in brackets are the top producers in 1994. 
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One of the reasons for these results is that there has been some consolidation in the sector 
between the companies: 
(a) Fiat has gained control of Alfa Romeo; 
(b) BMW has acquired Rover; 
(c) VAG has consolidated its holdings of Seat and Skoda. 
Figure 5.22 shows the HHI of the EU automotive market for 1989 to 1994. 
Figure 5.22. EU market concentration ratios (HHIs), 1989-94 
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Source: E&Y. 
Contrary to expectations, the level of concentration as measured by the HHI actually fell 
between 1989 and 1991. The HHI then recovered by 1994 to only just more than the 
concentration level in 1989. There appears to be a high correlation between the degree of 
concentration as measured by the HHI and market conditions. 
5.2.4. Actual impact - concentration ratios and HHIs 
It is likely that the single market programme has facilitated the small increase in concentration 
as observed by the concentration ratios for the top three and top ten companies. This is 
consistent with our expected impact of the single market programme. However, market 
conditions also appear to be playing a part in our analysis. Our analysis of the whole market 
concentration through HHIs up to 1994 indicated that the market was becoming more 
fragmented but then increased to a level similar to 1989. It seems likely that increasing global 
competition and the recent recession are playing a more important part in determining the 
level of concentration than the single market programme. 
5.2.5. Expected impact - profitability 
Barriers to entry allow a producer to price above the level it would price at if competition 
allowed entry into the market. This means that profits will be higher before barriers are 
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removed than they will be afterwards. The removal of barriers to entry, and the increase in 
competition that this enables, should drive down profits. Measuring profitability, therefore, 
should indicate whether the competitive environment in the EU has changed. 
5.2.6. Other factors - profitability 
Globalization of competition is likely to have an effect on our analysis. However, profitability 
is not only affected by competition. In recent years, the global automotive industry has been 
hit hard by recession. This will reduce the level of profitability of most firms. With recession 
comes over-capacity, which will also reduce profitability as firms attempt to reduce stock by 
selling at a lower price, cutting margins. Furthermore, to avoid problems with over-capacity, 
EU manufacturers have succeeded in lowering their break-even points, thus providing some 
security against cyclical downturns in demand and thus affecting profitability. In their case 
study, Renault also argue that the increasing cost of compliance with new regulations means 
that it is harder to maintain margins. Currency instability also places companies in a difficult 
balancing act between the maintenance of market presence and the loss of profit. 
5.2.7. Quantitative analysis - profitability 
We have used return on capital employed as our measure of profitability. We have examined a 
number of EU-owned manufacturers' (PSA, Renault, Volvo, VAG) average return on capital 
employed over a ten-year period, and compared this with a sample of Japanese-owned global 
manufacturers' (Honda and Nissan) return on capital. 
Naturally, the competitive environment is not the only influence on profitability. Market 
conditions and excess capacity are all factors which will have a bearing on the degree of 
automotive manufacturers' profitability. We present our analysis in Figure 5.23. 
Figure 5.23. Return on capital employed (%), 1985-93 
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Figure 5.23 shows that: 
(a) For all manufacturers, return on capital employed has fallen over the ten-year period. 
Fluctuations experienced by the EU-owned manufacturers are closely correlated to the 
business cycle, as would be expected. 
(b) Japanese return on capital employed is also falling during the period and is similarly 
correlated to the business cycle. The general trend will also have been influenced by the 
appreciation of the Yen. 
5.2.8. Actual impact - profitability 
Levels of competitiveness, as reflected by reductions in profitability, appear to be increasing. 
This is consistent with the expected effects of the single market programme. Undoubtedly, the 
business cycle will be an important explanatory variable and, at this relatively early stage in 
companies' development within the single market, it is difficult to determine the exact 
influence of the single market programme. 
In our case studies, some companies argued that the increasingly competitive global 
automotive industry means that maintaining margins is more difficult and that the single 
market programme is, at most, one factor among many increasing competition. Furthermore, 
some companies are concerned that the additional costs of compliance with more and more 
stringent regulations combined with the increase in competition are increasing the downward 
pressure on margins. Increasing costs from compliance with regulations combined with 
increasing competition means that it is increasingly difficult for the manufacturers to pass on 
these increasing costs to the consumer, even if the product is of a superior quality. For 
example, side impact tests have caused the development of side impact bars, increasing the car 
weight which has increased purchasing and in-use costs for the consumer. Furthermore, 
emissions tests require exhausts to include catalytic converters which make them more costly, 
bulkier, heavier and more brittle. Volvo estimate that emissions regulations have added an 
extra ECU 1,800- 2,400 to their costs per car. Combining these increased costs with increased 
globalization of competition means that margins are falling. The single market programme has 
reinforced this trend. 
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Figure 5.2.4. Summary diagram 7: Hypothesis 7 
Expected Single Market Effects 
Competition and market 
concentration will increase 
Actual Single Market Effects 
We consider that the SMP has had a 
small effect on overall concentration. 
Competition, as measured by 
profitability appears to have increased. 
However, relative market conditions, 
low returns, overcapacity in the industry 
and globalization of competition have 
probably played a more important role 
in these results than the SMP. 
TB 
Other Explanatory Factors 
Globalization of competition 
(regardless of the SMP), in 
particular from Japanese, US 
and Korean producers 
Market conditions 
Overcapacity 
Regulation/cost of compliance 
Low returns 
^ Some measurable effect 
on concentration 
5.3. Hypothesis 8: Final prices will become less variable across the Member States 
5.3.1. Expected impact 
Final prices should have become less variable across the Member States as a result of the 
single market programme. As barriers to trade are removed, distortions in information, 
availability and therefore price should be removed. Therefore, the variance of price of the 
same model across all Member States should fall as the single market programme takes effect. 
We are fortunate that for the past three years, the European Commission has researched and 
published an analysis of car prices across the EU. In compiling these data, great care has been 
taken to exclude taxes and to ensure that the same vehicles are compared in the survey. 
Our analysis examines whether European car prices (adjusted for each model and level of 
trim) are equalizing across the Member States. The expectation is that the implementation of 
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the single market programme would tend to bring prices for the same model closer together 
across Member States. 
5.3.2. Other factors 
With any analysis of Member State prices over a period of time, exchange rate differences 
during the period will have an effect. Variances in prices will be affected by currency 
devaluations in any one Member State, because the relative price of the same vehicle in two 
different states will change. Despite the fact that the prices recorded by the EC are net of tax, 
tax differences still affect pre-tax prices. Cross-border shopping for cars is still more 
complicated than cross-border shopping for most other goods. Usually, the country of origin 
principle is employed, and therefore the full price is paid in the country where a good is 
bought. For cars, a different regime applies. The net price of a new car is paid in the country of 
purchase, and VAT and other purchase-related taxes have to be paid in the country where the 
car is finally registered, impeding consumers to make full use of the single market in this 
sector. In Denmark, for example, there is close to a 100% purchase tax which places a 
downward pressure on the pre-tax prices set by manufacturers in order to retain sales in 
Denmark. A lower pre-tax price in Denmark means that pre-tax prices across the whole of the 
EU are also forced down so that manufacturers can retain an EU-wide pricing policy 
minimizing tendencies towards cross-border shopping. 
5.3.3. Quantitative analysis 
We have calculated the average price for all vehicles in each of the EU Member States for the 
five time periods. With these average prices we have then calculated the variance across the 
Member States. Because of the anticipated problems with exchange rate fluctuations, we have 
also split the price information into two groups of Member States ('loosely linked' and 
'closely linked' currencies) and calculated the variance for these separately. The loosely linked 
currency Member States are Spain, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and the UK. The closely linked 
currencies are Germany, France and the Benelux states. Denmark and Greece are not included 
in the analysis because the data were not available for these Member States for the entire 
period. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 5.11. 
Table 5.11. The evolution of car price differences in the EU, May 1993 to November 
19951 
Date 
May-93 
Nov-93 
May-94 
Nov-94 
May-95 
Nov-95 
Total variance 
18.00 
26.68 
20.87 
21.83 
46.36 
21.74 
'Loosely linked' 
9.73 
1.61 
1.80 
13.41 
26.87 
0.007 
'Closely linked' 
5.89 
11.67 
3.93 
4.95 
6.00 
5.73 
Source: Car Price Differentials within the EU. 
' The calculation of variance is based on indices where 100 represents the price in Belgium. 
Marketing 73 
Table 5.11 shows that: 
(a) The variance of car prices across all Member States has actually fluctuated but is fairly 
static with a variance of around 20. 
(b) Unsurprisingly, the variance of car prices for the 'loosely linked' Member States has 
fluctuated quite a lot and no clear trend can be seen. However, the variance in the last 
time period was effectively zero although too much weight should not be given to one 
data point. 
(c) The closely linked variance is generally lower than the loosely linked variance and, apart 
from a jump in November 1993, appears to be gradually falling. 
We have carried out an additional analysis of the variance of car prices for a selection of 
Europe's most popular cars: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
(h) 
(i) 
G) 
(k) 
Ford Fiesta 
Ford Escort 
VW Golf 
GM Astra 
GM Corsa 
Peugeot 306 
Peugeot 106 
Renault Clio 
BMW 3-Series 
Fiat Cinquecento 
Fiat Punto. 
This selection was made on the basis of the most popular models in 1994 as shown in Tables 
5.3 to 5.10, our analysis of the most popular models in Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, 
Italy, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. Because of exchange rate fluctuations, we have once 
more carried out separate analyses of variance of these cars: all models in the Member States 
with 'loosely linked' currencies and all models in the Member States with 'closely linked' 
currencies. The results of these analyses are shown in Table 5.12. 
Table 5.12. The evolution of car price differences in the EU, May 1993 to November 
1995, selected models1 
Date 
May-93 
Nov-93 
May-94 
Nov-94 
May-95 
Nov-95 
Total variance 
34.60 
49.51 
36.51 
40.77 
54.47 
26.23 
'Loosely linked' 
24.06 
42.33 
33.68 
43.73 
47.01 
14.41 
'Closely linked' 
10.52 
21.88 
9.91 
4.18 
10.56 
5.25 
Source: Car Price Differentials within the EU. 
1 The calculation of variance is based on indices where 100 represents the price in Belgium. 
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Table 5.12 shows that: 
(a) Over the period analysed, the total variance in prices for the most popular models has 
fluctuated a lot. 
(b) The total variance for the most popular models is consistently much higher than the 
variance for all models as shown in Table 5.11. 
(c) Examination of loosely linked variances shows that one of the reasons for the 
differences between Table 5.11 and Table 5.12 is that the variance in price for the most 
popular models in the 'loosely linked' Member States is very high. 
(d) Despite this, the variance in prices for the most popular models in the 'closely linked' 
Member States is consistently higher than the corresponding figures in Table 5.11. It 
could be said that these figures are trending down although the time series is short. 
5.3.4. Actual impact 
Price as a measure reflects a whole range of causal factors and as such is a relatively 
unsatisfactory means of getting to a single issue. Probably partly as a result of this, the results 
of our analysis are somewhat ambiguous. This may be because of a lack of data, or that even 
splitting into separate groups of Member States is not enough to remove the impact of 
exchange rate fluctuations. The variance is generally less for 'closely linked' currencies, 
suggesting that exchange rate fluctuations are important; there is greater variance for the most 
popular cars; and the trend is downward for the most popular cars in the closely linked 
currencies. 
It is unlikely that the automotive industry treat their pricing policy in the same way. Certainly, 
Renault described a situation where they had to balance the twin concerns of maintaining 
market share in other Member States and profitability. One factor confusing this balance was 
the desire of the company to maintain a relatively clear pricing structure across Europe. The 
purpose of this policy was mainly to help the dealers near the borders with Member States 
whose currency had recently devalued and avoid the possibility of parallel exports. 
Nissan explained how their pricing strategy had been affected by the devaluation of the Lira. 
Traditionally, Nissan develop their pricing strategies through negotiations with the country 
distributors, and by comparing their European prices against competitor car prices. However, 
following the devaluation of the Lira, Nissan were unable to continue with this pricing strategy 
since their distributors in southern Germany, Austria and France would be placed in serious 
financial difficulty as customers undertake parallel importing from Italy. To avoid this 
problem, Nissan have changed their prices in Italy, reducing the possibility of growth in this 
Member State. 
The Italian producer, Fiat, suggested that the devaluation of the Lira has had only a limited 
effect, helping Fiat to improve profitability. Fiat have also used the devaluation to offer more 
'added extras' on their cars so that they are more competitive. Our analysis in Section 5.1.3 
found that there has been a strong correlation between the performance of Italian producers in 
their national market and the ECU/Lira exchange rate. 
Another pricing change has been occurring over recent years which may be affecting the 
results of this analysis. A redefining of the prices for the different product segments has 
started. For example, the introduction of the new Mercedes Α-class, a small car, came with a 
large car price tag. This move is an attempt to get away from following the price/segment 
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strategy of the market leader in each of the segments. This strategy is intended to allow 
producers to establish their brands without having to follow other manufacturers' pricing 
strategy and hence gain market share within the newly defined 'market'. 
Figure 5.25. Summary diagram 8: Hypothesis 8 
Other Explanatory Factors 
Currency fluctuations 
Actual Single Market Effects 
Does not appear that SMP has had an 
effect. Probably too early to tell. 
No measurable effect 
5.4. Hypothesis 9: Pan-European marketing and distribution networks have developed 
The next hypothesis is that pan-European marketing by automotive manufacturers has 
developed in response to the single market programme. 
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5.4.1. Expected impact 
As market access increases, we would expect to see the development of structures for pan-
European marketing and distribution networks as companies proactively undertake to sell 
more output in other Member States. There should be less distinction between national 
networks as a pan-European manufacturer viewpoint takes hold. Economies of scale in 
marketing and distribution will be more readily available as the single market programme 
becomes established, presenting manufacturers with new opportunities to reduce costs. 
5.4.2. Other factors 
The development of pan-European marketing and distribution is likely to be affected by a 
number of different factors. A likely barrier to pan-European marketing is the cultural 
difference between Member States - what appeals to some countries does not appeal to others. 
Existing contracts with distribution companies are likely to be relatively long-term and 
developed over a number of years. This ensures that the manufacturers have a guaranteed 
supply, with distributors they know and trust, but will slow down adjustments to external 
change. The third factor which may affect the development of pan-European distribution 
networks is the block exemption for the automotive industry from Article 85 of the Treaty of 
Rome, allowing certain restrictive agreements between vehicle manufacturers and distributors. 
We describe the block exemption in detail in Section 3.1.2. A final factor for consideration is 
that the market for automotive vehicles in the EU is not homogeneous. Long-running 
structural differences in demand and distribution mean that setting up a retail network across 
the EU might be of limited benefit. 
5.4.3. Quantitative analysis 
Our case studies revealed different strategies among the automotive manufacturers. Renault 
said that they never used pan-European advertising campaigns because of the cultural 
differences amongst the Member States. Volvo has a different strategy of focusing different 
advertising strategies on different areas of Europe based on the fact that their products appeal 
only to some Member States and they appeal in a different way to each of these areas. Volvo is 
essentially dependent on three main countries for its sales: Sweden, the UK and Germany. 
Nissan, on the other hand, usually launch new models using a pan-European marketing 
campaign, often with a common advertising theme. For example, the Aimera advertising 
campaign was shown in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. However, 
smaller campaigns are organized by national distributors, usually with the national operation 
of the same advertising company. Fiat also prefers to target the European customer, but they 
also acknowledge the importance of more 'local' advertising campaigns. Peugeot carried out 
separate advertising campaigns in Germany, France and the UK in launching its new 406 
model. 
Distribution is dominated by small, independent enterprises. The four major markets are 
served by some 70,000 dealers. Some characteristics of European dealerships are shown in 
Tables 5.13 to 5.15. 
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Table 5.13. Retail car outlets in European markets, 1994 
Country 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
UK 
Main dealers 
17,000 
4,000 
4,500 
6,700 
Sub-dealers 
9,000 
19,000 
10,250 
600 
Total 
26,000 
23,000 
14,750 
7,300 
Source: Neil Mullineux, 'Car Retailing in Europe', Financial Times Management Report, 1995. 
Table 5.14. Average dealership in Europe, 1994 
Business area 
New car sales (units) 
Used car sales (units) 
Turnover (million ECU) 
Employment (number) 
Workshop staff 
Commercial/administration 
Facilities (sq metres) 
Start-up costs (million ECU) 
Units 
500 
400 
6 
34 
15 
19 
8,000 
3 
Source: E1U, 'The Future of Car Retailing in Western Europe', 1995. 
Table 5.15. Comparison of US and European dealers, 1994 
Population (million) 
New car sales (billion ECU) 
Car pare (million) 
Franchisee! dealers (thousands) 
Sales per dealer (million ECU) 
Cars per dealer (number) 
US 
260 
107 
130 
23 
4.6 
1,800* 
Europe 
470 
165 
155 
100 
1.7 
500* 
Source: Mullineux, 1995. 
E&Y estimates. 
The size and structure of distribution systems employed by vehicle assemblers varies 
according to the national market served, and the strategy of the assembler concerned. That is, 
in detail at least, there is little evidence for cohesive and uniform distribution systems in 
Europe. 
We can identify three types of distribution structure in Europe according to a range of 
characteristics, as shown in Table 5.16. 
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Table 5.16. Typology of distribution systems in Europe 
Type 
Owned sales points 
Sales per point 
Second tier 
Multifranchising 
Dealer groups 
Japanese networks 
Southern Europe 
Many, especially Fiat, 
Renault, PSA 
Low, under 100 per 
annum 
Many, some 
rationalization 
Weak, usually only within 
major groups 
Few with more than five 
sites 
Very weak 
Northern Europe 
Mixed, mainly Mercedes, 
Volvo 
Medium 
Mixed, several types of 
second tier 
Very weak 
Some larger 'regional' 
groups with 20+ sites 
Toyota and Nissan have 
good networks, others 
much weaker 
UK 
Few 
High, over 300 per 
annum 
Few, being phased out 
Extensive, over 35% of 
all outlets 
Large, some with national 
coverage 
Well established 
Source: CAIR. 
(Note: Southern = Italy, Spain and France plus smaller markets such as Greece; Northern = Germany, Benelux plus smaller 
markets such as Sweden. UK is unique.) 
The diversity of structures and the nature of change in these structures should not come as a 
surprise, reflecting as they do the huge diversity in the EU. A number of factors have led to 
this fragmented distribution structure, of which the block exemption may be one. 
Our case studies revealed a key difference between the development of distribution networks 
for passenger cars and commercial vehicles. Generally, commercial vehicle manufacturers 
need to have a far closer contact with the final consumer than is the case with cars, in order to 
ensure that the differing needs for a diversity of applications may be met. In Volvo's opinion, 
an important by-product of the single market programme is the emergence of pan-European 
freight companies which have significant purchasing power. Fiat-Iveco also consider that 
transport liberalization has significantly impacted the EU commercial vehicle industry. The 
deregulation of the transport sector and the elimination of customs controls have enabled more 
efficient use of companies' pools and have favoured concentration in the sector. 
5.4.4. Actual impact 
As the analysis above shows, there remain large differences in the structure of marketing and 
distribution around the EU. The nature of the block exemption may have been a factor in this 
by restricting competition, but we have not carried out any analysis to assess this, since it is 
outside the scope of the study. However, the structure of distribution in the EU has been 
affected by the single market programme through the adoption by dealers of pan-European 
training, quality and standards. One example of this is the FORCE programme, encouraging 
pan-European national vocational qualifications to improve worker mobility across Europe. 
Despite this, it is unclear whether economies of scale in retailing of passenger cars are 
attainable. The EU is an extremely diverse area with many cultural differences affecting the 
demand for motor vehicles. This has resulted in large distributors, such as Lex, questioning the 
benefits of expanding throughout Europe and actually reducing the number of dealerships they 
have throughout the EU. 
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Figure 5.26. Summary diagram 9: Hypothesis 9 
Other Explanatory Factors 
■ Cultural differences 
■ Block exemption 
Actual Single Market Effects 
SMP has had no effect on the structure 
of distribution. There have been 
developments in pan-European 
marketing. V Some measurable effect 
This completes our analysis of the nine hypotheses relating to the marketing process within 
our Industry Process Model. We drew intermediate conclusions on market access in Section 
5.1.10. Our conclusions on the marketing process as a whole, along with the other processes 
within our process model, are presented in Chapter 8. 

Production, purchasing and RD&D 
6. Production, purchasing and RD&D 
Chapter 4 set out the methodological approach undertaken to carry out this study. This chapter 
examines the hypotheses directly relating to production, purchasing and RD&D. Figure 6.1 
below extracts the hypotheses related to these business functions from the full set presented in 
Section 4.2 and Figure 4.2. 
Figure 6.1. Production, purchasing and RD&D hypotheses 
The SM removed 
administrative 
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Sections 6.1 to 6.4 address our production hypotheses, Section 6.5 concerns the purchasing 
hypothesis and Section 6.6 examines the RD&D hypothesis. Our analysis of these hypotheses, 
along with those examined in Chapter 5, will enable us to draw as clear a picture as possible 
on the impact of the single market on the EU automotive industry. 
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6.1. Hypothesis 10: Production costs will fall 
Understandably, automotive manufacturers are highly secretive about production costs as this 
information is commercially highly sensitive. We are unable to publish or present analyses on 
in-house cost data within this report. For these reasons, we have examined a number of 
published measures which can act as proxies for costs of production. We have also included 
qualitative analyses based on views expressed in our case studies. Inevitably, however, 
analysis based on proxies and qualitative data will always be a 'second best'. Moreover, 
comparison of published figures from annual accounts is always difficult due to different 
national practices, especially in accounting and taxation. However, we have used sources 
which seek to adjust for these as much as possible. 
The single market programme should have decreased the production costs of vehicles 
throughout Europe, through savings arising from the harmonization of technical standards, 
savings in transport costs, greater economies in scale of production, and cheaper supplies from 
a more efficient components supply industry. 
Figure 6.2 shows the separate measures we have used as proxies for production costs. 
The first measure used is cost of sales. This includes all the costs of operating the business, 
including production costs. It is therefore a very broad measure. The next proxy we have used 
is value added. This measure strips out the cost of bought-in supplies, but includes all of the 
other costs associated with the business. The final proxy used is labour costs, which are a 
function of the wage rate and the levels of employment. 
We cover the effects of the changes in components supply structure in Section 6.6. 
6.1.1. Expected impact 
As the single market programme is implemented, we expect that there will be a more 
competitive environment faced by the automotive manufacturers. Manufacturers will respond 
to this by trying to reduce costs. The measures used as proxies for production costs should 
therefore show a declining trend. 
6.1.2. Other factors 
In attributing changes in the costs of production to the effects of the single market programme, 
there are other explanatory factors which could contribute to the observed results. In 
describing them below, we have drawn on our overall analysis of the other factors likely to 
affect the sector which we described in some detail in Section 4.1. The factors are as follows: 
(a) External market conditions will influence the drive to reduce production costs. When 
there is a drop in demand, manufacturers compete over a smaller market, and put greater 
efforts into driving down costs and prices to the final consumer. 
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Figure 6.2. Different measures used as proxies for production costs 
Cost of Sales 
Includes all sales, production, 
overheads and bought-in materials 
costs 
Value Added 
Takes out the costs associated with 
bought-in materials 
Labour Costs 
Takes out contributions to 
investment, costs of running plant and| 
overheads 
(b) Production costs will be affected by changes in the production process itself. For 
example, most of the industry has sought to adapt Japanese lean production techniques. 
The industry has also been introducing automated techniques over time, such as 
integrated transfer presses and water-based paint systems. Production improvements also 
are made on an intermittent basis, and therefore production cost changes may be 
'lumpy'. Implementation of new techniques and machinery is normally carried out on 
new product launches (or major upgrades), when production lines require complete 
overhauls. 
(c) New model launches will also affect production costs. Clearly, more complex vehicles 
with more complex platforms and features will cost more to produce. 
(d) Supply chain changes will also affect the results. If more components are outsourced, 
then this will affect the direct production costs faced by vehicle manufacturers. 
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6.1.3. Quantitative analysis - cost of sales as a percentage of turnover 
We have collected data on the cost of sales for EU-based and Japanese manufacturers and 
related this to turnover. 
Figure 6.3 shows the average cost of sales per unit as a percentage of turnover for a sample of 
EU-based manufacturers (Renault, Volvo, VW, Fiat and Ford UK) compared with a sample of 
Japanese manufacturers (Honda and Nissan). The decision for this sample was made on the 
basis of data availability. Inflation is accounted for in the analysis by creating a ratio of two 
variables which will have been affected similarly by inflation. 
Figure 6.3. Average cost of sales as a percentage of turnover, EU-based and Japanese 
manufacturers, 1985-93 
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Source: Marketing Systems GmbH. 
The figure shows that: 
(a) The average cost of sales as a percentage of turnover for the EU-based manufacturers 
has declined gently, especially from 1991, falling by around 7% between 1991 and 1994. 
(b) Although at no point are the Japanese cost ratios higher than the EU-based levels, the 
Japanese average cost of sales as a percentage of turnover is increasing slightly. A large 
part of this effect will be due to appreciation of the Yen. 
6.1.4. Actual impact - cost of sales as a percentage of turnover 
Cost of sales as a proportion of turnover is essentially a measure of profitability. It appears that 
there is some convergence between Japanese and EU-owned profitability and that the EU-
owned manufacturers are becoming more competitive. This is consistent with the effects we 
expect from the single market programme. However, this analysis is at a high level and 
undoubtedly the other factors we identified (market demand, appreciation of the Yen) are 
having a substantial effect. Moreover, our case studies revealed that the EU automotive 
companies do not regard the single market programme as being a major factor in affecting 
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production costs. Most reductions in production costs are attributed to the increase in global 
competition, regardless of the single market implementation. At best, the single market 
programme is regarded as one factor among many which has contributed to increasing 
competition and therefore the drive to lower costs and therefore prices. Some manufacturers 
have argued that the increasing regulation of the industry through emissions controls and 
safety regulations has actually increased production costs. 
6.1.5. Quantitative analysis - value added to turnover 
This subsection covers value added to turnover as a proxy for production costs. This figure 
includes all of the costs associated with production, marketing and RD&D, but excludes the 
cost of bought-in supplies. If the value added to turnover is declining, production costs may be 
falling. Conversely, if the value added to turnover is increasing, production costs may be 
increasing. However, the degree of outsourcing will clearly affect our statistics. If suppliers 
make more of the final vehicle, the cost of bought-in supplies will increase and the value 
added to turnover figure will decrease. Figure 6.4 shows the value added as a percentage of 
turnover for a number of manufacturers between 1986 and 1993. The manufacturers chosen 
should provide a good idea of the effect of the single market programme. In addition, we have 
included figures for the two major US manufacturers to provide a comparison for the EU 
automotive manufacturers on a more global level. 
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Figure 6.4. Value added to turnover, selected manufacturers, 1986-93 
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Figure 6.4 shows that: 
(a) the general trend of the value added to turnover is declining for all of the EU­owned 
manufacturers; 
(b) this decline is most marked from 1990 onwards; 
(c) VAG experienced a decline in value added to turnover up until 1994 when there was a 
sudden jump; 
(d) US manufacturers Ford and GM have experienced similar falls in the value added to 
turnover but the ratio appears to have increased slightly from 1992; 
(e) there does not appear to have been any change in value added to turnover during the 
period shown at Renault. 
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6.1.6. Actual impact - value added to turnover 
Our discussions with companies as part of our case study programme led us to believe that 
market conditions have had a pronounced effect on the decline in value added to turnover. 
During the recession, companies were unable to adjust their costs to take account of the fall in 
sales. This is because of the high fixed costs in the industry, and the difficulties involved in 
laying off workers. The increase in outsourcing has also affected the results. As more value is 
passed down the supply chain, the cost of bought-in supplies increases, and the value added to 
turnover figure decreases. For example, Renault explained that 70% of the cost of the vehicle 
is now produced by components suppliers, compared to 20% of the cost of the vehicle some 
20 years ago. 
6.1.7. Quantitative analysis - labour costs 
As another cost of production is labour, we have included this in our assessment of the effects 
of the single market programme on production costs. Figure 6.5 illustrates real labour costs as 
a percentage of real turnover for a number of EU and EU-based manufacturers for the years 
1985 to 1993. Manufacturers included in this analysis were VAG, Seat, PSA, Renault, Fiat, 
Mercedes, Volvo and Ford UK. 
Figure 6.5. Average real labour costs as a percentage ofturnover, 1986-93 
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Source: Marketing Systems GmbH. 
Figure 6.5 shows that: 
(a) the overall trend for the growth period during the second half of the 1980s is upwards, 
followed by a fall in the 1990s; 
(b) this decline is illustrating an increase in capital (as opposed to labour) intensity, possibly 
caused by more efficient working practices brought about by an increase in competition 
during the decline in market conditions at this time. 
Figure 6.6 shows the average of the EU manufacturers' labour costs per employee. The 
manufacturers used for this analysis were the same as in Figure 6.5. 
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Figure 6.6. Average of EU manufacturers' real labour costs per employee, 1985-93 
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Source: Marketing Systems GmbH. 
The figure shows that: 
(a) the labour costs per employee have steadily increased in real terms over the entire 
period; 
(b) average real labour costs per employee fell between 1992 and 1993 and around this 
period, the trend appears to have changed. 
The two charts, Figures 6.5 and 6.6, show that although costs per employee are increasing 
fairly rapidly, the average labour cost is relatively flat over the period, suggesting that staff 
numbers have fallen. 
6.1.8. Actual impact - labour costs 
Our analysis of labour costs is generally consistent with the effects expected from the single 
market programme. However, our case study interviews suggested that the main factors 
affecting these results were changes in production methods and the downturn in market 
conditions. The companies did not consider that the single market programme had a 
significant effect on the results. 
Production, purchasing and RD&D 89 
Figure 6.7. Summary diagram 10: Hypothesis 10 
SMP will increase the level of 
competition faced by manufacturers 
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Quantitative Analysis 
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Companies view changes as deriving 
primarily from increased global 
competition 
Fall in total labour cost by 9% between 
1992 and 1994 
Other Explanatory Factors 
■ External market conditions 
■ Staged improvements 
■ Production and supply chain 
techniques 
■ Technological changes 
■ Increasing complexity of 
vehicles 
Actual Single Market Effects 
SMP seems to have had little direct 
effect although it may have reinforced 
the observed decline in production costs. 
It is difficult to determine 
any effect of the SMP because 
production cost changes take time to 
implement. It is likely that production 
and supply changes and technology 
change have had the greater effect. 
V Some measurable effect by 
reinforcing the change 
6.2. Hypothesis 11: Productivity has increased 
6.2.1. Expected impact 
A key objective of the single market programme was to increase the global competitiveness of 
the European industry. Whilst there are no specific single market measures aimed at increasing 
productivity, the increase in competition (caused by the single market) will increase the need 
for manufacturers to cut costs and hence increase productivity. The analysis which follows 
examines this issue. Again, we have used a number of different measures to gain as full an 
indication of the single market programme impact as possible. 
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6.2.2. Other factors 
The other factors affecting our analysis are likely to be the same as those affecting production 
costs (see Section 6.1). 
6.2.3. Quantitative analysis 
Measurement of productivity in the automotive industry is recognized as particularly difficult 
because the types of vehicle produced do not remain constant. Whilst we recognize this fact, 
we have produced a range of different measures of productivity as follows: 
(a) value added per employee; 
(b) hours needed to assemble a standard car; 
(c) numbers of cars produced per employee; 
(d) units sold per employee; 
(e) revenue per employee. 
Figure 6.8 shows the value added per employee for a selection of manufacturers in the EU and 
the US from 1986 to 1993. The sample of manufacturers chosen should provide a good 
indication of the single market effect since they not only cover a number of different Member 
States, they also compare performance with US companies GM and Ford as well as provide a 
mixture of specialist and volume producers. 
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Figure 6.8. Value added per employee, ECU, 1986-931 
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Source: Marketing Systems, GmbH. 
1 Rover data not available for 1993. 
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Figure 6.8 shows that: 
(a) 
(b) 
in most cases, the value added per employee has increased. Notable exceptions to this 
are Fiat and Volvo, although they both appear to be recovering; 
comparing the levels of value added per employee of US firms against EU-owned firms 
reveals there is still some way to go for the EU-owned manufacturers before they catch 
up with their competitors. 
We questioned companies about the changes in productivity as part of our case study 
programme. Following these discussions, we concluded that the adoption of new production 
techniques from the Japanese and the increasing globalization of competition were the chief 
factors in any productivity gains. 
The work carried out in the early 1990s by the International Motor Vehicle Programme 
(IMVP) showed that there were large differences in productivity between US-based, 
European-based and Japanese-based manufacturers. The IMVP argued that these differences 
were a result of lean production techniques used by the Japanese. The Japanese implants into 
the US market encouraged adoption of such techniques and led to increases in overall US 
productivity. Increases in Europe came somewhat later, and were probably also caused by 
Japanese competition and the lessons learnt from Japanese FDI. Figures 6.9 and 6.10 provide 
an analysis of the changes in the numbers of hours it takes to make a standard vehicle in 
Western Europe compared with Japan and the US in index and absolute terms respectively. 
Figure 6.9. Index of hours needed to assemble a standard car, 1980,1990 and 1993 
Japan USA W Europe 
Sources: IMVP, E&Y 
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Figure 6.10. Number of hours needed to assemble a standard car, 1980,1990 and 1993 
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Sources: IMVP, E&Y. 
The measure of hours to produce a standard car is notoriously problematic. First, it is difficult 
to define exactly what a 'standard' car is, especially if we compare the cycle times (the 
average time each worker spends on a vehicle to add a components). These range from 4 hours 
for a specialist producer such as Morgan to 15 minutes or less for an Audi A8. Furthermore, 
the adoption of new production techniques and the changing relationship between 
manufacturers and components suppliers adds to the difficulties of comparison. With more 
components suppliers developing systems rather than supplying the components, the 
manufacturers need to spend less time on assembly (whether they are more productive or not). 
Taking these reservations into account, it appears that manufacturers have improved their 
productivity between 1980 and 1993. Between 1990 and 1993, US producers increased their 
productivity by 23% and during the same period European producers increased productivity by 
29% - a slightly better performance, but the proportional change is influenced by the poorer 
starting point. The single market programme may have encouraged the Japanese 
manufacturers to enter the European market. This is because it removed many of the non-tariff 
barriers to trade and therefore facilitated (or brought forward) the setting up of plants in fewer 
locations than would have been necessary. Growing competition from these Japanese entrants 
then put pressure on the European producers to adopt lean production methods. In our 
discussions with Nissan, we heard how all major European producers have sent teams of staff 
to view their plant at Sunderland prior to 1992. 
Figure 6.11 shows more aggregated information on the changes in revenue per employee, units 
sold per employee and production per employee. The European production per employee 
figures are based on samples of European-based companies. The remaining figures are based 
on world-wide figures for European, Japanese and US manufacturers. Naturally, there are 
some problems with this type of analysis since legal structures, stockholding strategies as well 
as accounting regulations and practices and subcontracting strategies differ greatly between 
Japan, USA and the EU. Figure 6.11, therefore, is only indicative of the changes identified in 
the analysis above. 
94 Motor vehicles 
Figure 6.11. Additional measures of productivity, 1985-93 
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6.2.4. Actual impact 
The analyses emphasize the relatively greater productivity of the Japanese producers, but also 
show gradual improvements by the European producers. This is consistent with the 
expectation that the single market programme will increase the productivity of the European­
owned manufacturers. However, our case studies revealed that the most important factors in 
increasing productivity were regarded as the increase of global competition and the inward 
investment of the Japanese manufacturers in Europe as well as the adoption of new working 
methods in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Fiat, for example, said that the reorganization it has 
implemented since the early 1990s is based on the Fabbrica Integrata (Integrated Factory) 
project, which adopts Japanese working methods. Fiat therefore regards the productivity gains 
and the cost reductions of recent years as almost entirely due to the implementation of lean 
production techniques within the integrated factory framework. Renault regards the adoption 
of Japanese working methods from the late 1970s as the primary reason for its improved 
productivity. 
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However, we consider that the single market may have encouraged Japanese market 
development in the EU, and therefore since the productivity gains can be attributed to 
Japanese lean manufacturing techniques, the single market programme has indirectly 
reinforced these changes. The single market programme is one of a number of factors which 
have increased global competition, which has, in turn, led to improvements in productivity. 
Figure 6.12. Summary diagram 11: Hypothesis 11 
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Quantitative Analysis 
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but was starting from a worse 
position. Productivity of the EU 
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Other Explanatory Factors 
Actual Single Market Effects 
EU productivity (relative to global 
levels) has improved but 
this is more of a long term trend 
which began well before the SMP was 
implemented. The adoption of 
new working methods in production 
from the Japanese is key. and was 
initiated by Japanese inward 
investment 
Production and supply chain 
changes. 
/ Little measurable effect 
6.3. Hypothesis 12: Employment will fall 
6.3.1. Expected impact 
It is expected that the single market will result in increased competition and competitiveness 
of the EU automotive industry. One of the by-products of this might be a reduction in the level 
of employment experienced by some manufacturers. This may be as a result of some closures 
of inefficient plant which were previously maintained by barriers to trade, or through the 
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adoption of improved manufacturing techniques which may not be as labour intensive. 
Therefore, although this is not an intention of the single market programme, economists regard 
falls in employment as an inevitable by-product of increased competition since reducing the 
costs of labour is an easy way to reduce costs overall. 
The implementation of the single market programme is expected to have had an impact on the 
employment levels of the automotive manufacturers. Removal of barriers to entry increases 
the level of competition faced by EU-based manufacturers. One of the expected responses to 
this increased competition is a reduction in employment levels through improved techniques 
of manufacture and increased reliance on automation. This analysis is closely linked to the 
previous hypothesis on productivity. 
6.3.2. Other factors 
In assessing the employment levels of these companies, several other factors need to be taken 
into consideration: 
(a) General competition in the automotive industry has been increasing over the last ten to 
twenty years. In order to compete at this level, changes in the structure of the companies, 
including employment levels, will have been planned and made. 
(b) Employment in the automotive industry will also be highly dependent on market 
conditions. In times of recession, some companies may reduce employment or reduce 
working hours, and in times of recovery, employment is likely to increase. 
(c) Changes in the level of employment are likely to be made when new products are 
introduced. Changes in employment at a corporate level, therefore, are likely to be 
'lumpy' but in aggregate these changes will be smoothed out. 
(d) Changes in the supply chain will also be important. Vehicle assemblers are increasingly 
outsourcing components suppliers and, consequently, require fewer employees to 
produce a vehicle. 
The single market programme may also have affected the mobility of workers within the EU, 
therefore increasing competition and lowering wages. 
6.3.3. Quantitative analysis - employment levels 
Figure 6.13 shows the number of people employed by the EU-owned manufacturers. 
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Figure 6.13. EU-owned manufacturers' employment in the automotive sector, 1985-93 
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Source: Marketing Systems GmbH. 
Figure 6.13 shows that: 
(a) employment in the EU was relatively constant up to 1990 when it went into a shallow 
decline; 
(b) employment declined increasingly from 1992 to 1993. 
We have also carried out econometric regression analysis of the determinants of automotive 
employment. The expectation is that the regression will tell us the exact impact of the single 
market programme on employment. However, data availability means that the results of this 
analysis are extremely limited. 
We present the results of our regression analysis in Appendix L. 
6.3.4. Quantitative analysis - mobility 
Our case study of Volvo revealed that the type of company and the markets it serves can play a 
part in the degree of cross-border recruitment. Volvo is a very international company, selling 
and producing in a wide range of markets outside its national market. As such, Volvo views 
the single market programme as helping its generally international outlook. Moreover, as a 
specialist producer, Volvo has to recruit key staff outside Sweden, because the industry in 
Sweden is simply too small to support the development of all the specialist skills needed to 
develop and manufacture motor vehicles. 
We found an example of bureaucratic constraints imposed by the Bavarian labour authorities 
on the transfer of consulting engineers from a UK firm to that region. The firm was asked for: 
(a) copies of various contracts of employment; 
(b) copies of standard commercial contracts; 
(c) documentation from banks confirming the company's financial position; 
(d) documentation confirming the directors' tax status; 
(e) certificate of compliance from the tax authorities; 
(f) individual statutory declarations for each of the Executive Directors; 
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(g) company registration forms 288 and 363 from the UK company registration authority. 
The documents took a considerable amount of time to put together and several were returned 
three to four months later with a request for very minor amendments. All of the documentation 
had to be translated into German. This was very costly and resulted in significant delays, 
which had a major effect on the viability of the project. 
6.3.5. Actual impact 
EU-owned manufacturers' employment has steadily declined during the period shown, falling 
by 12% over the entire period, although the rate of decline increased markedly from 1992 to 
1994 falling by 9% in this period alone. We believe that the change in the rate of decline is 
likely to have been due to a combination of the downturn in market conditions, continuing 
competition from increasing globalization and new technology, and that the single market 
programme reinforced some of the trends to increasing competition. Our case studies revealed 
that recently the trend to increasing capital intensity has slowed. Indeed, emphasis is on 
increasing the overall education levels of the workforce to increase flexibility and the ability to 
carry out more than one task on the shop floor and to be able to adapt to change quicker. The 
lead in this new 'production technique' has been set by the Korean manufacturers who employ 
as many graduates as possible on the shop floor. 
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Figure 6.14. Summary diagram 12: Hypothesis 12 
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6.4. Hypothesis 13: The structure of investment in the EU will change 
6.4.1. Expected impact 
The single market programme can be expected to affect the level of investment and location 
decisions of automotive producers in the following principal ways: 
(a) Easier access between EU Member States is likely to result in the long-term 
rationalization of production on the basis of comparative advantage. Multinational 
automotive manufacturers already established in several Member States may reorganize 
their production within the European Union into a smaller number of locations. From 
these locations they will be able to serve the whole of the EU if the capacity is great 
enough. 
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(b) The increased attractiveness of the EU both as a single market and as a location for 
production might increase the foreign direct investment (FDI) from non-EU sources, 
such as Japan and Korea. This FDI may consist purely of production facilities, or may 
include RD&D facilities to counteract potential accusations of 'screwdriver' plants and 
provide more integrated European operations. 
(c) The single market, combined with the increased competition in the market, may also 
affect the research, design and development (RD&D) function in a number of ways. 
From non-EU sources, the desirability of an EU location may increase, in order to take 
advantage of speedier information flows allowing the product design to appeal more 
closely to European tastes. A 'designed locally' label may also be desirable. In terms of 
the location of RD&D, the single market programme makes it easier to separate RD&D 
from production, allowing RD&D to be sited according to comparative advantage. 
6.4.2. Other factors 
Increasing global competition is likely to play an important part in the decisions of automotive 
manufacturers to invest in more capacity and new locations. This competition is likely to 
result in automotive producers choosing cheaper locations for plant. Exchange rate 
differentials might also play a part in the decision to invest in existing or new plant. Relatively 
cheaper countries are likely to be favoured for new or increased plant capacity. Furthermore, 
older locations may have become sub-optimal over time as a result of, for example, site 
constraints, infrastructure suitability as well as labour practices and norms which restrict the 
search for greater productivity. Therefore, this may be behind many drives for new locations 
where such norms and constraints are not present. 
Additionally, despite plant closures and over 400,000 redundancies in the early 1980s, the EU 
automotive market is still characterized by over-capacity. This will affect the structure of 
investment. Despite the problems of over-capacity, even the possibility of state aid in the mid-
1980s failed to induce many closures. The mid-1980s policy of the European Commission was 
to link state aid to capacity reductions - for example, the £680 million loan to British Leyland 
Bus and Truck for a 60% reduction in capacity. Aid was also offered to Alfa Romeo, Renault, 
Rover and ENASA, with the share of aid in the total restructuring costs roughly equivalent to 
the share of capacity which had to be eliminated. Despite the inducements of state aid and 
chronic over-capacity, only the following major plants were closed: 
(a) Renault at Billancourt; 
(b) Rover at Cowley South; 
(c) Lancia at Desio and Chivasso; 
(d) Volvo at Kalmar; 
(e) Seat at Barcelona. 
Another factor which will affect the structure of investment is that many manufacturers have 
plants spread out across the EU as part of the 'Europeanization' of production which was 
being pursued well before the implementation of the single market. The time lags in making 
significant adjustments to production are similar to the length of product cycles, so it may be 
too early to assess the impact of the single market programme on the structure of investment. 
Moreover, manufacturers have considerable sunk costs in their plants. This creates extreme 
inflexibility in terms of changes in production locations and new plant development. Because 
of this inflexibility, some producers might want to maintain lower capacity plant so that they 
have more flexibility to change production over a short period of time. 
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6.4.3. Quantitative analysis 
Table 6.1 shows a sample of the major investment decisions of automotive manufacturers in 
Europe since 1985 in new car production, by acquisition, joint venture or greenfield site. 
Table 6.1. Major investment decisions of car manufacturers in Europe since 1985 in 
new car production, by acquisition, joint venture or greenfield site1 
Date 
1996 
1995 
1995 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1993 
1993 
1993 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1991 
1991 
1991 
1991 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1989 
1986-90 
1986 
1985 
Manufacturer 
GM 
Mercedes 
Daewoo 
Chrysler 
Daewoo 
BMW 
Hyundai 
Fiat 
GM 
Mercedes 
Ford 
GM 
VAG 
VAG 
Honda 
Mitsubishi 
GM 
Toyota3 
GM 
Fiat 
Ford 
VAG 
Suzuki 
Nissan 
Country 
Poland 
France 
Poland 
Hungary 
Romania 
UK 
Turkey 
Italy (Melfi) 
Poland 
Russia 
Portugal 
Hungary 
Former 
Czechoslovakia 
E. Germany 
UK (Swindon) 
Netherlands 
E. Germany 
(Eisenach) 
UK (Derby) 
Sweden 
Poland 
UK 
Spain 
Hungary 
UK (Sunderland) 
Investment type 
Greenfield site 
JV (with Swatch) 
JV (with FSL) 
Greenfield site 
JV (with Oltcit) 
Acquisition (of Rover) 
JV (with Assan) 
Greenfield site 
JV (with FSO) 
JV (with UAZ) 
JV (with VAG) 
Greenfield site 
Acquisition (of Skoda) 
Acquisition (of Trabant) 
Greenfield site 
JV (with Volvo) 
Greenfield site 
Greenfield site 
Acquisition (50% of Saab) 
Greenfield site 
Acquisition (of Jaguar) 
Acquisition (of Seat) 
Greenfield site 
Greenfield site 
Amount of 
investment 
(million ECU) 
265 
1,000 
2,500 
5,000 
430 
500 
990 
1,000 
2,450 
Car capacity2 
72,000 
50.000 
40,000 
120,000 
500,000 
100,000 
450.000 
10,000 
50,000 
180,000 
25.000 
400,000 
100,000 
200,000 
150,000 
200,000 
120,000 
200,000 
100,000 
600.000 
50,000 
300.000 
1 Fiat has plans to produce its new world car (the 178) in Poland in the next two to three years. It intends to produce 54% of its cars 
outside Italy by the year 2000. Ford also has plans to produce vehicles in Poland (30,000 Escort cars and Transit vans by 1998). 
2 Car capacity figures are only illustrative. Car capacity figures for joint ventures (JVs) are for total capacity of the plant. They may 
change due to model changes or subsequent changes in the investment decision. 
3 Toyota has plans to increase the numbers of cars it manufactures outside Japan from 45% in 1994 to 55% in 1996 to 65% in 1998. 
Source: CAIR 
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Table 6.1 reveals that: 
(a) There have been significant new investments into the EU and neighbouring countries 
from 1985. To some extent this may be a reflection of automotive manufacturers 
applying 'rational expectations' by recognizing the benefits of the single market well 
before its implementation and acting on these expectations through investment in new 
plant. 
(b) Most of the investments in the EU have been in peripheral, non-traditional car making 
regions in Spain, Portugal, the UK and Italy. This is likely to be a direct response to the 
single market, new investments being sited because of grants and aid within these 
regions as well as wider advantages from site suitability, the lack of constraints allowing 
new layouts and production organization. 
(c) A significant amount of the investment in the UK and Spain has been through 
acquisitions of existing producers, rather than greenfield site production. This provides 
evidence of rationalization resulting from global competition and the single market. 
(d) Recent investment has been concentrated outside the EU in the periphery of Eastern 
Europe. Some of this will be linked to specific market opportunities in the country of 
location and low production costs and some, particularly former East Germany, because 
of the direct links with the West following reunification. 
Appendix Ρ provides details of a mini-case study we carried out on Mercedes-Benz/Swatch 
TV's decision to locate in Hambach in France. 
Additionally, however, major investments have also been made by car manufacturers in their 
existing car engine and components production plants since 1985. This is illustrated in Table 
6.2. 
Table 6.2. Illustrative major investment decisions of car manufacturers in Europe 
since 1985 in existing (brownfield) sites (car production, engines and 
components) 
Date 
1994 
1990-99 
1986-90 
1991 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1990-92 
1994-95 
1993 
1993 
1993 
1993 
1989-91 
1995-2000 
Manufacturer 
Fiat 
Ford 
Ford 
Ford 
Ford 
Ford 
Ford 
GM 
GM 
GM 
GM 
PSA 
PSA 
Volvo 
Volvo 
Country 
Italy 
UK 
Spain 
Spain 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
UK 
UK 
Germany 
Belgium 
France 
Spain, UK 
Belgium 
Belgium 
Investment type 
Car production (new models/plant 
improvements) 
Car production and components 
Car production 
Engines 
Car production - new metallic paint 
Components assemblies 
Engines 
Engines 
Car production 
Engines 
Components 
Car production 
Car production 
Car production 
Car production 
Amount of 
investment 
(million ECU) 
21,000 (half by 
1994) 
3,200 
500 
800 
800 
800 
165 
256 
150 
450 
120 
300 
Source: CAIR. 
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The table reveals that: 
(a) there has been substantial investment in existing plant; 
(b) the companies making these investment decisions tend to be those that were more pan-
European in their production prior to the single market programme. 
There have also been major investment decisions by vehicle manufacturers in new 
components plants. For example in 1995, BMW-Rover invested in a new paint plant in the 
UK and Mercedes invested in a new engine plant in Germany. 
Table 6.3 shows a series of major investments by producers in new RD&D centres. 
Table 6.3. Major investment decisions by car producers in new RD&D facilities in 
Europe 
Date 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1989 
1989 
1988 
1988 
1988 
1987 
Manufacturer 
BMW-Rover 
Renault 
Ford 
Daewoo 
Daewoo 
Ssang Yong 
BMW 
Nissan 
Nissan 
Nissan 
Honda 
Toyota 
Country 
UK 
France 
Germany 
Germany 
UK 
UK 
Germany 
Belgium 
UK 
Germany 
Germany 
Belgium 
Investment type 
Design and engineering centre 
New technology centre 
RD&D centre 
Design centre 
Acquired IAD 
Acquired R&D company 
New design centre 
RD&D centre 
RD&D centre 
Design centre 
RD&D centre 
RD&D centre 
Source: CAIR. 
Table 6.3 reveals that: 
(a) The Japanese have been establishing RD&D facilities in Europe, spatially separated 
from their production sites, in areas traditionally considered strong in automotive 
RD&D.7 This would be consistent with the idea that the single market programme is 
aiding location of functions according to comparative advantage. 
(b) Rover and Renault seem to be concentrating their research efforts in one location as 
much as possible. This again would seem consistent with the single market's potential 
effects, though Ford's world-wide strategy to locate RD&D in five global centres (each 
handling a car segment for world production) puts the single market programme effects 
in the context of wider global changes taking place. 
(c) BMW's decision to set up a design and engineering centre can be seen as an attempt to 
differentiate the Rover brand in technological terms. 
It is also interesting to note that the Japanese manufacturers" entry strategy has included setting up distribution centres 
to supply parts to all their franchised dealers. These distribution centres are based centrally in either Belgium or the 
Netherlands. 
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(d) The acquisitive strategies of Daewoo and Ssangyong may signal their intent to set up full 
production in the EU at a future date and the growing need for car manufacturers to have 
RD&D capability in a market as large as the EU. 
Investment in the EU has, in part, been facilitated by state aid. This aid can be divided into 
two categories: 
(a) aid to support domestic producers; 
(b) aid to attract foreign direct investment. 
Table 6.4. Examples of state aid 
Supporting domestic producers 
Renault (1987) 
Alfa Romeo (1985) 
Rover Group (1986 and 1990) 
Peugeot(1988) 
Volkswagen (1991) 
Opel (1991) 
Fiat (1991) 
Fiat and PSA JV (1994) 
Attracting foreign direct investment 
VW in Belgium (1990) 
GM in Portugal (1990) 
Nissan in the UK (1991) 
Ford and VW in Portugal (1991) 
Volvo in Belgium (1992) 
Volvo and Mitsubishi in the Netherlands (1992) 
Renault in Spain (1994) 
Mercedes in France (1996) 
Source: EC Annual Reports on Competition Policy. 
Japanese components firms have not, to date, arrived in the numbers which some European 
commentators feared - and certainly not on the scale which has been evident in the North 
American market. This may be attributed to the following factors: 
(a) lower absolute level of Japanese capacity in Europe; 
(b) political sensitivity over the issue, leading to greater amounts of business being placed 
with existing suppliers in Europe; 
(c) recession in Japan reducing investment funds available; 
(d) consolidation of investments in North America; 
(e) greater opportunities in South-East Asia; 
(f) greater use of technology licence arrangements with European partners. 
6.4.4. Actual impact 
The evidence concerning the recent investment decisions of car manufacturers in the EU is 
generally consistent with the potential effects of the single market programme. However, one 
must also be aware that these trends are also discernible in the wider global industry and were 
being pursued to an extent before the implementation of the single market programme. It is 
also the case that the lack of plant closures in the EU, when seen in addition to the new plant 
being built in more optimal locations, presents the potential for over-capacity in the future. 
This may mean that the long-term rationalization of production on the basis of comparative 
advantage will not take place through planned company action but via a much more 
competitive European market. 
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Figure 6.15. Summary diagram 13: Hypothesis 13 
Actual Single Market Effects 
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Investment has certainly increased, 
and the investment in peripheral, non-
traditional car making regions has 
been facilitated by the SMP. 
However, globalization of competition 
and State Aids have also played a part. 
S Some measurable effect 
6.5. Hypothesis 14: Component supply structure has become more pan-European 
6.5.1. Expected impact 
The removal of barriers to entry as a result of the single market programme is expected to 
result in an increase in competition in the components supply sector. There are likely to be two 
possible responses to this: 
(a) purchases becoming more internationalized to reduce costs; 
(b) the internationalization of suppliers as they adapt to their increasingly competitive 
environment. 
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6.5.2. Other factors 
General improvements in the system of supply is another factor which needs to be considered. 
There have been moves over the last 10-15 years to improve production techniques through 
lean distribution and production as competition has increased. In some cases, these require 
suppliers to be located close to the manufacturers, limiting the likelihood of cross-border 
sourcing. Length of contracts and the development of long-term relationships with suppliers 
are also likely to affect the impact of single market implementation. Differences in currency 
will play a part in the decision of manufacturers to buy components from certain companies. 
The relative impact of the recent recession on some companies will affect both the decision to 
supply and the decision to purchase. 
It must be noted that volume manufacturers tend to balance the choice of best supplier with the 
choice of location of supplier. This leads to a range of strategies in which pre-manufactured 
and part-assembled components are supplied to an intermediary subassembly plant alongside 
the volume manufacturer. This intermediary then supplies components and systems JIT to the 
volume manufacturer. 
We present our analysis below in the following way: 
(a) internationalization of purchases : 
(i) cost savings resulting from cabotage and reduction in border delays, 
(ii) intra-EU trade in components, 
(iii) the Irish components sector, 
(iv) the Portuguese components sector; 
(b) internationalization of suppliers: 
(i) mergers and acquisitions, 
(ii) nationality of ownership of the supply base, 
(iii) leading components suppliers; 
(c) exchange rates and sourcing patterns. 
6.5.3. Quantitative analysis - internationalization of purchases 
We have contacted ΝΕΑ (the firm carrying out the related study on the effects of the single 
market programme on freight and transport8) and they have been able to provide us with some 
information which indicates the cost savings resulting from the single market programme. The 
savings which they have indicated will provide incentives for vehicle manufacturers to procure 
components on a pan-European basis. Table 6.5 shows the estimated reductions in transport 
costs as a direct result of the single market programme, broken down by the savings attributed 
to cabotage, and those associated with the elimination of border times. 
The Single Market Review, Subseries II: Impact on services, Vol. 5: Road freight transport, Office for Official 
Publications of the EC and Kogan Page Publishers, 1997. 
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Table 6.5. Changes in intra-EU transport costs and time 
Nationality of haulier 
Β 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
UK 
GR 
I 
NL 
Cabotage/cross-border trade 
transport cost reductions (%) 
-4.1 
-3.3 
-4.1 
-3.3 
-3.3 
-3.3 
-4.1 
-3.3 
-4.1 
Elimination of border times (%) 
-2.0 
-2.1 
-2.1 
-1.8 
-2.0 
-1.9 
-1.9 
-2.1 
-2.1 
Source: ΝΕΑ. 
Table 6.5 shows that there have been cost savings in cabotage and the elimination of border 
delays. It is likely, therefore, that there may be some internationalization of supply by the 
automotive manufacturers because of this reduction in costs. 
Figures 6.16 and 6.17 show the intra­EU trade of a selection of car components relative to the 
number of registrations. Dividing by registrations means that any changes in market conditions 
are factored out, making the assessment of the single market impact easier. Figure 6.16 has 
each components considered separately and Figure 6.17 considers components in aggregate. 
Intra­EU trade in tyres is of a different order of magnitude than the other components in our 
sample, and is considered separately. 
Figure 6.16. Intra-EU trade in components, 1989-94 
Intra-EU trade 
in tyres (% 
registrations) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
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other components 
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­•­Radiators 
­*­Silencers & Exhaust pipes 
­ι— Drive­axles with differential 
­^­Suspension shock­absorber 
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Sources: E&Y, Eurostat. 
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Figure 6.17. Intra-EU trade in components, in aggregate, 1989-94 
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Source: E&Y, Eurostat. 
The figures show that: 
(a) The cross-border flows of components are generally low compared to registrations, 
indicating that there is some way to go before a more internationalized flow is 
established. 
(b) Intra-EU trade in tyres fell between 1989 and 1990 but then recovered through the rest of 
the period. Other components in aggregate fell until 1991 but then recovered afterwards. 
(c) Intra-EU trade in components does not appear to have been affected by the single market 
programme. 
(d) The overall trend in intra-EU trade in components is increasing, but this trend started 
well before the single market programme. 
The internationalization of purchasing has been most pronounced from vehicle assemblers 
based in Germany. Mercedes, for example, which in 1985 purchased 90% of components and 
materials from within Germany plans to reduce this to 75% by the year 2000. VAG has 
established purchasing offices in the UK, France and elsewhere with the explicit intention of 
purchasing more in these countries. The growth of production in Spain based on vehicle 
assemblers from Germany (Ford, Opel, VAG) and France (Renault, PSA) has encouraged 
suppliers from those countries to establish operations in Spain. While it is the case that French 
vehicle assemblers are generally in favour of retaining spending within France, a greater share 
of purchases are with non-French-owned companies. In addition, with the adoption of new 
working methods by the European automotive manufacturers, especially just-in-time (JIT), 
there is an increasing tendency for components suppliers to locate in the locale of the 
manufacturer's plant. This will tend to mitigate any increase in cross-border sourcing. For 
example, in 1993, Nissan used 197 European suppliers which accounted for an annual 
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expenditure of ECU 1 billion. Two-thirds of the suppliers were located in the UK, 30 of which 
were immediately surrounding the plant. 
The growth of the automotive components industry in countries such as Ireland is indicative of 
the pressure to purchase components on a pan-European basis and to seek out lower cost 
locations. It is significant that much of the components industry in Ireland is owned by 
German interests, and that the bulk of exports are to Germany. In the decade to 1990, exports 
of components from Ireland grew by about 20% per year to reach ECU 340 million in an 
industry of about 100 firms and 10,000 workers - despite the lack of an indigenous vehicle 
assembly capacity. Investment support ranges from outright grants to the provision of worker 
training courses. Figure 6.18 provides an analysis of the export destination of components 
from Ireland in 1991. 
Figure 6.18. Export destination of automotive components from Ireland, 1991 
SP a i n Other 
4% w 
Sweden 
5%, 
____ Germany 
HF 62% 
Source: IDA. 
ANFIA, the components trade association in Portugal, has collected information on the growth 
of the national components industry and its dependence on the national market. Figure 6.19 
provides this analysis. 
The figure reveals that the components sector has grown to over five times its original size 
over the past ten years. Exports as a percentage ofturnover have increased from 53% in 1986 
to 79% in 1995. The majority of exports go to Germany (28%), France (24%) and Spain 
(22%). This growth indicates the scale of the increasing focus on peripheral regions of the EU 
for automotive production. We discussed this in some detail in Section 5.5. 
Some manufacturers have begun to adopt a more pan-European strategy for the supply of 
components within the firm. Ford-Europe, for example, produces all transmissions for all Ford 
variants in Europe in one plant in France. There are, however, limits to this policy. For 
example, because of concerns for security of supply, Ford-Europe produces engines from more 
than one plant in Europe. This ensures that if one plant is shut down, production of the final 
product can continue using engines from other parts of Europe. 
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Figure 6.19. Growth in the Portuguese components sector, 1986-94 
80 T- a-600 
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Year 
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-Index of Turnover 
Source: ANFIA. 
6.5.4. Quantitative analysis - internationalization of suppliers 
The sector as a whole shows a considerable degree of 'turbulence' in the form of: 
(a) acquisitions; 
(b) joint ventures and other alliances; 
(c) greenfield investments, including FDI; 
(d) plant closures and sales; 
(e) exits and entrances to the automotive supply base. 
Figure 6.20 shows the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity in the automotive components 
sector for the EU Member States between 1989 and 1994, split by domestic, intra-EU and 
extra-EU transactions. The first chart in Figure 6.20 shows the transaction in value terms (in 
ECU), and the second shows the actual number of transactions. These figures do not include 
joint ventures which are considered in our section on business strategy and covered in more 
detail in Appendix M. 
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Figure 6.20. M&A activity in the automotive components sector, 1989-94 
M&A Activity in the automotive components sector - Value (ECU m) 
Year 
M&A activity in the automotive components sector - number of transactions 
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Source: Economists Advisory Group. 
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The figure shows: 
(a) for both analyses, and for each of the three measures, M&A activity appears to be 
cyclical, falling at the middle of the period and then recovering; 
(b) domestic M&A activity is greatest in number - 176 in total for the period, but extra-EU 
M&A activity is of the greatest magnitude - ECU 1,109.5 million for the period (current 
exchange rates). 
Table 6.6 shows the nationality of ownership of components supply companies in a number of 
Member States. 
Table 6.6. Nationality of ownership of sample automotive components companies in 
selected EU countries (% of total) 
Country of 
ownership 
Country of 
location 
Germany 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
Portugal 
UK 
Germany 
86.2 
17.0 
12.6 
4.5 
18.8 
10.1 
Spain 
0.0 
41.0 
0.6 
0.0 
2.8 
0.0 
France 
0.9 
10.0 
60.2 
7.5 
7.2 
3.1 
Italy 
0.6 
1.5 
3.0 
57.5 
1.4 
1.8 
UK 
2.4 
10.0 
7.8 
3.0 
2.8 
54.4 
Japan 
0.0 
1.5 
0.0 
1.5 
0.0 
5.6 
USA 
7.4 
13.9 
12.0 
24.0 
8.6 
24.0 
Other 
2.1 
4.6 
3.6 
1.5 
57.8 
0.6 
Sample 
size 
321 
129 
166 
66 
69 
158 
Sources: Italy: AFIA; Spain: SERNAUTO; France: FIEV; Portugal: ANFIA; UK: SMMT; Germany: VDA. 
Note: Analysis based on membership of relevant organizations, which tends to distort data by over-emphasis of 'domestic' 
companies. Analysis based on companies listed, not on number of plants, employment, turnover, etc. JVs attributed to 
dominant country member, 50/50 JVs allocated to domestic. In practice this table understates the extent of 
internationalization because the international companies tend to be larger and more orientated towards original equipment 
work. 
Table 6.6 shows that the majority of automotive components companies are domestically 
owned. However, US companies own significant shares of the automotive components sector 
in each of the Member States. Japan's presence is felt most in the UK. Germany has the most 
significant share of the automotive components sector in its own territory and in other Member 
States. It would be wrong to assume that Germany is closed off from competition - success 
should not be equated with barriers to entry. 
It is clear that the automotive components industry is relatively 'internationalized', even from 
this snapshot of sector ownership. 
Table 6.7 shows some of the leading components suppliers. 
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Table 6.7. Leading European components suppliers (approximate ranking) 
Company 
Michelin 
Robert Bosch 
Continental 
Pirelli 
ZF 
Valeo 
Magneti Marelli 
Thyssen 
GKN 
Lucas 
BTR 
Hella 
Pilkington 
Freudenberg 
F&S 
T&N 
ECIA 
Siemens 
SKF 
BFA 
VDO 
BBA 
Teksid 
Saint Gobain 
Country 
France 
Germany 
Germany 
Italy 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Germany 
UK 
UK 
UK 
Germany 
UK 
Germany 
Germany 
UK 
France 
Germany 
Sweden 
France 
Germany 
UK 
Italy 
France 
Product area 
Tyres 
Automotive electronics 
Tyres 
Tyres 
Transmissions 
Lights, wipers, air-con, automotive 
electronics 
Automotive electrics 
Steel, engineered products 
CV joints, engineered products 
Automotive electrics, brake systems 
Mainly rubber products 
Lighting systems 
Glass 
Elastomer-metal products 
Clutches 
Powertrain products, friction products 
Exhausts, interior trim 
Engine management systems, 
electronics 
Bearings 
Seats 
Instrument clusters 
Brakes, clutches 
Aluminium castings 
Glass 
Source: CAIR estimates. 
Germany, France, Italy and the UK have the main components suppliers. These countries with 
the longest histories in automotive manufacture are likely to have a large presence in the 
components supply sector. Barriers to entry prior to the Common Market and the single 
market encouraged components supply sourcing from within the national boundaries. This 
history will add inertia to the process of cross-border supply, although new countries are being 
sought by these components suppliers for locating production. For example, Renault explained 
that in their view, the location of their suppliers has not been affected by the single market 
programme: most of the contracts with its suppliers are long-term and based on mutual long-
term understanding and trust. Whilst these constraints may well delay internationalization in 
the short to medium run, in the longer run one would expect greater flexibility. However, the 
components industry is in a state of flux with Bosch's UK £1 billion take-over of Allied 
Signal brakes and the impending sales of Lucas and Valeo. 
6.5.5. Quantitative analysis - exchange rates and sourcing patterns 
Our case studies revealed the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on sourcing patterns both 
for intra-firm trade and for extra-firm trade. Procurement strategies differ between companies, 
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but overall the major assemblers try to balance the proportion of supplies sourced in individual 
countries to the levels of demand across the countries. In this way, they seek to offset 
exchange rate risks. Other factors (such as the high sunk costs in existing plants and lower 
labour costs in some regions) also play an important role and it is clearly difficult for the 
companies to balance supplies across countries in an exact manner. The degree to which 
companies can take into account favourable changes in currency is also limited by the 
contractual arrangements which assemblers have signed with their major suppliers. 
Certain companies are clearly more exposed than others. During our case study exercise, we 
found that Fiat has benefited from the devaluation of the Lira because it primarily sources its 
components in Italy. Such a sourcing strategy will have the opposite effect and will harm its 
exports if the Lira appreciated in value. The devaluation of the Peseta had a minor effect on 
the Ford plants because its strategy was to hedge its currency risks by sourcing its supplies in 
Germany and France. Car pricing information collected by the European Commission shows 
that prices in the overall Spanish market remained relatively constant but fell in Italy in ECU 
terms. 
The effects are felt both for intra-firm trade (for example, Ford's decisions on the relative 
outputs of its engine plants), and for extra-firm trade. 
6.5.6. Actual impact 
In general terms, we conclude that there has been an internationalization of sourcing in both 
senses: 
(a) internationalization of purchases; 
(b) internationalization of suppliers. 
The two are of course closely related, and arise in the main from the strategic response of the 
components sector to changes in purchasing strategy by the vehicle assemblers in Europe. For 
vehicle assemblers, purchasing regimes which seek the 'best' available international suppliers 
may well have to look beyond national borders, giving rise to an internationalization of 
purchasing. Moreover, in order that current suppliers should expand their capabilities, vehicle 
assemblers are encouraging their suppliers to win new business in new locations. This even 
applies to the in-house suppliers owned or part-owned by the vehicle assemblers who also are 
expected to win new business outside the parent group. 
At the same time, new capacity in new locations (such as the Fiat Melfi plant in southern Italy, 
the Seat Martorell plant in Spain) includes space alongside the assembly facilities for key 
suppliers who may be 'pulled' to the location from other countries. Certainly, Fiat believes 
that there will be less cross-border sourcing because of lean production techniques, rather than 
more. Volvo finds that the search for the best supplier is constrained by the need to secure 
short lead times for the delivery of components to the assembly plants. Volvo defines a broad 
geographic area which fixes the limits of secure supply to meet lead times. Beyond this area 
special measures need to be taken (for example, extra stocks may be held) and this makes 
locations outside the secure area relatively unattractive. About 60% of Volvo's spending is on 
just in time or small batch deliveries, and this has reduced the extent of 'long distance' 
sourcing. However, as explained earlier in this subsection, 'near' sourcing can be carried out 
through intermediary plants, so this may not be such a hindrance to internationalization of 
purchasing and suppliers. 
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It is interesting to note that GM has adopted a global sourcing approach to suppliers and Ford 
is moving to a World-wide Integrated Purchasing System, suggesting that internationalization 
of purchasing is the way ahead for the automotive sector. 
Figure 6.21. Summary diagram 14: Hypothesis 14 
Actual Single Market Effects 
The SMP has had some effect on these 
changes. However, new production 
and supply chain techniques and new 
research and technology change have 
had an impact. 
Other Explanatory Factors 
Market conditions 
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techniques 
Research initiatives and 
technology change 
Currency fluctuations 
/ Some measurable effect 
6.6. Hypothesis 15: RD&D costs will fall 
6.6.1. Expected impact 
The effects of the single market programme on research, design and development (RD&D) can 
be broken down into three broad areas: 
(a) cost savings arising from the components type approval measures, which may affect 
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) as well as components manufacturers; 
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(b) cost savings resulting from the whole vehicle type approval measure which mean that 
the vehicle manufacturer is only required to gain type approval from one Member State 
for the rest of EU, rather than having to apply to each Member State in which the car is 
to be sold; 
(c) rationalization of RD&D which we discussed in Section 6.4. 
6.6.2. Other factors 
The effect of the type approval measures is unlikely to have been affected by any other factors. 
The rationalization of the RD&D function is likely to have been affected by the overall 
globalization of the sector as we discussed in Section 6.4. 
Components type approval measures 
• Expected impact 
The components type approval measures were based on standards set up by the Economic 
Commission for Europe of the United Nations (UNECE). Mutual recognition of standards was 
laid down by UNECE in 1958 (the so-called March 1958 Agreement). The EU's components 
type approval measures, which largely brought these previous standards into European law, 
are therefore unlikely to have had a major effect. 
• Quantitative analysis 
In order to determine the actual effects of the components type approval measures, we carried 
out mini case studies with three components: 
(a) tyres 
(b) headlights 
(c) exhausts. 
These components were chosen as they were considered likely (through their function and 
value) to illustrate the effects of the single market programme on both components suppliers 
and OEMs. 
For each components, we interviewed a number of companies in order to investigate their 
views on the cost savings arising from having fewer variants of their products across the EU. 
We summarize the findings below, and present the full output from each case study in 
Appendix K. 
• Actual impact 
Our tyres case study revealed that UNECE regulations covering tyres had been in place for at 
least ten years prior to the adoption of the Directive covering type approval for tyres 
(92/93/EEC), and that the EU Directive was identical in the standards it set. The 
implementation of the Directive had no effect on changing the nature of the products being 
produced across Europe, and no effect on RD&D. 
Our case study on headlights showed a similar result and noted that standards were already in 
place before the introduction of the Directive. Interestingly, the headlight manufacturers said 
that significant costs were incurred through having to provide variants for right hand/left hand 
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driving and the offering of wipe/wash extras. In addition, the companies noted that the 
standards adopted within Europe were very different from those in Japan and North America. 
Our case study on exhausts provided different results since the market for exhausts in Europe 
is significantly more complex than the market for tyres and headlights. Sourcing of exhausts 
varies widely across the EU and there has been a significant proliferation of types per model 
range. The most important influence on variant costs arises from vehicle assembler strategy on 
platforms, model variants and engine/transmission choices. 
Whole vehicle type approval 
• Expected impact 
We would expect the whole vehicle type approval to have resulted in a reduction in costs 
because new models need to be approved by only one Member State rather than all of them. 
• Quantitative analysis 
Cost savings arising from the whole vehicle type approval can be calculated at a number of 
different levels: 
(a) Tests required to get a new vehicle approved need only be carried out in one country 
rather than in all Member States. Each national vehicle certification agency used to 
request three or four variants of each model in order to approve the new car. Each of 
these models could potentially be different. Since the vehicles provided are made with 
'soft' tools, they were expensive and the requirement to produce a large number of 
variants added significantly to the overall costs. Around three cars of each variant are 
required, since a separate vehicle has to be put through a front, side and rear impact test. 
Since the vehicle manufacturer now has to go to only one Member State rather than all 
15, it will save the cost of the cars used in these (extra) tests. Each type approval 
requires around three cars, and so the potential saving is, say, ECU 30,000 (for the 
vehicle) multiplied by three (cars which would have been used) multiplied by 14 
(Member States). This amounts to some ECU 1.2 million for each new model launch. 
(b) There are consequent reductions in the time to market resulting from the whole vehicle 
type approval. Prior to the measure, each country took substantially different amounts of 
time to approve the same vehicle. For example, type approval in Germany could last 
some six months, compared with three months in the UK. Our research also indicates 
that the RD&D costs of a new vehicle amount to some ECU 400 million and the process 
takes around 36 months. If whole vehicle type approval has resulted in a time saving of 
around three months, and on the assumption that the development team needs to be kept 
active, then this represents a maximum saving of around ECU 30 million. 
(c) Given the time savings in gaining type approval, the vehicles used in this test are 
produced later on in the development cycle, which costs less as the manufacturing 
tooling and assembly works are more developed. The type of vehicles used during the 
development cycle are as follows: 
(i) mule vehicle, which is a very early prototype and may cost ECU 300,000 per 
vehicle; 
(ii) Phase 1 prototype which is hand-built; 
(iii) Phase 2 prototype which uses 'soft' tools; 
(iv) pilot built which costs between ECU 25,000 and ECU 40,000; 
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(ν) volume production costing around ECU 12,000 per vehicle. 
The crash test which is required for each specified type or model of car to be approved 
by the authorities must use production-built vehicles. Manufacturers' evidence suggests 
that the cost savings resulting from using a car later on in the development cycle amount 
to some ECU 30,000 per model. 
(d) There are cost savings from having fewer staff involved in the type approval process. 
We understand that one manufacturer has reduced the levels of staffing by 14 as a result 
of the measure. This amounts to an annual saving of around ECU 600,000 for this 
company. 
(e) There are fewer administrative charges from each country carrying out the test. The 
VDA told us that prior to European type approval, the cost of national type approval in 
Germany was ECU 740 and around ECU 11,100 for all Member States. The VDA now 
charges ECU 900 for a whole vehicle type approval. The harmonized system has 
therefore resulted in administrative cost savings of around ECU 10,400 for each whole 
vehicle type approval. 
• Actual impact 
All of these savings can be attributed to the single market programme. The direct savings, for 
example, total ECU 1-1.5 million for each model launch, and further indirect savings may 
approach ECU 30 million. 
Rationalization of RD&D 
We covered the key decisions to invest in independent RD&D centres in Section 6.4, and 
noted that these new investments were in part attributable to the single market programme. 
There have also been some changes in the way the RD&D process has been undertaken. 
The RD&D process can be characterized in the following way: 
(a) sequential/functional/linear, 
(b) parallel/functional, 
(c) parallel/team and leader. 
Historically, the European automotive sector has tended to adopt a linear and sequential 
approach to RD&D. This has largely been replaced by some sort of parallel development 
approach. However, a number of Western companies are seeking to introduce an approach 
usually associated with Japanese companies, entailing parallel development within a small 
core team and a specific project leader. 
• Sequential RD&D 
Under this approach the various functional elements of the vehicle manufacturer organization 
would come into the process at discrete points, after the previous function had finished. Thus, 
for example, the vehicle engineering team would put together the total design and then hand it 
over to production engineering, who would seek to develop systems to actually make the car. 
They would then hand over to marketing, who would think about how to sell the vehicles 
produced. 
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• Parallel/functional RD&D 
The above process has been replaced by various attempts at parallel development in which the 
functional elements involved work on the project at the same time or with strong overlaps in 
time. Thus, marketing would be involved at the product styling and conception stage, 
manufacturing engineering would be involved at the styling stage. 
This leads to increased co-ordination costs at the front of the development process, but also 
greater time savings later on - essentially a matter of improving the 'right first time' 
performance. 
• Parallel/team and leader 
This is an emulation of Japanese practice in which an individual takes charge of the entire 
vehicle development process, and builds a small cross-functional team which also remains in 
place over the entire process. The team is a temporary organizational structure which takes 
seconded staff from the various functional elements of the company and, usually, concentrates 
loyalty to the product rather than the functional elements of the company. Design times are 
reduced and co-ordination improved. 
In Europe, Renault has been quite successful in using this approach, for example to design the 
Twingo. Development times were under 24 months, and the product has unusually bold styling 
with a high degree of styling integrity. 
We questioned companies about the development of parallel RD&D processes. They told us 
that the single market programme has not been a direct influence on these changes. However, 
most of the changes were influenced by the Japanese approaches. Given that Japanese 
investment into Europe may have been caused to some extent by the single market 
programme, the single market may have had an indirect effect. 
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Figure 6.22. Summary diagram 15: Hypothesis 15 
High measurable effect 
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7. The impact on global competitiveness 
We have now considered all aspects of the hierarchy of hypotheses which look inwards at the 
impact of the single market programme on the EU Member States. There is one final 
hypothesis remaining to be tested, which is whether the global competitiveness of the EU-
owned automotive industry has increased. This chapter looks at this hypothesis. 
7.1. Hypothesis 16: Global competitiveness of the EU-owned automotive industry will 
increase 
One of the main objectives of the single market is that it should result in the EU-owned 
automotive manufacturers becoming more competitive on the world market. In the previous 
chapters, we have examined the impact of the single market programme on the marketing, 
production, purchasing and RD&D functions of the EU automotive manufacturers. 
Improvements in each of these areas will lead to a more competitive product produced by the 
EU-owned automotive manufacturers. These products should be more attractive to markets 
other than the EU because of a more competitive price, better technological specifications and 
more transferable standards. 
7.1.1. Expected impact 
Improved competition within the EU is expected to increase the value and reduce the costs of 
EU manufactured products. This, in turn, should result in the EU manufacturers becoming 
more competitive compared to non-EU manufacturers. 
7.1.2. Other factors 
There are a number of other factors which need to be considered. The first of these is that there 
have been a number of moves by the EU-owned manufacturers to adopt a more global strategy 
in recent years. This includes the adoption of new working methods, development of plant in 
regions other than Western Europe and the development of more European and global cars 
with a wider appeal. The relative market conditions and exchange rates in other markets 
compared to the EU Member States will also play a part.in determining the level of trade with 
these other states. Recession in other markets is likely to make national producers more 
competitive as they try to hold on to their traditional market share. Exchange rate fluctuations 
can make imported products less competitively priced. Barriers to trade are also likely to 
impact on the perceived success of market entry strategies by EU-owned manufacturers. It also 
takes some time for manufacturers to develop these strategies given that new production or 
plant may be required, so it may be too early to tell whether the single market has had an 
impact on the global competitiveness of the EU-owned automotive manufacturers. In any 
consideration of world trade, costs of transport and shipping are likely to have an impact. 
7.1.3. Quantitative analysis 
Figure 7.1 shows the EU-owned manufacturers' share of the US market, the Japanese market 
and the rest of the world between 1990 and 1994. The USA and Japan were chosen for 
particular examination because they are the two largest automotive producing countries in the 
world, producing extremely competitive products. 
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Figure 7.1. EU manufacturers' share of the Japanese, US and world markets, 1990-93 
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Figure 7.1 shows that: 
(a) The share held by the EU-owned manufacturers in both of these markets is extremely 
low. 
(b) Relative market conditions (as indicated by the dip in share in 1990 for both markets) 
appear to play an important part in determining the level of market share held by the EU-
owned manufacturers. 
(c) Generally, for the US and Japanese markets, the trend in share in recent years is upward, 
but the emergence from recession may be an important factor until the last year of the 
period. The continuation of the upward trend in 1994 suggests that the single market 
programme may have had an effect. 
(d) For the rest of the world, the EU-owned automotive manufacturers' share has declined. 
This is despite the fact that the volume of EU-indigenous production to the rest of the 
world has actually increased. 
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7.1.4. Actual impact 
The single market programme does appear to have had an effect. Assessing the extent of this 
effect is difficult given that globalization of the market for automotive vehicles has been 
increasing for some time. Relative market conditions also appear to have affected our analysis, 
making it even more difficult to draw any firm conclusions regarding the impact of the single 
market programme. 
Figure 7.2. Summary diagram 16: Hypothesis 16 
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8. The impact on business strategy 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter deals with the effects of the single market on corporate strategy. In addition to 
discussions with manufacturers, trade bodies, and academic researchers through our interview 
programme, we have reviewed press articles and journals to determine the various strategies 
put in place. This chapter is broken into three sections: 
(a) key factors determining strategy; 
(b) effects of the single market programme on corporate strategy, i.e. the way in which the 
whole firm structures itself in carrying out its business; 
(c) effects of the single market programme on business process strategy, i.e. the strategy of 
the different functional departments. 
It is clearly difficult to summarize corporate strategies for an entire industry, where each 
company is positioned differently, adopts varying strategic approaches, attacks its competitors 
and serves its market in different ways. Nevertheless, there are a number of clear trends which 
can be identified. 
8.2. What are the key factors which determine strategy in the industry? 
We consider that there are a number of common factors which have affected motor vehicle 
manufacturers' corporate strategies: 
(a) increasing demand for value for money in terms of the quality and price of vehicles 
purchased by consumers; 
(b) increasing competition from new entrants, particularly from Korea and Japan; 
(c) the location and nature of demand in different geographic markets, particularly in Asia 
and Eastern Europe; 
(d) increasing degrees of regulation, especially for environmental and safety considerations; 
(e) technological developments in production such as integrated transfer systems and water-
based paints. 
8.3. The effects of the single market programme on corporate strategy 
Whilst it is very difficult to summarize the corporate strategies for an entire industry, we 
suggest that strategies within the sector have three common characteristics: 
(a) a tendency to focus on particular segments of the market; 
(b) increasing investment in new production locations; 
(c) a desire by the companies to form strategic alliances. 
8.3.1. Increasing brand and market focus 
Automotive companies are increasingly focusing particular brands on selected market 
segments. Throughout our analysis, we have stressed how globalization is a key driver and 
inevitably this means that consumers are becoming more brand mobile and so less likely to 
purchase vehicles from their traditional national supplier(s). For these reasons, strong branding 
is becoming increasingly important, so that consumers can easily recognize the attributes and 
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characteristics of particular vehicles produced by manufacturers from whom they may not 
have made any previous purchase. Moreover, manufacturers are increasingly moving towards 
multiple brands as the market requires more differentiated products in each segment. Whilst 
this is not in any way a novel concept for the motor vehicle industry (for example, General 
Motors and the predecessors to Rover have used brand families for decades), the driver for 
economies of scale in design is reinforcing this trend. The economies are sometimes being 
achieved by acquisition, particularly in the small volume/high value sector (e.g. BMW's take-
over of Rover, Ford's takeover of Jaguar) but more often by alliances and joint ventures, 
which we discuss further below. 
Brand stretch across an entire range is perhaps becoming more difficult. Examples of the focus 
sought by the vehicle manufacturers include the following: 
(a) Renault is focusing on small cars in northern Europe. 
(b) Fiat is developing a series of world cars which will be targeted at developing countries. 
(c) Volvo is keen to make its brand 'sportier', but wishes to retain its niche position for 
producing safe and high value cars. 
(d) For a long time, BMW and Mercedes have focused on the high value end of the market, 
but they are also attempting to use the brand to move to higher volume, but still focused 
markets. 
(e) Even manufacturers with the broadest European range (such as Ford and GM) are keen 
to expand through acquisitions into more differentiated brands. Ford's takeover of 
Jaguar and GM's alliance with Saab can be seen in this light. These takeovers result in 
no change to the brand of the acquired company, but have clear benefits in the sharing of 
technology, RD&D, suppliers, and production facilities. 
(f) Renault is retaining an American truck brand name (Mack) to develop its market in 
North America. 
8.3.2. Investment in low cost regions 
The second trend which can be observed is investment in plants located in lower cost areas. 
We discussed this in some detail in Section 5.5. For example, GM has set up plants in the 
former East Germany, Hungary and Poland; VAG has invested in Skoda; and Mercedes has 
set up joint ventures in Russia. As we mentioned in Section 5.5, European policies have 
facilitated this development. Companies are not only investing in these low cost areas but 
increasingly selling products to them. For example, Fiat is targeting specific models for 
emerging markets. Brazil (from April 1996) and then Poland will be the hub of the 'Palio' 
production. Production will be extended to Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, Morocco 
and South Africa. As a consequence of the 'Palio', Fiat expects its sales to be equally split 
between Italy, the rest of Europe and the rest of the world. 
8.3.3. The formation of strategic alliances 
Corporate strategies in a number of firms have been directed towards developing strategic 
links with other firms in the sector. These take the form of: 
(a) Joint equity ventures to produce cars, commercial vehicles or important components 
such as engines and gearboxes. For example, Renault and PSA between them have 
formed four joint ventures. 
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(b) Agreements to produce vehicles and components for other assemblers. For example, 
Volvo makes pressed components for Saab, and engines, pressed parts and transmissions 
for Renault. 
(c) Technology agreements between the largest car assemblers. For example, Honda and 
Rover have several licensing agreements and BMW and Fiat co-operate on car recycling. 
In Figure 8.1, we outline the key agreements which have been developed. Appendix M 
provides more detail and covers each company in turn. 
We consider that these alliances were set up for a variety of reasons including: 
(a) a desire by companies to reduce their costs of production through: 
(i) moving production to countries with lower labour costs (see Section 6.5), 
(ii) moving production to other countries to spread the risk of currency fluctuations, 
(iii) taking advantage of economies of scale in the production of parts or vehicles; 
(b) a desire to collaborate in technology. For example, Honda's licensing deal with Rover in 
the UK was seen to have benefited greatly the quality of the products produced by 
Rover; 
(c) risk sharing for the development of new product types, e.g. MPVs/4x4s. 
Co-operation between the producers was uncommon before the mid-1970s. The exception was 
an arrangement between Renault and Peugeot for the joint manufacture of engines and 
transmissions. Strategic alliances grew rapidly in the 1980s and more recently co-operation 
has been prevalent in developing multi-purpose and off-road vehicles. For example: 
(a) Isuzu and GM are producing a 4x4; 
(b) Nissan and Ford are producing an MPV; 
(c) VW and Ford are producing an MPV. 
Whilst the single market has fostered a general culture which encourages alliances and 
restructuring among European manufacturers, it is difficult to associate these changes with any 
one particular measure. 
8.4. Implications of the single market programme on business process strategy 
We have considered the effects of the single market programme on business strategy by 
focusing on different business functions which were outlined in our industry analytical model: 
(a) marketing, 
(b) production, 
(c) purchasing, 
(d) research, design and development (RD&D). 
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Figure 8.1. Significant equity ventures and cross-shareholdings in the EU-based 
automotive industry 
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8.4.1. Marketing 
In terms of marketing, the passenger car market is commonly broken down into a number of 
sub-sectors. Table 8.1 provides an overview of sales within each of these over time. 
Table 8.1. The segmentation of the new car market in Western Europe 
Sub-sector 
Small 
Lower-medium 
Upper-medium 
Large/luxury 
Coupes/roadsters 
MPVs 
Off-road 
Van-derived 
Others 
Total 
1989 
% market share 
(units) 
31.1 
31.7 
23.1 
9.1 
1.1 
0.5 
1.5 
0.9 
0.8 
100 
1991 
% market share 
(units) 
31.7 
31.3 
21.7 
8.7 
2.0 
0.7 
1.6 
1.3 
1.0 
100 
1994 
% market share 
(units) 
31.2 
32.5 
22.1 
6.8 
2.2 
1.4 
2.1 
1.0 
0.6 
100 
Source: EIU. 
Note: Numbers do not add up to 100 because of rounding. 
The table shows that there has been a shift towards 'people carriers' (MPVs) and off-road 
vehicles. Renault told us during our case study programme that over the last ten years there 
has been more commonality among the different producers' products. For example, there are 
fewer specific concepts, such as the 2CV or the R4. However, there has been an increase in 
the number of models in each model class. In the 1950s, there was usually only one model by 
class. Now, there are usually four models for each class of car (coupe, hatchback, estate and 
saloon). This has resulted in a decrease in share for each model as they become increasingly 
differentiated. 
For these reasons, Renault considers that the increase in models and variants is more a 
reflection of the long-term increase of global competition in the automotive industry than the 
single market programme increasing the competition and variety available to the consumer. 
Global competitive increases are more to do with the Common Market, a natural progression 
to develop sales in new markets and overcapacity world-wide. This, in turn has led to a more 
sophisticated consumer who demands more from the automotive manufacturers. This has also 
led to an increase in competition. 
With respect to distribution, the key issues are: 
(a) to reduce the cost of distribution; 
(b) to improve the customer-order delivery time; 
(c) to improve responsiveness to customer requirements; 
(d) to retain service, repair and parts sales; 
(e) to provide a pan-European brand experience. 
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That is, in the short to medium term there will be an overall trend towards greater uniformity 
between individual national distribution systems. In the longer term, a more sophisticated and 
subtle approach to structuring distribution systems within Europe may develop, in which 
national boundaries are no longer the primary determinant of marketing areas. 
The strategy pursued by Daewoo in the UK has attracted attention. The Korean company has 
commenced building a network of about 30 manufacturer-owned car sales points (Daewoo 
Vision 2000) which feature single price, 'no-haggle and no-pressure' approaches to sales. 
Servicing is to be carried out by a third party, Halfords, in their national network of 'fastfit' 
centres. Thus far, the strategy has been a success, with sales in the first nine months of 
operation gaining over 1% of the market - the most rapid gain in market share ever recorded 
for a new entrant in the UK. We understand that to facilitate this growth, the company is 
investing ECU 3,000 on marketing for each car sold. 
The strategy of vehicle assemblers with production facilities in Europe is, where possible, to 
leverage this advantage in distribution and marketing by offering greater speed of response and 
greater sensitivity to customer demands. This entails establishing robust EDI systems to link 
dealerships with factory output, having the necessary flexibility in production, and where 
possible removing stock from dealerships to larger regional or national stock-holding points. 
Some companies, especially those producing high value vehicles, such as Volvo, Saab and 
BMW, have sought to differentiate themselves through the quality of their service and repair 
work in the distribution network. 
8.4.2. Production 
In terms of vehicle production, there have been a number of important changes: 
(a) there has been a trend for new investments to be set up in peripheral regions; 
(b) the industry is increasingly using lean manufacturing techniques; 
(c) there has been an increasing use of new technological processes in producing vehicles. 
Companies are investing in peripheral regions of Europe in order to benefit from both lower 
costs (in aggregate, allowing for subsidies) and the ability to set up new labour agreements and 
exploit large new sites for new production layouts and space for JIT suppliers, etc. We covered 
the investments made by vehicle producers in Chapter 6. Of the 24 investments covered 
between 1985 and 1996, 12 were in Eastern Europe (including former East Germany). Volume 
manufacturers argue that fundamental changes in production are easier and less costly to 
implement in new production facilities than trying to change all of their existing facilities. 
There is also a trend for the Japanese companies to expand their production outside their 
domestic market. For example, Toyota has plans to increase the numbers of cars it 
manufactures outside Japan from 45% in 1994 to 55% in 1996, and to 65% in 1998. 
Manufacturers have been using increasingly lean production techniques. For example, Fiat's 
new plant at Melfi in the south of Italy, which produces the Punto, uses its 'integrated factory' 
concept. This focuses on lean production, using Japanese techniques such as team working, 
multi-skilling, flexibility, continuous improvement and the exploitation of plant-level 
economies of scale. These changes have helped to reduce the number of hours it takes to make 
a vehicle. These improvements can be illustrated by comparing the performances of the new 
Melfi (assembly) and Pratola Serra (engines) plants with the older ones: Cassino and Termoli. 
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In the new plants there has been a reduction in time based manufacturing, measured by the 
time required by the car to go from the start to the end of the line. This indicator is lower at 
Melfi compared to Cassino, by 40% in body welding, by 30% in paint, and 8% in final 
assembly (i.e. the improvements are largest in the highly automated areas). The total time 
devoted to these operations is 27 hours at Melfi and 38 hours at Cassino. In addition, the 
number of parts stored along these lines has decreased by 32% (as a result of more proximate 
suppliers). Smaller manufacturers, such as Volvo, see flexibility in manufacturing as key to 
their competitive survival. This flexibility is necessary so they can compete with the low cost, 
high volume producers, such as Ford. 
There are still large variations in the efficiency of the manufacturing process for different 
geographic regions and manufacturers. Toyota can currently produce a car in 12 man-hours 
compared to 16-20 for Honda, Nissan and Ford. Boston Consulting Group concluded in their 
study for the European Commission that the productivity of the leading Japanese car assembly 
companies was 30% higher than in Europe. Such benchmarking analyses need strong 'health 
warnings'; both definition of the beginning and end of production and method of measurement 
vary from company to company, making inter-firm comparison on this basis very difficult. 
Companies have increasingly been using new technological processes, in order to improve 
quality and to reduce costs. For example, engines used to be made with general purpose 
machine tools, but are now made with flexible numerically computer controlled and robotic 
machinery or with dedicated machine tools. In-cycle quality assurance takes place using 
programmable metrologicai probes which test tolerances and reject parts immediately if they 
do not meet quality criteria. The manufacture of body panels has also benefited from manual 
tandem technological changes. Manufacture then moved on to semi-automated or automated 
tandem press lines (typically six to eight lines of eight presses). Further innovations included 
tri-axis transfer presses. The body in white assembly (i.e. welding) has also undergone some 
important changes. First, there were simple manual jigs and manual welders. This, then, 
moved on to programmable robotic body welding. The latest technology being employed is an 
Intelligent Body Framing System. 
The conclusion from this is that the single market programme may support such 
manufacturing strategies, but is of minor importance compared with other activities. 
8.4.3. Purchasing 
The power of vehicle assemblers in the supply chain should not be underestimated. While they 
have ceded some ground in terms of extended purchasing contracts and greater technological 
dependency on their suppliers, their control over the relationship is such that they are able to 
insist upon sweeping cost reductions. Supplier facilities located alongside assembly plants 
may be dedicated to serving that plant alone. For example, Fiat explained to us how 16 
suppliers are located within their Melfi plant. In these circumstances, while components 
suppliers may have contracts for the lifetime of production of a particular model, there may 
not be any contract security beyond that point. As a result, close proximity investments often 
involve leased premises and low capital investment costs. 
Vehicle assemblers are also reducing the number of suppliers they deal with. For example, 
Volvo is reducing its supply chain by a net amount of 20 suppliers per annum. They have 
identified 160 product areas, and the intention is to have one supplier per components area per 
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model or platform. Our case study with Fiat showed that it started its selection and 
empowerment of suppliers in 1991, in view of the launch of the Punto. This 'crescita guidata' 
(assisted growth) was based on the collaboration between Fiat and a set of selected suppliers 
to cut costs by 15% through standardization, quality control, warehousing and reducing the 
weight of components. Fiat told us that the reduction in the number of suppliers has been 
significant, from 1,200 in 1987 to 380 today. Renault dealt with 1,163 suppliers in 1989 and 
by 1995 this had been reduced by 28% to 843. Seventy per cent of the cost of the vehicle is 
now produced by components suppliers, compared with 20% only 20 years ago. 
The greater demands placed upon suppliers to undertake 'systems' development and a greater 
share of the R&D input into the product demands that suppliers achieve scale and, ideally, 
synergies across their businesses. For example, Volvo expects to save 30-40% in RD&D costs 
through co-development with suppliers. Fiat has seen the proportion of design carried out by 
suppliers grow markedly from 30% for the Uno in 1983, to 45% for the Punto in 1994 and to 
55% for the Bravo/Brava in 1995. Moreover, a 'system' is not a fixed concept, but is 
continuously redefined in the face of changes in product technology and sourcing strategy. 
Thus, components suppliers face great challenges in creating an optimum business structure 
and defining a specific place within the supply chain that is appropriate for their capabilities. 
The conclusion from this is that for both volume manufacturers and suppliers, the single 
market programme does not conflict with the strategy for purchasing. 
Section 6.6 covered our analysis of the degree to which components suppliers were becoming 
international. 
8.4.4. Research, design and development 
RD&D organization and process changes are made in response to one central problem: the 
need to minimize the cost and time taken to create a coherent, production-ready design in the 
face of growing product complexity and market fragmentation. A key element of RD&D 
organization and process is the link to manufacturing strategy in what are often global 
companies seeking to address a range of distinct markets. Typically about 3-5% of sales is 
devoted to RD&D, but only a portion of this is actually new vehicle design and development. 
At least half of the resources go towards facilities improvement. Large sums may be spent on 
technologies not immediately used (especially in the area of drivetrains where manufacturers 
adopt a range of approaches on a 'just in case' basis). Volvo have a strong commitment to the 
social and environmental aspects of their products, and so environmental issues play an 
important part in their RD&D. It has developed a series of environmental concept vehicles, 
including the use of gas turbine/electric motors. 
We can distinguish four basic models of RD&D organization in the automotive industry: 
(a) centralized, 
(b) bi-polar, 
(c) networked hierarchy, 
(d) multi-nodal networks. 
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Centralized model 
In a centralized organizational structure all the major elements of the RD&D process are 
located within one main centre, which may in fact consist of one main building or may be a 
collection of proximate buildings. Such centres would also contain test facilities, such as wind 
chambers and test tracks. A contemporary example of this approach is Renault, who are 
constructing a vast 'Technocentre' outside Paris. This Technocentre is seen as 'an architectural 
interpretation of a new way of working' by Renault based on a simple basic idea: '...to 
improve and accelerate the process of vehicle development by bringing together on a single 
site all the men and women who are involved in the design, engineering and manufacturing 
process activities'. 
The Renault Technocentre will house approximately 12,000 of its own staff, and about 1,000 
staff seconded from suppliers. It will enable Renault to adopt a new form of RD&D process by 
reducing the costs of co-ordination and integration. RD&D processes are discussed separately 
below. 
Bi-polar model 
The bi-polar structure is common in the automotive sector, consisting of two more or less 
equal centres for RD&D activities which may or may not undertake distinctly separate 
activities. Typically, this type of structure emerges following the acquisition or restructuring of 
previously separate entities. Typical examples may include Ford in Europe (prior to the Ford 
2000 changes), BMW-Rover, and PSA (with Peugeot and Citroën activities). 
The bi-polar structure can be seen as sub-optimal in that there may be a degree of duplication 
of activities. Both sites are essentially equal in standing and resources. Where activities are 
apportioned to each site, there remain costs of co-ordination and integration, especially where 
manufacturing responsibilities are split. 
Networked hierarchy model 
The networked hierarchy is the preferred structure for globalized Japanese automotive 
companies. In brief, it entails the centralized location of core activities in basic research and 
vehicle design. Secondary hubs in the network may perform a range of 'localization' roles 
including styling; local engineering requirements (e.g. changes to suspensions); materials 
conformance; standards conformance; and supplier evaluation to support local manufacturing 
activities. 
The central hub in the network is roughly equivalent to the organizational structure noted 
above, and is based in the 'domestic' market of the manufacturer. Secondary centres may feed 
into the design process at several stages. For example, many Japanese companies maintain 
styling centres in California, and these may feed into the product concept stage. Engineering 
centres of the type employed by the Japanese in Europe may undertake a range of roles later on 
in the development process including 'local' engineering changes to meet specific market or 
regulatory conditions, or supplier quality and performance monitoring including materials 
standards conformance testing. Key strategic and design decisions are taken at the centre. 
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Multi-nodal networks model 
This is a further stage in the evolution of RD&D structures in which secondary hubs are 
effectively upgraded towards a more equal status with the central hub. A number of 
automotive assemblers are moving in this direction including Ford (whose global network 
includes Mazda in Japan and Kia in Korea), Honda, Nissan and GM. In this type of structure, 
each hub is capable of full product development, from conception and styling through to 
production engineering. This in turn is linked to a manufacturing strategy which entails 
product specialization for some facilities. Thus, for example, the Honda Accord Aerodeck was 
designed in the USA, is built in the USA, and exported to both Japan and Europe. Under the 
Ford 2000 programme, Europe will be the primary location for small cars RD&D, while the 
USA will be the location for medium and large car work. Nissan told us that there was no 
'mother development' of the Terrano II/Maverick or the Vanette Cargo in Japan. All the 
development was carried out in Europe, although it did use common components from other 
models such as engines and gearboxes. 
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9. Case study summaries 
This chapter summarizes the findings of our detailed case studies with a selection of 
automotive manufacturers. More extensive findings from the case studies are set out in 
Appendices Q to U, where each of the manufacturers is examined in more detail. 
9.1. Nissan 
Nissan was chosen as a case study for a number of reasons: it first entered the European 
market in the 1960s and during the 1980s made major investments in manufacturing facilities 
in the region providing an interesting, non-EU perspective on market entry and plant location; 
it is a global player, so its attitude to the EU can be compared with its strategies towards North 
America; it pioneered the introduction of a number of new practices to the European 
automobile industry, such as lean manufacturing techniques, simultaneous engineering and 
common terms and conditions. 
Products and production. Nissan produces passenger cars in high volume with a good 
presence throughout the small to large segments. In total, there are 26 models (passenger cars, 
light commercial vehicles and trucks) for the European market from over 40 model-types 
available globally. In 1991, Nissan was producing nearly 200,000 units in Europe, by 1995 
production in Europe was nearly 340,000. Throughout this period two-thirds of production 
was from the UK, with the remainder in Spain. They foresee a trend of rationalizing their 
number of platforms and restricting their range in the future. 
The single market and access. Nissan offers its products to the whole of Europe. It sells six 
main models into the European market, compared with a total of around 20 major models 
across the globe. Nissan employs a pan-European marketing campaign for the launch of a new 
product, often using a common advertising theme. Nissan said that at the time of market entry, 
the establishment of an effective sales network was one of the more difficult problems, 
particularly given the block exemption system. Nevertheless, Nissan thought that it was 
normal for a new entrant to make more of an effort than indigenous players. Nissan added that 
the appreciation of the Yen had not affected its strategy towards Europe and the development 
of production facilities. 
Production. Nissan intends to commonize its engines, drives and chassis on a global basis, but 
to retain different production structures within each region. Nissan is also attempting to halve 
the number of platforms it has from the current 26, in order to achieve economies of scale at 
the global level. Productivity targets have been 10% increases per annum in the UK. They 
have achieved this in 1994, 1995 and 1996. Of the 10%, 7-7.5% is from process 
improvements, the rest is through design changes. Future targets are 10%, 8% and 7% over the 
next three years. 
Employment. Nissan indulges in some transfer of employees across the EU. This is more to do 
with the development of the skills of the employees rather than the single market programme. 
Manufacturing plants, location and size. Nissan has not relocated as such, but has developed 
new European sites to manufacture and distribute its vehicles. Nissan has two manufacturing 
bases in Europe, one in the UK and the other in Spain. Nissan Motor Manufacturing (UK) Ltd 
is Nissan's European passenger car production plant, making the Micra and Primera. 
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Established in 1985, it was the largest exporter of passenger vehicles from the UK in 1993. By 
1995 it had produced 215,000 vehicles. The Spanish operations produce 4x4, multi-purpose, 
light commercial vehicles, commercial and industrial vehicles and forklifts. Nissan entered the 
market by buying a Ford plant, becoming majority shareholder in 1982. In 1995, it produced 
122,000 vehicles, two-thirds of which are exported to other European markets. 
Purchasing. In 1994, Nissan had 198 suppliers for the UK plant and 241 for the Spanish plant. 
Thirty-nine suppliers are common to the UK and Spanish plants, and this number is 
increasing. Components expenditure in Europe has increased from around UK£ 50 million in 
1986 to UK£ 200 million in 1995. The number of European components suppliers has 
increased from zero in 1986 to around 750 in 1995. When Nissan entered the EU market it 
used indigenous sources of supply because its perceived customer requirements were different 
for performance requirements from subsystems (e.g. suspension systems, braking systems, 
etc.) in the EU compared to Japan. It considered the best way to meet these requirements was 
to use indigenous components supply (in contrast to previous policy in North America). Since 
entry, Nissan has actively encouraged the components suppliers to adopt new techniques and 
to improve efficiency. 
RD&D. Nissan's European Technology Centres (NETCs) operate from bases in the UK and 
Belgium and represent a total investment of ECU 78 million. Our calculations suggest that 
Nissan makes direct savings of approximately ECU 1 million through the single market 
programme's whole vehicle type approval. Products for both Japan and Europe are 
increasingly likely to have their design, development and production shared between these two 
regions, rather than Europe purely 'localizing' design. Design and development has been 
increasingly delegated down to the suppliers. However, this originated from Nissan's own 
policy on relations with suppliers (i.e. simultaneous engineering) and not as a result of the 
single market programme. 
Business strategy. Nissan's strategy over the past two to three years has been the global 
'commonization' or sharing of platform and parts/components across model lines in order to 
reduce both production costs and costs to the after-sales market. One example of this 
'commonization' strategy is that the new Primera built in the UK shares a common platform 
with the Japanese Bluebird. Nissan shares the design and production of the Terrano II with the 
Ford Maverick. Both are made at Nissan's Spanish site. Within production at Nissan's plant in 
Sunderland, all staff share the same terms of employment. Eight major suppliers who 
manufacture components simultaneously have plants alongside the Sunderland site. 
9.2. Fiat 
Fiat was chosen as a case study because: the company is one of the major automotive 
manufacturers in the EU; the Italian automotive market has been relatively closed in the past 
with the strong brand of Fiat dominating entrants; Fiat has invested heavily in Poland and has 
a growing presence in new markets around the world; and has a strong commercial vehicle 
presence through Iveco. 
Products and production. Since its inception, Fiat has concentrated in its home market and 
specializes in the economy car segment. However, the acquisition of Alfa Romeo strengthened 
its presence in the luxury car segment. Currently, Fiat sells its products under six different 
makes: Fiat, Lancia, Alfa Romeo, Innocenti, Ferrari and Maserati. Iveco produces the full 
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range of commercial vehicles, but specializes in light and medium vehicles. Fiat Auto 
production in 1994 was 2,107,800 units and a further 247,600 cars were produced by partners 
and licensees. 
The single market programme and access. Fiat performed badly between 1990 and 1993, 
mainly because of unsatisfactory products and an inefficient distribution system. In 1993, Fiat 
launched a revamped product range and overhauled the distribution system by reducing the 
number of franchised distributors and the development of a more systematic performance 
evaluation system. The new model range is focused on the mid-size segment because of the 
stability and volumes of sales available from this segment in Europe. Fiat views the 
devaluation of the Lira as beneficial to profits rather than to sales. Fiat believes that 
differences in tax systems, peculiarities in the administrative regimes, and some policies 
designed to protect local markets are restricting a truly unified market. 
Production. The reorganization of Fiat carried out in the early 1990s is based on the Integrated 
Factory project, which adopts the 'Toyota' framework. This has taken into account the 
shortcomings experienced in the previous technologically driven organizational innovations 
and the resultant rigidities. Fiat believes that the improved productivity performances are the 
result of growing global competition in the sector, which could have been caused only 
indirectly by the single market programme. Fiat believes that some regulations regarding the 
environment have generated a considerable increase in costs. 
Employment. Between 1990 and 1994, employment at Fiat fell by 10%. In Italy, the fall was 
30% whereas extra-European employment has increased. In Fiat's new plants, new contractual 
conditions have been implemented to gain greater flexibility in production organization. Fiat 
believes that the single market programme was not responsible for these changes, rather it is as 
a result of growing competition and changing labour relations in Italy. Furthermore, Fiat 
considers that there is no evidence of an increase in cross-border recruitment. 
Manufacturing plants, location and size. With the exception of the internationalization 
initiatives on an extra-European basis, Fiat Auto has historically concentrated its activities in 
Italy. However, production has shifted from the north of Italy to the south with the opening of 
the Melfi (capacity of 450,000 cars per annum) and Pratola Serra plants. These greenfield 
plants were selected over EU alternatives because of logistical considerations such as 
proximity to other Fiat operations and investment grants, although similar grants could have 
been obtained for other sites. The new Polish plant was implemented to take advantage both of 
developing Central and Eastern European markets, and provide opportunities to export to 
Western countries from a lower cost base. 
Purchasing. The main changes in this area are through a reduction in the number of suppliers 
used, an increased empowerment of components suppliers in product concept and design, the 
implementation of 'assisted growth' and the diffusion of JIT supply. This has led to suppliers 
being closer to the manufacturing plants, restricting the internationalization of supply and 
cross-border sourcing. Fiat believes that the single market has had only a limited effect on 
purchasing practices but has played a part in the increased concentration of the components 
industry. 
RD&D. Fiat Auto RD&D is run in Italy with the main design unit, the Research Centre of 
Orbassano (Torino), employing 781 people. Fiat considers that the implementation of 
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companion and whole vehicle type approval has not generated any savings because differences 
still remain in the administration of these procedures, particularly registration. 
Business strategy. Fiat views the EU as a domestic market with their primary focus 
increasingly on the emerging markets in South America and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the 
strengthening of the position on the European market is an essential objective of Fiat's 
strategy, to be secured by gaining a bigger market share in the medium car segment. Fiat's 
main objectives are to reduce the break-even point of its activities, increase efficiency and the 
new emerging markets. 
9.3. Renault 
Renault was chosen as a case study because of its significant presence in the EU: it is the third 
largest producer in the EU after Ford and GM and will provide a useful perspective from the 
point of view of a company which has been selling cars throughout Europe for a long time. 
Products and production. Renault produces passenger cars, ranging from the Twingo to the 
Espace, and industrial vehicles (through Renault V.l.) through two branches of its business -
Branche Europe and Mack trucks. In 1985, total passenger car production was 1.6 million 
vehicles and rose steadily to 1.93 million in 1989. Since then, production has fluctuated at 
around 1.8 million per annum. For commercial vehicles, Renault V.l. produced 64,415 
vehicles in 1994. Renault has three major markets - Western Europe, North America and the 
Asia Pacific. However, Renault has a presence in South America, the former Soviet states, 
China, Central Europe and Africa. 
The single market programme and access. Renault did not wait until the implementation of 
the single market programme before it treated Europe as a common single market. Renault 
established a Common Market division in 1961 and views the single market programme as a 
formalization of the Common Market. Renault considers the increase in models and variants 
available to customers in the EU more as a result of the increasing globalization of 
competition in the automotive industry than the single market programme. Renault does not 
consider that pan-European marketing is possible even though they do produce European cars. 
Pan-European marketing is difficult because of remaining differences in consumer needs and 
tastes across the EU. 
Production. Renault considers that the single market programme has not been the principal 
driver of improvements in production costs and productivity. Any recent changes in 
productivity are because of the globalization of competition in the automotive industry. The 
increased competition has increased productivity and Renault would have made these 
improvements whether the single market programme was implemented or not. Renault 
considers that, at most, the single market programme was a contributory factor to their 
improvements in productivity. 
Employment. There has been a significant decline in Renault's employment - as a direct result 
of productivity improvements made over recent years. Renault regards the role of the single 
market in this fall in employment as minimal at most. Mobility of Renault's workforce is low 
because of country-specific social laws, pensions, taxes and salaries, all perceived by Renault 
as barriers to mobility. 
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Manufacturing plants, location and size. Renault tends to have relatively small plants in 
comparison with the US companies. This is because Renault attaches significant importance to 
flexibility in production and balances this with scale economies. Renault's plants have been 
traditionally located in France and southern Europe, where demand used to be based. 
However, as demand for Renault's products has shifted to the north of Europe, so too have 
their plant locations. Renault does not consider that the single market has played a part in the 
location of their plants, but that their long-term strategy of developing sales in the north of 
Europe is more important. 
Purchasing. In 1989, Renault dealt with 1,163 components suppliers, by 1995 this had fallen 
by 27.5% to 843. This reduction is more a reflection of the use of 'systems' suppliers, those 
suppliers that take on a components system for manufacture and then pass that on to the 
automotive manufacturer, than as a result of the single market programme. Renault consider 
that the location of suppliers used has not significantly changed. This is a reflection of the fact 
that Renault has developed long-term contracts with suppliers for development and production 
of the components and systems. 
RD&D. Renault considers that the single market programme allows RD&D to be located in 
one place. Before the single market programme was implemented, Renault had been pursuing 
a policy of centralizing RD&D in France through the closure of some small RD&D operations 
in Spain. Renault considers that the single market programme has had a significant positive 
effect through whole vehicle type approval. However, Renault considers that the costs 
imposed through over-regulation have outweighed the cost benefits of whole vehicle type 
approval. 
Business strategy. Renault's prime strategy is the development of a demand base in northern 
Europe, away from its traditional demand base of southern Europe as this area becomes 
increasingly competitive. Renault considers that the single market programme has had an 
indirect effect on its business through the benefits it has brought to new entrants into the EU 
market, particularly the Japanese and Korean firms. In response to this increased competition 
and the steadily increasing globalization of competition, Volvo and Renault had attempted to 
merge. However, political differences, mainly the state ownership of Renault, saw the merger 
collapse. 
9.4. Volvo 
Volvo was selected as a case study because the company: combines commercial vehicle and 
passenger car production; has a small domestic market and a long experience of 
internationalization; is based in Sweden which is a new Member State in the EU; has 
significant and long-standing manufacturing investments in the EU; derives a significant 
proportion of total sales within the EU; and has been a key actor in alliance activity both 
successfully (with Mitsubishi) and unsuccessfully (Renault). 
Products and production. Volvo produces passenger cars in medium volume, with a stronger 
presence in the larger segments, and is thus illustrative of other European producers such as 
Mercedes and BMW. In the commercial vehicle sector, Volvo is considered a volume 
producer. In both, Volvo has major manufacturing operations in the EU. 
The single market and access. In both cars and, especially, commercial vehicles Volvo has 
long relied on markets outside Sweden - typically the USA, Germany, the Netherlands and the 
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UK. The single market programme has not affected this long-term position, but may be said to 
have supported it. Volvo considered other factors as important in shaping sales outside the 
domestic market but within the EU, notably Member State tax regimes, differences in Member 
State economic performance, and exchange rate movements. 
Production. In the 1980s, Volvo experimented in Sweden with working practices in order to 
reduce absenteeism and other labour problems. More recently, Volvo has adopted a set of 
working practices which could be generally termed 'lean' production. These changes, and new 
investment in productive capacity associated with the introduction of the 850 series passenger 
car, made a large difference to production costs against which the contribution of the single 
market programme was not discernible. 
Employment. Volvo, by virtue of its international production facilities, has long been a 
significant employer of non-domestic (i.e. non-Swedish) staff. The single market programme 
has facilitated the process of international recruitment. 
Manufacturing plants, location and size. Volvo's largest plant is in Ghent, Belgium whose 
output in 1994 was 147,000 cars. The Nedcar plant in Born, Netherlands, may, in part at least, 
be attributable to the desire of Volvo's joint venture partner, Mitsubishi, to have 
manufacturing operations within the EU. One reason why the Born plant is a workable 
proposition for both parties is that a single market exists, so that one plant can indeed serve all 
markets. Volvo has a more international spread of manufacturing operations for commercial 
vehicles, but again EU locations (UK, Belgium) are important. 
Purchasing. As with production, Volvo has adopted a new set of purchasing approaches which 
have generated significant cost savings on product development, piece prices, and assembly 
cost. By virtue of the restricted supply base within Sweden, and the long-term manufacturing 
presence within the EU, Volvo has traditionally sourced a high proportion of components 
outside Sweden. The single market programme is entirely supportive of the efforts of Volvo to 
reduce purchasing costs, but the direct cost saving impact is minimal compared with the very 
large savings generated by new purchasing approaches. 
RD&D. Volvo considered that RD&D savings could occur where a reduced number of 
variants needed to be produced. The largest single contributor to variance was the existence of 
different Member State tax regimes. The single market programme did reduce some variant 
cost, and reduced the cost of achieving type approval, but the savings were minor compared 
with the extra cost of variants noted above, and the savings generated by new collaborative 
RD&D relationships with suppliers. 
Business strategy. The single market programme was seen as essentially supportive of Volvo's 
corporate strategies, although the company has gone through some significant changes in 
strategic direction in the recent past following the failure of the merger with Renault. In 
general terms, the single market programme increased competitive pressure in the EU 
automotive industry, and this could be expected to drive further consolidation in the industry. 
9.5. Daewoo 
Daewoo was selected as a case study to represent a recent entrant into European markets, and 
also to represent the growing automotive industry of South Korea. Daewoo has no volume 
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production facilities in the EU at present, but has embarked upon a rapid global expansion 
which includes the acquisition of IAD, a UK company with expertise in vehicle RD&D. 
Daewoo has the bulk of its production facilities in South Korea, and has plans to expand 
capacity from 396,000 cars (1994) to 2,200,000 cars (2000). In the short term, the majority of 
sales into the EU will come directly from South Korea, though in the medium term, the new 
plants under construction in Uzbekhistan, Poland, and Romania could become sources of EU 
imports. At present, parts of the Daewoo car range are derived from previous generation GM 
products, but by the year 2000 the entire range should be Daewoo's own designs. 
The single market programme and access. Daewoo made its initial entry into markets in the 
EU in 1995, after the single market programme had been introduced. It is likely that the 
removal of barriers to trade within the EU had helped Daewoo gain market presence. Of more 
fundamental concern to Daewoo is the overall issue of imports from South Korea to the EU 
and reciprocal access for EU producers to the South Korean market. 
Production costs. Clearly, the single market programme has not had an impact upon 
production costs or productivity in Daewoo. 
Employment. At present, Daewoo is not a large employer within the EU and its presence is so 
recent that any effect from the single market programme is not yet noticeable. On the other 
hand, through the purchase of IAD and its general policy of recruiting non-South Korean staff 
for key RD&D and marketing posts, Daewoo can be said to benefit from the general freedom 
of movement within the EU. 
Manufacturing plants, location and size. As noted above, Daewoo does not at present have 
volume manufacturing facilities in the EU. In the future it may have, either because of 
enlargement of the EU to include countries which already have a Daewoo plant, or because 
Daewoo may decide to build a further new plant within the current EU. In the commercial 
vehicle sector, Daewoo has further deepened its relationship with Steyr of Austria and has 
taken a 65% share of four plants. Access to EU markets was probably an important factor in 
these investments. 
Purchasing. There is no information available on Daewoo purchasing activities in the EU, but 
they may be assumed to be insignificant. On the other hand, with the purchase of IAD, 
Daewoo is now in a position to develop RD&D links with potential suppliers. 
RD&D. As noted above, Daewoo has sought to expand its own RD&D capabilities so that it 
may become independent from other vehicle manufacturers - most notably through the 
purchase of IAD. As with other manufacturers in the EU, Daewoo may be expected to benefit 
from the reduced costs of type approval under the single market programme. 
Business strategy. To date, the expansion strategy of Daewoo has resulted in many new plants 
being built, both large and small, but none has been within the major markets of the EU, North 
America or Japan. Equally, the market focus has been on Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin 
America. Prior to 1995, Daewoo was excluded from EU markets under the terms of its licence 
agreement with GM. The single market programme has been less of an issue for Daewoo; of 
more concern is the possible application of quotas and tariffs to South Korean imports into the 
EU. 
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10. Conclusions and future actions 
This chapter provides our assessment of the effects of the single market programme on the 
motor vehicles sector, and the measures which we believe should be put in place in the future 
in order to remove the remaining restrictions on trade which impede the development of the 
sector. 
10.1. Impact of the single market 
Our views are brought together under each of the hypotheses covered in this report. In the 
table which follows, we summarize the analysis and results against each of the hypotheses 
covered in Chapters 5 and 6. The final column shows the extent to which the results are 
consistent with the expected impact of the single market programme. 
Table 10.1. Conclusions for each hypothesis 
Hypothesis Consistency with 
expected impact of 
SMP 
Marketing 
Improved market access 
Intra-EU trade at an 
aggregate level has 
increased 
Number of models and 
variants will increase 
Relative share of national 
sales as a proportion of 
total sales will fall 
Intra-EU trade relative to 
individual Member State 
consumption will increase 
Manufacturers' national 
market shares will fall 
Manufacturers' market 
share will equalize across 
Member States 
Competition and market 
concentration will increase 
Prices will become less 
variable across Member 
States 
Pan-European distribution 
and marketing networks 
will be developed 
This hypothesis is covered by the more detailed hypotheses below. 
Overall, this hypothesis is consistent with our results that the 
single market programme has improved market access. 
Aggregate measurement of intra-EU trade failed to prove this 
hypothesis. It is likely that the impact of the single market was 
being outweighed by other factors in some Member States, as 
discussed below. 
There has been a dramatic increase in the number of variants and 
models available in France and Germany. Moreover, the share of 
the top ten models in France has also fallen, also indicating a more 
fragmented market. 
While some manufacturers' national sales as a percentage of total 
sales declined, other (most notably German-owned manufacturers) 
shares increased. German reunification is a factor in these results. 
There were differing results for the countries analysed. Other 
factors appear to have played a more important role in determining 
exports and imports rather than the single market programme. 
While some manufacturers' share of their national market 
declined, German-owned manufacturers' national share increased. 
German reunification is a factor in these results. 
From 1992, the variance in price across the Member States for 
French and German manufacturers declined. Exchange rate 
volatility was an additional factor affecting our results for Italy. 
Concentration increased for the top three and top ten producers. 
Profitability, as measured by return on capital employed, has 
fallen. 
The variation of prices for certain models had fallen. 
Large differences remain in the structure of distribution across the 
EU Member States. 
• 
■/ 
■/ 
S 
S 
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Table 10.1. Conclusions for each hypothesis (continued) 
Hypothesis 
Production 
Production costs will be 
lower 
Productivity will increase 
Employment levels will fall 
as an indirect result of 
greater competition and 
competitiveness of EU 
manufacturers 
The structure of investment 
in the EU will change 
Supply 
Components supply will 
become more European 
RD&D 
RD&D costs will fall 
All 
Global competitiveness of 
the EU-owned automotive 
industry will increase 
Analysis 
The EU-owned manufacturers were found to have become more 
globally competitive and average real labour costs have fallen 
recently. 
EU producers have made gradual improvements in productivity, 
although these improvements began well before the single market 
programme was implemented. 
Employment by EU-owned automotive manufacturers declined by 
9% between 1992 and 1994. 
The FDI flows analysed indicated that the companies anticipated 
the likely impact of the single market programme. Some 
manufacturers' FDI strategy appears to be based on a global rather 
than a single market programme strategy. Few plants have been 
closed. 
Purchases have become more internationalized and suppliers have 
become more internationalized. These results may also be a 
reflection of wider policy goals of globalization. 
Whole vehicle type approval harmonization has had a direct 
impact on the costs of RD&D. 
Type approval harmonization for some components has had a 
limited impact, since UNECE standards were already followed. 
Actual volumes of exports to non-EU markets have increased, 
percentage share held by EU-owned manufacturers has fallen. 
Consistency with 
expected impact of 
SMP 
• • • 
·/ 
Note: We have used a tick system to represent various degrees of consistency: 
SVV indication that the single market programme has had a direct impact; 
SS indication that the single market programme has facilitated the results; 
S indication that the result is to some extent consistent with the expected impact; 
indication of no impact. 
As the table shows, the single market programme has had a positive impact on the automotive 
sector, particularly in facilitating trade for both vehicles and components, increasing consumer 
choice in Member States and reducing costs of applying for whole vehicle type approval. In 
addition, it is clear in a number of cases that there has been a convergence between the 
behaviour and shares held by the manufacturers and Member States. For example, the 
'opening' of more closed markets has resulted in a similar share held by the top ten brands of 
passenger car across the EU. 
However, the effects of the SMP on the other changes occurring in the industry has been 
limited. This is because: 
(a) The automotive industry is mature and was one of the first to see markets in a global 
perspective. Half a century before the single market programme was conceived, 
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companies (particularly the US-owned manufacturers) had set up plants in a number of 
countries and were selling products in each country. The abolition of customs duties 
within the Common Market significantly affected the development of US-owned 
manufacturers in Europe over the last 50 years (e.g. Ford integrating European control 
through setting up Ford of Europe in 1966). Much of this adjustment has already 
occurred and so, within this context, the industry is less likely to undertake radical 
change to take account of the removal of further non-tariff restrictions to trade. 
(b) The investment/return lead times in the industry are very long. It takes over three years 
to build a new plant and to develop a new car (the total production length for a car is, on 
average, 10 years, and the car is on the market for around 30 years). The industry's 
planning horizons take place over a significant time frame. The industry is therefore 
faced with large sunk costs in its plants and the timescales for radically altering the way 
in which vehicles are produced around Europe may be around a decade. Therefore, 
responses that have occurred over the three years since the completion of the single 
market programme are likely to be muted. 
Table 10.2 shows the relative impact of the 'other factors' on our analysis. 
Table 10.2. Other factors affecting our analysis 
Hypothesis 
1 : Intra-EU trade at an aggregate level 
will increase 
2: Degree of intra-EU trade relative to 
individual consumption will increase 
3: Market shares will equalize 
4: Variants available will increase 
5: National sales relative to non-national 
sales will fall 
6: Domestic market shares will fall 
7: Competition and concentration will 
increase 
8: Final prices will become less variable 
9: Marketing and distribution networks 
will be developed 
10: Production costs will fall 
Market 
conditions 
• 
• 
German 
reunification 
• 
• 
• 
• 
New model 
launches 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
Globalization 
• • • 
• 
• " • • 
Currency 
fluctuations 
• • 
• 
Overcapacity 
• 
Low returns 
• 
Production and 
supply chain 
changes 
• • 
Research 
initiatives and 
technological 
change 
VV 
single market 
programme 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
V 
V 
n 
o Table 10.2. (continued) 
Hypothesis 
11 : Productivity will increase 
12: Employment will fall 
13: Investment in the EU will change 
14: Components supply structure will 
become pan-European 
15: RD&D costs will fall 
16: Global competitiveness of the EU-
owned automotive industry will increase 
Market 
conditions 
V 
• 
German 
reunification 
New model 
launches 
Globalization 
• • 
• 
• • 
Currency 
fluctuations 
• 
Overcapacity Low returns Production and 
supply chain 
changes 
• • 
Research 
initiatives and 
technological 
change 
• • 
• 
single market 
programme 
• 
• 
• 
• • • 
• 
^1 
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Table 10.2 shows that the key other factors impacting on the marketing side of the automotive 
industry are globalization of competition, new model launches, relative market conditions and 
currency fluctuations. The key other factors impacting on the production and purchasing side 
of the business are production and supply chain changes and research initiatives and 
technological change. 
Indirectly, the single market has helped reinforce (and has itself been reinforced by) many of 
these factors. In addition, there are a number of additional factors which should be considered: 
(a) clear guidance on 'rules of origin' has encouraged several overseas manufacturers to set 
up plant within the EU over the past decade introducing new production techniques to 
Europe and increasing the supply of highly competitive products; 
(b) the policy to reduce and eliminate quotas on Japanese imports by 1999 has had a very 
major effect on competition and the position of European producers, particularly in the 
previously more protected markets; 
(c) the Association Agreements with Central and Eastern European countries, through 
reducing tariffs and providing a pathway to full membership of the EU has facilitated 
trends to invest in low cost production facilities outside the EU; 
(d) the reduction in pan-European distribution costs and times and the improvements in pan-
European transport infrastructure is facilitating new approaches to logistics. 
For these reasons, the indirect effects of the single market programme and related European 
programmes may have been more important than the direct effects. These policies have 
reinforced strong trends occurring in the global economy and it may have brought forward by 
several years structural adjustments to the European motor vehicles industry. This is likely to 
be of significant importance for the European industry in global terms. 
10.2. Benefits of the single market programme 
10.2.1. Benefits to vehicle assemblers 
As described above, the single market programme has reinforced many of the global trends 
which were prevalent over the time period in question. This is particularly the case if the 
single market programme has been a factor in attracting FDI from Japanese firms. The 
Japanese promotion of lean production techniques to the indigenous EU vehicle assemblers 
has been an important development which might have happened later had the single market 
programme not been implemented. For example, companies have been increasingly attempting 
to penetrate markets outside the EU and the single market has made it easier for them to do 
this by lowering the administrative barriers to trade between Member States. 
The most direct benefit to the automotive assemblers has been the whole vehicle type approval 
measure which has meant that new models can be introduced throughout Europe without the 
requirement to gain separate type approval in each Member State. This has resulted in very 
positive time savings to market, and in use of fewer and cheaper vehicles in the tests. This has 
benefited the automotive manufacturers by allowing them to develop a more clear purchasing 
strategy, by seeking the best method of purchasing on an international basis. 
An important by-product of the single market programme for the commercial vehicle sector is 
that it has facilitated the emergence of very large pan-European freight distribution companies 
which have very significant purchasing power. These groups will expect to deal with 
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manufacturers directly, and the franchised dealership network is there to support the vehicles 
once they are in use, rather than to sell the vehicles. Whether the increased market power of 
distributors is a benefit in the long run is another question. 
10.2.2. Benefits to component manufacturers 
Whilst the components sector was only considered indirectly in our study, there is clear 
evidence that manufacturers have also seen some benefits as a result of the single market 
programme. Component manufacturers have traditionally been much more focused on their 
domestic markets. Intra-EU trade, particularly from peripheral countries of Europe, has 
radically increased. The single market has greatly facilitated this trend. 
10.2.3. Welfare benefits 
The single market has benefited consumers in a number of important respects. 
First, by making type approval measures consistent across all Member States and allowing 
type approval in one Member State to be applied to all Member States, the single market 
programme has contributed to lowering market entry costs. The consequences for consumers 
are twofold: a small but positive benefit in terms of reduced costs per model; and a second, 
arguably more important, benefit in terms of greater choice of models and variants within each 
Member State market. In this way, distortions in the market caused by differences in 
regulatory requirements have been removed, and therefore the efficiency of the market has 
improved. It should be noted that, in theory at least, having markets which are in some 
respects more competitive (e.g. more models and variants available) should lead to further 
pressure on prices, with welfare benefits to consumers in aggregate. 
Second, the single market programme is complementary to, and serves to reinforce the efforts 
of the vehicle manufacturers to create pan-European sales and distribution systems under 
which consumers can be more readily assured of consistent sales and service support wherever 
they may be located within the EU. In its broadest sense, this contributes to the goal of greater 
freedom of movement within the European Union. 
Third, the single market has encouraged the emergence of large, pan-European freight 
distribution companies in the commercial vehicle sector. The larger companies have greater 
purchasing power relative to the vehicle manufacturers or importers, and are therefore able to 
secure better terms for the supply of commercial vehicles. This class of consumers (i.e. 
industrial) has certainly therefore benefited from the single market programme. 
Sustainable development 
It should also be noted that the contribution of new emission and crash impact standards 
towards sustainable development is at best partial, and sometimes contradictory. For example, 
in order to improve the performance of cars in frontal and side impacts, vehicle manufacturers 
have increased the weight of steel used in the car body structure, and this in turn will lead to 
greater fuel consumption (and hence emissions) than was hitherto the case. Equally, the 
stricter emission standards that have been introduced have resulted in the widespread use of 
catalytic converters in the exhaust system. While this enables pollutants such as NOx to be 
reduced per se. there are two negative effects which do not contribute to sustainable 
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development: greater fuel consumption (and hence CO2 emissions); and greater initial levels 
of pollutants while the catalyst warms up. 
The EU has no definition as such of sustainable development in the automotive sector. There 
is no mechanism to allow the trade-off between reductions in pollutants in one area against 
increases in pollutants in another. The proposed Carbon Tax marks a further step towards 
defining an environmentally optimized vehicle, but is still not comprehensive enough to 
constitute a holistic and whole life cycle approach. 
At a general level, we would note that in so far as the SMP has increased the size of the 
market, there will be associated environmental costs in producing the extra vehicles required. 
Secondly, in so far as the SMP has increased trade in both components and finished vehicles, 
there will be increased environmental costs. In both cases, it is of course possible that 
improved plant level efficiency will offset the added environmental costs. 
10.3. Concerns about the single market programme 
Any major initiative like the single market programme will give rise to a series of concerns as 
well as benefits. Here, we focus on a key concern, which is the lack of global standards. There 
is a danger that the development of standards within the single market programme might be on 
a different course to the rest of the world. If this were to continue, there might be serious 
disbenefits for the EU automotive manufacturers in the future. It is possible that if the 
standards set in the EU are out of step with that in much of the rest of the world, the EU 
automotive manufacturers could face serious additional cost barriers in accessing other 
markets in the future. The European Commission has recently undertaken to reduce this 
problem through involvement in efforts to harmonize global standards. 
Many manufacturers complained to us during our interviews of the cost of complying with 
safety and environmental regulations. Current moves towards an economic approach to 
regulation will be an important factor in helping to minimize the costs and maximize the 
benefits of future regulations. 
10.4. Future actions 
Despite the fact that the single market programme has gone a long way to improving the 
competitive environment in the EU automotive industry, we suggest there are a number of 
areas where careful consideration should be given to future action. We have considered these 
at three levels: 
(a) constraints which currently create cost burdens for the industry and restrict market 
access; 
(b) constraints which may not restrict market access, but act as a barrier to rationalization of 
the industry and therefore affect the industry's ability to be fully competitive on a global 
basis; 
(c) issues which have been raised by interested parties, but where our analysis suggests that 
the case for EU action has not been proven. 
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10.4.1. Constraints which create cost burdens and restrict market access 
We consider that there are still a number of constraints which continue to create cost burdens 
for the industry: 
(a) Member States have very different tax structures for vehicles. For example, six Member 
States based their ownership tax on the cubic capacity of the engine, four on the weight, 
two on the levels of horsepower and two on the fuel type used (see Appendix D). These 
differences impose large variant costs on producers. For example, Ford in introducing 
the Galaxy into the French market had to redesign its final drive ratio to ensure that it 
was taxed by the French authorities in the same class as the main competitor. This had 
major RD&D and production implications. Renault believe that the differences in tax 
legislation based on requirements of insurance and the size of engines add substantially 
to their production costs and estimate that (for one model) approximately 20% of 
variants arise through national differences in tax structures. They estimate the cost at 
ECU 4.27 million per vehicle. The different tax structures can also affect the distribution 
of certain specialist marques. For example, Volvo operates in the medium and large 
segments of the car market and does not offer small vehicles or engines below 1.3 litre 
capacity. Therefore, in markets where there are strong financial disincentives against 
larger cars or engines (e.g. Italy), Volvo is placed at a disadvantage. 
(b) Exchange rate fluctuations impose difficulties on the industry and affect location. The 
cost of hedging against exchange rate fluctuations still exists in the Community. These 
difficulties of exchange rate fluctuation are more pronounced for the more nationally 
focused manufacturers who are less able to lay off exchange rate risks through location 
and sourcing decisions and sourcing patterns for components. Both Ford and Nissan 
mentioned that their Austrian dealers had suffered as a result of the devaluation of the 
Lira because Austrian consumers were crossing the border and buying vehicles in Italy 
to take advantage of the lower prices. For Volvo, movements in exchange rates can be 
significant, especially in terms of production in Sweden. For example, following the 
devaluation of the Krona in the early 1990s, output in Sweden was cheaper in key export 
markets but the purchasing costs were higher from leading supplier countries such as 
Germany. 
(c) Different standards exist in each global market.9 Our discussions with companies 
indicated to us that components standards in place throughout the world can be very 
different. These differences increase design costs and constrain production economies of 
scale. Given the greater fragmentation of the European industry and its smaller share of 
overseas trade compared with the American and Japanese industries, this can have an 
adverse impact. For example, Volvo finds that different basic regulations between the 
market in North America and that in the EU (on how truck length is measured) means 
that few EU-engineered and produced trucks sell in North America and few trucks built 
However, whilst standards do vary, they may be as a result of different customer demands. The standards are not the 
real problem, but the other factors which influence them. For example, Americans generally like big cars. They are 
therefore much wider than their European counterparts and their bumpers are also much wider. The side impact test in 
the US uses a ram which is wider than the ram used in the European test. The US ram covers both the A post and B post 
of the car. i.e. just in front of the front door and just behind it. The European test only covers the B post. Therefore, a 
European car has to have a hardened B post because it has to take a great deal of force compared with the US test which 
covers both. In lapan, the cars are a little larger than those from Europe and tend to have US-type bumpers and so the 
test in Japan is similar to the US one. The test for air bags is another interesting example. In the US. because there are 
no seat belt regulations, the air bag has to restrain the whole of the passenger, whereas in Europe, the air bag only has to 
restrain the head. 
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there are sold in the EU. Currently, these problems are very typical and officials from 
US and European motor industries have agreed to try and harmonize standards and 
certification to boost car trade across the Atlantic. Martin Bangemann, the EU's industry 
commissioner, has estimated that regulations to harmonize safety, emissions and seating 
systems across the Atlantic could reduce the cost of a car by up to 10%. 
(d) There are different internal standards within the industry. Components suppliers 
therefore have to cope with the different quality standards imposed by the vehicle 
manufacturers, and some voluntary framework encouraged by policy makers would 
assist. 
(e) Each Member State requires different forms from manufacturers in order to register new 
cars, primarily because the registration documents are used to determine the codes. Even 
though a Directive has been put in place in this area which provides for a consistent set 
of registration data (which is around 10 times as much as any one country actually uses), 
each Member State requires a different selection of data from this set and different 
presentations of the data. This imposes an extra administrative burden on producers. 
(f) The type approval measures must be flexible enough and reviewed frequently enough to 
ensure that they keep up with innovation within the EU automotive industry. For 
example, there are currently no Europe-wide standards for the remote keyless entry 
across Europe. In Italy, the type approval authority will only accept test reports from its 
own government-owned and run test house. It also insists that all pieces of equipment, 
receivers and transmitters are tested, even when physical differences are very slight. It 
also only accepts payment via a visit to an Italian post office at two separate stages in the 
testing process. In Greece, for the same product, the approval process does accept other 
countries' test reports, but the approval process is very unpredictable (from 3 to 35 
weeks). The Spanish authority only accept applications in a particular format, in Spanish 
and approved by an engineer of the Official Telecommunications Institute in Spain. 
Other countries therefore either have to follow a costly and complex joining process or 
use a consultant (this takes 3-5 months). 
10.4.2. Constraints acting as a barrier to rationalization of the industry 
We highlight two factors which may be impeding economically efficient rationalization of the 
industry: 
(a) The definition of the relevant market in competition investigations - particularly in the 
components supply sector. Our findings indicate that the components supply industry is 
becoming increasingly European. However, there are a number of examples of national 
competition authorities taking a narrow view of the relevant market in merger cases. For 
example, the acquisition by a large pan-European piston manufacturer with German 
interests (T&N) of a smaller German domestic-based manufacturer (Goetze) was 
stopped by the German competition authorities on the basis of its impact on the German 
domestic market. Another example is ZF, a German independent manufacturer of 
transmission and steering systems, which was refused permission in 1993 to purchase a 
GM subsidiary, Allison Transmissions, because of concerns over monopoly in the 
German market. 
(b) The industry is viewed as having too many nationally orientated players compared with 
the much larger competitors in the North American and Japanese markets. This 
constrains their longer term development. State aids have been provided to Member 
State manufacturers under the understanding that this will allow the producers to reduce 
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their capacity or re-engineer their processes. However, these state aids may have delayed 
some necessary rationalization of the European industry. 
10.4.3. Issues in which the case for EU action has not yet been proven 
(a) Member States have different ways of dealing with end-of-life vehicles which affect the 
demand profile in each market. For example, the recent French government's cash offers 
for consumers to trade in their cars has dramatically increased new car sales in the 
country. Whilst these may have different implications for each national producer and 
many provide an effective subsidy to producers with the larger market shares, they are 
not market closing in their own right. The case for harmonization of such regulations 
would need to be argued on environmental grounds. Indeed the Directorate General for 
the Environment's end-of-life vehicle proposal does not arise as a result of a perceived 
single market problem, but from a perceived environmental problem. 
(b) Member States' tests to confirm the roadworthiness of vehicles at periodic stages of 
their life are still substantially different. The 1991 Roadworthiness Directive leaves 
considerable discretion with Member States over the frequency and scope of the tests. 
These differences do not affect market access, but may change the demand profile for 
spare parts and repair facilities in different Member States. 
(c) The need to manufacture right-hand and left-hand drive vehicles in Europe affects 
market access for some low volume European producers, where the variant costs are 
higher than the benefits of selling the models in the non-domestic markets. For global 
players, the need to supply both left- and right-handed drive models is less important, 
because there are important markets for both variants around the world. Indeed, a UK 
Monopolies and Mergers Report concluded that right-hand drive models for the UK and 
Ireland does not impose significant costs on producers. However, we understand that 
Lancia pulled out of the UK market because of the costs of developing such variants. 
Volvo told us that the changes required to engineer a car to right-hand drive affected 
15% of the total car, by value. 
10.4.4. Actions required from a safety perspective 
Whilst we were not asked to investigate safety issues as part of our analysis, our interviews 
with consumer protection organizations indicated to us that there may be a requirement for 
regulations in the area of head restraints, back seat strength and child restraints. Furthermore, 
differentiated safety standards across the global market could create problems for the 
automotive manufacturers in the long run as they continue to trade with other states around the 
world but find that they have to make more and more changes to standards to gain entry. 
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APPENDIX A 
Technical harmonization 
The sector measures essentially involve the progressive replacement of a body of detailed 
technical rules in each Member State. These rules ensured the safety of users and third parties 
and provided for acceptable environmental impact. Whilst most of the rules concerned 
components and subsystems of vehicles, a key element of the national controls were 
(differing) systems of type approval for whole vehicles. Essentially, these involved 
administrative procedures to ensure all the detailed rules had been met. Until this element was 
brought into life, car and component manufacturers had to go through different type approval 
procedures across the Member States. This final element was harmonized across the 
Community through the introduction of a single system of type approval of vehicles which 
will eventually replace all the existing national systems. 
Technical harmonization, which began in 1970 with measures relating to noise levels and 
exhaust gases, was completed for private cars through the adoption in June 1992 of the last 
three of the 45 directives laying down rules for vehicle design. These rules made it possible for 
a single EU type approval system to be agreed in January 1993 (70/156/EEC amended by 
92/53/EEC). The full type approval system for new and existing passenger cars will formally 
replace national procedures on 1 January 1998. EC type approval remains optional for other 
road vehicles. 
The diagram above shows that technical harmonization can be categorized into legal measures 
(of which the two main approaches are new approach directives and specific directives), and 
standards, such as those set by CEN and CENELEC. We cover these main categories below: 
(a) Historically, the Commission has followed an approach of proposing separate directives 
to harmonize technical requirements. These set specific technical requirements on 
particular products such as tyres and safety glass. There are now 45 separate directives 
relating to the type approval of components, systems, and technical units. These started 
to be put into place during the 1970s, i.e. before the single market programme was 
developed. Changes to separate directives as a result of new technical or safety 
requirements ('adaptation to technical progress') are made by regulatory committees 
consisting of Member States' representatives and chaired by the Commission, which 
submits a proposal to amend a directive. 
(b) New approach (framework) directives are horizontal in nature and require specific 
standards for each application. However, the new approach directives have had little 
effect on the industry and the directives usually explicitly exclude cars. The sole 
exception we discovered was the new CEN standard under the Pressure Vessels 
Directive for the brake systems of trucks and buses. The 'new' approach was set out in a 
Council Resolution of 7 May 1983 and in Directive 83/189/EEC. The new approach 
directives have three main principles: a distinction is drawn between what must be 
harmonized in legislation and what may be left to be harmonized by European 
standardization bodies; legislative harmonization must be restricted to laying down 
health, safety and other essential requirements; and harmonization of industrial 
standards should be achieved by the elaboration of European standards which should be 
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developed by CEN or CENELEC as appropriate. Examples of these new approach 
directives include those relating to pressure vessels, electro-magnetic compatibility and 
machine safety. These so-called 'new approach directives' mandate the development of 
standards for specific purposes which are negotiated and developed by standards-making 
bodies such as CEN and CENELEC. Under the single market programme, the 
Community's approach is increasingly to use these new approach directives, rather than 
the older directives in setting standards. 
(c) Standards are set by official standard-setting bodies such as CEN, CENELEC, national 
standards authorities, individual companies such as VAG and Ford or by trade 
associations such as VDA in Germany. Standards set by the official bodies can be either 
mandated or non-mandated. Mandated standards would apply to the standards set under 
the new approach directives. 
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APPENDIX Β 
B.l. Sectoral legislation 
Title 
Whole Vehicle 
Type Approval 
Roadworthiness 
test 
Mechanical 
coupling 
devices 
Lateral 
protection for 
goods vehicles 
Weights and 
dimensions 
(cars) 
Interior fittings 
Tyres 
Tyre pressure 
gauges 
Safety glass and 
glazing 
materials 
Motor vehicle 
noise 
Air pollution: 
passenger cars 
Emission of 
gaseous 
pollutants from 
diesel engines 
Sulphur content 
of certain liquid 
fuels 
Spray-
suppression 
devices 
Road vehicles: 
weights and 
dimensions 
Measure 
92/53/EEC of 
18 June 1992 
(latest 
amendment) 
94/23/ECof8 
June 1994 
(latest) 
94/20/EC of 
30 May 1994 
89/297/EEC 
of 13 April 
1989 
92/21/EEC of 
31 March 
1992 
91/662/EEC 
of6 
December 
1991 
92/23/EEC of 
31 March 
1992 
86/217/EEC 
of 26 May 
1986 
92/22/EEC of 
31 March 
1992 
92/97/EEC of 
10 November 
1992 (latest) 
94/12/ECof23 
March 1994 
(latest) 
91/542/EECof 
1 October 1991 
(latest) 
93/12/EECof 
23 March 1993 
91/226/EECof 
27 March 1991 
92/7/EECof 10 
February 1992 
Description Influence 
(initial 
view) 
Focus Cars or 
commercial 
vehicles 
Type approval is carried out by one MS which 
provides a certificate which is valid in all MSs 
(Appendix B2 provides a list of the individual 
measures which were not formally part of the 286 
single market measures) 
States that MSs must carry out periodic 
roadworthiness tests and provide a certificate 
proving that they have done so 
Part of the type approval regime. States that 
coupling devices must conform to certain 
standards 
Provides technical requirements for side 
protection of heavy goods vehicles and their 
trailers 
Harmonizes national laws concerning the weights 
and dimensions of cars. Covers maximum 
dimensions, weights and towed weight 
Harmonizes the technical requirements for the 
behaviour of the steering device under impact 
Harmonizes national type approval for tyres and 
their fitting 
Harmonizes national provisions relating to tyre 
pressure gauges in order to facilitate trade 
Brings into line national provisions and relates to 
type approval in terms of materials used and their 
installation 
Lays down limits on the noise level of the 
mechanical parts and exhaust systems 
Establishes limit values for emissions from cars 
Technical requirements for diesel engines to 
combat air pollution 
Limits the sulphur content of gasoline and 
kerosene (derogation for Greece until 1999) 
Harmonizes the type approval procedures for 
spray-suppression devices 
Lays down maximum weights and dimensions for 
large vehicles 
High 
Medium 
Medium 
Low 
High 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Medium 
Medium 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
RD&D 
Manufact 
-uring 
Suppliers 
RD&D 
Sales 
RD&D 
RD&D 
RD&D 
Low 
Medium 
Low 
Medium 
Low 
Medium 
Low 
Medium 
RD&D 
Suppliers 
RD&D 
Suppliers 
RD&D 
Suppliers 
RD&D 
Suppliers 
RD&D 
RD&D 
RD&D 
RD&D 
RD&D 
RD&D 
Cars 
Cars 
Cars 
CVs 
Cars 
Both 
Both 
Both 
Both 
Both 
Cars 
CVs 
Both 
Both 
CVs 
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Title 
Speed limitation 
devices for heavy 
goods and 
coaches 
Speed limitation 
devices for 
commercial 
vehicles 
External 
projections on 
cabs of 
commercial 
vehicles 
Opening up of 
Japanese imports 
Block exemption 
Environment 
Measure 
92/24/EEC of 
31 March 1992 
92/6/EECoflO 
February 1992 
92/114/EECof 
17 December 
1992 
Article 5(3) of 
Treaty of Rome 
and Regulation 
(EC) No 
1475/1995 of 
28 June 1995 
(latest) 
COM(91)219 
final 
89/458/EEC, 
88/77/EEC. 
70/157/EEC, 
85/210/EEC, 
87/416/EEC. 
Description 
Limits the maximum speed for heavy vehicles 
used to carry goods or passengers 
Limits maximum speed of commercial vehicles 
Relates to the external projections forward of the 
cab's rear panel 
From 1981 to 1993, Japanese imports have been 
restricted in five markets. New agreement in 1991 
which covers the 1990s - 8.1 % of total market by 
1999 
Automotive distribution sales and servicing 
exempted from certain provisions of EC 
competition law. Later regulation intensifies 
competition in this area 
Stricter limits on emissions and sound from 
vehicles. Council Directives ensure the 
availability of unleaded petrol and require the 
reduction of the maximum lead content in petrol 
Influence 
(initial 
view) 
Low 
Low 
Low 
High 
High 
Medium 
Focus 
RD&D 
RD&D 
RD&D 
All 
Sales 
Manufac-
turing 
(increased 
production 
of engines 
which take 
unleaded 
petrol) 
Cars or 
commercial 
vehicles 
Cvs 
CVs 
CVs 
Both 
Both 
Cars 
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B.2. Technical harmonization measures 
The following list provides further details on the technical harmonization measures: 
No. Reference 
01 70/157/EEC 
73/350/EEC 
77/212/EEC 
81/334/EEC 
84/372/EEC 
84/424/EEC 
89/491/EEC 
92/97/EEC 
02 70/220/EEC 
74/290/EEC 
77/102/EEC 
78/665/EEC 
83/351/EEC 
88/76/EEC 
88/436/EEC 
89/458/EEC 
89/491/EEC 
91/441/EEC 
93/59/EEC 
94/12/EC 
03 70/221/EEC 
79/490/EEC 
81/333/EEC 
Adopted by 
Council 
Commission 
Council 
Commission 
Commission 
Council 
Commission 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Commission 
Commission 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Commission 
Council 
Council 
EP& 
Council 
Council 
Commission 
Commission 
Title 
Permissible sound level and the 
exhaust system of motor vehicles 
Adaptation 
Amendment 
Adaptation 
Adaptation 
Amendment 
Adaptation 
Amendment 
Measures to be taken against air 
pollution by emissions from 
motor vehicles 
- Corrigendum 
Adaptation 
Adaptation 
Adaptation 
Amendment 
Amendment 
Amendment 
Amendment (cars < 1,4 1) 
- Corrigendum 
Adaptation 
Amendment 
Amendment 
Amendment 
Liquid fuel tanks and rear 
protective devices for motor 
vehicles and their trailers 
- Corrigendum (FR-EN-IT-NL-DA) 
Adaptation 
Adaptation 
Date of 
adoption 
06.02.1970 
07.11.1973 
08.03.1977 
13.04.1981 
03.07.1984 
03.09.1984 
17.07.1989 
10.11.1992 
20.03.1970 
28.05.1974 
30.11.1976 
14.07.1978 
16.06.1983 
03.12.1987 
16.06.1988 
18.07.1989 
17.07.1989 
26.06.1991 
28.06.1993 
23.03.1994 
20.03.1970 
18.04.1979 
13.04.1981 
O J (L) No. 
and page 
42/16 
321/33 
66/33 
131/6 
196/47 
238/31 
238/43 
371/1 
76/1 
81/15 
159/61 
32/32 
223/48 
197/1 
36/1 
214/1 
226/1 
270/16 
238/43 
242/1 
186/21 
100/42 
76/23 
65/42 
128/22 
131/4 
Date of the 
OJ 
23.02.1970 
22.11.1973 
12.03.1977 
18.05.1981 
26.07.1984 
06.09.1984 
15.08.1989 
19.12.1992 
06.04.1970 
11.04.1970 
15.06.1974 
03.02.1977 
14.08.1978 
20.07.1983 
09.02.1988 
06.08.1988 
03.08.1989 
19.09.1989 
15.08.1989 
30.08.1991 
28.07.1993 
19.04.1994 
06.04.1970 
15.03.1979 
26.05.1979 
18.05.1981 
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No. 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
Reference 
70/222/EEC 
70/31 l/EEC 
92/62/EEC 
70/387/EEC 
70/388/EEC 
71/127/EEC 
79/795/EEC 
85/205/EEC 
86/562/EEC 
88/321/EEC 
71/320/EEC 
74/132/EEC 
75/524/EEC 
79/489/EEC 
85/647/EEC 
88/194/EEC 
91/422/EEC 
72/245/EEC 
89/491/EEC 
72/306/EEC 
89/491/EEC 
Adopted by 
Council 
Council 
Commission 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Commission 
Commission 
Commission 
Commission 
Council 
Commission 
Commission 
Commission 
Commission 
Commission 
Commission 
Council 
Commission 
Council 
Commission 
Title 
Space for mounting and the 
fixing of rear registration plates 
on motor vehicles and their 
trailers 
Steering equipment for motor 
vehicles and their trailers 
- Corrigendum 
Adaptation 
Doors of motor vehicles and their 
trailers 
Audible warning devices for 
motor vehicles 
- Corrigendum 
Rear-view mirrors of motor 
vehicles 
Adaptation 
Adaptation 
Adaptation 
Adaptation 
Braking devices of certain 
categories of motor vehicles and 
their trailers 
Adaptation 
Adaptation 
Adaptation 
- Corrigendum 
Adaptation 
Adaptation 
Adaptation 
Suppression of radio interference 
produced by spark-ignition 
engines fitted to motor vehicles 
Adaptation 
Measures to be taken against the 
emission of pollutants from diesel 
engines for use in vehicles 
- Corrigendum (FR-EN-IT-NL-DA) 
- Corrigendum (FR-EN) 
Adaptation 
Date of 
adoption 
20.03.1970 
08.06.1970 
02.07.1992 
27.07.1970 
27.07.1970 
01.03.1971 
20.07.1979 
18.02.1985 
06.11.1986 
16.05.1988 
26.07.1971 
11.02.1974 
25.07.1975 
18.04.1979 
23.12.1985 
24.03.1988 
15.07.1991 
20.06.1972 
17.07.1989 
02.08.1972 
17.07.1989 
OJ (L) No. 
and page 
76/25 
133/10 
196/14 
199/33 
176/5 
176/12 
176/72 
68/1 
239/1 
90/1 
327/49 
147/77 
202/37 
74/7 
236/3 
128/12 
146/35 
380/1 
92/47 
233/21 
152/15 
238/43 
190/1 
215/20 
297/27 
238/43 
Date of the 
OJ 
06.04.1970 
18.06.1970 
03.09.1970 
18.07.1992 
10.08.1970 
10.08.1970 
21.06.1974 
22.03.1971 
22.09.1979 
29.03.1985 
22.11.1986 
14.06.1988 
06.09.1971 
19.03.1974 
08.09.1975 
26.05.1979 
14.06.1979 
31.12.1985 
09.04.1988 
22.08.1991 
06.07.1972 
15.08.1989 
20.08.1972 
06.08.1974 
23.11.1977 
15.08.1989 
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No. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Reference 
74/60/EEC 
78/632/EEC 
74/61/EEC 
74/297/EEC 
91/662/EEC 
74/408/EEC 
81/577/EEC 
74/483/EEC 
79/488/EEC 
75/443/EEC 
76/114/EEC 
78/507/EEC 
Adopted by 
Council 
Commission 
Council 
Council 
Commission 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Commission 
Council 
Council 
Commission 
Title 
Interior fittings of motor vehicles 
(interior parts of the passenger 
compartment other than the 
interior rear-view mirrors, layout 
of controls, the roof or sliding 
roof, the backrest and rear part 
of seats) 
- Corrigendum 
Adaptation 
Devices to prevent the 
unauthorized use of motor 
vehicles 
- Corrigendum (FR-EN-IT-NL-DA) 
Interior fittings of motor vehicles 
(the behaviour of the steering 
mechanism in the event of an 
impact) 
Adaptation 
- Corrigendum 
Interior fittings of motor vehicles 
(strength of seats and of their 
anchorages) 
Amendment 
External projections of motor 
vehicles 
Adaptation 
Reverse and speedometer 
equipment of motor vehicles 
- Corrigendum 
Statutory plates and inscriptions 
for motor vehicles and their 
trailers and their location and 
method of attachment 
Adaptation 
Date of 
adoption 
17.12.1973 
19.05.1978 
17.12.1973 
04.06.1974 
06.12.1991 
22.07.1974 
20.07.1981 
17.09.1974 
18.04.1979 
26.06.1975 
18.12.1975 
19.05.1978 
OJ (L) No. 
and page 
38/2 
215/20 
206/26 
38/22 
215/20 
165/16 
366/1 
172/86 
221/1 
209/34 
266/4 
128/1 
196/1 
296/19 
24/1 
155/31 
Date of the 
OJ 
11.02.1974 
06.08.1974 
29.07.1978 
11.02.1974 
06.08.1974 
20.06.1974 
31.12.1991 
27.06.1992 
12.08.1974 
29.07.1981 
02.10.1974 
26.05.1979 
26.07.1975 
15.11.1975 
30.01.1976 
13.06.1978 
19 
20 
76/115/EEC 
81/575/EEC 
82/318/EEC 
90/629/EEC 
76/756/EEC 
Council 
Council 
Commission 
Commission 
Council 
Anchorages for m 
safety belts 
Amendment 
Adaptation 
Adaptation 
otor vehicle 
Installation of lighting and light-
signalling devices on motor 
vehicles and their trailers 
18.12.1975 
20.07.1981 
02.04.1982 
30.10.1990 
27.07.1976 
24/6 
209/30 
139/9 
341/14 
262/1 
30.01.1976 
29.07.1981 
19.05.1982 
06.12.1990 
27.09.1976 
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No. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
Reference 
80/23 3/EEC 
82/244/EEC 
83/276/EEC 
84/8/EEC 
89/278/EEC 
91/663/EEC 
76/757/EEC 
76/758/EEC 
89/5I6/EEC 
76/759/EEC 
89/277/EEC 
76/760/EEC 
76/761/EEC 
89/517/EEC 
76/762/EEC 
77/389/EEC 
77/538/EEC 
89/518/EEC 
77/539/EEC 
Adopted by 
Commission 
Commission 
Council 
Commission 
Commission 
Commission 
Council 
Council 
Commission 
Council 
Commission 
Council 
Council 
Commission 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Commission 
Council 
Title 
Adaptation 
- Corrigendum (FR-EN-DE-IT-NL-
DA) 
Adaptation 
Amendment 
Adaptation 
Adaptation 
- Corrigendum 
Adaptation and codification 
- Corrigendum (FR-DE) 
Reflex reflectors for motor 
vehicles and their trailers 
End-outline market lamps, front 
position (side) lamps, rear 
position (side) lamps and stop 
lamps for motor vehicles and 
their trailers 
Adaptation 
Direction indicator lamps for 
motor vehicles and their trailers 
Adaptation 
- Corrigendum 
Rear registration plate lamps for 
motor vehicles and their trailers 
Motor vehicle headlamps which 
function as main-beam and/or 
dipped-beam headlamps and 
incandescent electric filament 
lamps for such headlamps 
Adaptation 
Front fog lamps for motor 
vehicles and filament lamps for 
such lamps 
Motor vehicle towing devices 
Rear fog lamps for motor vehicles 
and their trailers 
- Corrigendum (FR-EN-DE-IT-NL-
DA) 
Adaptation 
Reversing lamps for motor 
vehicles and their trailers 
- Corrigendum (FR-EN-DE-IT-NL-
DA) 
Date of 
adoption 
21.11.1979 
17.03.1982 
26.05.1983 
14.12.1983 
28.03.1989 
10.12.1991 
27.07.1976 
27.07.1976 
01.08.1989 
27.07.1976 
28.03.1989 
27.07.1976 
27.07.1976 
01.08.1989 
27.07.1976 
17.05.1977 
28.06.1977 
01.08.1989 
28.06.1977 
OJ (L) No. 
and page 
51/8 
111/22 
109/31 
151/47 
9/24 
109/38 
114/52 
366/17 
172/87 
262/32 
262/54 
265/1 
262/71 
109/25 
114/52 
262/85 
262/96 
265/15 
262/122 
145/41 
220/60 
284/11 
265/24 
220/72 
284/11 
Date of the 
OJ 
25.02.1980 
30.04.1980 
22.04.1982 
09.06.1983 
12.01.1984 
20.04.1989 
27.04.1989 
31.12.1991 
27.06.1992 
27.09.1976 
27.09.1976 
12.09.1989 
27.09.1976 
20.04.1989 
27.04.1989 
27.09.1976 
27.09.1976 
12.09.1989 
27.09.1976 
13.06.1977 
29.08.1977 
10.10.1978 
12.09.1989 
29.08.1977 
10.10.1978 
Appendix Β: Technical harmonization measures 163 
No. Reference Adopted by Title Date of 
adoption 
OJ (L) No. 
and page 
Date of the 
OJ 
30 77/540/EEC 
31 77/541/EEC 
81/576/EEC 
82/319/EEC 
90/628/EEC 
32 77/649/EEC 
81/643/EEC 
88/366/EEC 
90/630/EEC 
33 78/316/EEC 
93/91/EEC 
94/53/EC 
34 78/317/EEC 
35 78/318/EEC 
Council Parking lamps for motor vehicles 28.06.1977 
- Corrigendum (FR-EN-DE-IT-NL-
DA) 
Council Safety belts and restraint systems 28.06.1977 
of motor vehicles 
Council Amendment 20.07.1981 
Commission Adaptation 02.04.1982 
Commission Adaptation 30.10.1991 
- Corrigendum 
Council Field of vision of motor vehicle 27.09.1977 
drivers 
- Corrigendum (FR-EN-DE-IT-NL-
DA) 
- Corrigendum (FR-DE-IT-NL-DA) 
Commission Adaptation 29.07.1981 
Commission Adaptation 17.05.1988 
Commission Adaptation 30.10.1990 
Council Interior fittings of motor vehicles 21.12.1977 
(identification of controls, tell­
tales and indicators) 
Commission Adaptation 29.10.1993 
Commission Amendment 15.11.1994 
Council Defrosting and demisting systems 21.12.1977 
of glazed surfaces of motor 
vehicles 
Council Wiper and washer systems of 21.12.1977 
motor vehicles 
220/83 
284/12 
220/95 
209/32 
139/17 
341/1 
10/56 
267/1 
150/6 
284/11 
231/41 
181/40 
341/20 
81/3 
284/25 
299/26 
81/27 
8.1.49 
29.08.1977 
10.10.1978 
29.08.1977 
29.07.1981 
19.05.1982 
06.12.1990 
16.01.1992 
19.10.1977 
06.06.1978 
10.10.1978 
15.08.1981 
12.07.1988 
06.12.1990 
28.03.1978 
19.11.1993 
28.03.1978 
28.03.1978 
36 
37 
38 
39 
94/68/EC 
78/548/EEC 
78/549/EEC 
94/78/EC 
78/932/EEC 
80/1268/ 
EEC 
89/491/EEC 
93/II6/EEC 
Commission 
Council 
Council 
Commission 
Council 
Council 
Commission 
Commission 
Adaptation 
Heating systems for the passenger 
compartment of motor vehicles 
Wheel guards of motor vehicles 
Adaptation 
Head restraints of seats of motor 
vehicles 
Fuel consumption of motor 
vehicles 
Adaptation 
Adaptation 
- Corrigendum 
16.12.1994 
12.06.1978 
12.06.1978 
21.12.1994 
16.10.1978 
16.12.1980 
17.07.1989 
17.07.1989 
354/1 
168/40 
168/45 
354/10 
325/1 
375/36 
238/43 
329/39 
42/27 
31.12.1994 
26.06.1978 
26.06.1978 
31.12.1994 
20.11.1978 
31.12.1980 
15.08.1989 
30.12.1993 
15.02.1994 
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No. 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
Reference 
80/1269/ 
EEC 
88/195/EEC 
89/491/EEC 
88/77/EEC 
91/542/EEC 
89/297/EEC 
91/226/EEC 
92/21/EEC 
92/22/EEC 
92/23/EEC 
92/24/EEC 
92/114/EEC 
94/20/EC 
Adopted by 
Council 
Commission 
Commission 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Council 
Council 
EP& 
Council 
Title 
Engine power of motor vehicles 
Adaptation 
- Corrigendum (EN) 
Adaptation 
Measures to be taken against the 
emission of gaseous pollutants 
from diesel engines for use in 
vehicles 
Amendment 
Lateral protection (side guards) 
of certain motor vehicles and 
their trailers 
Spray-suppression systems of 
certain categories of motor 
vehicles and their trailers 
Masses and dimensions of motor 
vehicles of category Ml 
Safety glazing and glazing 
materials on motor vehicles and 
their trailers 
Tyres for motor vehicles and 
their trailers and their fitting 
Speed limitation devices or 
similar speed limitation on-board 
systems of certain categories of 
motor vehicles 
External projections forward of 
the cab's rear panel of motor 
vehicles of category N 
Mechanical coupling devices of 
motor vehicles and their trailers 
and their attachment to those 
vehicles 
Date of 
adoption 
16.12.1980 
24.03.1988 
17.07.1989 
03.12.1987 
01.10.1991 
13.04.1989 
27.03.1991 
31.03.1992 
31.03.1992 
31.03.1992 
31.03.1992 
17.12.1992 
30.05.1994 
OJ (L) No. 
and page 
375/46 
92/50 
238/43 
36/33 
295/1 
124/1 
103/5 
129/1 
129/11 
129/95 
129/154 
409/17 
195/1 
Date of the 
OJ 
31.12.1980 
09.04.1988 
15.08.1989 
09.02.1988 
25.10.1991 
05.05.1989 
23.04.1991 
14.05.1992 
14.05.1992 
14.05.1992 
14.05.1992 
31.12.1992 
29.07.1994 
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B.3. List of technical harmonization directives and 
applicability 
The table below shows the applicability of each of the technical harmonization directives. The 
codes for the columns which show the applicability of the measures are provided in full below 
the tables. However, in broad terms, 'M' represents cars, 'N' trucks and 'O' trailers. The 
measures are provided in chronological order. Towards the end of the table, we have included 
a number of measures which have not yet been fully agreed (Nos 50 to 57). 
Subject Directive Applicability 
Ml M2 M3 Nl N2 N3 01 02 03 04 
1 Sound levels 
2 Emissions 
3 Fuel tanks/rear 
protective devices 
4 Rear registration plate 
place 
5 Steering effort 
6 Door latches and 
hinges 
7 Audible warning 
8 Rear visibility 
9 Braking 
10 Suppression (radio) 
11 Diesel smoke 
12 Interior fittings 
13 Anti-theft 
14 Protective steering 
15 Seat strength 
16 Exterior projections 
17 Speedometer and 
reverse gear 
18 Plates (statutory) 
19 Seat belt anchorages 
70/157/EEC 
70/220/EEC 
70/221/EEC 
70/222/EEC 
70/311/EEC 
70/387/EEC 
70/388/EEC 
71/127/EEC 
71/320/EEC 
72/245/EEC 
72/306/EEC 
74/60/EEC 
74/61/EEC 
74/297/EEC 
74/408/EEC 
74/483/EEC 
75/443/EEC 
76/114/EEC 
76/115/EEC 
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Subject 
20 Installation of lighting 
and light signalling 
devices 
21 Reflex reflectors 
22 End-outline, front-
side, rear-side, stop, 
day time running, 
side-marker lamps 
23 Direction indicators 
24 Rear registration plate 
lamps 
25 Head lamps 
(including bulbs) 
26 Front fog lamps 
27 Towing hooks 
28 Rear fog lamps 
29 Reversing lamps 
30 Parking lamps 
31 Seat belts 
32 Forward vision 
33 Identification of 
controls 
34 Defrost/demist 
35 Wash/wipe 
36 Heating systems 
37 Wheel guards 
38 Head restraints 
39 Fuel consumption 
40 Engine power 
41 Dieselemissions 
42 Lateral protection 
43 Anti-spray devices 
Directive 
76/756/EEC 
76/757/EEC 
76/758/EEC 
76/759/EEC 
76/760/EEC 
76/761/EEC 
76/762/EEC 
77/389/EEC 
77/538/EEC 
77/539/EEC 
77/540/EEC 
77/541/EEC 
77/649/EEC 
78/316/EEC 
78/317/EEC 
78/318/EEC 
78/548/EEC 
78/549/EEC 
78/932/EEC 
80/1268/EEC 
80/1269/EEC 
88/77/EEC 
89/297/EEC 
91/226/EEC 
Applicability 
Ml 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
M2 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
M3 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Nl 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
N2 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
N3 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
1 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
02 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
03 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
04 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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Subject 
44 Masses and 
dimensions (cars) 
45 Safety glass 
46 Tyres 
47 Speed limiters 
48 External projections 
of cabs 
49 Couplings 
50 Masses and 
dimensions (other 
than vehicles referred 
to in item 44) 
53 Front impact 
54 Side impact 
55 Animal transport 
vehicles 
56 ADR vehicles 
57 Head lamp cleaners 
Directive 
92/21/EEC 
92/22/EEC 
92/23/EEC 
92/24/EEC 
92/114/EEC 
94/20/EC 
95/48/EC 
95/.../EC 
96/27/EC 
95/.../EC 
95/.../EC 
95/... /EC 
Applicability 
Ml 
X 
X 
X 
X 
M2 
X 
X 
X 
M3 
X 
X 
X 
X 
NI 
χ 
χ 
χ 
χ 
Ν2 
χ 
χ 
χ 
χ 
χ 
Ν3 
χ 
χ 
χ 
χ 
χ 
01 
χ 
χ 
χ 
02 
χ 
χ 
χ 
03 
χ 
χ 
χ 
04 
χ 
χ 
χ 
1 Category Μ 
Category Μι 
Category Μι 
Category Μ3 
2 Category Ν 
Category Ni 
Category Ν? 
Category N3 
3 Category O 
Category Οι 
Motor vehicles with at least four wheels used for the carriage of passengers 
Vehicles used for the carriage of passengers and comprising no more than eight seats in addition to the driver's 
seat 
Vehicles used for the carriage of passengers, comprising more than eight seats in addition to the driver's seat 
and having a maximum mass not exceeding 5 tonnes 
Vehicles used for the carriage of passengers, comprising more than eight seats in addition to the driver's seat 
and having a maximum mass exceeding 5 tonnes 
Motor vehicles with at least four wheels used for the carriage of goods 
Vehicles used for the carriage of goods and having a maximum mass not exceeding 3.5 tonnes 
Vehicles used for the carriage of goods and having a maximum mass exceeding 3.5 tonnes but not exceeding 
12 tonnes 
Vehicles used for the carriage of goods and having a maximum mass exceeding 12 tonnes 
Trailers (including semi-trailers) 
Trailers with a maximum mass not exceeding 0.75 tonnes 
Category O2 
Category O3 
Category O4 
Trailers with a maximum mass exceeding 0.75 tonnes but not exceeding 3.5 tonnes 
Trailers with a maximum mass exceeding 3.5 tonnes but not exceeding 10 tonnes 
Trailers with a maximum mass exceeding 10 tonnes 
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APPENDIX C 
Horizontal measures 
The table below provides the horizontal measures which have affected the automotive sector. 
Title 
Public 
procurement 
Transport 
Health & 
safety 
Corporate 
taxation 
VAT 
Customs 
duties 
Measure 
93/36/EEC 
93/23/EEC 
90/531/EEC 
92/106/EEC 
(11.6.92); 
3578/92 
(7.12.92); 
1841/88 
(21.6.88); 
881/92 
(26.3.92); 
91/440/EEC 
(29.7.91) 
89/391/EEC 
sets out basic 
responsibilities. 
13+other 
Directives give 
further detail 
90/434-^36/ 
EEC 
92/77/EEC 
1991 PTAs with 
Cz, Hu and Pol. 
2913/92 and 
2454/93; 
717/91 
(21.3.91) are 
the main 
developments 
Description 
If a contract for works or services is 
(partially) funded by the public sector 
and exceeds certain thresholds, then it 
must be put out to tender through an 
official process. There has also been 
progress in eliminating discrimination 
against European suppliers for US 
Government procurement. 
Introduction of a number of financial and 
practical incentives to promote multi-
modal transport for freight. Liberalization 
of road haulage industry leading to 
increased competition. Abolition of all 
permits and quotas between Member 
States for road haulage. Improvements in 
rail system planned and liberalization of 
air transport. 
The Safety Framework Directive requires 
worker consultation, appointments of staff 
or subcontractors to monitor it. Workplace 
Directive lays down minimum health and 
safety requirements. Safety signs must also 
be used. Pregnant women are also given 
special protection. There are rules for the 
safe use of VDUs, heavy loads, dangerous 
substances, personal protective clothing. 
The taxation of (cross-border) mergers 
Directive allows for deferral of taxation 
charges on capital gains. If a company 
owns more than 25% of a company in 
another MS then double taxation of 
dividends has been abolished and 
withholding taxes are prohibited. 
Large traders have to provide detailed 
information on intra-Community sales and 
purchases. VAT payments are no longer 
made at the frontier, but on domestic VAT 
returns. Traders can store any goods from 
outside the EC in tax warehouses and only 
pay VAT when they are released from the 
warehouse. There are simplifications on 
triangulation procedures. There have been 
moves to approximate VAT rates across 
Europe, with a minimum of 15% standard 
rate. 
Agreements with Eastern Europe to 
progressively liberalize trade. Creation of 
EEA has increased number of countries 
operating free markets for European 
products. 
Influence 
(initial 
view) 
High 
Medium 
Medium 
Low 
Medium 
Medium 
Focus 
Sales & distribution (as a 
result of increased cross-
border procurement of 
vehicles for defence, 
health care, emergency 
services and utilities) 
Sales & distribution 
Manufacturing (different 
standards affect 
productivity of plants in 
different MSs) 
Sales & distribution 
(unlikely to have 
significantly changed 
companies' incentives to 
engage in cross-border 
mergers) 
Sales & distribution 
(affects the end price to 
the consumer and 
therefore the demand for 
the vehicle) 
Manufacturing, Sales & 
distribution 
(affected the costs of 
importing vehicles from 
Eastern Europe and may 
have facilitated inward 
investment into Europe) 
Cars 
or CVs 
CVs 
CVs 
Both 
Both 
CVs 
(purch-
asers 
usually 
claim 
back 
VAT) 
Both 
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Title Measure Description Influence 
(initial 
view) 
Focus Cars 
or CVs 
Excise duties 
Non-
mandated 
standards 
Financial 
services 
EMU 
Competition 
policy 
State aids 
Company law 
92/82/EEC 
Various 
88/361/EEC; 
90/619/EEC 
(8.11.90); 
92/96/EEC 
(10.11.92); 
88/357/EEC 
(22.6.88) 
90/232/EEC 
(14.5.90) 
Treaty on 
European 
Union 
Articles85/86 
123/85 
Articles 92, 93 
and 94 
Fourth and 
Seventh 
Company Law 
Directives. 
2137/85 
(21.7.85) 
COM(91) 174/1 
and II 
Directive sets minimum rates of excise 
duty on mineral oils, including petrol and 
diesel 
Development of ISO 9000 standards. 
Removal of standards other than health, 
safety, consumer protection and 
environment as barriers to trade except 
where previous legislation exists and 
attempts to converge standards allow 
rationalization of manufacturing processes 
and promote competition (see sectoral 
legislation). Testing and certification 
bodies are to be brought up to EN45000 
standards with a view to mutual 
recognition of these bodies. 
Insurance companies can set up branches 
and offer services in any MS under single 
licence. There are provisions to encourage 
further competition in the life assurance 
and pensions market. 
Exchange controls have been abolished 
and by the end of 1992 Spain, Ireland and 
Portugal removed their existing controls. 
Harmonization of car insurance 
requirements. 
Treaty on European Union sets a date of 1 
January 1999 for the introduction of a 
single currency. 
Article 85 of Treaty of Rome prohibits 
agreements between firms which distort, 
prevent or restrict competition. 
Exemptions for the automotive sector. 
Joint ventures are subject to supervision. 
Merger Control Regulation (1990) 
prohibits mergers which create or reinforce 
a dominant position. State aid granted 
illegally can be challenged retroactively by 
the Commission and may have to be 
repaid. Car distribution has a block 
exemption from Articles 85 and 86. 
Ensures that removal of barriers to trade is 
not negated by Member States protecting 
their industries through unjustified 
subsidies or other forms of support which 
distort fair competition. 
Common standards for the presentation of 
company reports and accounts. Ability to 
set up European Economic Interest Groups 
for ancillary activities. Proposals to impose 
restrictions on take-over and other general 
bid procedures and to provide for the 
creation of a European Company. 
Low 
Medium 
Low 
High 
High 
Medium 
Low 
Sales & distribution 
(affects the total cost of 
running a vehicle) 
Manufacturing 
Both 
Sales & distribution Both 
Production 
Sales & distribution, 
manufacturing 
(lack of adoption has 
high (negative) effect 
and the industry has 
reacted to the uncertainty 
by spreading plants 
around Europe) 
Sales & distribution 
(probably affected final 
prices to consumers) 
Both 
Finance & sales, 
distribution 
Finance 
Both 
Both 
Both 
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Title 
Intellectual 
property 
Telecomm-
unications 
Frontier 
controls 
Measure 
91/250/EEC; 
89/104/EEC; 
40/94 
(20.12.93) 
90/387/EEC 
(28.6.90); 
92/44/EEC 
(5.6.92); 
91/396/EEC 
(29.7.91); 
92/264/EEC 
(11.5.92) 
Regulation 
(EEC) No 
3648/91; 
Regulation 
(EEC) No 
717/91 
Description 
Number of copyright directives in specific 
areas such as software which harmonize 
national laws. Prohibition of the release for 
free circulation of counterfeit goods. 
Future changes in the procedures for 
patenting and trade mark protection (trade 
mark regulation already adopted; 
regulation on patents to come at an 
unspecified time) will reduce the costs of 
protecting intellectual property. 
Introduction of a Community trade mark 
applicable throughout the Community. 
Manufacturers of cars have recently not 
been provided with the copyright over the 
whole car and its spare parts (French court 
case against Italian parts copiers). 
Harmonized international codes and 
emergency numbers. Harmonized 
frequency bands for mobile phones. 
Increased competition through opening up 
national networks. 
Use of Single Administrative Document 
and subsequently the abolition of border 
controls. 
Influence 
(initial 
view) 
Medium 
Low 
High 
Focus 
RD&D and suppliers 
(profits affected because 
parts market opening up 
to increased competition) 
Manufacturing and 
suppliers 
Sales and distribution 
Cars 
or CVs 
Both 
Both 
Both 
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APPENDIX D 
Fiscal regime 
There has been some success in achieving VAT convergence. The Commission has now 
achieved its interim solution and whilst there is no full approximation, the spread of VAT 
rates has been reduced. In 1987 rates for cars varied between 38% (Italy) to 6% (Greece). All 
rates have now converged to the 15-25% range. However, we heard doubts expressed as to 
whether the proposed definitive VAT arrangement would occur by 1 January 1997, as 
scheduled. 
Differences in car acquisition taxes are a more important factor in continuing international 
price discrepancies as well as differences in car ownership. These differences are shown in the 
tables below. 
Differences in classification for the purposes of taxation have a significant effect on the 
segmentation of the car market. 
Differences in tax treatment of company cars means that the market is distorted towards 
demand for larger segments and more highly specified cars (i.e. with additional features such 
as powered sunroofs). 
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Table D.I. VAT on new cars in EU Member States, 1987 and 1994 
Country 
Austria 
Belgium 
up to 3 litres or 116 kW 
over 3 litres or 116 kW 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
up to 2 litres, petrol 
up to 2.5 litres, diesel 
over 2 litres, petrol 
over 2.5 litres, diesel 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
1987 % 
-
25.0 
33.0 
22.0 
-
28.02 
14.0 
6.0 
23.0 
18.0 
18.0 
38.0 
38.0 
12.0 
20.0 
16.0 
33.0 
-
15.0 
15.0 
1994 % 
20.0 
20.5 
20.5' 
25.0 
22.0 
18.63 
15.0 
18.04 
21.0 
19.0 
19.0 
19.0 
19.0 
15.0 
17.5 
16.0 
15.0 
25.0 
17.5 
17.5 
Source: EIU, The New Car Market in Europe, 1995. 
1 A standard 19.5% VAT was introduced in April 1992 and increased to 20.5% on 1 January 1994. 
2 Reduced from 33.3% in September 1987. 
3 Reduced to this level in April 1992, after having fallen to 25% in 1989 and 22% in 1990. 
4 Increased to this level (which is the standard rate of VAT in Greece) in August 1992. 
Appendix D: Fiscal regime 173 
Table D.2. Taxes on acquisition 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Spain 
France 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
UK 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
VAT 
(%) 
20.5 
25 
15 
16 
18.6 
18 
21 
19 
15 
17.5 
16 
17.5 
20 
22 
25 
Sales tax 
Passenger cars 
based on cc+age 
105% up to DKR 24400 
180% on the remainder 
taxable value=price inc. VAT 
none 
12% 
none 
new car: 10-75% 
<2.5 litres: 23.2% 
>2.5 litres: 29.5% 
>21 HP (petrol) 
or 24 HP (diesel) 
LIT 5-12 million 
(abolished 31.12.94) 
none 
petrol car: 45.2%-HFL 3,394 
diesel car: 45.2%-HFL 1.278 
based on cc e.g. 1801: ESC 
1,327,776 
none 
based on fuel consumption 7-
14% 
100% 
excise tax based on pollution 
Commercial vehicles 
none 
95% 
none 
none 
none 
new vehicle: 0-30% 
13.3% for LCV; otherwise 
£40-100 
transfer taxes 
none 
none 
none 
none 
none 
none 
excise tax 
Registration 
charge 
BFR 2,500 
DKR 1,000 
DM54 
PTA 8,650 
FF 88-160 & parafiscal 
charge 
8-16% 
New: LIT 230,000 
Used: LIT 210,000 
LFR 1,128 
22-93.25 HFL 
ESC 5,000 
Source: ACEA. 
Table D.3. Taxes on ownership 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Spain 
France 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
UK 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
Sales tax 
Passenger cars 
based on cc+supplement 
weight 
cc 
HP 
cc+age+district 
DR 15,000-50,000 
cc 
cc+diesel, methane or LPG surtaxes 
cc 
deadweight, province, fuel 
cc+age 
UK £135 
HP 
weight 
weight 
Commercial vehicles 
deadweight 
weight 
total weight 
pollution, noise category 
weight 
cc+age+district 
DR 12.5/kg +parafiscal 
charge, unladen weight 
payload 
unladen weight 
deadweight and fuel 
weight and operating zone 
laden weight, HP 
weight 
weight, axles, fuel 
Registration 
charge 
number of private km 
car value 
purchase price 
acquisition cost 
-
-
purchase price 
-
list price 
none 
purchase price+cc+age 
-
-
-
Source: ACEA. 
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Table D.4. Taxes on motoring 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Spain 
France 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
UK 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
Excise duties on fuels (excl. VAT) in ECU/ l,000litre 
Leaded 
497 
416 
566 
386 
587 
402 
377 
512 
410 
588 
478 
460 
Unleaded 
427 
387 
513 
355 
547 
351 
345 
458 
357 
524 
442 
399 
350 
467 
438 
Diesel 
298 
290 
324 
257 
328 
243 
297 
339 
255 
316 
315 
399 
259 
285 
265 
LPG 
177 
55 
8 
Tax on the 
insurance premium 
(%) 
27 
50 (< 6 tonnes) 
25 (> 6 tonnes) 
12 
35 
19.6 
13.5 
4 
Source: ACEA. 
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APPENDIX E 
Drivers for change in the European automotive industry 
The European automotive industry is, of course, not just composed of European-owned 
manufacturers. Neither is it confined to the European market. Hence, many of the drivers 
noted below are global in character - indeed globalization is one of the most important 
features of the industry. 
E.l. Globalization 
E. 1.1. Interpénétration of markets 
Since the early 1970s Japanese exports of complete vehicles to North America and Europe 
have constituted the major trade flows. Lesser trade flows consisted of flows from Europe to 
North America, Africa and South America; and Japan to South-East Asia. More recently this 
pattern has begun to change in the light of Japanese FDI, rising domestic production costs in 
Japan, the arrival of new players and the impact of Japanese transplants in Europe and the US. 
Thus, today, trade flows from Japan to North America are reducing, and those to Europe are 
static under the general agreement to limit exports until 1999. Growth in exports to Europe 
and North America is evident from Korea. European manufacturers are winning back some of 
the loss of market share endured in North America. Exports from the US, including those of 
the domestic manufacturers and those of Japanese transplants, are beginning to make an 
impact in Europe. Some Japanese transplant production is shipped back to Japan, while small 
inroads have been made by importers into Japan. Korea remains a closed market. At the 
European national level, domestic 'national champions' are effectively losing dominant 
market share and seeking to compensate by exports to other countries. 
Summary: Europeans face even more competitive markets, especially within Europe itself. 
E. 1.2. Spatial extension of production 
Most notable here has been the Japanese transplants in North America and Europe. Growth in 
transplant capacity is slowing down, especially in North America. New Japanese capacity in 
Europe will be c. 2 million units by the year 2000. Still the most globally organized companies 
remain GM and Ford. 
There is growth in European capacity in the 'EU periphery' (i.e. Portugal, southern Italy, 
Burneston), former East Germany, etc. and also growth just outside Europe, for example, Fiat 
in Poland. Growth is much less in traditional industry heartlands, though reinvestment is 
occurring (Jaguar, Ford Dagenham, Renault Flins) and few closures have been announced. 
There is a new trend to local production by European companies in North America. For 
example, Mercedes and BMW have new plants there. This may be the start of reversing the 
trend for Europeans to exit the North American market. 
There is little European production capacity in South-East Asia, but growth is expected in 
China - exports to or production in China is difficult to predict because of the political 
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dimension, sudden shifts in policy can and do occur. There is a perceived danger of protection 
in these markets, particularly in China. 
There is a trend for developing countries to purchase production line processes. For example, 
parts of the production line for Rover's Montego car have been sold to India. 
Summary: FDI flows reflect the need to develop a broadly-based portfolio of production 
locations. 
E. 1.3. Pan-national alliances 
Production alliances are a feature of the industry, as are various marketing or 'badge 
engineering' agreements, e.g. the Ford Terrano is actually a Nissan vehicle. Alliances in 
general can be seen as a means of virtual integration or partial integration - achieving the 
benefits of scale without the costs of integration. The failure of the Renault-Volvo merger is 
indicative of the political difficulties in rationalization of the European industry. 
At a global scale there is an emerging 'clustering' of companies around a few leaders, i.e.: 
GM Opel, Vauxhall, Isuzu, Saab 
Ford Mazda, Kia, Jaguar, Aston Martin, IVECO 
Toyota Hino, etc. in Keiretsu 
Nissan Nissan Diesel, etc. 
VW Seat, Audi, Skoda (but quite European in focus) 
Mitsubishi Proton (Malaysia), links with Mercedes, Nedcar 
These may be short-term moves to experiment in different markets or product lines. 
Summary: Some European firms (Renault, PSA, Volvo, Fiat) appear largely outside the major 
groupings, and are potentially vulnerable. 
E.2. Global currency movements 
The inexorable rise of the Yen has pushed up the market prices for Japanese cars, and is an 
important element both in further attempts at efficiency improvement within Japan, and in 
globalization of production. 
Equally, the strength of the German Mark is undoubtedly a factor in the long-term movement 
of productive capital out of Germany. 
Summary: Currency movements are a vital factor in long-term competitiveness. They underpin 
and support globalization of production and sourcing. 
E.3. Overcapacity 
Capacity is a moving target, in that available capacity may increase without new plant 
investment as a result of improvements in productivity within existing plant. Capacity is also 
relative to demand. The extent to which capacity of specific models or types of vehicle can be 
changed is also of importance. In the USA, for example, Ford and GM are busy converting 
plant which made large saloons into plant to make pick-up trucks. This takes time and money. 
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In Europe there appears to be an overall surplus of capacity of around 20% relative to average 
demand - though in practice this is common. 
US industry has typically been very cyclical, with assembly capacity structured so as to 
maximize output at the top of the cycle - there is nothing worse for a manufacturer to have 
demand for the product and be unable to supply it. Japanese industry, until the recent 
downturn, did not show similar cyclical swings, so capacity could be developed to more 
accurately match demand. Additionally, leading assemblers such as Toyota can access capacity 
at sister companies (Toyota has always produced more vehicles than apparent capacity). 
Europe faces an emerging overcapacity in small sports cars, 4 wheel drive vehicles, standard 
saloons and Espace-type people carriers. Much new capacity has been added in Europe 
(mainly with subsidies), but relatively little taken away; this cannot continue. 
Summary: New capacity offers state-of-the-art productivity - but somewhere the system has to 
give. Traditional European producers and locations are most at risk. 
E.4. Market conditions 
E.4.1. Demand in Europe 
As noted above, capacity is relative to demand. In Europe demand has stagnated since 
1991/92, and unusually appears to have done so broadly across all markets at the same time -
an ominous portent for European industry which could previously offset declines in one 
national market with growth in another. 
European demand for either cars or trucks is mature and is unlikely to experience significant 
upward growth. Even if overall economic conditions improve, Europe cannot absorb any more 
cars, and increasingly measures are being introduced at all governmental levels which will 
restrict car usage. 
European market share in Europe (including US companies) is under threat from the Japanese 
(unrestricted access after 1999) and the Koreans (no restrictions). 
Summary: More competitive sales environment. 
E.4.2. North America 
North America is a vital market for European built high value cars (Volvo, Mercedes, BMW, 
Jaguar, Porsche, Ferrari, Rolls Royce, etc.). However, European firms suffered a catastrophic 
fall in sales over the period 1986-93. There has been some recovery since then, but Japanese 
firms have taken a strong hold over the luxury car segment, epitomized by the Lexus LS400. 
North America can take over 50% of the sales of the above companies, and of the output of 
more specialized products, such as the new MGF (Rover Group). It is not surprising therefore 
that US safety and emissions standards have been a bigger driver than European standards for 
these companies (e.g. high level brake lights). 
Summary: Some recovery, but Europe needs to succeed in the USA. 
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Summary: Chronic lack of profitability increases pressure on weaker firms in all parts of the 
industry. 
E.4.3. Japan and South-East Asia 
European firms have a very small share in these markets, which are either almost closed 
(South Korea), non-existent (Myanmar) or dominated by Japanese products (Malaysia, 
Thailand, Australia, Taiwan, etc.). There are often high growth markets in smaller developing 
countries. There is a long-term weakness for European industry in this region, especially in the 
market in Japan itself. Some recent progress has been made here, but from a very low base. 
E.4.4. Others 
Growth of sales in Eastern Europe has been disappointing; change will happen a lot more 
slowly than some optimists first suggested. South America has consistently failed to live up to 
expectations, but new growth in sales is occurring in the key markets of Brazil and Argentina, 
where European firms (Fiat, VW) are reasonably placed. 
Summary: European firms need to find new markets outside Europe, but it is going to be 
difficult. 
E.5. Low returns 
In 1993 GM recorded the biggest corporate loss in history. Long-term profit trends in the 
industry show low returns, getting even lower, with highly cyclical swings. GM strategy is 
now to make as much in the good times as possible, in order to see through the next 
downsizing. 
In Europe, in the last 30 years only BMW has been consistently profitable. Others have been 
consistently unprofitable, or of marginal profitability. This is a major long-term structural 
problem, as profits are needed to develop new models, etc. Cash is frequently raised on 
financial markets. 
Some companies are better placed. Volvo has assets following its strategy of selling non-core 
businesses; BMW has substantial cash reserves. Individual or family ownership is still 
important in the cases of Fiat (Agnelli), BMW (Quant), PSA (Peugeot), and Porsche (Piech). 
The French state still controls Renault, although this could be privatized in due course. Low 
returns are endemic, from component suppliers to dealers - again the implication is that in the 
long run something has to give. What happens to profits is equally important. Japanese firms 
have low levels of profit, but most is reinvested rather than paid out to shareholders. 
E.6. Standards and governmental regulation 
E.6.1. Europe 
Meeting EU safety and emissions standards is a prerequisite, but harmonization should lower 
costs. European legislation is slow; national measures (e.g. incentives to introduce catalysts) 
prior to European harmonization were allowed, but national measures can fall foul of 
European measures. Europe tends to lag behind the USA on regulation issues, so in this sense 
EU regulation is less of a driver. 
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However, standards are set to rise in terms of emissions, having gone through Euro-1 and 
Euro-2. This is expensive, but at least predictable for manufacturers. However, it means 
engines (which typically are kept in production for much longer than bodies) are more liable to 
be rendered obsolete. 
Note that harmonization of standards is much less complete in the commercial vehicle 
industry. Partly this is a reflection of the fragmentation of demand, with many customized 
applications built onto volume produced chassis. Basic terms, such as allowed total weight, 
height and width, vary across national markets. 
Summary: Regulation of product and process (CFCs, hydro-soluble paints, landfill) dominates 
the design process. 
E.6.2. USA 
The picture in the USA is somewhat confusing. Essentially, California has led the way on 
emissions, but the Big 3 are fighting hard for alternative standards to be adopted elsewhere. 
Some states want to follow California. 
Safety and fuel economy (CAFE) are monitored by the national government. If European 
manufacturers intend to sell into North America, they have to adopt US standards. US air bags 
are bigger than in Europe: GM fits them in its European cars, Ford does not. 
Truck regulations in the USA are again different to those in Europe, as are those in Japan. 
However, the European truck industry has a strong ownership presence in the North American 
market. Very different standards between these two markets may act to the detriment of 
European producers. 
Summary: A lead in regulation has been established in California under increasing pressure, 
but manufacturers cannot assume the overall direction of regulation will change - ultimately 
radically new technologies will have to be introduced. 
E.7. Trade 
Established and emerging economic regions dominate the global structure - EU, NAFTA, 
Mercusor, etc. Notwithstanding the efforts of GATT/WTO, there is a concern to be within 
each region with the production facilities in order to access the markets. 
Friction over trade, especially the surplus enjoyed by Japan with the EU and North America, is 
source of continuing political disagreement. Japan has sourced more components from North 
America and Europe to balance trade flows, but the net impact to date is still small. 
Future trade disputes are likely to focus on Korea and, potentially, Japanese exports via North 
America. Growth in production in Eastern Europe may also be a problem (e.g. with Koreans 
entering). 
E.8. Design 
Many of the issues confronting vehicle manufacturers are distilled in vehicle design. European 
performance in terms of design time is below global best practice, as is design for manufacture 
and extent of supplier involvement. 
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Vehicle designers are using fewer platforms, more carry over parts, etc. in an effort to reduce 
design time and amortize costs over longer production runs while providing product 
differentiation (VAG are to use just four platforms for their entire group range). Europe 
continues to have strengths in the innovative character of design and the ability to style 
vehicles more effectively; the Twingo is a good recent example. Europe is less competitive in 
terms of the design process. 
E.9. Production organization and processes 
Europe continues to improve production organization and processes, but debate still continues 
over the wider social context within which production takes place. The difference between 
wages paid to staff and total labour costs can be large (e.g. Germany, Sweden) where social 
costs are high. 
E.9.1. Assembly 
Japanese transplants have achieved remarkable production performances, e.g. in hours to build 
a vehicle; in time to reach full production after introducing a new model; and in output in 
vehicles per employee. This has been partly through radical changes in work organization, 
teamworking, elimination of demarcations, etc.; especially in the UK, European industry is 
catching up. Elsewhere in Europe shift patterns, holidays, working time, etc., all vary widely -
in many instances working time is less than in Japan or the USA. 
Many of the European plants (including Ford and GM) are long-established, with poor layout 
and access. Newer plants (e.g. Fiat at Melfi) are much more competitive. 
Summary: European plants must continue to improve productivity. 
E.9.2. Supply chain management 
As part of the total costs calculus for production, assemblers have sought to squeeze the 
supply base - in some cases pushing through absolute reductions in piece price (VW). Supply 
chain management is a vital part of competitive performance for manufacturers. Use of quality 
performance systems lacks integration (though harmonization of standards is occurring) and 
represents an added cost for suppliers and also a management cost for assemblers, which, in 
the medium term, it would be useful to do without. Few European assemblers have global 
purchasing capability (essentially GM and Ford, plus new Japanese transplants), or even well 
developed purchasing capability across Europe (e.g. Sogedac/PSA still buys largely in France 
and Spain). 
Europe cannot simply copy Japanese practice in this area, especially with regard to logistics 
and JIT. Newer plants tend to have some key suppliers alongside, but note that this is not the 
case with Toyota at Burneston. European suppliers also underperform global best practice 
productivity and quality, but have a good record on innovation. Many have won business with 
Japanese transplants. 
Summary: Fragmentation of assemblers is reflected in the supply base; performance is still 
below global best practice. 
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E.10. Government research initiatives and technology change 
These can be national (e.g. UK-based IMI Programme) or pan-European (e.g. Prometheus, 
Drive, Eureka). Of particular importance is EUCAR, an umbrella grouping to co-ordinate the 
long-term technological development of the industry. These initiatives provide a mechanism to 
bring in suppliers and assemblers, reduce risk, share cost, and provide a clear direction for 
change. Similar major programmes are underway in the USA (USCAR, which excludes non-
US firms) and Japan. Major concerns are: new vehicle design concepts and use concepts; 
innovative drivetrain technologies, e.g. fuel cells, gas-turbine hybrids, advanced batteries, 
innovative body materials; advanced telematics and vehicle navigation systems; and advanced 
urban traffic management systems. 
More applications of electronics sensor and actuator technology are likely. Technological 
advances in other areas are important, too - especially telecoms/EDI which has a direct impact 
on the vehicle design process (networked CAD/CAM), purchasing (EDI) and vehicle sales and 
distribution (EDI). 
Summary: The industry faces radical technological change and, therefore, high uncertainty and 
risk. 
E.H. Environmental and other transport systems 
Thus far, regulation has been very narrow. There are specific controls over processes or 
process materials (CFCs, water-based paints, consumption of energy or water) or over specific 
attributes of vehicles (occupant safety in a head-on impact; exhaust emissions). Regulation has 
also been slow and cautious (except Sweden, which is generally ahead of Europe on safety). 
More recent concerns are over landfill and the vehicle scrapping process. But a more deeply 
embedded environmental approach (which seems inevitable) will demand a more holistic 
attitude of looking at the costs of the entire life-cycle of vehicles - which will have a profound 
impact on materials, powertrain and vehicle longevity. 
At a local level, many measures are being enacted which restrict vehicle use or make it more 
expensive, e.g. city centre bans, higher parking costs, road pricing, etc. This leads to questions 
on the need for transport at all, and secondly on the mode of transport. Light rail and other 
alternatives are being adopted more widely, cycling is being promoted, etc. 
Summary: Vehicles may become less of a necessity, more of a leisure activity. Assemblers 
must be more sensitive to environmental concerns generally. 
E.12. Demographics 
Many European countries have ageing population profiles. In North America GM is crippled 
by health care costs. Overall, social costs are likely to rise, and will have to be carried by 
vehicle assemblers. Recruitment could become more of a problem, especially on the shop 
floor. 
Car buyers are also ageing: the average new GM car buyer in the USA is almost retired! This 
impacts on vehicle design. Alternative forms of 'ownership' may have to be developed (e.g. 
Mercedes pool leasing scheme). Vehicles are likely to become more expensive in relative 
terms. European marketing costs are very high already, and some brands appear poorly placed 
to cope with radical changes in the market or the product. 
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APPENDIX F 
Case studies 
We have offered to carry out five case studies - Volvo, Nissan, Fiat, Renault and Daewoo. 
F.l. Volvo 
This company was chosen because it manufactures both automobiles and commercial vehicles. 
Also, as Sweden is a new EU member, it represents a new entrant into the market. 
F.2. Nissan 
Nissan is a Japanese manufacturer of both automobiles and commercial vehicles. It has a 
Spanish plant producing commercial vehicles. It set up production facilities in Europe in the 
mid-1980s, just before the single market programme. It would therefore be interesting to 
assess its reasons for doing this. It has successfully implemented some of the lean production 
techniques common to the industry in Japan. 
F.3. Fiat 
Fiat is an Italian producer of automobiles and commercial vehicles, traditionally having a very 
high share of its domestic market - more so than Renault or Peugeot/Citroën. Fiat has been 
under great pressure as a result of single market initiatives. 
F.4. Renault 
Renault is the third largest European assembler (after GM and Ford). It is interesting because 
of its high levels of sales outside its domestic French market and its developed relationships 
with suppliers. It has been active in seeking lower cost production bases, notably in the 
Americas. 
F.5. Daewoo 
Daewoo is a recent Korean entrant into the European marketplace. It has developed some very 
innovative distribution arrangements. It also offers the opportunity for us to review a recent 
foreign direct investment into Eastern Europe. 
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APPENDIX G 
New registrations of passenger cars in Western Europe by 
manufacturer, 1989-94 
(in units) 
Opel/GM Europe 
Ford 
Renault 
Volkswagen 
Fiat 
Peugeot 
Citroën 
Mercedes-Benz 
Nissan 
BMW 
Rover 
Toyota 
Audi 
Seat 
Volvo 
Mazda 
Honda 
Lancia 
Mitsubishi 
Alfa Romeo 
Hyundai 
Suzuki 
Chrysler 
Skoda 
Saab 
Lada 
Land Rover 
Subaru 
Daihatsu 
Others 
Total 
1989 
1.471,991 
1.561,261 
1,388,459 
1,349,556 
1,475,977 
1,050.629 
643,959 
423,423 
404,105 
375,564 
393.049 
344,661 
358,279 
303.508 
265,103 
237,029 
136,121 
293,942 
163,846 
217,269 
16,750 
93,214 
31,315 
32,036 
65.979 
114,072 
20,326 
50,852 
41.321 
129,032 
13,452,628 
1990 
1,497,408 
1.508,866 
1,298,166 
1,370,643 
1,367,302 
1.075,853 
628,776 
425,021 
393,927 
360,581 
361,764 
352,416 
356,828 
306,946 
232,087 
275,306 
159,380 
299,215 
172,876 
204,405 
18,274 
105,513 
35,778 
24,821 
57,190 
98,300 
30,987 
50.930 
40,322 
123,550 
13,233,431 
1991 
1,551,738 
1,591,919 
1,344,526 
1,444,023 
1,251,047 
1,014,357 
607,797 
450,503 
451,773 
411,780 
325,440 
357,053 
393,873 
321,430 
198,259 
283,387 
170,998 
270,697 
191,674 
188,977 
40.776 
110,863 
40,776 
47,774 
52,030 
111,057 
28,869 
54,663 
53,689 
134.540 
13,496.288 
1992 
1,611,406 
1,505.183 
1,426,993 
1,561,852 
1,192,057 
991,174 
645,486 
408,789 
449,908 
440,502 
306,835 
335,791 
411,920 
329,084 
200,232 
267,430 
175,457 
228,487 
162,051 
164,275 
83,024 
117,455 
41,911 
51,293 
50,535 
99,260 
29.352 
52,158 
45,879 
119.351 
13,505,130 
1993 
1.415,552 
1,292,490 
1,186,898 
1,209,699 
894,177 
835,899 
551,108 
350,940 
408,648 
365,303 
328,832 
312,618 
305,599 
259,389 
171,551 
191,109 
160,537 
163,284 
137,886 
113,723 
85,257 
99,518 
53,878 
51,232 
42,271 
52,062 
35,040 
40,977 
33,613 
86,786 
11.235,876 
1994 
1,475,042 
1,391,439 
1,296,674 
1,212,061 
1,015,583 
914,808 
605,883 
416,355 
403,335 
386,370 
354,529 
314,073 
310,036 
295,280 
199,743 
176,536 
167,386 
162,720 
121,380 
100,083 
85,411 
78,913 
60,788 
56,717 
51,626 
40,428 
39,364 
37,757 
24,312 
96,600 
11,891,232 
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APPENDIX H 
Market share information 
Table H.l. Market share information - volumes (%) 
Opel/GM Europe 
Ford 
Renault 
Volkswagen 
Fiat 
Peugeot 
Citroen 
Mercedes-Benz 
Nissan 
BMW 
Rover 
Toyota 
Audi 
Seat 
Volvo 
Mazda 
Honda 
Lancia 
Mitsubishi 
Alfa Romeo 
Hyundai 
Suzuki 
Chrysler 
Skoda 
Saab 
Lada 
Land Rover 
Subaru 
Daihatsu 
Others 
Total 
1989 
10.9 
11.6 
10.3 
10.0 
11.0 
7.8 
4.8 
3.1 
3.0 
2.8 
2.9 
2.6 
2.7 
2.3 
2.0 
1.8 
1.0 
2.2 
1.2 
1.6 
0.1 
0.7 
0.2 
0.2 
0.5 
0.8 
0.2 
0.4 
0.3 
1.0 
100.0 
1990 
11.3 
11.4 
9.8 
10.4 
10.3 
8.1 
4.8 
3.2 
3.0 
2.7 
2.7 
2.7 
2.7 
2.3 
1.8 
2.1 
1.2 
2.3 
1.3 
1.5 
0.1 
0.8 
0.3 
0.2 
0.4 
0.7 
0.2 
0.4 
0.3 
0.9 
100.0 
1991 
1.5 
118 
10.0 
10.7 
9.3 
7.5 
4.5 
3.3 
3.3 
3.1 
2.4 
2.6 
2.9 
2.4 
1.5 
2.1 
1.3 
2.0 
1.4 
1.4 
0.3 
0.8 
0.3 
0.4 
0.4 
0.8 
0.2 
0.4 
0.4 
1.0 
100.0 
1992 
11.9 
111 
10.6 
11.6 
8.8 
7.3 
4.8 
3.0 
3.3 
3.3 
2.3 
2.5 
3.1 
2.4 
1.5 
2.0 
1.3 
1.7 
1.2 
1.2 
0.6 
0.9 
0.3 
0.4 
0.4 
0.7 
0.2 
0.4 
0.3 
0.9 
100.0 
1993 
12.6 
11.5 
10.6 
10.8 
8.0 
7.4 
4.9 
3.1 
3.6 
3.3 
2.9 
2.8 
2.7 
2.3 
1.5 
1.7 
1.4 
1.5 
1.2 
1.0 
0.8 
0.9 
0.5 
0.5 
0.4 
0.5 
0.3 
0.4 
0.3 
0.8 
100.0 
1994 
12.4 
11.7 
10.9 
10.2 
8.5 
7.7 
5.1 
3.5 
3.4 
3.2 
3.0 
2.6 
2.6 
2.5 
1.7 
1.5 
1.4 
1.4 
1.0 
0.8 
0.7 
0.7 
0.5 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.2 
0.8 
100.0 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit 1995. 
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H.2. World market share by manufacturer HQ, passenger cars, 1982-93 
Europe 
America 
Japan 
Korea 
Others 
1982 
37.14 
33.69 
26.17 
0.40 
2.60 
1983 
35.54 
36.04 
25.69 
0.42 
2.32 
1984 
33.20 
38.89 
24.88 
0.52 
2.51 
1985 
32.84 
38.13 
25.74 
0.83 
2.47 
1986 
33.67 
36.94 
25.47 
1.37 
2.54 
1987 
35.25 
33.35 
26.27 
2.37 
2.77 
1988 
34.83 
33.11 
26.61 
2.46 
2.99 
1989 
34.29 
31.09 
29.45 
2.47 
2.71 
1990 
33.71 
28.75 
32.01 
2.76 
2.77 
1991 
34.02 
27.54 
32.49 
3.33 
2.63 
1992 
34.16 
27.43 
31.89 
3.82 
2.70 
1993 
31.30 
30.24 
30.83 
4.74 
2.90 
Source: Ward's 1994. Table 23 p26. 
H.3. World market share (%) by marque and group, passenger cars, 1984-93 
Alfa 
Audi 
BMW 
Citroen 
Fiat 
Jaguar 
Lancia 
Mercedes 
Peugeot 
Renault 
Rover 
Saab 
Seat 
Volvo 
VW 
Others 
European 
EU 
American 
Japanese 
Korean 
Fiat Group 
PSA Group 
1984 
0.65 
1.14 
1.40 
1.59 
3.81 
0.10 
0.62 
1.67 
3.17 
5.00 
1.32 
0.33 
0.65 
1.23 
5.41 
1.88 
33.20 
29.99 
38.89 
24.88 
0.52 
5.08 
4.77 
1985 
0.54 
1.10 
1.39 
1.58 
3.65 
0.11 
0.66 
1.72 
2.98 
4.62 
1.46 
0.35 
0.63 
1.27 
5.94 
1.81 
32.84 
29.77 
38.13 
25.74 
0.83 
4.86 
4.56 
1986 
0.55 
1.06 
1.33 
1.60 
3.96 
0.12 
0.68 
1.81 
3.12 
4.55 
1.24 
0.38 
0.63 
1.24 
6.67 
1.73 
33.67 
30.67 
36.94 
25.47 
1.37 
5.19 
4.71 
1987 
0.58 
1.22 
1.37 
1.95 
4.14 
0.14 
0.77 
1.81 
3.25 
4.73 
1.42 
0.40 
0.76 
1.29 
6.37 
2.05 
35.25 
32.26 
33.35 
26.27 
2.37 
5.49 
5.19 
1988 
0.62 
1.16 
1.35 
2.00 
4.27 
0.13 
0.75 
1.68 
3.40 
4.43 
1.35 
0.34 
0.85 
1.42 
6.15 
2.15 
34.83 
32.04 
33.11 
26.61 
2.46 
5.65 
5.40 
1989 
0.61 
1.11 
1.40 
2.02 
4.29 
0.13 
0.81 
1.59 
3.40 
4.54 
1.29 
0.29 
0.90 
1.42 
6.20 
1.52 
34.29 
31.52 
31.09 
29.45 
2.47 
5.72 
5.42 
1990 
0.57 
1.17 
1.40 
1.95 
3.99 
0.11 
0.80 
1.58 
3.53 
4.19 
1.26 
0.24 
0.88 
1.25 
6.37 
1.71 
33.71 
31.02 
26.75 
32.01 
2.76 
5.38 
5.48 
1991 
0.55 
1.29 
1.54 
1.99 
3.90 
0.07 
0.63 
1.63 
3.30 
4.49 
1.11 
0.23 
0.94 
0.98 
6.66 
1.94 
34.02 
31.44 
27.54 
32.49 
3.33 
5.25 
5.29 
1992 
0.45 
1.36 
1.67 
1.96 
3.77 
0.06 
0.53 
1.50 
3.37 
4.83 
1.06 
0.24 
0.92 
0.84 
6.86 
1.84 
34.16 
31.36 
27.43 
31.89 
3.82 
4.85 
5.32 
1993 
0.37 
1.07 
1.59 
1.88 
3.48 
0.08 
0.51 
1.40 
3.11 
4.54 
1.21 
0.20 
0.78 
0.96 
6.20 
1.43 
31.30 
28.80 
30.24 
30.83 
4.74 
4.37 
4.97 
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VAG 
EU-7 
average 
EU-12 
average 
Idealized 7 
Idealized 12 
1984 
7.20 
4.28 
2.50 
4.50 
2.50 
1985 
7.67 
4.25 
2.48 
1986 
8.36 
4.38 
2.56 
1987 
8.36 
4.61 
2.69 
1988 
8.16 
4.58 
2.67 
1989 
8.21 
4.50 
2.62 
5.00 
3.00 
1990 
8.42 
4.43 
2.58 
1991 
8.90 
4.49 
2.62 
1992 
9.14 
4.48 
2.61 
1993 
8.06 
4.11 
2.40 
4.00 
2.50 
Source: Ward's 1994, p. 70. 
Notes: European total includes Skoda and Lada. 
Changes in ownership over the time period. 
EU-7 average = PSA+VAG+Renault+Fiat Group+BMW+Mercedes+Rover. 
EU-12 average = Peugeot+Citroën+Renault+VW+Audi+Fiat+Lancia+Alfa Romeo+Mercedes+BMW+Rover+Seat 
Table H.4. Domestic sales as a proportion (%) of total global passenger car sales, 
1984-93 
Fiat (Gp) 
PSA 
VAG 
Renault 
Average 4 
Alfa 
Audi 
Citroen 
BMW 
Fiat 
Lancia 
Mercedes 
Peugeot 
Rover 
Saab 
Seat 
VW 
Volvo 
Average 12 
Idealized 
1984 
65.04 
40.04 
30.64 
35.70 
42.00 
60.15 
41.30 
46.10 
37.31 
64.31 
74.66 
45.74 
37.00 
77.48 
29.02 
41.47 
31.76 
16.66 
49.40 
50.00 
1985 
65.97 
41.98 
27.88 
34.36 
42.00 
65.37 
37.05 
44.86 
32.52 
63.86 
77.97 
49.57 
40.45 
70.39 
24.00 
32.12 
28.91 
18.01 
48.00 
1986 
63.29 
39.00 
29.23 
39.72 
42.00 
60.76 
42.73 
41.88 
33.33 
61.96 
77.18 
50.28 
37.53 
71.81 
23.16 
36.99 
29.60 
15.65 
48.60 
1987 
64.29 
40.52 
31.22 
40.55 
44.00 
60.06 
51.63 
40.41 
32.61 
62.48 
77.27 
47.72 
40.59 
63.60 
22.52 
40.36 
30.55 
16.80 
48.80 
1988 
65.32 
39.53 
28.52 
40.92 
43.00 
64.23 
45.63 
37.48 
37.69 
63.05 
79.16 
47.36 
40.74 
69.68 
22.47 
36.14 
28.55 
14.82 
49.10 
1989 
65.06 
37.90 
26.87 
40.05 
42.00 
64.55 
39.23 
37.14 
37.64 
62.48 
79.10 
44.89 
38.35 
66.70 
24.90 
34.69 
27.50 
12.87 
47.60 
1990 
62.24 
37.99 
26.48 
41.53 
41.00 
62.16 
38.87 
37.19 
37.08 
59.68 
74.75 
44.97 
38.43 
60.53 
21.97 
30.31 
28.02 
10.33 
46.00 
1991 
58.21 
35.83 
34.90 
33.75 
40.00 
58.27 
48.92 
33.77 
42.15 
54.73 
75.09 
50.09 
36.75 
57.75 
22.03 
26.84 
33.13 
10.81 
45.80 
1992 
59.89 
33.62 
34.52 
35.94 
40.00 
66.51 
48.00 
33.32 
40.87 
56.26 
76.89 
47.90 
33.79 
56.72 
16.42 
29.61 
33.17 
11.94 
56.50 
1993 
56.75 
30.52 
32.98 
34.46 
38.00 
64.70 
47.05 
31.29 
37.90 
52.77 
77.43 
46.42 
30.06 
58.57 
18.50 
29.79 
31.87 
10.25 
45.10 
45.00 
Source: Ward's 1994. Compiled from various tables. 
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Table H.5. EU sales as a proportion (%) of total sales, 1984-93 
Fiat (Gp) 
PSA 
VAG 
Renault 
Average 4 
Alfa 
Audi 
Citroen 
BMW 
Fiat 
Lancia 
Mercedes 
Peugeot 
Rover 
Saab 
Seat 
VW 
Volvo 
Average 7 
Idealized 
Ford 
GM 
Nissan 
Toyota 
Japanese 
1984 
90.86 
76.52 
56.62 
70.86 
73.72 
85.95 
66.26 
93.04 
64.52 
90.95 
95.53 
60.69 
68.22 
97.50 
22.32 
73.46 
52.57 
63.66 
79.31 
75.00 
31.19 
15.57 
12.17 
6.69 
10.61 
1985 
89.94 
80.21 
55.28 
74.57 
75.00 
87.91 
62.80 
91.40 
59.09 
89.32 
95.00 
66.14 
74.27 
89.44 
19.12 
69.86 
52.35 
64.73 
73.52 
29.13 
15.95 
12.37 
7.41 
10.51 
1986 
89.98 
80.22 
54.90 
78.74 
75.96 
87.36 
67.19 
90.93 
60.75 
89.42 
95.35 
66.78 
74.74 
98.02 
21.68 
81.95 
50.40 
64.87 
75.62 
30.83 
16.83 
14.76 
8.61 
12.29 
1987 
92.46 
82.87 
60.70 
80.82 
79.21 
91.04 
76.49 
85.36 
58.85 
91.94 
96.35 
66.64 
81.38 
87.14 
21.32 
92.80 
53.83 
62.02 
75.64 
33.64 
20.51 
14.48 
8.61 
12.25 
1988 
93.27 
83.67 
61.25 
81.51 
79.93 
92.88 
80.07 
84.05 
67.07 
92.70 
96.83 
68.49 
83.45 
93.02 
24.49 
88.76 
53.91 
53.11 
78.32 
31.37 
20.61 
15.19 
7.68 
11.58 
1989 
93.23 
82.43 
62.11 
82.15 
79.98 
92.22 
79.60 
84.42 
68.75 
92.62 
97.17 
69.48 
81.26 
87.42 
30.37 
90.53 
54.85 
51.40 
77.93 
80.00 
33.61 
23.58 
13.93 
7.06 
10.41 
1990 
91.97 
81.24 
60.88 
82.00 
79.02 
92.06 
75.25 
84.45 
65.20 
90.96 
96.78 
68.63 
79.46 
83.30 
35.24 
92.04 
53.93 
50.55 
80.53 
35.77 
24.93 
13.58 
6.88 
10.37 
1991 
89.80 
82.94 
63.71 
81.81 
79.57 
92.38 
77.47 
82.77 
70.25 
87.86 
97.44 
73.28 
83.04 
98.13 
35.04 
93.70 
56.79 
56.71 
79.99 
40.52 
28.12 
15.97 
7.63 
11.72 
1992 
89.47 
83.49 
65.84 
80.00 
79.69 
93.10 
76.90 
89.87 
69.65 
87.75 
97.20 
72.75 
79.79 
88.65 
38.04 
97.36 
59.40 
65.95 
78.56 
75.00 
37.89 
29.06 
17.05 
7.21 
11.42 
1993 
83.19 
80.46 
62.67 
75.53 
75.46 
93.16 
80.70 
85.22 
65.40 
80.05 
96.94 
70.30 
77.61 
88.54 
38.14 
94.89 
55.48 
53.30 
75.15 
32.42 
25.26 
17.89 
7.68 
11.28 
Source: Ward's 1994, various tables. 
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Table H.6. Shares of the EU market (%), passenger cars, 1984-93 
Alfa 
Audi 
BMW 
Citroen 
Fiat 
Lancia 
Mercedes 
Peugeot 
Renault 
Rover 
Saab 
Seat 
VW 
Volvo 
Total EUR 
Average 7 
Average 12 
Ford 
GM 
Total US 
Nissan 
Toyota 
Total Japan 
Korean 
Fiat Gp 
PSA 
VAG 
Idealized 
1984 
1.85 
2.50 
2.98 
4.89 
11.43 
1.95 
3.36 
7.15 
11.91 
4.25 
0.25 
1.57 
9.39 
1.65 
67.17 
9.59 
5.59 
13.05 
10.95 
24.01 
2.60 
1.83 
8.72 
0.10 
15.24 
12.05 
13.47 
12.00 
1985 
1.59 
2.30 
2.74 
4.83 
10.91 
2.10 
3.81 
7.39 
11.51 
4.35 
0.22 
1.47 
10.39 
1.63 
67.57 
9.65 
5.63 
12.10 
11.22 
23.32 
2.62 
2.07 
9.04 
0.07 
14.59 
12.22 
14.17 
1986 
1.53 
2.26 
2.57 
4.61 
11.23 
2.06 
3.83 
7.40 
11.38 
3.87 
0.26 
1.64 
10.68 
1.65 
67.29 
9.61 
5.60 
11.81 
10.87 
22.68 
2.72 
2.30 
9.93 
0.10 
14.82 
12.00 
14.58 
1987 
1.57 
2.77 
2.38 
4.92 
11.28 
2.20 
3.58 
7.83 
11.34 
3.67 
0.25 
2.10 
10.17 
1.50 
67.59 
9.65 
5.63 
12.16 
10.57 
22.72 
2.62 
2.18 
9.54 
0.15 
15.05 
12.76 
15.04 
1988 
1.74 
2.78 
2.71 
5.03 
11.87 
2.17 
3.44 
8.51 
10.81 
3.75 
0.25 
2.26 
9.93 
1.45 
68.56 
9.79 
5.71 
11.53 
10.44 
22.03 
2.64 
2.04 
9.23 
0.17 
15.78 
13.54 
14.96 
1989 
1.67 
2.61 
2.83 
5.04 
11.72 
2.34 
3.26 
8.14 
11.01 
3.32 
0.26 
2.40 
10.03 
1.45 
67.86 
9.69 
5.65 
11.90 
10.93 
22.96 
2.84 
1.97 
9.04 
0.14 
15.72 
13.18 
15.03 
1990 
1.58 
2.66 
2.75 
4.97 
10.94 
2.40 
3.27 
8.45 
10.36 
3.18 
0.26 
2.45 
10.36 
1.36 
66.65 
9.52 
5.54 
11.71 
11.34 
23.21 
2.64 
2.17 
10.02 
0.13 
14.92 
13.42 
15.47 
1991 
1.44 
2.85 
3.08 
4.69 
9.75 
2.23 
3.40 
7.79 
10.44 
2.82 
0.23 
2.51 
10.78 
1.15 
64.96 
9.28 
5.41 
12.06 
11.63 
23.92 
3.00 
2.23 
10.82 
0.29 
13.42 
12.48 
16.12 
1992 
1.20 
2.97 
3.30 
4.98 
9.37 
1.73 
3.09 
7.61 
10.95 
2.87 
0.26 
2.54 
11.55 
1.15 
65.61 
9.37 
5.46 
11.30 
11.90 
23.45 
3.07 
2.12 
10.31 
0.63 
12.30 
12.60 
17.06 
1993 
1.07 
2.73 
3.28 
5.01 
8.80 
1.62 
3.11 
7.62 
10.84 
3.38 
0.24 
2.35 
10.87 
1.17 
63.64 
9.09 
5.30 
11.60 
12.63 
24.62 
3.36 
2.42 
10.99 
0.75 
11.49 
12.63 
15.96 
12.00 
Source: Ward's 1994, p. 72. 
Appendix H: Market share information 189 
Table H.7. Domestic market share (%), passenger cars, 1984-93 
Alfa 
Audi 
BMW 
Citroen 
Fiat 
Lancia 
Mercedes 
Peugeot 
Renault 
Rover 
Saab 
Seat 
VW 
Volvo 
Fiat Gp 
PSA 
VAG 
1984 
7.33 
6.01 
6.66 
12.75 
45.70 
8.61 
9.76 
20.39 
31.01 
17.84 
12.81 
16.29 
21.89 
27.04 
61.64 
33.13 
28.12 
1985 
6.47 
5.47 
6.06 
12.84 
42.79 
9.47 
11.50 
21.82 
28.75 
17.90 
10.20 
11.64 
23.11 
27.04 
58.73 
34.66 
28.76 
1986 
6.14 
5.33 
5.22 
11.65 
44.76 
9.60 
10.71 
20.42 
31.54 
15.80 
10.84 
11.86 
23.28 
23.93 
60.51 
32.07 
28.81 
1987 
5.91 
7.23 
5.11 
12.48 
43.72 
10.07 
9.93 
20.93 
30.48 
14.99 
9.56 
11.41 
22.33 
22.94 
59.69 
33.42 
29.92 
1988 
6.51 
6.67 
6.43 
11.99 
43.76 
9.64 
10.04 
22.18 
28.98 
15.01 
7.93 
10.41 
22.18 
21.85 
59.90 
34.17 
29.39 
1989 
6.09 
5.58 
6.74 
12.01 
41.18 
9.91 
9.17 
20.82 
29.09 
13.57 
8.38 
9.88 
21.86 
21.63 
57.18 
32.83 
28.28 
1990 
5.55 
5.51 
6.27 
11.56 
37.26 
9.61 
8.60 
21.59 
27.69 
14.01 
8.50 
10.00 
20.04 
20.70 
52.42 
33.14 
26.97 
1991 
4.87 
5.43 
5.58 
11.81 
32.56 
9.22 
7.02 
21.30 
26.60 
14.40 
9.64 
10.20 
18.97 
20.13 
46.65 
33.11 
26.69 
1992 
4.55 
5.70 
6.22 
11.06 
31.90 
7.26 
6.52 
19.30 
29.45 
13.51 
9.01 
9.96 
20.69 
23.23 
43.71 
30.37 
28.71 
1993 
4.21 
5.32 
6.34 
11.38 
32.69 
7.29 
8.85 
18.29 
30.61 
13.38 
10.08 
10.57 
20.83 
26.57 
44.19 
29.67 
28.01 
Source: Ward's 1994, various tables. 
Note: Alfa, Lancia. Fiat, Fiat Group domestic market = Italy. 
Peugeot, Citroen, PSA Group, Renault domestic market = France. 
Seat domestic market = Spain. 
VW, Audi, VAG domestic market = Germany. 
Table H.8. Size of markets, passenger cars, major areas (millions), 1984-93 
EU 
Western 
Europe 
North 
America 
Japan 
World total 
1984 
9.23 
10.18 
11.50 
3.09 
30.51 
1985 
9.57 
10.64 
12.34 
3.10 
32.00 
1986 
10.54 
11.64 
12.65 
3.14 
33.34 
1987 
11.27 
12.40 
11.40 
3.27 
33.42 
1988 
11.84 
12.97 
11.83 
3.71 
35.47 
1989 
12.31 
13.46 
11.03 
4.40 
36.31 
1990 
12.19 
13.23 
10.53 
5.10 
36.78 
1991 
12.54 
13.49 
9.41 
4.86 
35.68 
1992 
12.60 
13.50 
9.45 
4.95 
35.74 
1993 
10.63 
11.43 
9.65 
4.19 
33.68 
Source: Ward's 1994, various tables. 
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Table H.9. Size of markets, passenger cars (%), 1984-93 
EU 
Western 
Europe 
North 
America 
Japan 
World total 
1984 
30.27 
33.39 
37.71 
10.15 
100.00 
1985 
29.93 
33.26 
38.60 
9.70 
100.00 
1986 
31.51 
34.93 
37.95 
9.44 
100.00 
1987 
33.73 
37.11 
34.12 
9.80 
100.00 
1988 
33.38 
36.64 
33.39 
10.48 
100.00 
1989 
33.90 
37.08 
30.40 
12.13 
100.00 
1990 
33.14 
35.97 
28.64 
13.87 
100.00 
1991 
35.16 
37.82 
26.45 
13.64 
100.00 
1992 
35.27 
37.79 
26.46 
12.46 
100.00 
1993 
31.65 
33.99 
28.68 
12.47 
100.00 
Table H.10. Multi-domestic sales as % of total global sales, PSA, 1984-93 
France 
Spain 
UK 
Total 
1984 
40.04 
7.09 
6.54 
53.67 
1985 
41.98 
7.22 
6.95 
56.15 
1986 
39.00 
6.90 
7.70 
53.60 
1987 
40.52 
8.74 
8.48 
57.74 
1988 
39.53 
10.22 
10.11 
59.86 
1989 
37.90 
10.30 
10.43 
56.09 
1990 
37.99 
8.94 
9.16 
56.09 
1991 
35.83 
8.67 
8.75 
53.45 
1992 
33.62 
10.69 
9.91 
54.22 
1993 
30.52 
9.00 
13.26 
52.88 
Source: Ward's 1994, various tables. 
Table H.H. Multi-domestic sales as % of total global sales, Renault, 1984-93 
France 
Spain 
Belgium 
Total 
1984 
35.70 
9.60 
2.00 
47.30 
1985 
34.36 
11.43 
2.32 
48.11 
1986 
39.72 
11.16 
2.24 
53.12 
1987 
40.55 
12.75 
2.26 
55.56 
1988 
40.92 
13.18 
2.29 
56.02 
1989 
40.05 
13.21 
2.67 
55.93 
1990 
41.53 
10.76 
3.20 
55.49 
1991 
33.75 
10.49 
2.61 
46.85 
1992 
35.94 
10.18 
2.65 
48.77 
1993 
34.46 
7.92 
2.81 
45.19 
Source: Ward's 1994, various tables. 
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Table H.12. Multi-domestic market share (%), PSA, 1984-93 
France 
Spain 
UK 
1984 
33.13 
20.48 
5.52 
1985 
34.66 
18.96 
5.67 
1986 
32.07 
16.53 
6.12 
1987 
33.42 
16.81 
5.77 
1988 
34.17 
18.67 
5.88 
1989 
32.83 
17.70 
6.00 
1990 
33.14 
18.47 
6.23 
1991 
33.11 
20.76 
6.05 
1992 
30.37 
20.24 
5.74 
1993 
29.67 
5.21 
Source: Ward's 1994, various tables. 
Table H.13. Multi-domestic market share (%), Renault, 1984-93 
France 
Spain 
Belgium 
1984 
31.01 
29.10 
8.25 
1985 
28.75 
30.42 
9.05 
1986 
31.54 
25.82 
8.32 
1987 
30.48 
22.37 
8.53 
1988 
29.98 
19.77 
8.43 
1989 
29.09 
10.03 
10.01 
1990 
27.64 
16.87 
10.38 
1991 
26.60 
18.02 
9.06 
1992 
29.45 
17.93 
9.81 
1993 
30.61 
16.27 
11.45 
Source: Ward's 1994, various tables. 
Table H.14. Multi-domestic sales % of total global sales, Ford, 1984-93 
Germany 
UK 
Spain 
Belgium 
Total 
1984 
7.60 
12.60 
1.92 
0.91 
23.03 
1985 
6.41 
12.20 
1.90 
0.84 
21.35 
1986 
7.38 
12.81 
2.35 
0.89 
23.43 
1987 
7.39 
14.24 
3.35 
0.99 
25.97 
1988 
6.47 
13.41 
3.25 
0.98 
24.11 
1989 
6.54 
13.96 
3.66 
1.03 
25.19 
1990 
7.50 
12.71 
3.55 
1.04 
24.80 
1991 
11.42 
10.33 
3.26 
1.16 
26.17 
1992 
9.73 
9.40 
3.67 
1.16 
23.96 
1993 
7.91 
10.01 
2.80 
0.93 
21.65 
Source: Ward's 1994, various tables. 
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Table H. 15. Multi-domestic sales % of total global sales, GM, 1984-93 
Germany 
UK 
Spain 
Belgium 
Total 
1984 
5.99 
4.35 
0.68 
0.67 
11.69 
1985 
5.46 
4.50 
0.93 
0.71 
11.60 
1986 
6.21 
4.19 
1.33 
0.70 
12.43 
1987 
7.82 
4.66 
2.24 
0.82 
15.65 
1988 
7.17 
5.06 
2.58 
0.84 
17.81 
1989 
8.01 
6.13 
2.81 
0.86 
18.17 
1990 
9.46 
5.82 
2.41 
1.06 
21.60 
1991 
13.81 
4.79 
2.04 
1.03 
21.22 
1992 
12.75 
5.15 
2.36 
0.96 
18.46 
1993 
10.04 
5.71 
1.93 
0.78 
Source: Ward's 1994, various tables. 
Table H.16. Multi-domestic market share (%), Ford, 1984-93 
Germany 
UK 
Spain 
Belgium 
1984 
12.27 
27.83 
14.75 
9.44 
1985 
10.72 
26.51 
13.60 
12.87 
1986 
10.50 
27.38 
14.41 
11.67 
1987 
10.32 
28.81 
15.11 
11.37 
1988 
10.04 
26.35 
13.32 
11.75 
1989 
10.07 
26.45 
13.92 
11.16 
1990 
9.85 
25.25 
14.43 
12.35 
1991 
10.27 
24.24 
13.74 
11.61 
1992 
9.31 
22.17 
14.09 
10.66 
1993 
9.45 
21.46 
14.75 
11.07 
Source: Ward's 1994, various tables. 
Table H.17. Multi-domestic market share (%), GM, 1984-93 
Germany 
UK 
Spain 
Belgium 
1984 
16.28 
16.71 
8.75 
11.82 
1985 
15.46 
16.56 
11.23 
12.87 
1986 
14.89 
15.11 
13.80 
11.67 
1987 
15.59 
13.45 
14.45 
11.37 
1988 
15.32 
13.70 
14.79 
11.75 
1989 
16.14 
15.21 
14.02 
11.16 
1990 
17.25 
16.08 
13.63 
12.35 
1991 
17.27 
15.62 
11.97 
11.61 
1992 
16.75 
16.70 
12.44 
10.66 
1993 
16.74 
17.09 
13.84 
11.07 
Source: Ward's 1994, various tables. 
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APPENDIX I 
Market share equalization 
Figure 1.1 shows how market shares are affected by barriers to entry: 
(a) State A is affected by various barriers to entry. Consumers in State A, as in State B, 
assess the value and quality of competing manufacturers' product. 
(b) However, consumers in State A have their assessment distorted by the fact that the 
selection of product on offer and the price and information available about this product 
are distorted by the barriers to entry. 
(c) In State B, the market share of each manufacturer acts as a true guide of the relative 
merits of each manufacturer's product, since consumers were able to make a fair and un-
distorted choice. 
(d) The removal of these distortions in State A is expected to result in the market shares for 
manufacturers in State A and State Β to tend towards each other. 
The removal of barriers to trade means that consumers can decide which product to buy based 
on the same market conditions as everywhere else in Europe. As a result of this, the market 
shares in individual Member States should tend towards each other. In addition, analysis of 
imports and exports between EU Member States over time can illustrate whether the EU is 
becoming a single market. 
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Figure 1.1. The impact of barriers to entry on manufacturers' market share 
State 'A ' - Barriers to Entry State 'B ' - Free Trade 
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APPENDIX J 
The Elzinga-Hogarty analysis 
The Elzinga-Hogarty test10 considers the extent to which sales in a region originate from 
outside that region or where the production from a region is exported. The extent to which 
sales in a region originate outside the region provides some indication as to the degree to 
which consumers are able to switch demand from local to non-local suppliers. This type of 
observation is useful in deciding whether domestic markets face significant competition from 
foreign suppliers. 
Elzinga and Hogarty specify two criteria: 'little in from outside' (LIFO), meaning that imports 
into the region are small; and 'little out from inside' (LOFI), meaning that exports from the 
region are small. If either of these tests are failed, then there is a presumption towards 
including both regions in the same market. However, the Elzinga-Hogarty test is conservative 
in the sense that it determines the narrowest extent of the relevant market. 
The data is organized in three steps: 
(a) in the two areas under consideration, calculate the total sales of the firms under 
consideration (or in many cases, total production); 
(b) in each area, calculate the total exports; 
(c) calculate exports from each area excluding those exported to the other area under 
consideration. 
The LIFO component of the definition reflects conditions on the buyers' side of the market, 
and can be expressed as follows: 
Production minus Exports 
Consumption 
where consumption is production minus exports plus imports. 
The LOFI component of the definition reflects conditions on the sellers' side of the market, 
and can be expressed as follows: 
Production minus Exports 
Production 
The data required for this test, therefore, are: 
(a) total production of automotive vehicles by Member State; 
(b) total exports from each Member State (volume); 
(c) details of which EU Member States are exported to and what the volume of exports to 
each of these states is. 
10 Elzinga, K. and Hogarty. T., 'The problem of Geographic Market Definition in Antimerger Suits', Antitrust Bulletin, 
1973. 
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APPENDIX K 
Component supplier case studies 
K.l. Tyres and the single market 
K.1.2. Introduction 
As part of our analysis of the effects of the single market programme on the automotive sector, 
we agreed to carry out three case studies on the effects of the type approval measures on the 
components supply sector. The following is the output of the first of these case studies, 
covering the supply of tyres. 
Council Directive 92/23/EEC of 31 March 1992 on tyres for motor vehicles and trailers 
concerns the technical requirements for the construction and testing of tyres and the fitting of 
tyres to the vehicle. We have interviewed some of the major tyre manufacturers in Europe to 
assess how important this directive has been to their business in terms of administration, 
production costs and their European outlook. The companies interviewed were: 
(a) Japanese tyre manufacturer with European presence; 
(b) large European manufacturer No 1 ; 
(c) UK tyre manufacturer; 
(d) large European tyre manufacturer No 2. 
The questions asked to each of these manufacturers covered: 
(a) the cost of developing fewer variants of tyres across Europe; 
(b) the production process changes (if any) as a result of this harmonization; 
(c) the administrative cost savings as a result of not having to obtain type approval in 
separate countries; 
(d) any further restrictions which are still apparent in this area, which the Commission 
should be aware of. 
We have also spoken to the Commission to gain their opinion on the effect of type approval 
harmonization for tyres. This has helped to ensure that the case study results reported below 
are balanced with company interests countered by EC beliefs. 
K.1.2. Summary 
(a) The overall feeling is that the companies interviewed have been becoming more 
'European' for at least the last ten years. This has greatly reduced the possible impact of 
the implementation of the Directive for tyre type approval. 
(b) United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) regulations have been in 
place for at least ten years. Adoption of these meant that the impact of the EEC Directive 
has been weakened further, since there is very little difference in the UN and EU 
regulations. Harmonization of type approval has already happened. 
(c) The companies do feel that there has been a general easing in the trade processes and 
administration as a result of the SMP. This has led to a reduction in the requirements for 
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stock centres spread across Europe as trade and 'just-in-time' supply is more easy. 
However, production processes of the tyre manufacturers have not significantly changed. 
(d) There do appear to be slight problems in the interpretation of the Directive by the 
different Member States. This has led, in some countries, to an increase in the 
paperwork required and a deterioration in the logistics of trade between the Member 
States. 
(e) Other directives regarding the environmental impact of tyres have been felt to have had a 
significant impact on the way the tyre manufacturers operate. Directives regarding 
emissions from the production process and on-road efficiency of tyres are noted as 
having had an effect on the companies. 
(f) Competition in Europe has been felt to have increased through the entry (via takeover) 
of Japanese companies with new manufacturing techniques and equipment. The 
adoption of these techniques by European companies has been a gradual process. 
(g) The European Commission also felt that the tyre industry of Europe would not be greatly 
affected by the single market. The tyre companies were already treating Europe as a 
single market prior to the implementation of the programme, utilizing UN ECE 
regulations for type approval. 
We present the results of our survey for each of the tyre manufacturers. 
Japanese manufacturer with European presence 
(a) There was a general feeling that even though the rules determining type approval across 
Europe have been harmonized, there are still problems caused by the interpretation of 
Member States legislative bodies of these rules resulting in an increase in paperwork 
necessary to gain type approval in some cases. 
(b) One example of the problems caused by legislative differences is the French decision of 
January 1995 regarding the definition of category of tyre. Strict interpretation of this rule 
requires tyres of the same size, trade mark, manufacturer and tyre type to be fitted to the 
same axle of vehicles. Even if the same tyre is available from a different manufacturer, it 
cannot be fitted to that axle. The interpretation of this ruling in such a strict sense leads 
to increased paperwork and slower trade. Other legislation is not as strict regarding the 
manufacturer of the tyre; as long as the same specification of tyre is fitted, there is no 
problem. 
(c) The main drivers for change in the specifications required of their tyres are the truck and 
car manufacturers. The manufacturers are continually looking for new ways to increase 
their performance which has led to a proliferation of types and sizes of tyre, e.g. through 
demand for increased load index of the tyres and higher speed capability. Another EU 
directive has been instrumental in the changes in requirements from the manufacturers -
requirement of 4m maximum height of intercontinental trucks - which resulted in the 
demand for smaller tyres to help increase/maintain the loads available on 
intercontinental trucks. 
(d) Other EU directives which have had an effect on the tyre manufacturers are the 
environmental emissions directives which have led to increased demand for more 
efficient tyres to increase kilometres per gallon. 
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Large European manufacturer No 1 
(a) This company views itself as the market leader in tyre production in Europe. 
(b) They produce a standard/uniform product at plants across the EU and the rest of the 
world and did so well before the implementation of the single market programme. 
(c) For these reasons, they do not feel that the EU directives have had a great deal of effect 
on their business, viewing themselves more as the standard-setter with international 
coverage little affected by the Directive for type approval. 
(d) There has been a slight increase in the degree of paperwork in some areas of their 
business, but they did not specify where and how. 
(e) The company feels that their production has been affected by some EU directives 
regarding the environment and emissions from the production process; particularly by 
the strict application of emission standards in the UK. 
(f) They feel that there has been little effect on the volume of their trade across Member 
States since it has a wide presence already established. However, they do feel that cross-
border access has improved as a result of single market implementation. 
UK tyre manufacturer 
(a) This company harmonized its type approval for car and truck tyres across Europe in the 
mid-1980s. They had followed the regulations established by the UNECE setting a 
standard for marking and testing tyres which the EEC directive did not change. 
(b) Given this, the effects of the EEC Directive were regarded as minimal. The only area 
which did change was the testing and marking for motorcycle tyres - a one-off cost to 
change the engraving for the moulds. 
(c) With regard to administrative changes as a result of the EEC Directive, the volume car 
and truck tyre production has not been affected. Well before the Directive, all ECE 
countries which complied with the International Standards Organization standard for 
tyre testing and specifications required just one application for approval to sell their tyre 
'literally anywhere'. 
(d) The single restriction which this company regarded as a hindrance to trade and harmful 
to the consumer was the definition of category of tyre - Annex 2, 2.1 of the UNECE 
Tyre Regulation. The company feels this should refer to the type of tyre only and not the 
manufacturer or trade mark. 
Large European manufacturer No 2 
(a) This company has been developing its product on a Europe-wide basis for the past ten 
years. 
(b) Type approval for their tyres has traditionally been obtained in Italy and then the 
specifications of tyre would be meted out to the different manufacturing centres. 
(c) The implementation of the single market programme has not resulted in any changes in 
its production processes since it operated on a world-wide basis before and has not 
changed this since. 
(d) This company is not aware of any further restrictions in this area that it feels the 
Commission should be aware of. 
European Community opinion 
(a) The European Community opinion is that the single market programme has had a 
negligible impact on the costs faced by tyre companies in the type approval application 
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process. This is largely because many companies already abided by the UN ECE 
regulations to act as European competitors. 
(b) Given the international outlook of the tyre companies, the impact of the single market on 
the production processes were also felt to have been minimal. Increased globalization of 
competition has led to tyre companies trying to find as many ways as possible to cut 
costs in the production process. These moves to cost cutting have been affected by the 
single market to a small extent but are mainly because of moves to become global 
competitors. 
(c) It is felt that there will be a reduction in the number of European competitors in the next 
downturn in the market. The Commission feels that there will be a need for 
rationalization as competition increases even more over the next few years. 
(d) One future potential problem in the EU market for tyres is that as competition increases, 
the margins available to the tyre companies are likely to decrease. Many tyre companies 
are already looking at niche markets for their products - geographic or product markets 
- such as their home markets or the 'green' tyre. The Commission is concerned that 
these companies could come to dominate these niche markets and abuse their position to 
generate excess profits. 
K.2. Automotive lighting systems and the single market 
K.2.1. Introduction 
The effects of the single market programme on the automotive sector were also examined with 
respect to the supply of automotive lighting systems. Lighting systems were one of the areas 
highlighted in the Ludvigsen (1988) study (along with windscreens and emissions), in which 
practical standardization had not yet been achieved. However, lighting systems legislation has 
been increasingly standardized (and updated for technological progress) across the EU since 
1976. We interviewed a number of lighting systems manufacturers in Europe, to assess how 
important the programme has been to their business. The companies interviewed were: 
(a) large French-owned lighting system manufacturer; (1) 
(b) large German-owned lighting system manufacturer; (2) 
(c) large UK lighting system manufacturer for commercial 
vehicles and coachbuilder; (3) 
(d) large UK lighting system manufacturer. (4) 
The questions each of these manufacturers were asked covered: 
(a) the reduction in the variance of lighting systems within models over the past ten years; 
(b) the cost reductions associated with such reductions in variance; 
(c) the ways in which the single market programme influenced these reductions in variation 
(e.g. via type approval, legislation and/or the increasingly competitive single market 
environment created); 
(d) the largest remaining causes of variance in lighting systems (to highlight areas where 
futher legislation may be necessary or desirable). 
K.2.2. Summary 
(a) The overall feeling seemed to be that the companies interviewed have not been directly 
affected by single market programme legislation, but rather indirectly, by an increasingly 
competitive market environment (in which the programme played a part). Companies 
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were unable to be specific about the ways in which the legislation reduced variation 
(apart from removing the need for yellow headlights in France). 
(b) The increasingly competitive market environment seems to have engendered different 
responses from the customers of the lighting systems suppliers, depending on the sector 
in which those customers operate. For lighting systems supplied to car assemblers, the 
increased competition has led to a reduction in variants per car model, in order to reduce 
what is perceived as costly and unnecessary variation. Alternatively, for lighting systems 
supplied to commercial vehicles manufacturers and coachbuilders, the increased 
competition has led to an increase in variation, in order to differentiate vehicles. 
Previously the systems were more standardized, even between different producers. 
(c) The differences in lighting systems caused by different hand drives (right hand/left hand) 
continues to be an irritant and an obstacle to reducing variation. Additionally, models 
offering options of wash/wipe systems for headlights are also seen as causing variation, 
as are models with the option of load levelling systems. However, these latter causes of 
variance should probably be seen as reflecting the competitive process, rather than 
requiring legislation. 
Large European lighting system manufacturer (for car assemblers) (I) 
(a) Generally, the company had noticed a reduction in variation within models over the 
previous ten years. The average number of variants was now down to four per model. 
They did have one customer with 32 variants in its lighting systems for one model, but 
this original equipment manufacturer (OEM) is now realizing that this is a costly 
practice. 
(b) The company was unable to give a figure for the cost reduction associated with reduced 
variance. 
(c) They thought the single market programme had influenced the reductions in variance 
that had occurred over the previous ten years, but only in the broad sense, as part of the 
general competitive process. The only specific example of what they saw as a single 
market programme generated reduction in variance was the removal of the need to 
supply yellow headlight bulbs to France. 
(d) They saw the largest remaining causes of variance in lighting systems as car models 
which offered variants with/without wash/wipe systems for headlights, and variants 
with/without load levelling systems, which required different lighting systems. 
Large European lighting system manufacturer (for car assemblers) (2) 
(a) This company said it had seen no real reductions in variance over the previous ten years, 
arguing that the main cause of variation over these years, had been and still remained the 
left hand/right hand drive imposed constraint. 
(b) Not applicable. 
(c) Not applicable. 
(d) The main cause of variation, as indicated in (a) were left hand/right hand drive imposed 
differences. 
Large UK lighting system manufacturer (for commercial vehicles and coachbuilders) (3) 
(a) The new model cycle of this firm's customer base is greater than that of the car industry. 
Nevertheless, they had acually noted an increase in the number of lighting systems they 
were being asked to produce. This was due to styling becoming increasingly important 
as customers sought an individual style. This was linked to the increasing importance of 
controlling the aftermarket as competition squeezed margins on original equipment. 
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Indeed the firm was finding it increasingly difficult to offer a standard lamp across its 
customer base. 
(b) The increase in variation was not seen as greatly affecting the costs to the firm, because 
of the already low volume of production (relative to the car industry). 
(c) The single market programme was seen as having influenced the increase in variation, to 
the extent that it had opened up borders, reduced barriers and increased competition, 
making styling more important and thus affecting variation. 
(d) The greatest remaining causes of variance (apart from styling) for this firm, were new 
technological developments, such as LEDs and gas discharge illumination. 
Large UK lighting system manufacturer (4) 
This manufacturer's system for type approval works as follows (and has not been affected by 
the single market programme): 
(a) The standards are specified by the customer. 
(b) The legal requirements for lighting concern the performance of the lighting and the 
power of the signal. 
(c) Usually the type approval system specified is UNECE (Regulation 20). Sometimes 
customers specify the EC or the US regulation (FM VSS 108). Other than these legal 
requirements, the customer makes the specifications. One big difference between 
lighting and tyres/exhausts is the much lower aftermarket demand, which means lighting 
is much more customer led. 
(d) The single market programme has not made any appreciable difference in procedures. 
They also use the British Standards Institute and VDA. 
K.3. Exhausts and the single market 
The market for exhaust systems in Europe is a complex one. These items are bulky and 
difficult to store, making international trade in such products unattractive. The basic 
technology of exhaust manufacturing, involving roll forming, presswork and welding offers no 
great difficulties or even particularly large investments. 
Historically then, the European industry developed along fragmented and nationalistic lines. 
Moreover, sourcing of exhausts varies widely: some vehicle assemblers will buy in a complete 
system from one supplier, others will assemble exhausts themselves from supplied 
components. 
The degree of vertical integration in exhaust manufacture varies widely too, particularly at 
individual plant level - a feature which complicated the Cardiff-Cambridge Benchmarking 
study (Cardiff Business School) for example. 
However, as a product, exhausts have changed quite considerably over the years. The most 
important changes have been: 
(a) greater proliferation of types per model range; 
(b) meeting regulatory requirements. 
With respect to the former point, proliferation of exhaust types has been driven by the 
increasing variety within any one model family offered by a vehicle assembler (in engine types 
and drivetrain systems) which influences exhaust design. It should also be noted that 
increasing variety gives a benefit to vehicle assemblers and their distribution systems in terms 
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of competing with the independent aftermarket. It is indicative that front wheel drive Ford 
Escorts have over 50 varieties of exhaust system. 
In terms of regulatory performance, exhaust systems have been made more complex and costly 
as a result of meeting emissions and noise level requirements; most obvious here is the 
addition of catalysts. Additionally, the product has greater longevity, with an average 
replacement time of 2-3 years rather than the 18 months that used to pertain - a key element 
here is the greater use of coated steels. Greater longevity has a profound effect on the 
aftermarket, both in terms of manufacturers supplying product and for the service centres 
which undertake exhaust replacement work. In the period 1984-94 it is thought that the 
replacement volume in the UK fell from 18 million transactions (i.e. exhausts or parts of 
exhausts) to 10 million. 
The most important influence on variant costs in exhaust production arises from vehicle 
assembler strategy on platforms, model variants, and engine/transmission choices. In brief, this 
has driven a rise in variant numbers rather than the economies of standardization which might 
be expected from single market measures to harmonize standards, etc. The most important 
market distortion arises out of the right hand/left hand drive issue. In essence exhaust systems 
have to fit a package space which is determined mainly by the platform on which the car is 
built - so moves to reduce the number of basic car platforms in Europe could increase 
manufacturing scale at the exhaust suppliers. 
The most recent estimates on market share and size come from the Economic Intelligence Unit 
(EIU). They must be regarded strictly as estimates, because there are few agreements over 
definitions, etc. 
Table K.l. Western Europe exhaust sales (million units), 1988-92 
Year 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Original equipment 
12.2 
13.7 
13.6 
13.2 
13.7 
11.8 
12.3 
Replacement 
51.6 
53.0 
55.5 
58.4 
60.0 
61.6 
63.1 
Total 
63.8 
66.7 
69.1 
71.6 
73.7 
73.4 
75.4 
Source: EIU. 
It is thought that two companies hold a significant share of the market: Tenneco Walker (about 
20%), and Bosal (about 15%). As the above table shows, the aftermarket is vital to companies 
in the automotive exhaust business. Growth in sales can be expected in those markets which 
are introducing more rigorous vehicle testing regimes (France, Greece, Spain), but these gains 
may be offset by reductions in the stock of older vehicles following the introduction of 
scrapping incentives. 
The size of the market in value terms is equally difficult to estimate, but is thought to be in the 
region of ECU 2.5 billion for the five leading EU markets. 
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The leading players are: 
Tenneco Walker. US-owned (Tenneco Automotive), world's largest exhaust manufacturer. 
Offers over 2,000 references for car models in Europe alone. Manufacturing facilities in 
France (3 sites), Germany (3 sites including subsidiary) and UK (2 sites). Also plants in 
Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Portugal. European HQ in the Netherlands. R&D in 
Germany. 
Bosal. Dutch company with range of interests in steel tubes, tow-bars, etc. Major R&D base 
and HQ in Belgium. Also manufacturing plants in France, UK (2), Spain, the Netherlands, and 
Denmark. 
Arvin. US-owned. This company has, in recent years, sought to expand its presence on the 
European aftermarket, mainly by acquisition of existing companies and joint ventures in 
France, Germany and Italy, largely building from the strong UK base established over many 
years. 
ECIA. The dominant OE supplier in France is owned by PSA, which supplies virtually all 
exhausts for this company. It even supplies Renault, and is thought to have about 25% of the 
aftermarket in France and manufactures about 9 million systems per annum. 
Cromodura. This is a subsidiary of Guardini, which in turn is owned by Magneti Marelli, and 
in turn owned by Fiat. It is the largest OE and aftermarket supplier in Italy with two very large 
plants. 
Other exhaust suppliers in Europe include: 
Eberspacher (Germany), leading challenger to Bosal and Tenneco; 
Desçam (Italy), subsidiary of ITT Industrie Riunti, aftermarket only; 
Zara (Italy), aftermarket only; 
Ansa Marmitte (Italy), high performance exhaust systems; 
Fonos (Spain), major OE supplier, 35% of aftermarket in Spain; 
Armstrong-Bosal (Spain), joint venture in Spain; 
Inducar (Spain), small independent producer of partial systems in Spain; 
Situbsa (Spain), 50% owned by Guardini; 
Gillet (Germany); 
Roth Technic (Germany); 
Leistriz (Germany); 
Sebring (Germany), performance exhausts. 
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APPENDIX L 
Regression analysis 
L.l. The model 
The equation analysed took the following form: 
Automotive employment = oco+ β ι Unit Sales¡ + β2 Average cost of labour¡ + β3 GDP¡ + 
DUMMY 1 + TREND + s¡ 
Where: 
i = the number of observations; 
an = the constant; 
Sj = the residual 'noise'; 
DUMMY 1 = takes the value zero for observations before 1993 and one afterwards; 
TREND = intends to take out any trend factors unrelated to the other variables; and 
β = the coefficients. 
L.2. The variables chosen 
We chose the variable 'unit sales' because it will reflect the demand for new automotive 
product ­ unit sales and automotive employment should be positively correlated with each 
other. We chose the variable 'cost of labour' because employment will be affected by this ­ as 
cost of labour increases, employment is likely to fall. We chose GDP since this will reflect the 
general health of the economy. The strength of the economy should be a determinant of 
employment in the automotive industry ­ as GDP increases, so too should automotive 
employment. 
We have not considered productivity since this relates directly to the number of persons 
employed and would create serious problems for the regression analysis. Imports were also not 
included because they will be related directly to unit sales, creating problems of 
multicolinearity." 
L.3. The data and regression results 
All the data are for the whole of the EU in aggregate, but only ten observations were available 
from the different sources of data available (1985­94). The lack of consistent data from these 
sources, limiting our analysis to only ten observations, are a severe constraint on the validity 
of the analysis. The results presented below, therefore, are not intended as any 'proof of a 
relationship one way or another. 
" Multicolinearity arises where variables on the right hand side of the equation to be modelled are correlated with each 
other. This creates serious problems for the robustness of the model. 
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Table L.l. Employment regression results using linear functional form 
Variable 
Constant 
Lagged unit sales 
Labour costs 
GDP 
Dummy 
R2 3 
F-statistic4 
Coefficient 
1107.37 
6.54 
0.03 
-3.76 
-48.22 
0.95 
25.99 
t-statistic2 
17.58 
1.10 
1.27 
-2.96 
-3.17 
Source: Ernst & Young. 
2 The t-statistic indicates the level of significance of the variable to the equation. If the t-statistic is greater than 1.96, we 
can state wth 95% confidence that the variable is statistically significant. 
3 R2 indicates how much the variables are explaining employment. In this case, they are explaining 95% of the variation 
in employment. 
4 The F-statistic indicates whether all of the variables in the equation together are significant - they are statistically 
significant explanators of employment. If the F-statistic is greater than the critical value - based on number of variables 
and observations - then the explanatory variables are jointly significant. 
Despite the fact that the F-statistic indicates that the variables are significant explanators of 
employment, the results from this analysis are poor. Unit sales were found to have had no 
impact on employment at all; 'lagging' this variable to see whether sales last year are more of 
a determinant of employment this year did not improve the result. Labour costs were also 
found to be statistically insignificant. Despite the fact that, as expected, the single market 
programme appears to have had a negative impact on employment, GDP is also negatively 
correlated with employment, against expectations. Despite the fact that the equation appears to 
be telling us that the single market programme has had the expected result, it would be wrong 
to draw any firm conclusions from any result based on data from only two observations for 
1993 and 1994. 
The strange result of a negative relationship between GDP and employment might have been 
caused by multicolinearity (high correlation between explanatory variables) or omitted 
variables creating serial correlation12 (often a problem with time series analysis). We checked 
for multicolinearity but found no significantly high correlation between the variables. More 
data on a consistent basis are not available to avoid an omitted variable problem. 
To get over the possible problem of serial correlation, the equation can be modelled using 
differences. The results are presented in Table L.2. 
12 Serial correlation is a common problem with time series regression. It occurs where the error terms are correlated when 
they should be independent. The explanatory variables do not sufficiently explain the variable we are regressing, 
resulting in inconsistent results. The explanatory variables are no longer the best estimators resulting in an over-
optimistic R". 
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Table L.2. Employment regression results using data in differences 
Variable 
Constant 
GDP 
Dummy 
R2 
F-statistic 
Coefficient 
-0.20 
0.49 
-0.03 
0.72 
7.67 
t-statistic 
-1.77 
1.36 
-2.39 
Source: Ernst & Young. 
The F-statistic is significant and the coefficient on GDP is the expected sign but is not 
statistically significant. By calculating differences, we lose another observation, so a lack of 
significance is not entirely surprising given that we have only nine observations to model. The 
dummy for the single market programme implementation is once more negatively correlated 
with employment - employment has fallen in 1993 and 1994. As these results are not entirely 
satisfactory, we have also modelled the data in logarithmic form. The results of this are 
presented in Table L.3. 
Table L.3. Employment regression results using data in 
Variable 
Constant 
GDP 
Dummy 
R2 
F-statistic 
Coefficient 
7.55 
-0.15 
-0.08 
0.91 
38.67 
logs 
t-statistic 
24.47 
-2.19 
-6.02 
Source: Ernst & Young. 
The F-statistic indicates that the variables are significant explanators of employment, but unit 
sales and cost of labour were both insignificant so we did not use them in this model. Again, 
although employment appears to have fallen as a result of the single market programme, the 
result for GDP is confusing. 
In summary, from our regression results, we believe that any strong conclusions regarding this 
analysis and the impact of the single market programme on automotive employment would be 
extremely dangerous. Extreme limitations in data, strange observed relationships between 
variables and a lack of observations all cast doubt on the validity of the results. For example, it 
seems clear that our data for EU GDP are weak, failing to pick up the fall in employment as a 
result of the recent recession. This weakness will affect the observed relationship between the 
single market programme and automotive employment. 
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APPENDIX M 
Strategic alliances 
Figure M.l. Volkswagen - Audi Group: relationships with other companies 
world-wide 
VAG: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
(h) 
(i) 
is taking over Skoda; 
has taken over SEAT, which will make minicars for Suzuki; 
has a joint venture (JV) with Ford in Argentina, called Autolatina (now ending); 
has a JV with Ford Europe in Portugal, called Autoeuropa, producing MPVs; 
has a JV with First Automotive Works in China to produce cars; 
has a JV with Shanghai Tractor & Auto Co. and the Chinese Government, called 
Shanghai - VW, to produce cars and engines; 
has a JV with the Polish Government in Poland, called FSR, to produce delivery vans; 
has a JV with BAZ in the Czech Republic, called SPOL-SRO, to produce cars and 
transmissions; 
is supplying Raba with light CV kits; 
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(j) is supplied with assembled cars by Porsche in Germany; 
(k) is assembling trucks for Toyota in Germany. 
Figure M.2. Ford Group: relationships with other companies world-wide 
Ford: 
(a) owns Jaguar Cars; 
(b) owns 25% of Mazda; 
(c) owns Ford Europe; 
(d) has a JV with VAG, in Argentina, called Autolatina (now ending) producing cars; 
(e) through Ford Europe, owns Aston Martin; 
(f) through Ford Europe, has a JV with VAG in Portugal, called Autoeuropa, producing 
MPVs; 
(g) through Ford Europe, is supplied with 4 wheel drives by Nissan Europe (Spain); 
(h) through Ford Europe, will produce cars for Mazda in the UK; 
(i) through Ford Europe, has developed engines with Yamaha (sigma engine). 
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Figure M.3. Fiat Group: relationships with other companies world-wide 
QTechnology Cooperation 01 Car Recycling 
Fiat Group: 
(a) owns Maserati, Alfa Romeo, Lancia, Ferrari, Fiat Iveco; 
(b) controls component firms Magneti Morelli, Giardini, Teksid, Weber, Solex, Veglia 
Borleti, Carello; 
(c) has agreements with Renault and BMW on car recycling cooperation; 
(d) has licensing agreements with car assemblers in Iran, the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Zambia, Kenya, Algeria; 
(e) has a JV with PSA in Italy and northern France, called Sevel, to produce vans and 
MPVs; 
(f) through Fiat Iveco, has a JV with Mekong Corp. in Vietnam, to produce minibuses and 
light trucks; 
(g) through Fiat Iveco, has a partnership with Ashok Leyland in India, to produce trucks; 
(h) through Fiat Iveco, has an agreement with Renault to produce common components for 
trucks and CVs; 
(i) through Fiat Iveco, has licences with Nasco (Egypt) and Otoyel (Turkey) for industrial 
vehicles and trucks. 
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Figure M.4. Renault: relationships with other companies world-wide 
Renault: 
(a) owns 70% of Setubel in Portugal, which produces Clios; 
(b) has a JV in India, with Ashok Leyland, to produce cars; 
(c) has a minority ownership of a plant in Morocco producing cars and CVs; 
(d) has a JV in South-East Asia, with Sanjong Aviation, to produce vans; 
(e) has a JV with Matra, to produce MPVs (Espace); 
(f) has a majority ownership of a plant in Columbia, producing CVs; 
(g) has JVs with Peugeot, France, to produce CVs, cars, engines, gearboxes, transmissions; 
(h) has a technology agreement with Fiat, on car recycling; 
(i) has engines and transmission made for it by Volvo; 
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(j) has licences with Dancia (Romania), Hong Yen (South-East Asia), Sanfo (Taiwan) and 
Vietnam Motors. 
Figure M.5. GM Group: relationships with other companies world-wide 
GM: 
(a) has JVs with Toyota, to produce cars in the USA and Australia; 
(b) owns 37% of Isuzu; 
(c) owns GM Europe; 
(d) through GM Europe, owns 50% of Saab; 
(e) through GM Europe, has a JV with Isuzu, in the UK, called IBC, to produce vans and 4 
wheel drives; 
(f) through GM Europe, has a JV with FSO in Poland, to produce cars. 
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Figure M.6. Peugeot-Citroën (PSA Group): relationships with other companies 
world-wide 
PSA: 
(a) has JVs with Renault, in France, for cars, CVs, engines, gearboxes and transmissions; 
(b) has a JV with Fiat in Italy and northern France, called Sevel, to produce vans and 
MPVs; 
(c) has a JV in Egypt, to produce cars; 
(d) has a technology partnership with Sagem, for electric vehicles; 
(e) has licences with PAL (India), Kasan (Turkey) and Sevel (Argentina) for cars and CVs. 
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Figure M.7. Volvo Group: relationships with other companies world-wide 
Volvo: 
(a) has a JV with Mitsubishi and the Dutch Government in the Netherlands, called NedCar, 
to make cars; 
(b) has a JV with Plaxton Coachbuilders, in Canada, called Prévost car, to produce buses; 
(c) produce pressed parts for Saab; 
(d) produce engines, transmissions and pressed parts for Renault. 
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Figure M.8. Mercedes-Benz: relationships with other companies world-wide 
licence marketing 
49% 
f Swatchmobile\ 
I ■ Cars J 
Technology, 
Develop, 
produce, market 
steering systems 
Mercedes-Benz: 
(a) has a JV with the Tata Group, called Telco, to produce cars, CVs and engines; 
(b) has a JV with UAZ, to produce cars and engines; 
(c) has a JV with Swatch, to produce the Swatchmobile; 
(d) has a 5% share of Ssangyong in South Korea, a licensing agreement for technology to 
produce light CVs and a marketing agreement to market Ssangyong light CVs in 
Europe; 
(e) has a technology agreement with ZFVW in Germany, to develop, produce and market 
steering systems; 
(f) has agreed licences with partners in South Korea, Taiwan, Sri Lanka, India, South 
Africa, the Philippines, Pakistan and New Zealand. 
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Figure M.9. BMW Group: relationships with other companies world-wide 
BMW: 
(a) owns Rover; 
(b) supplies Rolls Royce with engines and various components; 
(c) has technological cooperation agreements with Fiat and Renault on car recycling; 
(d) through Rover, has licences with Bulgarian and Indian producers for cars; 
(e) through Rover, is licensing technology (on cars). 
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Figure M.IO. Toyota Group: relationships with other companies world-wide 
Toyota: 
(a) owns Toyota, UK; 
(b) has JVs in Australia and USA, with GM, to produce cars; 
(c) has trucks produced for it, by VAG, in Hoover Germany; 
(d) has various JVs in licences with producers in South-East Asia. 
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Figure M.ll. Honda Group: relationships with other companies world-wide 
Honda: 
(a) licenses its technology to Rover; 
(b) owns Honda UK. 
Figure M.12. Nissan Group: relationships with other companies world-wide 
Nissan: 
(a) owns Nissan Europe; 
(b) through Nissan Europe (Iberia, Spain) produces 4 wheel drives for Ford; 
(c) has various agreements with producers in South-East Asia. 
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APPENDIX N 
Sources of information 
Networks 
IMVP (MIT programme) 
Permanent Group for the Study of the Automotive Industry and its Employees (GERPISA), 
French-based international network 
Academic experts 
Jean-Jacques Chañaron (Coopers & Lybrand's automotive expert, CNRS) 
E. de Banville (CNRS) 
Guiseppe Volpato (University of Venice) 
Aldo Enrietti (University of Torino) 
Ben Dankbaar (University of Maastricht) 
Ulrich Jürgens (WZB, Berlin) 
Y. Lung (University of Bordeaux) 
G. Carillo (University of Madrid) 
P. Cooke (Henley Management College) 
Frank Den Hond (Vrije Universiteit) 
Main published sources 
Economist Intelligence Unit reports 
Eurostat 
European Commission's Automotive Pricing Quarterlies 
ACEA publications 
CEPA publications 
Boston Consulting Group's Report on Automotive Components 
Financial Times Reports 
Industry bodies: Association of European Automotive Manufacturers (ACEA), Associazione 
Nazionale Fra Industrie Automobilistiche (ANFIA), Comité des Constructeurs Français 
d'Automobiles (CCFA), Association of European Component Manufacturers (CLEPA), 
Fédération des Industries des Equipments pour Véhicules (FIEV), Society of Motor 
Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT), Verband der Automobilindustrie eV (VDA). 
Note: The contractors are aware of some of the difficulties involved in interpreting data 
sources, such as currency fluctuations, different definitions of production volumes, 
different approaches to counting foreign assembly plants. 
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APPENDIX O 
Views from companies on market share changes 
O.l. Mercedes-Benz 
The introduction of the new Ε­class (with sales of 2.7 million cars, this was the most 
successful Mercedes of all time) in 1984 had as an effect the rise of its domestic market share 
(which peaked in 1985). The downward trend from 1985 to 1992 is due to the weak economy. 
The rise of the market share from 1992 can be explained by the introduction of the new E­
class model. Between 1990 and 1993, Mercedes benefited from the new East German demand 
which overcompensated for the falling sales in other countries. That is the reason why the 
domestic sales of Mercedes as a proportion of total global sales peaked in 1991. 
O.2. Peugeot and Citroën 
The influences affecting the domestic market share and the proportion of global sales sold 
nationally of both Peugeot and Citroën are caused by new model launches and the changes in 
the national/international levels of competition. 
Since 1990, the company has developed their sales due to the SMP. The PSA Group produce 
more of all their makes in foreign countries (particularly in Europe) and have achieved higher 
sales in Europe. This trend was stimulated by the fall of trade restrictions and the common 
European legislation introduced by the SMP. Pricing policies have not been changed 
significantly during the period. 
It should be noted that since 1995, the devaluation of the Italian and Spanish currency had a 
significant effect on sales in these countries. 
0.2.1. Peugeot 
Domestic market share 
The relatively high domestic market share of Peugeot in 1985 and 1988 was mainly caused by 
the introduction of new models. The 205 was introduced in 1983 and achieved a peak in sales 
two years later. The introduction of the 405 in 1987 was an immediate success within one year 
which caused the rise of Peugeot's domestic market share. As far as the period from 1990 to 
1993 is concerned, the high number of model launches from national and international 
competitors constantly weakened Peugeot's domestic market position. 
Domestic sales as a proportion of total global sales 
The reason why the national sales were relatively high compared to global sales of the PSA 
Group in 1985 was that it acquired the French automobile company Talbot in the same year. 
Talbot, whilst obtaining good sales in France, was quite unknown in other countries. 
The downwards trend in Peugeot's domestic sales relative to the global sales can be explained 
by better sales in Europe and increased opportunities in South America and India. 
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0.2.2. Citroën 
In comparison with Peugeot, Citroën's rising domestic market share was due to the 
introduction of new models, e.g. the AX in 1986 and the ZX in 1991, which strengthened the 
market position in 1987 and the following years to 1991. In fact, a potential falling domestic 
market share of Citroen was compensated by the introduction of the ZX model. 
Citroën's increased global sales relative to national sales is explained by the same factors as 
for Peugeot: increased sales in Europe and the conquering of new market shares in South 
America and India. 
O.3. BMW 
The influences affecting the market position of BMW ­ national and international ­ were 
especially caused by new model launches and the changes in the national/international levels 
of competition. The sales of BMW do not depend significantly on relative market conditions 
because of its high price segment. In addition, two thirds of all BMWs are company cars. 
Nowadays, BMW sells about one third of its cars in Germany, one third in other European 
countries and the rest of its sales are non­European. 
The SMP had positive as well as negative effects on BMW as restrictions decreased, but 
bureaucracy increased. Nevertheless, the SMP is perceived as having a positive effect for 
BMW. The pricing policy was not changed in the analysed period. 
0.3.1. Domestic market share 
As far as BMW's domestic market share is concerned, it suffered in 1985 from Mercedes­
Benz having a big success with its new Ε­series that year. The downward trend between 1986 
and 1991 was due to the expiring of the old BMW 3­series. The trend was turned around in 
1991 through the introduction of the new 3­series. 
0.3.2. Domestic sales as a proportion of total global sales 
The increasing proportion of national sales between 1985 and 1991 was caused by sales 
decreasing in the USA. This can be explained by the devaluation of the Dollar and other 
restrictions like the luxury tax. Indeed, the highest American sales for BMW were in 1986. 
The reunification of Germany influenced BMW in 1990, where bad international sales were 
compensated by sales to former East Germany. From 1991 onwards, Japanese and American 
sales went up and thus also BMW's relative market share. 
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APPENDIX Ρ 
Micro Compact Car (MCC) - a co-operative venture 
between Mercedes-Benz and SMH 'Swatch-Mobil', 
'Smart Mobil' 
In the beginning of 1994, a co-operative venture between Mercedes-Benz (51%) and 
Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Mikroelektronik und Uhrenindustrie AG (SMH) (49%) was 
announced to build an innovative, small and light vehicle designed especially for densely 
populated urban areas, called the Micro Compact Car (MCC). 
According to the annual report for 1994 of Mercedes-Benz, the MC Micro Compact Car AG 
(MCAG), with headquarters in Biel, Switzerland, is responsible for carrying out this project. 
The preparations for development and production are carried out in Renningen, Germany. 
Production will be based in Hambach, France, near the German border. The first Smart cars 
will be sold in 1999. 
The decision to produce in Lorraine, France, was based on market policy considerations as 
well as advantages in logistics and the anticipated production costs. The great flexibility in 
organizing working time and the internationally competitive level of wages provide a solid 
basis for attractive pricing for the MCC, especially in this price-sensitive sector. According to 
MC AG, relatively cheap ground prices and the quick procedures of French construction 
permissions, as well as significant subventions from the French Government influenced the 
decision to produce in France. Among 37 potential production sites, Europol (an industrialized 
region in France) was chosen as the best one. The conclusion of the Tariff Agreement, 
apparently, did not seem to have been important. 
Prior to the decision on the production site location, an aggressive public discussion (closely 
followed by the newspapers) between the companies concerned and the government/union (IG 
Metall) was held in Germany. The question was whether to produce in Germany or France. 
Both companies, Mercedes-Benz and SMH, would prefer to produce in Germany, but only 
under better, more efficient conditions for production. Naturally, Germany as the production 
site was favoured by the government and the union as an opportunity to produce new jobs. 
Negotiations and compromises towards the companies were nearly impossible. 
In addition, the discussion between both parties (companies and German institutions) was held 
during new tariff agreements (IG Metall). As these did not end very satisfactorily for the 
companies, a decision was taken in favour of France. 
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APPENDIX Q 
Case study on Nissan 
Q.I. Introduction 
Nissan is Japan's second largest manufacturer of motor vehicles and the fifth largest in the 
world. It produces some three million vehicles per annum that are marketed in 170 countries. 
In Europe, it offers direct employment to 16,000 people and has 4,300 dealers. Europe 
represents approximately 28% of its total non-Japanese unit sales. It has two manufacturing 
operations in Europe - in the UK and Spain. Two-thirds of its sales in Europe are sourced in 
Europe. 
Nissan's European operations are summarized in the table below: 
Table Q.I. Overview of the company's European structure 
Name 
Nissan Europe NV, Amsterdam 
Nissan Motor Parts Centre 
(Europe) BV, Amsterdam 
Nissan Distribution Service 
(Europe) BV, Amsterdam, 
Barcelona, Tyneside 
Nissan European Technology 
Centres 
Nissan Design Europe GmbH 
Nissan Motor Manufacturing (UK) 
Ltd 
Nissan Motor Iberica SA 
Nissan Forklift España 
Nissan Vehículos Industriales 
Nissan Motorsports Europe 
Activity 
European Headquarters 
Responsible for Europe-wide distribution of parts and the development and 
distribution of accessories. Holds over 114,000 parts and 500,000 registered 
items. 
Responsible for vehicle distribution across Europe, as well as vehicle storage, pre-
delivery inspection, portside installation of parts and final delivery. 
Based in Cranfield, Sunderland and Louvain-la-Neuve. UK activities include 
planning, design and development of vehicles produced in Europe, vehicle and 
engine testing, and support to European manufacturing operations. The Belgium 
centre focuses on homologation issues. 
Located close to Munich, NDE is involved in internal and external design of 
future generation Nissan vehicles. 
£1.25 billion investment in Sunderland in the UK. Production of Micra and 
Primera. 
Largest of Nissan's Spanish production plants. Centre for production of Terrano 
II, Patrol, Serena, Vanette Cargo. An R&D department is also included. 
Located in Noain, Spain, making forklifts for Europe and other markets. 
Based in Avila, Spain. Responsible for the design, manufacture and sale of 
commercial and industrial vehicles. 
Based in Didcot, UK. Supports Nissan distribution and private Nissan customers 
participating in motorsport activities in / around Europe. 
Appendix Q: Case study on Nissan 223 
Nissan also owns its distributors in seven European countries (Germany, UK, France, Spain, 
Italy, Netherlands and Switzerland). 
Our case study was carried out during 1995/96 and involved high level interviews with the 
vice-president for manufacturing, the vice-president of marketing and the director of business 
development. Due to resource constraints within Nissan, we were unable to speak to other 
senior managers. However, Nissan has been very co-operative and we believe we have gained 
sufficient insight into the company to ascertain its views on the effects of the single market 
programme and the future actions that are now required. 
Nissan was chosen for a number of reasons: 
(a) It first entered the European market in the 1960s, and during the 1980s has made major 
investments in manufacturing facilities in the region. Its attitude to the EU in terms of 
market entry and plant location are therefore very different from indigenous European 
firms. 
(b) It is a global player. Its attitude to Europe can therefore be compared with its strategies 
towards North America. 
(c) It pioneered the introduction of a number of new elements to the European automobile 
industry, such as lean manufacturing techniques, simultaneous engineering and common 
terms and conditions. 
Q.2. Background to the company 
Q.2.1 Nature of products 
The table below shows a breakdown of the company's product portfolio in Europe. 
Table Q.2. Retail sales of main models in Europe, 1993-95 
Model 
Micra 
Primera* 
Sunny*/Almera 
Terrano II 
Serena 
Total 
1995 
139,419 
92,622 
86,756 
22,754 
18,958 
360,509 
1994 
139,678 
103,676 
95,077 
23,195 
17,788 
379,427 
1993 
117,494 
103,065 
110,661 
10,581 
15.566 
357,367 
Source: Nissan 1996 Fact Sheet. 
* Includes Wagon. 
Other models sold include the Patrol, Tirade, Sunny van, 200 SX, 300 ZX and 100 NX. 
224 Motor vehicles 
Q.2.2. Geographic markets 
Nissan's entry into Europe started in the 1960s and it is important to understand the reasons 
behind Nissan's tactical decisions to sell into various markets over time, and its decisions to 
set up plants to serve the more protected markets. Annex C provides an overview of the key 
milestones in Europe for the company and the reasons for its entry into each market. 
The table below shows a breakdown of sales and market shares in the 16 major markets of 
Europe using registration figures. 
Table Q.3. Nissan's vehicle registration figures and market shares in Europe, 1993-95 
(16 major markets) 
Type 
Passenger cars 
Light commercial 
vehicles 
Total 
1995 
370,717 
69,389 
440,106 
% change 
3.1 
5.4 
3.3 
1994 
390,179 
68,510 
458,689 
% change 
3.3 
5.7 
3.5 
1993 
397,688 
72,355 
470,043 
% 
3.5 
6.4 
3.8 
Source: Nissan 1996 Fact Sheet. 
Table Q.4. 
Global unit sales 
of which Europe 
% represented 
by Europe 
Nissan's unit sales over time (financial years) 
1995 
2,699,774 
460,222 
17 
% 
change 
0.32 
-2.82 
1994 
2,691,168 
473,556 
18 
% 
change 
-4.33 
-14.02 
1993 
2,812,880 
550,794 
20 
% 
change 
-3.91 
4.28 
1992 
2,927,305 
528,183 
18 
% 
change 
1.53 
5.09 
1991 
2,883,094 
502,587 
17 
Source: 1995 Annual Report. 
Europe's percentage of Nissan's global sales peaked in 1993 at 20% but has subsequently 
declined to 17%. The table also shows the relative depth of the recession (in retail demand for 
vehicles) in Europe between 1993 and 1994, with a 14% drop in sales in Europe compared 
with a fall of only 4% globally. 
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Table Q.5. Nissan's top five European markets, 1994-95 
Country 
Germany 
UK 
Spain 
Italy 
France 
1995 registrations 
93,353 
97,084 
49,040 
52,000 
35,912 
1994 registrations 
101,005 
96,772 
53,241 
50,983 
34,050 
1995 Market share 
(%) 
2.7 
4.5 
4.8 
2.9 
1.6 
1994 Market share 
(%) 
3.0 
4.6 
5.0 
2.9 
1.5 
Source: 1996 Annual Report. 
The largest proportions of European sales are in Germany and the UK. Nissan appears to have 
a much larger market share in the countries in which it has manufacturing facilities - 4.6% in 
the UK and 5% in Spain. It is interesting to note that neither of these countries have strong, 
locally owned manufacturers. 
Q.2.3. Number and location of plants 
As already stated, Nissan has two manufacturing bases in Europe, one in the UK and the other 
in Spain: 
(a) Nissan Motor Manufacturing (UK) Ltd is Nissan's European production plant for 
passenger cars. It makes the Micra and Primera models. Cumulative production 
exceeded one million units in 1995. The plant was established in 1984 in Sunderland 
and cumulative investment has since reached ECU 1.5 billion. In 1993, it was the largest 
exporter of passenger vehicles from the UK. In 1994, of the 205,195 cars produced, the 
Micra represented 64% and the Primera 36%. In 1995, of the 215,346 vehicles produced, 
the Micra represented 58% and the Primera 42%. 
(b) The operations in Spain are made up of the following: Nissan Motor Iberica SA (4by4, 
multi-purpose and light commercial vehicles); Nissan Vehículos Industriales SA 
(commercial and industrial vehicles); and Nissan Forklift España. The main models 
made in Spain include the Patrol, Serena, Terrano II, and Vanette. The main plant was 
originally a Ford plant making tractors, trucks and diesel engines. Nissan acquired an 
equity interest in 1980 and became a majority shareholder in 1982. In 1995 it produced 
121,863 vehicles of which the Terrano II and Maverick represented 30%, the Mistral (a 
version of the Terrano II for the Japanese market) 13%, the Serena 18%, and the Vanette 
Cargo 17.5%. Two thirds of the Spanish output is sold to other European markets. 
All Micra, Primera, Serena, Terrano II/Maverick, and Vanette Cargo models sold in Europe 
are sourced at these plants. 
Exports outside Europe amounted to some 26,558 units in 1995. 
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Q.2.4. Trends in units produced 
Figure Q.l shows the total units produced in Europe over time. 
Figure Q.l. Units produced 
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Table Q.6 shows the number of vehicles produced in the UK and Spain over time. 
Table Q.6. Trends in units produced 
Year (calendar) 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
UK 
124,664 
179,005 (+44%) 
246,285 (+38%) 
205,795 (-16%) 
215,346 (+5%) 
Spain 
72,446 
79,674 (+10%) 
84,055 (+5%) 
104,412 (+24%) 
121,863 (+17%) 
Total in Europe 
197,110 
258,679 
330,340 
310,207 
337,209 
Source: Nissan 1996 Fact Sheet. 
The output from Nissan's European manufacturing plants has grown significantly, especially 
considering the recent recession. 
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Q.3. Effects of the single market on market access 
Q.3.1. How sales outside the domestic market have changed over time and the reasons for this 
Nissan views Europe as one of its regional markets. This subheading (which has been used in 
the other case studies) is not relevant for Nissan, because it does not consider any one 
European country as a 'domestic' market. 
Q.3.2. Launch of new models for the whole European market and the reasons behind this 
Nissan offers its products to the whole of Europe. It sells six main models into the European 
market, compared with a total of around 20 major models across the globe. In total, there are 
26 models (passenger cars, light commercial vehicles and trucks) for the European market, 
from the 40-plus model types available globally. 
Typically, new models are launched using a pan-European marketing campaign, often (but not 
always) with a common advertising theme. For example, the Aimera launch advertising 
campaign was shown in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. However, 
smaller campaigns are organized by the national distributors, usually with the national 
operation of the same advertising company (TBWA/Omnicom). 
Q.3.3. Relative effects of recession and exchange rates on the levels of access to other 
European markets 
Nissan said that its strategy towards Europe and particularly its development of production 
facilities had little to do with the appreciation of the Yen. The Yen only began to appreciate 
with the Plaza Accord in 1986 and at that time the level of appreciation was not significant. 
The main appreciation of the currency occurred from 1992 onwards. Nissan's global 
manufacturing strategy was much more heavily driven by the structural change of the world 
automotive market due to the second oil shock and the experience of automobile trade friction 
during the 1970s than by exchange rate fluctuations. 
However, it informed us that the devaluation of the Lira has had a significant effect. It 
traditionally develops pricing strategies through negotiations with the country distributors, but 
considers a basket of competitor car prices. If the pricing strategy was left at the current level, 
Nissan's distributors in southern Germany, Austria and France would be put under serious 
financial difficulties, because customers would want to parallel import from Italy. To avoid 
this problem, Nissan has changed its pricing strategy in Italy so that market share growth is 
less likely. 
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Q.3.4. Implications of different tax regimes on market access 
Nissan mentioned that the French, Spanish and to a lesser extent, the UK and Italian 
governments encourage the use of diesel engines. This imposes extra costs on the company. 
However, quantification of these extra costs was not possible. Italy, Spain and France have 
progressive taxes based on the cubic capacity of engines. The French system also uses a 
formula which links the tax to the final drive ratio. The German tax system is less progressive, 
but Germany has different insurance breaks which are dependent on the horsepower of the 
engine. This means that Nissan has to make a 90HP 1.6 litre engine for the German market 
compared with the 102 HP variant sold to the rest of the EU. 
Q.3.5. Introduction of pan-European marketing and distribution networks and the effect of the 
block exemption on this 
Nissan said that at the period of market entry, the setting up of an effective sales network was 
one of its most difficult problems, particularly under the block exemption system. However, it 
considered that it was also normal for a newcomer to make more of an effort than indigenous 
players. Taking into account the technical/technological complexity of modern cars, Nissan 
believes that the block exemption system is still very crucial for providing high quality 
services to end-users. 
Nissan also considers that the block exemption system is favourable to manufacturers. For 
example, unified shop designs, colour schemes, Customer Interface (C.I.) etc. would be 
extremely difficult to put in place if the block exemption did not exist. 
Q.4. Production costs and productivity 
Q.4.1. Changes in production costs 
The company was unable to provide us with any trend data on its production costs. 
Q.4.2. Changes in productivity 
Productivity targets have been 10% increases per annum in the UK. They have achieved this in 
1994, 1995 and 1996. Of the 10%, 7-7.5% is from process improvements, the rest is through 
design changes. Future targets are 10%, 8% and 7% over the next three years. 
In the financial year to March 1993, Nissan recorded a pre-tax loss of YEN 56 billion on net 
sales of YEN 6,197 (down from YEN 6,418 in 1992). This led to a strategy to improve cost 
efficiency including an objective to improve the productivity of manufacturing operations by 
10% during the three-year period from 1994 to 1996. 
Q.4.3. New methods of working 
Nissan is at the forefront of adoption of lean production techniques. It is now embarking on a 
global strategy by positioning itself in strong sub-sectors of the market. Nissan intends to 
harmonize its engines, drives and chassis on a global basis, but retain different production 
structures within each region. Nissan is also attempting to halve the number of platforms it has 
from the current 26, in order to achieve economies of scale at the global level. 
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Q.4.4. Effect of the single market on productivity and production changes 
Nissan does not view the single market as having affected their productivity and production 
changes. 
Q.5. Employment 
Q.5.1. Changes in employment levels 
Nissan does not believe that the single market has had an effect on employment levels. 
Q.5.2. Changes in conditions of employment 
Nissan does not believe that the single market has had an effect on employment conditions. 
Q.5.3. Degree of cross-border recruitment 
Nissan does transfer employees across the EU, although this is more for the dissemination of 
information and development of the workforce than as a result of the single market 
programme. 
Q.5.4. Effect of the single market on employment levels and conditions 
Nissan does not believe the single market has had an effect on their employment levels or 
conditions. 
Q.6. Manufacturing plants 
Q.6.1. Overview of the location and size of plants over time 
Nissan sells six models to the European market. Table Q.7 shows where each of these is made 
and puts Nissan's European product market strategy in a global context. 
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Table Q.7. 
Product 
Micra 
Aimera 
Primera 
Maxima QX 
Terano II 
Serena/Van-
ette Cargo 
Production of vehicles for the European market 
Made in 
Japan 
Yes (March) 
Yes (Platform 
used is global) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes (Serena 
only) 
Made in USA 
Sentra uses 
platform 
Made in 
Europe 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Sold in Japan 
Yes (March) 
Yes (Pulsar) 
Yes 
(some are 
imported from 
EU) 
Yes 
Yes (Mistral) 
(Exported & 
pan EU) 
Yes (Serena 
only) 
Sold in USA 
Yes (Maxima) 
Sold in 
Europe 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes (sold to 
Ford as 
Maverick) 
Yes 
Source: Nissan. 
In addition to the above six models, Nissan manufactures a significant number of other models 
for the US and Japanese markets. 
Q.6.2. Reasons for any international relocations 
Nissan has not relocated as such, but has developed new European sites to manufacture and 
distribute its vehicles: 
(a) In 1980, Nissan purchased a stake in the Spanish manufacturer Motor Iberica, a 
manufacturer of tractors, vans and trucks. Nissan said that this move was part of their 
globalization strategy. This strategy was for the Spanish manufacturing base to become 
one of the key bases for commercial vehicles and 4X4s, firstly for the EU market and 
then for the global market. The plant was owned by Massey Fergusson which was 
experiencing financial difficulties at the time. The plant was exporting to France and 
Italy. At that time, Nissan attempted to sign a joint venture with Alfa Romeo (the Arna 
project), but ultimately this was short-lived. It decided to set up the new plant in 
Sunderland, UK, after it had researched a number of other potential sites: Spain, 
Portugal, Belgium, Northern Ireland, the French/Belgian border region, and southern 
Italy. 
(b) In 1984, Nissan Motor Manufacturing (UK) Ltd was established on a greenfield site in 
Sunderland. Nissan was keen to increase its local production based on its philosophy of 
localization: NMUK endeavoured to increase local content to 60%. At this level, 
NMUK products could be treated as being of UK origin according to the EU rules. In 
1988, when this criteria was achieved, NMUK products were freely circulated on the EU 
market. However, in line with Nissan's above-mentioned philosophy, NMUK was not 
satisfied with local content of 60% and, in 1992, local content passed 80%. 
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(c) In 1989, Nissan Europe NV was established in Amsterdam. The Netherlands was 
already home to vehicles and parts logistics operations and had been key in controlling 
the logistics of imports from Japan for the rest of Europe. The Netherlands therefore had 
a large stock-yard. The UK, Belgium and Germany were other options for the location of 
the European head office. 
Table Q.8. Number of suppliers, UK manufacturing plant, 1995 
Country 
UK 
Germany 
France 
Spain 
Belgium 
Ireland 
Italy 
Portugal 
Austria 
Switzerland 
Total 
Number of suppliers 
134 
24 
17 
12 
3 
4 
2 
2 
1 
1 
200 
Percentage 
67 
12 
8.5 
6 
1.5 
2 
1 
1 
0.5 
0.5 
100 
Source: Nissan Fact File, 1996. 
Q.7. Purchasing 
Q.7.1. Numbers of suppliers used and their location over time 
In 1994, Nissan had 198 suppliers for the UK plant and 241 for the Spanish plant. Thirty-nine 
suppliers are common to the UK and Spanish plants, and this number is increasing. The 
locations of suppliers for the UK operation are shown in Table Q.8. 
Figure Q.2 shows the growth in numbers of suppliers and the expenditure on components over 
time (by 1991: components expenditure ECU 400 million; number of suppliers 150+). 
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Figure Q.2. Growth in numbers of suppliers and expenditure 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
European components expenditure has been rising steadily throughout the period. The main 
increases in the number of suppliers came between 1987 and 1988 and between 1989 and 
1990. 
Nissan has warehousing and vehicle and parts distribution operations in Amsterdam as well as 
further vehicle distribution centres in Tyneside, UK, Barcelona, Spain and Le Havre in France. 
It has a three to four month stockholding of vehicles which it views as about average in the 
industry. 
Q.7.2. Examples of changes in cross-border sourcing 
In 1994, Nissan had 198 suppliers for the UK plant and 241 for the Spanish plant. Thirty-nine 
suppliers are common to the UK and Spanish plants, and this number is increasing. 
Components expenditure in Europe has increased from around UK £50 million in 1986 to UK 
£200 million in 1995. The number of European component suppliers has increased from zero 
in 1986 to around 750 in 1995. When Nissan entered the EU market it used indigenous 
sources of supply because of different customer requirements in the EU as opposed to Japan. It 
considered the best way to meet these requirements was to use indigenous component supply. 
Since entry Nissan has actively encouraged the component suppliers to adopt new techniques 
and to improve efficiency. 
Q.7.3. Effect of exchange rates on sourcing decisions 
Nissan does not feel that there has been an effect on their sourcing decisions. 
Q.7.4. Views on and examples of the internationalization of supply base 
Nissan does not feel that there has been an effect on their sourcing decisions. 
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Q.7.5. Effect of the single market on these changes 
Nissan does not feel that there has been an effect on their sourcing decisions. 
Q.8. Research, design and development (RD&D) 
Nissan's European Technology Centres (NETCs) operate from bases in the UK and Belgium 
and represent a total investment of ECU 78 million. The UK centre in Cranfield was 
established in May 1988 and has a workforce of 330. The Belgian operation was established in 
July 1989 and its Louvain-la-Neuve base has a workforce of 59. In addition, Nissan Design 
Europe GmbH was established near Munich in 1992 and has a current workforce of nine. 
Activities at Cranfield include the design and development of complete vehicle styling, body 
chassis, electrical and trim design, component and engine testing, trial vehicle building and 
project control. 
Q.8.1. Estimation of cost savings from the component type approval measures 
Nissan was unable to quantify the cost savings resulting from the component type approval 
measures. 
Q.8.2. Estimation of cost savings from the whole vehicle type approval measure 
Nissan's national distributors used to obtain type approval for new models on a national basis 
supported by the homologation department in Japan. By 1985, Nissan had created an 
additional homologation department in the UK. This department formed a relationship with 
the Vehicle Certification Agency in Bristol. In 1991, when NETC UK was established, this 
department was incorporated into it. In 1993, Nissan established NETC Brussels (in Louvain-
la-Neuve) and the planning and co-ordination process is carried out in association with NETC 
UK and other related Nissan operational bases. 
Nissan has obtained Whole Vehicle Type Approval for the whole of Europe for two of its 
models (even though the Directive does not require this until 1996/98). The number of staff in 
this area has been reduced from 14 to 4 - primarily as a result of not having to comply within 
each EU country. 
The cost savings from the Whole Vehicle Type Approval for passenger cars arise from two 
areas: 
(a) The need to present a car for inspection only once rather than 15 times - saving the cost 
of 14 prototype cars. 
(b) The speed of the process which means that the car used for the inspection can come off 
the manufacturing line rather than at an early prototype stage. This saving is significant. 
Nissan stated that Germany used to require six months to obtain type approval (the 
longest lead time) versus three to four months in the UK (the shortest). The difference in 
costs between a prototype and a production vehicle amounts to tens of thousands of 
ECU per vehicle. 
Our calculations suggest that the Whole Vehicle Type Approval has resulted in cost savings of 
around ECU 1 million per new model. 
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Q.8.3. Key changes taking place in RD&D (particularly joint design with suppliers) 
When developing a new model, Nissan initially decides where the market is likely to be for the 
new product concept. It breaks its markets into four: Europe, America, Japan and the Far East. 
Products can be marketed to just one market or more than one. Products just for the European 
market are likely to have their RD&D activities and production carried out in Europe. 
Products for both Japan and Europe are likely to have their design, development and 
production shared between these two regions. 
The three main RD&D centres are NETC (with 398 engineering staff) in Europe, NTC in 
Japan (with 6,600 engineering staff) and NRD in the USA (with 500 engineering staff). The 
three centres all use the same CAD/CAM technology. Nissan is also helping in the 
development of technical standards in the use of CAD/CAM technologies, e.g. STEP 
(Standard for Exchange Specification) and IGES (Initial Graphics Exchange Specification). It 
also has its own proprietary translators that it offers to its suppliers. 
Nissan believes that the way in which it structures research, design and development is unique. 
It has developed three different models for sharing design: 
(a) Localization - the principal design and development is carried out in Japan and local 
changes are made to adapt the vehicle to European specifications for components. This 
happened in 1986 during the development of the Bluebird. For this model, it took 2.5 
years of localization to reach 60% local content. The localization of design is necessary 
because of the differences in materials, standards and customer requirements. For 
example, the standard for the thickness of Japanese glass is different to that in Europe. 
This necessitates changes to the rubber mouldings and fittings for the European model. 
Similarly, battery capacities are much higher in Japan (to provide power for more 
electric add-ons) and localized design and development is started at the same time. This 
was the case for the Primera and the Micra. They achieved around 80% local content of 
the European versions at the time the car was launched in both Japan and Europe. 
(b) Sole but facilitated development where there is no 'mother' development in Japan. An 
example of this approach was the development of the Terrano II/Maverick, or the 
Vanette Cargo. However, the approach uses common components from other models, 
such as engines and gearboxes. 
(c) Sole development where there is no mother development and all of the components are 
newly designed. This has not yet been tried. 
Development of new products entails a number of discrete processes: 
(a) styling, 
(b) layout design, 
(c) body in white, 
(d) prototyping, 
(e) purchasing, 
(f) engineering. 
Each stage can be carried out at different locations. For example, the Terrano II was styled by 
an Italian design house. NETC in the UK designed the layout, and prototyping was carried out 
in Spain, where the model is also manufactured. 
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Q.8.4. Effect of the single market programme on these changes 
Design and development is increasingly delegated down to suppliers. However, this originated 
from Nissan's own policy on relations with suppliers (i.e. simultaneous engineering) and not 
as a result of the single market programme. 
Q.9. Business strategy 
Q.9.1. Key alliances developed 
NRD in the USA designed the CR truck which is manufactured by Ford. 
In Europe, NETC designed the Terrano II which is the same as the Ford Maverick. Both are 
made at Nissan's Spanish site and exported. The exports to Japan are rebadged as the Mistral. 
Q.9.2. Changes in business process strategy 
Purchasing 
In 1994, Nissan had 198 suppliers for the UK plant and 241 for the Spanish plant. Thirty-nine 
suppliers are common to the UK and Spanish plants, and this number is increasing. 
Components expenditure in Europe has increased from around UK £50 million in 1986 to UK 
£200 million in 1995. The number of European component suppliers has increased from zero 
in 1986 to around 750 in 1995. When Nissan entered the EU market it used indigenous 
sources of supply because of different customer requirements in the EU as opposed to Japan. It 
considered the best way to meet these requirements was to use indigenous component supply. 
Since entry Nissan has actively encouraged the component suppliers to adopt new techniques 
and to improve efficiency. 
Manufacturing 
Nissan's plant in Sunderland has a number of interesting strategic features: 
(a) All staff share the same terms of employment, the same canteen and health care 
schemes. They are all salaried and there is a single union agreement with the AEEU. 
(b) Eight major suppliers who manufacture components simultaneously have plants 
alongside the Sunderland site. 
(c) The engine building facility produces around 50 different variants on a single moving 
line. 
(d) Body assembly is highly automated and uses 250 robots carrying out 80% of all the 
necessary body welds. 
Sales and distribution 
Nissan began to set up its European sales and distribution infrastructure in the mid-1960s. In 
1964, it set up a liaison office in Brussels to facilitate this process. By 1966, it had appointed 
importers for the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland. In the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, distributors had been appointed in the UK and Germany. The development of 
the distribution network was based on the policy to start selling vehicles into each market as 
the quota controls were removed. 
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RD&D 
The technology centre at Cranfield has participated in three major projects, and its role in 
Nissan's overall RD&D has become increasingly important. For example, the technology 
centre had more input into the development of the Micra. Almost all the components and 
subassemblies were locally designed with the suppliers to meet European standards and 
conventions. Finally, the Terrano II project was led by the technology centre to meet a 
marketing brief from Nissan's European headquarters in Amsterdam. 
Q. 10. Views on future EU actions to help the sector 
Q. 10.1. Type approval 
Nissan's main frustration with the type approval system was that they were constantly trying to 
forecast future standards, e.g. future standards for the height of the front bumpers on trucks 
which affect the heights of the reinforcement bars on car doors. 
These problems have become worse as a result of: 
(a) the time required to translate documents into 14 languages, prolonging the agreement 
process; 
(b) possible delay of role-making due to the involvement of the European Parliament in the 
process. 
Standards between the US and Japan are coming closer together, but the EU is lagging behind. 
Nissan has been thinking about introducing a US version of the Primera. However, the 
differences in standards between the EU and the US are likely to mean that this will be too 
expensive. Importantly, the large and growing Asian market is likely to follow US standards. 
Nissan believes that the EU should do the same, given the size and potential of the Asian 
market. 
Q. 10.2. Different global emissions standards 
Different global emission standards require different engine sizes for the European and 
Japanese markets. Nissan gave us an example of the Aimera and Maxima QX models which 
are sold in 1.3, 1.5 and 1.8 litre varieties in Japan and 1.4 and 1.6 litre varieties in Europe. 
Emissions standards are the same around Europe. However, Germany is considering the 
provision of tax incentives for consumers to purchase cars conforming to the next emissions 
stage. Nissan may therefore have to produce cars for Germany with a larger catalyst than that 
required for other EU Member States. 
Q. 10.3. Effect of different tax structures across the EU 
The French, Italian and, to a lesser extent, the UK governments encourage the use of diesel 
engines. This adds extra costs for Nissan. 
Nissan mentioned that Italy, Spain and France have progressive taxes based on the cubic 
capacity of engines. The French system also uses a formula that links the tax to the final drive 
ratio. The German system is very different and has different insurance breaks which are 
dependent on the horsepower of the engine. This means that Nissan has to make a 90HP 1.6 
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litre engine for the German market, compared with the 102 HP variant sold to the rest of the 
EU. 
Single European currency or at least fixed exchange rate 
Nissan are in favour of the single currency (or at least the re-entry of all EU Member States 
into the ERM). Its dealers in the countries bordering Italy have been adversely affected by the 
devaluation of the Italian Lira and a single currency (or currency stability) would minimize 
these problems. 
Q.ll. Annex 
Q.l 1.1. List of persons interviewed 
Peter Slater, Vice-President, Marketing, Amsterdam 
Ken Foxley, Director of Business Development, Cranfield 
Q. 11.2. Articles/other information used 
Nissan Annual Reports; 
Nissan Fact Sheets; 
Nissan's European Localization Strategy by the Strathclyde International Business Unit; 
Nissan in Europe - Designing, developing, manufacturing and selling cars in Europe 
(produced by Nissan); 
Nissan European Technology Centre (produced by Nissan); 
Symbiosis - Towards the Harmonious Coexistence of People, Automobiles and Nature 
(produced by Nissan); 
Nissan in Britain (produced by Nissan); 
Nissan cars (produced by Nissan). 
Q. 11.3. Key milestones in Europe 
1960-62 
Nissan started exporting Datsun Bluebirds into Norway and Finland. By 1962, 713 had been 
exported to Finland. These countries were chosen because an independent local distributor 
was strongly interested in commercializing Nissan cars on his market. (NB: At that period 
Japanese cars had not yet established their good reputation and quotas/restrictions had not 
been raised.) 
1964 
Nissan opened a liaison office in Brussels. This acted as a centre for signing up 
importers/distributors in the key markets. 
1966 
Importers for the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland were appointed. 
At around the same time Ford closed its CKD plants in Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland. 
(NB: Concerning the Ford plant in Portugal, Nissan questions the date of closure of this plant 
- perhaps the date should be checked with Ford.) 
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1968 
Nissan started exporting to the UK and France. 
1972 
Nissan began to export to Germany. 
1980 
Nissan purchased a stake in the Spanish manufacturer Motor Iberica, a manufacturer of 
tractors, vans and trucks. The Spanish plant had been owned by Massey Fergusson and prior to 
that by Ford. The plant was already exporting to France and Italy. 
Nissan signed a joint venture with Alfa Romeo (the Arna Project). This project was short-
lived. 
Manufacturing for the local market also commenced in the USA. The 1978/79 oil shock had 
led to a surge in Japanese imports to compete with the larger US models. This increase led to a 
'Voluntary Restriction Agreement' and therefore created the incentive for Nissan to invest in 
the USA. Nissan started this process slightly later than Honda and Toyota when it set up the 
Smyrna plant in Tennessee. 
1983 
The Spanish production facility manufactured its first Nissan model - the Nissan Patrol. 
Nissan Motor Parts Centre started operations. 
1984 
Nissan Motor Manufacturing (UK) Ltd was established on a greenfield site in Sunderland. 
1986 
The UK plant started producing the Nissan Bluebird. 
1988 
Nissan established its European Technology Centre in the UK. 
1989 
Nissan Europe NV was established in Amsterdam. 
1991 
Nissan's Amsterdam based headquarters became fully operational. 
First shipments of European built Primera models to the Far East. 
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1992 
The UK plant began production of a second model - the Micra. 
Nissan Design Europe was established in Geretsried, near Munich. 
Nissan European Technology Centre opened in Cranfield, UK, in order to accommodate larger 
design/development facilities needed to support a more unique European product range. 
1993 
The Nissan Micra was voted the European Car of the Year. 
1994 
Nissan's technology centre in Brussels moved to new custom-built premises near Louvain-la-
Neuve. 
First Spanish-built Mistrals (Terrano II) exported to Japan. 
1995 
First exports of UK built Micra models to Australia. 
Nissan launched the Maxima QX and the Aimera. 
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APPENDIX R 
Case study on Volvo 
R.l. Introduction 
Volvo started making cars in 1927 and commercial vehicles in 1928, initially for the domestic 
market in Sweden. It still retains both car and commercial vehicle divisions (VCC and VTC 
respectively) and, following a recent reversal of past diversification decisions, over 85% of 
group turnover comes from the automotive sector. Volvo has related interests in marine 
engines (Volvo Penta) and aircraft engines (Volvo Aero) as well as construction equipment 
(VME). 
Volvo was selected as a case study for several reasons. First, it has both car and commercial 
vehicle production interests. Second, it is representative of an important segment within 
European car production - that of the 'specialist' producer. Third, while the company HQ is in 
Sweden and hence the company is in theory a recent entrant to the European Union (EU), 
Volvo has retained production facilities within the EU for many years. Fourth, partly out of 
necessity because of the small domestic market in Sweden, Volvo has long sustained a strong 
international orientation. Lastly, Volvo has recently disentangled itself from a cross-
shareholding with Renault - an episode which clearly illustrates the potential difficulties of 
corporate rationalization in the European Union. 
The case study is based upon a series of intensive interviews at VCC and VTC in Sweden, 
including staff from the Volvo AB group headquarters. Supporting documentary information 
was provided by Volvo, and supplemented with published sources. It is important to note that 
the interviews were conducted relatively early in the overall research programme (in 1995), as 
opposed to the other case studies which were conducted after the overall research programme 
had been completed. The Volvo case study therefore was conducted partly to inform the 
overall research process in advance, rather than check the findings at the end of the research. 
R.2. Company background 
R.2.1. Products 
VCC produces cars in the medium and large segments together with a range of engines. The 
products are shown in the table below. 
Table R.l. VCC products 
Model 
960 
940 
850 
440 
460 
480 
Engine size 
1.9-2.9 
1.9-2.3 
1.9-2.4 
1.5-1.9 
1.5-1.9 
1.7-1.9 
Year introduced 
1990 
1990 
1991 
1988 
1989 
1986 
1994 production 
23,400 
69,700 
166,500 
47,400 
41,900 
2,800 
Source: Volvo AB. 
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400 series, produced at Born in the Netherlands. Medium segment saloons and hatchbacks, 
now being phased out with the introduction of the joint venture production of the Mitsubishi 
Charisma/Volvo S4. 
800 series, produced at Torslanda in Sweden and Ghent in Belgium together with a small 
assembly plant at Halifax in Canada. Large segment saloons and estates. 
900 series, also produced at Torslanda in Sweden. Large segment saloons and estates. 
A large number of variants are produced, with high levels of additional equipment. VCC also 
produces petrol and diesel engines together with gearboxes, brake discs, axles, and various 
castings. 
VTC is the world's second largest producer of heavy trucks, bus chassis and completed buses 
(i.e. over 15 tonnes GVW (Gross Vehicle Weight)), together with the associated engines and 
gearboxes. The basic range is shown in the table below. 
Table R.2. VTC's products 
Model 
FL6/FE 
FS7/FL7/FL10/FS10/FL12 
F10/F12/F16 
FH12/FH16 
NL10/NL12 
WhiteGMC 
GVW 
8.6-18.0 
18.0-42.0 
19.7-41.0 
20.0-41.0 
19.7-32.7 
n.a. 
Year introduced 
1985 
1985 
1977 
1993 
1989 
n.a. 
1994 production 
7,150 
7,700 
3,700 
16,550 
7,600 
26,490 
Source: VTC. 
NB: White GMC production in the US - since July 1995 all white GMC trucks built here will carry the Volvo brand name. 
R.2.2. Geographic markets 
Figure R.l shows VCC's largest markets in 1994. 
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Figure R.l. VCC's markets in 1994 
20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 
Source: Volvo AB. 
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VTC's largest markets in 1994 are shown in the figure below. 
Figure R.2. VTC's markets in 1994 
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Source: Volvo AB. 
In the case of VCC, it is only recently that in the domestic market in Sweden Volvo has sold 
more cars than in the UK. In the case of VTC, it can be seen that the domestic market is 
residual. 
244 Motor vehicles 
R.2.3. Number and location of plants 
Table R.3. VCC plants world-wide, 1994 
Location 
Torslanda, Sweden 
Olofström, Sweden 
Skövde, Sweden 
Köping, Sweden 
Born, Netherlands 
Ghent, Belgium 
Halifax, Canada 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
Bangkok, Thailand 
Employment 
6,300 
3,900 
2,550 
1,100 
4,300 
3,500 
140 
450 
430 
Product 
800/900 series 
Body parts 
Engines, discs 
Gearboxes, rear axles 
400 series 
800 series 
800 series 
CKD 
CKD 
Output 
98,700 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
92,100 
147,600 
6,700 
2,300 
3,600 
Source: Volvo AB. 
Note: Born plant 33% owned by Volvo. 
VCC has three main car assembly plants: Torslanda, Ghent and Born. Components production 
is concentrated in Sweden. Other plants world-wide produce low volumes, mainly of kit 
assembled cars. Volvo used to have two further plants in Sweden, at Kalmar and at Uddevalla 
- both of which produced in low volumes but with innovative production organizations (see 
discussion under Section R.4 below). The Kalmar plant has been closed. The Uddevalla plant 
is now a joint venture operation with TWR (of the UK) for the low-volume production of 
cabriolet and coupe derivatives of their 800 series; output is expected to start in 1997. 
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Table R.4. VTC plants world-wide (including buses), 1994 
Location 
Torslanda, Sweden 
Skövde. Sweden 
Borås, Sweden 
Saffie, Sweden 
Köping, Sweden 
Lindesberg. Sweden 
Umeå. Sweden 
Ghent. Belgium 
Irvine, Scotland 
Orville, USA 
Vienna, Austria 
Lima, Peru 
Curitiba, Brazil 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
Brisbane, Australia 
Abenra. Denmark 
Employment 
1,650 
2,600 
290 
270 
780 
620 
1,580 
1,500 
1,170 
3,650 
250 
240 
1,500 
35 
390 
150 
Product 
Trucks 
Engines, castings 
Buses 
Bus bodies 
Gearboxes 
Rear axles 
Truck cabs 
Trucks 
Trucks 
Buses 
Trucks 
Bus bodies 
Trucks 
Buses 
Trucks 
Buses 
Trucks 
Trucks 
Buses 
Bus bodies 
Output 
11,730 
n.a. 
3,110 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
17,920 
3,190 
1,020 
27,630 
n.a. 
590 
160 
6,010 
1,290 
210 
1,040 
100 
n.a. 
Source: Volvo AB. 
VTC has its major truck assembly plants at Torslanda, Ghent and Orville (Texas), together 
with its plant in Brazil. A new plant at Monterey (USA) started production in 1995. Other 
truck plants tend to assemble kits produced in the main plants. VTC has been expanding its 
interests in bus body and bus assembly operations through the acquisition of existing 
companies. In 1994 for example, Drogmoller GmbH & KG (Germany) and Abenra Karosseri 
A/S (Denmark) were acquired. VTC also partly owns plants in Iran, Botswana, Morocco and 
China. 
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R.2.4. Trends in units produced 
Table R.5. VCC production by plant, 1985-94 
Source: Volvo AB. 
Note: Total includes production at other plants. 
(000s) 
Torslanda 
Kalmar 
Uddevalla 
Ghent 
Halifax 
Born 
Total 
1985 
166 
32 
0 
73 
10 
109 
397 
1986 
167 
32 
0 
80 
10 
118 
414 
1987 
165 
29 
0 
88 
8 
124 
423 
1988 
150 
28 
1 
91 
6 
115 
400 
1989 
139 
23 
9 
94 
8 
133 
414 
1990 
121 
18 
16 
83 
8 
121 
376 
1991 
73 
18 
19 
69 
7 
84 
278 
1992 
82 
17 
21 
77 
6 
94 
304 
1993 
72 
19 
4 
102 
5 
80 
290 
1994 
93 
5 
0 
147 
6 
92 
351 
Table R.6. VTC production by plant, 1985-94 
Source: Volvo AB. 
Note: Total includes production at other plants. 
(000s) 
Torslanda 
Ghent 
Irvine 
Orville 
Total 
Buses 
1985 
11.2 
11.2 
1.4 
10.7 
41.2 
3.2 
1986 
14.1 
12.8 
2.0 
11.1 
44.4 
3.2 
1987 
14.2 
13.8 
2.4 
11.4 
46.5 
3.9 
1988 
14.4 
17.2 
3.6 
19.9 
60.5 
5.5 
1989 
14.5 
17.3 
3.5 
19.1 
60.2 
5.5 
1990 
12.7 
15.5 
2.4 
16.0 
54.9 
4.6 
1991 
13.8 
16.4 
1.9 
13.7 
53.0 
4.7 
1992 
9.1 
12.7 
2.3 
17.6 
46.5 
5.6 
1993 
8.7 
11.1 
2.5 
22.7 
50.9 
5.0 
1994 
11.7 
17.9 
3.1 
27.6 
69.2 
5.7 
In aggregate, trends in units produced for both VCC and VTC reflect changing economic 
conditions in core markets. Within Europe, both VCC and VTC have seen a relative shift in 
emphasis over the time period towards production in Ghent, Belgium, over that in Sweden. 
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R.3. The effects of the single market on access 
R.3.1. Sales outside the domestic market 
VCC has a global market share of about 1%, and only 1.6% within Western Europe as a 
whole. Market share is highest in Sweden, at 27.4% in 1994. Sales in key markets are shown 
below. 
Table R.7. VCC unit sales in key markets, 1986-94 
Source: Volvo AB. 
(000s) 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
UK 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Spain 
Sweden 
USA 
1986 
10.0 
19.3 
17.3 
69.0 
16.7 
2.3 
28.7 
13.8 
2.6 
64.6 
111.1 
1987 
9.2 
18.8 
17.3 
70.9 
16.3 
3.4 
26.1 
9.2 
3.4 
72.5 
105.1 
1988 
9.0 
17.3 
17.5 
80.4 
14.8 
4.6 
21.8 
5.0 
4.4 
74.6 
97.8 
1989 
9.8 
16.6 
18.0 
81.7 
15.1 
7.1 
24.1 
3.5 
5.2 
66.6 
101.9 
1990 
9.3 
12.4 
17.3 
66.0 
23.0 
10.9 
24.2 
3.9 
6.1 
47.6 
89.0 
1991 
8.4 
8.9 
21.9 
46.7 
20.6 
10.1 
21.0 
3.2 
8.7 
37.9 
67.2 
1992 
9.6 
12.1 
21.2 
43.1 
22.1 
8.6 
23.2 
4.2 
10.8 
35.8 
67.9 
1993 
6.3 
8.5 
20.5 
43.5 
15.7 
11.9 
15.4 
4.1 
7.6 
33.0 
72.2 
1994 
8.4 
9.5 
25.6 
41.2 
19.7 
15.4 
16.7 
6.3 
9.5 
42.7 
80.8 
In the period since 1986, the relative market share of VCC in key markets has undergone some 
change. 
Table R.8. VCC market share in key markets, 1986,1990 and 1994 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
UK 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Spain 
Sweden 
USA 
1986 
% market share 
2.5 
1.0 
0.6 
3.7 
0.9 
0.1 
5.2 
8.2 
0.4 
23.9 
1.0 
1990 
% market share 
2.0 
0.5 
0.6 
3.3 
1.0 
0.2 
4.8 
6.3 
0.7 
20.7 
1.0 
1994 
% market share 
2.2 
0.5 
0.8 
2.2 
1.1 
0.5 
3.9 
7.4 
1.1 
27.4 
0.9 
Source: Volvo AB. 
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VCC has improved its market share in the domestic market of Sweden, and also shown good 
growth (albeit from a low base) in Japan and Spain. VCC said that the general improvement in 
market share and overall volumes from 1991 can be largely attributed to the introduction of 
the well-received 800 series. 
In the case of VTC, which has of necessity been less reliant on the domestic market in Sweden 
for many years, growth in sales has mainly come from accessing new geographic markets. On 
a world scale, VTC (including WhiteGMC in the USA) is the second largest producer of 
heavy trucks after Mercedes (including Freightliner in the USA) with a market share of about 
15% in Europe and 12% in the USA. 
Table R.9. VTC geographic distribution of sales since 1960 
Nordic (%) 
Europe (%) 
North America (%) 
Other (%) 
Units 
1960 
69 
14 
1 
16 
10,600 
1970 
50 
31 
0 
19 
15,700 
1980 
25 
50 
4 
21 
28,100 
1994 
6 
35 
39 
20 
68,500 
Source: VTC. 
Note: Europe excludes Nordic countries. 
From being largely dependent upon Nordic markets in 1960, VTC saw significant growth in 
other European markets through 1970 and 1980, and a very large growth in sales in North 
America by 1994. In the future, VTC expects sales growth to come from other countries 
within and outside the OECD. 
R.3.2. New models for the whole European market 
In the case of VCC it is clear that the market in North America is still seen as critical, and to 
this extent new model designs will be developed with this market in mind as much as the 
domestic market in Sweden or the wider market in the European Union. In the realm of safety 
equipment, for example, all VCC models are fitted with high-level rear brake lights as 
required on the market in North America. Thus, VCC engineers its new models to meet the 
highest safety and other standards in the world, and then manufactures and sells all its cars on 
this basis - even into markets which have lesser requirements. The only exceptions are those 
markets which do not have unleaded petrol, where VCC has had to engineer special variants of 
its engines. 
The Volvo 800 series has been styled and marketed to reach a younger buying population than 
hitherto have been traditional Volvo customers - the joint venture with TWR is in part a 
reflection of this strategy to create a sportier brand image. 
Within the EU, while VCC can and does sell in all EU markets, it is essentially dependent 
upon three main countries for sales: Sweden, the UK and Germany. The cars are engineered to 
meet conditions in these countries, the historic strength of VCC in northern Europe reflects at 
least in part the suitability of their products for the conditions prevailing in those markets. 
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The major exception here is the joint product with Mitsubishi, manufactured at Nedcar. The 
Charisma/S4 reflects the needs of Mitsubishi to have a local source of a high volume, 
medium-sized car for EU markets as much as VCC's need to replace the 400 series. 
In the case of VTC, the position is more complex. On the one hand, different basic regulations 
between the market in North America and that in the EU (on how truck length is measured) 
means that few EU engineered and produced trucks sell in North America and few trucks built 
there are sold in the EU. A similar story applies in the case of Japan. Moreover, commercial 
vehicles are less standardized than most cars, with a relatively high degree of customer/use 
specification. Model cycles in the commercial vehicle industry tend to be much longer than 
those in the car industry. The latest model to be introduced by Volvo, the FH range brought 
out in 1993/94, represents an important development for VTC in that it is explicitly a modular 
design - future models will be developed with the FH concept as the base. This approach 
should allow a better compromise to be reached between the need to obtain suitable 
economies of scale and standardization on the one hand, and the need to adjust product 
specifications to suit local conditions on the other. 
R.3.3. Relative effects of recession and exchange rates 
For VTC and VCC, movements in exchange rates can be significant, especially in terms of 
production in Sweden. The devaluation of the Krona in the early 1990s made output from 
Sweden cheaper in key export markets, but also increased purchasing costs from leading 
supplier countries such as Germany. 
VTC sales are strongly influenced by the business cycle in the markets in which it operates. 
VCC suffered from its reliance on the market in North America, which has a strong cyclical 
pattern of sales. VCC sales went from a peak of 117,000 in North America in 1986 to a low of 
71,000 in 1990. Against movements of this magnitude, movements in EU markets have been 
almost trivial. 
R.3.4. Implications of tax regimes for market access 
As a specialist producer, operating in only a few segments, VCC is vulnerable to the distorting 
effects of local tax regimes on market demand. A full-range producer will usually have at least 
one model that is well-suited to a market, whatever the taxation regime. 
VCC operates in the medium and large segments of the car market. It does not offer any small 
vehicles, or engines below 1.3 litre capacity. Thus, in markets where there is a strong fiscal 
disincentive against larger cars or larger engines (e.g. Italy), VCC is at a disadvantage. In 
contrast, in the UK where a fixed fee is paid whatever the size of vehicle, VCC has 
consistently sold well. 
One particular problem faced by VCC with respect to the market in Italy was with its five 
cylinder engines, which were designed initially with 2.3 litre capacity. For the market in Italy, 
VCC engineered a special 2 litre version at considerable expense. In practice, VCC cannot 
recover the full economic cost of these special versions, so, in effect, volume sales in core 
markets are cross-subsidizing sales into markets with special requirements. 
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At a wider level, differing vehicle safety and testing regimes also matter to market access. 
VCC products are engineered to meet the highest available standards of safety and durability, 
but historically in Europe some key markets (mainly 'southern' Europe) did not require all of 
these features. In effect, VCC cars were over-engineered for these markets and were therefore 
at a cost disadvantage. 
R.3.5. Pan-European marketing and block exemption 
VCC, as with most other vehicle producers, has an established distribution and sales network 
in the EU countries. Again, this is not a recent phenomenon and cannot be attributed to the 
single market programme. 
However, VCC took a longer term view of what the single market really meant. In particular, 
VCC considered that the current structure of national sales companies controlling franchised 
dealers within each country was not ideal or appropriate in all cases. Thus, VCC were 
interested in constructing marketing territories and dealership structures across national 
boundaries which, in a truly 'borderless' EU, would be possible. 
In the case of VTC, the position is different. Generally, commercial vehicle manufacturers 
need to have a far closer contact with the final customers than is the case with cars, in order to 
ensure that the differing needs for a diversity of applications may be met. An important by-
product of the single market programme is that it has facilitated the emergence of very large 
pan-European freight distribution companies which have very significant purchasing power. 
These groups will expect to deal with manufacturers directly, and the franchised dealership 
network is there to support the vehicles once they are in use, rather than to sell the vehicles. 
R.4. Production costs and productivity 
R.4.1. Changes in production costs 
As with other car companies, VCC tends to re-invest in facilities alongside new model 
developments. So, with the introduction of the 800 series VCC completely rebuilt the 
Torslanda body shop and invested in capacity expansion and a new paint shop in Ghent. As 
these investments bring in contemporary production technologies, so production costs may 
improve. However, for both VCC and VTC production costs have been more of an issue with 
respect to labour and to capacity utilization than with production technology. 
In Sweden, VTC and VCC suffered from two related problems: high social costs, and severe 
labour problems with respect to absenteeism and staff turnover. The tight labour market and 
generous social payments made it difficult for Volvo to recruit and retain staff, and it is in this 
context that the experiments at Kalmar and Uddevalla need to be understood. In the 1970s and 
early 1980s, Volvo faced absenteeism rates of 17% and labour turnover rates of 30%. 
It may be that the relative switch of production to Belgium observed above could be attributed 
to the lower costs of production there compared with Sweden. 
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Figure R.3. Volvo AB total salaries, wages and other remuneration costs (including 
social costs) (million SEK), 1984-94 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Years 
Source: Volvo AB. 
R.4.2. New methods of working 
In 1974 VCC opened the Kalmar plant, later to be followed by the Uddevalla plant, as an 
experiment in a new approach to working. Rather than the normal 1 or 2 second cycle times on 
the moving vehicle assembly line, VCC introduced a static assembly system in which a team 
of workers would assemble the entire car - with all the components brought to that one point 
of assembly. Cycle times were typically 45 minutes. The intention was that productivity and 
quality would improve through a process of job enrichment. Just as important, workers would 
derive more satisfaction from their jobs, have a greater commitment to the product and their 
team mates, and hence absenteeism and labour turnover would improve. 
The eventual closure of these plants in the early 1990s came at a time when external 
conditions had changed (notably, the labour market was no longer so difficult for VCC as 
demand for cars had fallen markedly) and when VCC (along with VTC) had adopted a 
different approach to work organization based on the Toyota Production System. Now all 
Volvo plants base production on a direct customer order system in which demand pulls the 
flow of work through the plant. Workers are organized in teams, with just-in-time delivery of 
components and so forth. Levels of automation at VTC in Torslanda (a new plant) are higher 
than most commercial vehicle assembly plants with, for example, extensive use of AGVs to 
move components to the assembly points. 
In 1994 VCC was unable to increase production of the 800 series at Torslanda quickly enough 
to meet demand. This resulted in greater customer delivery lead times and, in effect, lost 
revenue. As with any manufacturer, the problem is to reduce the break-even point of capacity 
utilization (to cope with the troughs in demand) while retaining the ability to maximize output 
(to cope with the peaks in demand). VCC is seeking to develop greater flexibility to achieve 
profitable operation over a greater range of output volumes. 
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R.4.3. Effect of the single market on productivity and production organization 
In the absence of hard data on changes in productivity or production costs, let alone the cause 
of those changes, it is perhaps unreasonable to attribute any single market effect. However, 
there can be little doubt that the whole issue of the EU as a market and as a source of 
competition has formed an important backdrop for changes in political attitudes in Sweden. 
VCC and VTC were thus able to convince their workforce that changes must be instituted in 
order for the company to survive against strengthening opposition. 
R.5. Employment 
R.5.1. Changes in employment levels 
Figure R.4. VCC, VTC and Volvo AB employment, 1988-94 
Units 
D VCC 
Β VTC 
■ Volvo AB 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Time 
Source: Volvo AB. 
Both VCC and VTC have reduced aggregate employment over the time period, a process 
which may be expected to continue. 
R.5.2. Changes in conditions of employment 
It is not clear what level of autonomy over conditions of employment the individual plants 
have, or whether these issues are decided more centrally by VCC and VTC in Sweden. 
Clearly, conditions of employment have to be sensitive to local conditions, prevailing pay 
levels, etc. 
R.5.3. Degree of cross-border recruitment 
No data as such, but VCC and VTC are both significant employers outside the domestic HQ 
country, Sweden. 
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Figure R.5. Volvo AB employment inside and outside Sweden, 1988-93 
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It can be seen that while employment outside Sweden has grown in aggregate, that for inside 
Sweden has declined. The major employment locations for Volvo AB outside Sweden are (in 
1993 figures) Belgium (6,265 staff), the United States (5,905), Brazil (3,135), the UK (2,753), 
and the Netherlands (1,274). 
R.5.4. Effects of the single market on employment 
VTC and VCC are clearly very international companies, producing and selling in a wide range 
of markets outside the traditional domestic HQ location. As such, the single market 
programme measures can only have helped the generally international outlook at Volvo. 
Moreover, as a specialist producer VCC has to recruit key staff outside Sweden; the industry 
in Sweden is simply too small to support the development of all of the specialist skills needed 
to develop and manufacture a car. Thus, VCC said that it recruits widely across Europe, 
especially for key engineering staff, and the single market programme may be expected to 
contribute to the effectiveness of this policy. 
R.6. Manufacturing plants 
R.6.1. Overview of the location and size of plants over time 
Much of this has already been discussed above. For VCC the main events have been the 
closure of Kalmar and Uddevalla, the subsequent re-opening of the Uddevalla plant, the joint 
venture with Mitsubishi at Born, and the continued growth in capacity at Ghent. The stated 
target of VCC is to have the capacity to produce 500,000 cars by the late 1990s. 
The joint venture plant with Mitsubishi at Born in the Netherlands is arguably the most 
important to VCC and the most interesting with respect to the wider impact of the single 
market programme. For both VCC and Mitsubishi, this plant can be described as one built to 
serve the entire EU. With Charisma/S4, Volvo shares common core components and the 
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internal body structure, but engines and external panels aie different. Both cars, uniquely, are 
built on the same final assembly line. Plant capacity has been approximately doubled with the 
introduction of the Charisma/S4. 
R.6.2. Reasons for any international relocations 
As noted above, while VCC has not opened greenfield sites for car assembly in recent years, 
there has been some concentration of capacity and a shift in emphasis towards the existing 
plants in Belgium and the Netherlands. The single market programme is unlikely to have had a 
direct bearing on these decisions - apart from the points noted above. 
VTC has similarly rationalized production in Sweden, and expanded capacity outside the 
domestic market - but on a more global basis than VCC. 
R.7. Purchasing 
R.7.1. Numbers of suppliers used and their location over time 
Currently about 500 main suppliers, but on a per model basis there are fewer. 
VCC annual spending on components was SEK 26.2 million in 1994. Distribution of VCC 
spending on components by location of invoice address is shown below for 1994. 
Figure R.6. Distribution of VCC component expenditure 
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Source: VCC. 
Note: This is not the same as location of HQ of component supplier. 
There are no data on numbers of suppliers, but in line with other car manufacturers VCC have 
been reducing the number of direct suppliers. 
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R.7.2. Examples of changes in cross-border sourcing 
Purchasing strategy has two main elements: 
(a) suppliers to be world class performing companies who actively support VCC; 
(b) VCC to be regarded as the market's most attractive and professional customer. 
Under this philosophy, VCC has no particular loyalty to sourcing from any location. The aim 
is to seek out the 'best' supplier wherever they may be located - and this has resulted in an 
increase in spending in Japan. 
On the other hand, this philosophy is constrained by the need to secure short lead times for the 
delivery of components to the assembly plants. VCC defines a broad geographic area which 
fixes the limits of secure supply to meet lead times; beyond this area special measures need to 
be taken (for example, extra stocks may be held) and this makes locations outside the secure 
area relatively unattractive. About 60% of spending is on just-in-time or small batch 
deliveries, and this has reduced the extent of 'long distance' sourcing. 
Germany has been the major source for at least 15 years. Since the 1980s, there has been a 
major decline in spending in the UK, attributed by VCC to quality problems with UK-based 
suppliers. VCC buys in US dollars from Japanese suppliers to take advantage of currency 
movements. In recent years, the volume has gone down, but currency changes mean the value 
has not changed. Japan is used as a source of contact for technological development in key 
fields and components. 
One by-product of the failed merger with Renault was that VCC was introduced to a wider 
supply base, especially from France and Italy, which gave more opportunities to moderate 
their dependence on suppliers in Germany. 
All quotations are based on ex-works price. Volvo then factors in the travel cost itself 
(common practice among vehicle assemblers) and then compares quotes on landed cost. 
R.7.3. Effect of exchange rates 
See Section R.7.2 for examples. 
R.7.4. Views on internationalization of the supply base 
VCC and VTC are relatively small volume producers, and the domestic automotive industry in 
Sweden is also relatively small, despite Scania and Saab also being present. As a consequence, 
both have long been disposed to international sourcing, with Germany as the main location for 
suppliers. 
As a result of long-run cost escalation in components delivered from Germany, VCC and VTC 
have broadened the geographical scope of sourcing. 
R.7.5. Effect of the single market 
The single market programme has acted as an important enabler in these processes - it is 
particularly relevant to the concept of a defined geographic area for secure lead times for 
example. In so far as the single market has improved the security of delivery schedules, it has 
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made it possible for VTC and VCC to access a wider potential supplier pool from which to 
choose its preferred suppliers. 
R.8 Research, design and development 
R.8.1. Estimation of cost savings from the component type approval process 
It should be noted that VCC considered the component type approval measures to have had a 
small, marginal net benefit in terms of cost savings, but these have been outweighed by large 
cost savings arising from the introduction of new purchasing approaches. 
R.8.2. Estimation of cost savings from the whole vehicle type approval measure 
VCC considered that the effect of whole vehicle type approval in terms of absolute cost 
savings was relatively small, though in terms of 'time to market' a more important benefit 
could accrue. RD&D costs were influenced by the costs of engineering variants to meet 
specific national market requirements, but these were based on fiscal or other issues rather 
than those addressed by the whole vehicle type approval process. In the most extreme case, 
that of engineering a car to right hand drive, the changes required affected 15% of the total car 
by value. 
R.8.3. Key changes in research, design and development 
In the case of VTC, as noted above, the most recent model introduction (the FH series) has a 
modular design philosophy which should allow future models to be derived more quickly and 
at lower cost. This philosophy of 'design for flexibility' has also become established at VCC -
where the impact is most noticeable in production equipment. A typical investment which 
illustrates this point is the VCC body framing line at Torslanda. This equipment can be 
reprogrammed to produce a wide range of cars, and is used by VCC instead of the more 
traditional fixed equipment. The programmable body framing line has a higher initial 
investment cost, but traditional fixtures had to be scrapped for new model introductions. So 
the programmable line should have lower costs over several model generations. As with VTC, 
VCC has sought modularity in its recent family of engine designs. 
VCC RD&D spending peaked in 1990 at about SEK 4.8 million with the introduction of the 
800 series. By 1993 this had fallen to SEK 2.4 million. Similarly VTC RD&D spending 
peaked in 1992 with SEK 2.5 million. In both cases the costs of staying in the automotive 
industry are high. While VTC has sought modularity of design for its own products, and added 
value through the acquisition of bus building companies, VCC has sought RD&D savings 
through its joint venture with Mitsubishi - and may in the future produce a version of a 
Mitsubishi 4x4 vehicle. At the time of the alliance with Renault, there was some discussion of 
a Volvo version of the Espace or its replacement - this appears to have lapsed with the 
alliance. 
As with other manufacturers, VCC and VTC now make extensive use of the capabilities of 
suppliers in terms of RD&D. 
However, it is not clear whether VCC can meet the costs of developing further new vehicles. 
Volvo AB has divested itself of most of its other assets outside the automotive sector, a 
process which provided extra revenue to fund new models and production investments. 
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Returns on sales do not appear to be large enough to generate sufficient revenue to cover 
RD&D costs. 
R.8.4. Effects of the single market 
The single market programme has probably offered a marginal direct reduction in RD&D 
costs, but this effect is negligible given the very large sums which VCC and VTC must spend. 
That is, VCC and VTC need to reduce RD&D spending by an order of magnitude more than 
the savings offered by the single market. 
R.9. Business strategy 
R.9.1. Key alliances developed 
As of 31 December 1994 Volvo AB had shares in the following non-group companies: 
Table R.10. Shares in non-group companies 
Company 
VME Group NV 
Netherlands Car NV 
Xian Silver Bus Corp. 
Renault SA 
Location 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
China 
France 
Volvo AB holding (%) 
50 
33 
50 
11 
Source: Volvo. 
There are also shareholdings in smaller companies in, for example, Botswana. 
The Renault-Volvo merger involved a set of cross-shareholdings and payments linking both 
the car and the truck divisions of both groups. By 1994, the process of disentangling these 
cross-shareholdings was well advanced but not completed. 
The most important alliance is with Mitsubishi in the Born plant in the Netherlands. 
Mitsubishi hold 33%, while the remaining 33% is held by the government. 
Since 1994 Volvo has acquired the remaining shares of VME Group NV at a cost of SEK 4.2 
billion. 
In May 1995 VTC announced it had agreed to purchase Provost Car Inc. (Canada) for SEK 
740 million. Half is then intended to be sold on to Plaxton (UK) to create a joint venture bus 
body producer for the North American market. 
In January 1995 VCC and TWR (UK) formed a joint venture to produce low volume cars at 
the Uddevalla plant. VCC has a 49% share, TWR a 51% share. Volvo will invest SEK 1.5 
billion, including product development. 
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The failure of the alliance-merger with Renault has not necessarily refuted the industrial logic 
behind the desire to merge. It remains to be seen whether there is indeed a necessity to create 
ever-larger European automotive groups, or whether specialist producers such as Volvo can 
continue to survive in the competitive marketplace. 
R.9.2. Changes in business process strategy 
Purchasing 
As with other manufacturers, VCC and VTC have introduced widespread changes in how they 
purchase components and materials. In brief, this entails: 
selection on cost, quality and delivery; 
just-in-time supply; 
supplier performance measurement; 
reduced numbers of direct suppliers; 
robust EDI systems; 
co-development of new products with suppliers; 
continuous improvement. 
It also entails being a good customer - for example, by having robust and stable production 
schedules. 
On a per annum basis VCC is reducing its supply chain with perhaps 25 suppliers removed, 
but also five new suppliers added. VCC have identified 160 product areas, and the intention is 
to have one supplier per component area per model or platform. 
With co-development with suppliers, VCC expects to save 30^40% in RD&D costs. 
Manufacturing 
As noted above, VCC and VTC see flexibility in manufacturing as the key to their competitive 
survival. For VCC, which has relatively low production volumes on a per model or a per plant 
basis, this flexibility is necessary to compete with the low cost, high volume producers. 
At a strategic level, VCC involvement with Mitsubishi may offer important learning 
advantages in terms of the transfer of production technologies and work organization. The 
Born plant has the potential capacity of 412,000 cars per annum, large enough to capture full 
plant-level economies of scale. 
Sales and distribution 
VCC and VTC operate a customer-order based sales and distribution system by which surges 
in demand are managed by increasing customer order delivery times. Sales and distribution are 
organized on a national basis within the EU, though this may change in the future. 
VCC has sought to differentiate itself in the past through the quality of its service and repair 
work in the distribution network - and to some extent this strategy has been successful. As a 
specialist producer, VCC is unable to maintain the extensive and exclusive networks of the 
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volume producers in all markets. Having a car which sells in reasonable volumes is therefore 
important to provide the franchised dealerships with a steady and reliable income. 
VTC distribution networks have been more stable than those of VCC, as well as considerably 
smaller in number. VCC and VTC own a proportion of their dealerships, but this is not 
expected to increase in the near future. 
VTC expects the long-term trend of sales growth in markets outside Europe and North 
America to continue. Whether VCC can sustain a strong presence in emerging markets is less 
clear. VCC has a small assembly plant in Thailand and has generally expanded sales in the 
Asia-Pacific region. 
RD&D 
As noted above, VTC and VCC have considerable pressure on RD&D budgets. The main 
thrust of strategy is thus to reduce RD&D spending on both product and process development 
wherever possible. 
VCC and VTC also have a strong commitment to the social and environmental aspects of their 
products, and thus environmental issues play an important part in their RD&D. 
Illustrative of this are the series of concept vehicles shown by VCC and VTC: 
(a) the Environmental Concept Car; 
(b) the Environmental Concept Truck; 
(c) the Environmental Concept Bus. 
VCC has been active in researching hybrid powertrain systems, and has shown gas 
turbine/electric versions in concept vehicles. 
R.10. Views on future EU actions to help the sector 
No particular views were expressed. To a certain extent VCC and VTC are still learning about 
the way in which the European Union works. Volvo AB has established a corporate office in 
Brussels to represent the company and to keep VCC and VTC informed of any developments 
in EU policy or legislation which could have a bearing on operations. 
The most important single change would be in terms of a single European currency. This was 
seen as a significant step to a more fully integrated market. As important were Volvo AB 
views on the operation of EU regional and industrial policy. Volvo AB questioned the wisdom 
of subsidizing capacity expansion in regions with no historic interest in automotive 
production. Instead, regional and industrial funding resources should be used to focus on the 
distinctive character and specialisms of the regions. 
R.ll. Annex 
R. 11.1 List of persons interviewed 
Djell Drotz (VTC), Manager, Competitor and Industry Research 
Lars Angervall (VTC), Manager, Industrial Development 
Anders Johannesson (VTC), Product Planning Department 
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Christine Ericsson (VTC), Public Relations 
Tom O'Donnell (VCC), Director of Strategie Planning 
Lutz Hanicke (VCC), Project Manager, Vehicle Concepts 
Lars Bolminger (VCC), Director, Strategie Sourcing and Partnership 
Rolf Wadell (VCC), European Affairs 
Sten-Olof Gustavsson (VCC), Team leader, ABC Project 
Lars-Erik Larsson (Volvo AB), Manager, Technological Development 
Roland N.-G. Gustafsson (Volvo AB), Director, Industrial Development 
R. 11.2. Articles/other information used 
EIU (1995), A strategic update on Volvo, European Motor Business, 3rd Quarter, 1995. 
Volvo AB (1994), Annual Report. 
Volvo AB (1995), Financial and Operating Statistics 1994/95. 
VCC (1994), Fact Sheet, March 1994. 
VTC (1995), Business Seminar 1995. 
Additional information was provided in the interviews. 
Appendix S: Case study on Fiat 261 
APPENDIX S 
Case study on Fiat 
5.1. Introduction 
This case study aims to analyse the impact of the implementation of the single market 
programme on the Fiat Group. 
More specifically, this study is centred upon car production activities by Fiat Auto and 
industrial vehicles production by Fiat Iveco. The period described starts from the second half 
of the 1980s. 
In 1989, Fiat's top management made the decision to embark upon a radical restructuring plan. 
The plan, which was first targeted at overall product quality (Total Quality plan), was then 
refocused and upgraded to include projects and actions to foster a thorough change of 
strategies and an overall restructuring of the company. We shall try to describe the main 
objectives and results of these actions when dealing specifically with Fiat's recent strategies. 
The case study is based on various documents, meetings with experts, and personal interviews 
with executives from the departments of Fiat which were deemed to have been more affected 
by the implementation of the single market. The interviews were carried out to collect personal 
opinions from these individuals on the validity of our research hypotheses. Wherever possible, 
we tried to obtain a quantitative assessment of the effects of the single market on costs. 
However, in most cases we were able to obtain only qualitative answers. 
5.2. Company background 
Set up in 1899, Fiat grew rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s when mass motorization spread 
throughout Italy. In the 1970s, Fiat, continuing in a long established tradition of 
diversification, embarked upon a major reorganization. Non-auto sectors were spun off and set 
up as independent companies. In 1979, auto manufacturing was established as an autonomous 
unit under the name of Fiat Auto, while Fiat became the holding company. 
The Fiat Group is highly diversified. However, car manufacturing is still the core business: in 
1995, the auto sector accounted for 48% of employment (out of a total of 236,800) and for 
51% ofturnover (LIT 75,500 billion), whereas commercial vehicles represented about 15% of 
employment and turnover. The importance of the car sector has remained stable over the years 
while commercial vehicles have declined slightly. Agricultural machinery and construction 
equipment (New Holland) represent 8% of employees and 11% of turnover. The Group 
maintains units in the field of auto components with Magneti Marelli (10% of employment 
and 8% of manufacturing) and Teksid (foundries, 5% and 3% respectively). 
Fiat Auto is present in 30 countries through 71 companies (1994): it has plants in Italy (25), 
Poland (6), Brazil (1), Venezuela (1) and Argentina (1). Other production sites are joint 
ventures with the Peugeot Group (1 in France and 1 in Italy) and through many overseas 
licensees (among which Turkey is the most important). With the acquisition of Alfa Romeo in 
1987, Fiat became the sole Italian car manufacturer (excluding niche market manufacturers). 
The Iveco industrial vehicle holding was set up in 1975 as a joint venture between Fiat (80%) 
(which already had units in Italy and France) and the German manufacturer Kloeckner-
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Humboldt-Deutz AG (KHD) (20%) which merged their truck and bus manufacturing 
activities. Five years later KHD's share was bought by Fiat. The joint venture, initially a very 
'Italian' concern, has become a real multinational company through various acquisitions and 
initiatives. In 1982, in co-operation with the Swiss company of Saurer, Dereco was set up. 
This was a company operating in the field of fluid dynamics and injection; it was later bought 
by Iveco. In 1986, there was an agreement between Iveco and Ford to establish Iveco Ford 
Trucks in the UK (managed by Iveco). In 1990, Iveco acquired 60% of Enasa of Spain and its 
branch Seddon Atkinson (UK). In 1992, it also acquired International Trucks of Australia. 
5.2.1. Nature of products 
Since its inception, Fiat has concentrated on its home market and specializes in the economy 
car segment. 
However, the acquisition of Alfa Romeo strengthened its presence in the luxury car segment. 
Currently, Fiat sells its products under six different makes: Fiat, Lancia, Alfa Romeo, 
Innocenti, Ferrari, and Maserati. 
Iveco produces the full range of commercial vehicles, but specializes in light and medium 
vehicles. 
5.2.2. Geographic markets 
Despite its traditional entrenchment in the home market, Fiat is pushing hard to expand its 
share of non-European markets. 
The strong foothold in Italy has declined from a market share of about 60% in 1985 (including 
Alfa Romeo) to 46% in 1995. The Italian market still accounts for 59% of total sales of 
1,331,800 units in Europe in 1995. Germany comes second with 9.9%, France third with 
9.3%, then the UK (5%) and Spain (4%). Fiat maintains a significant manufacturing presence 
in Poland (Fiat Auto Poland) and in Brazil (Fiat Automóveis). Currently Fiat has 51.2% of the 
Polish market, i.e. 135,600 cars in 1995. In 1995, Fiat's production in Poland reached 279,000 
units, of which 205,000 were the 'Cinquecento'. This model is exported throughout Western 
Europe with a market share in its segment of 56%. In Eastern Europe, Fiat's share is 6.3% in 
Hungary and 3.9% in former Czechoslovakia. 
In Brazil, Fiat Automóveis holds 28.3% of the market, i.e. 389,000 vehicles out of its total 
production of 434,000 cars in 1995. In Argentina, with 79,000 cars sold, it has carved out a 
share of 28%. Fiat is also engaged in various joint ventures or licensing agreements: the most 
important is Tofas in Turkey, where it has 58.6% of the market (116,000 cars in 1995). 
In 1994, Fiat sales of cars were broken down as follows: 38% in Italy, 23% in the rest of 
Europe and 39% in the rest of the world. 
Turning to commercial vehicles, Iveco is less dependent on the home market than Fiat. 
The Italian market share (vehicles >=3.5 tonnes GVW) is quite high, though it fell from 68.7% 
in 1985 to 52.1% in 1995. Commercial vehicles are also manufactured by Fiat Auto (under the 
Fiat brand name), which alone held 34% of this specific market in Italy in 1994 (Fiat and 
Iveco together reached 50% in the light vehicle segment). 
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Sales of Iveco vehicles in 1995 were as follows: over 34% in Italy (with a market share of 
52.1%), 16.3% in France (market share 17.3%), 16.5% in the UK and Ireland together 
(14.3%), 16.5% in Germany, Austria and Switzerland (11.6%), while Spain and Portugal 
account for 10% together (but with a 20.3% market share). The remainder is sold overseas 
through licensing agreements, mainly in Turkey and India. 
5.2.3. Number and location of plants 
In Europe, Fiat's production base is totally concentrated in Italy. However, the number of cars 
assembled in pan-European plants is steadily increasing. 
Fiat's car production in Italy is distributed in 25 plants. Manufacture of parts (Teksid and 
Magneti Marelli) is distributed more evenly and some plants are located outside Italy in 
Europe. Furthermore, the Polish and Brazilian plants have attracted plants from parts 
manufacturers (which are Fiat's partners). 
Iveco's manufacturing plants are less concentrated in Italy, although its extra-European 
presence is less marked than that of its main competitors. In Europe it has 21 plants out of a 
total of 25. Total production was 98,200 vehicles and 247,800 engines in 1994, almost entirely 
manufactured in Europe. A further 36,000 vehicles were produced by Iveco licensees around 
the world. 
Production of light and midsize trucks and buses is concentrated in Italy (over 16,000 
employees in 1994) and Spain for the light trucks (3,700); France specializes in engine 
production (2,000 employees). Heavy trucks and vehicles are manufactured in Germany and 
Spain (with almost 5,000 employees), midsize trucks are made in the UK (with 900 
employees). Iveco also operates overseas in many non-European countries through wholly-
owned subsidiaries: in Australia (with 600 employees), Venezuela (150); Ethiopia (180); and 
South Africa (30). Minority stakes are also held in various ventures in Turkey and India in 
addition to a 50:50 joint venture in China as well as licensing agreements in Libya, Tunisia, 
Egypt, South Korea and Argentina. 
5.2.4. Trends in production 
Car production by Fiat Auto, after a drop in the early 1990s, has levelled off in 1994, when it 
recovered from its previous slump, at about 2,107,800 units. This was about 6% less than the 
record year of 1989. 
A further 247,600 cars were produced by partners and licensees (1994). 
The geographic distribution of production has changed over the last few years: Brazil has 
contributed with 455,000 units in 1994 and the acquisition of the Polish plant has added a 
further 239,000. As a result of this, production which used to be 90% in Italy in 1990, dropped 
to 67% in 1994. If manufacturing by licensees is taken into account, Italy's proportion falls 
from 72% in 1990 to 60% in 1994. 
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S.3. Effects of the single market on market access 
S.3.1. How sales outside the national market have changed over time and the reason for this 
The poor competitive performance of Fiat in Europe since 1990 was mainly due to 
unsatisfactory product characteristics and an inefficient distribution system. The situation has 
dramatically improved since 1994, which represents a turning point in its position as an 
international player. 
In the 1980s, Fiat's strategy focused on the home market which at the time was showing high 
volumes of growth and over 60% of cars shipped in Europe were sold in Italy. Following the 
acquisition of Alfa Romeo in 1986, the market share in Italy reached 57% and Fiat became a 
market leader in Europe with a 15% share (primarily through the exploitation of the Uno). In 
the second half of the 1980s, Fiat managed to increase its market share in France, Germany, 
and the UK, but lost ground in Belgium and the Netherlands. From 1990 onwards, Fiat started 
feeling the pinch of the competition. It lost market share and only began to recover in 1994. 
This trend was first felt in the home market, beginning in 1990, but then, from 1991 was also 
seen in the other European markets. 
The dull product range and a flawed marketing strategy have been pointed out as the reasons 
for the company's slide. Fiat traditionally styled itself as a volume maker concentrating in the 
low segment of the market, but small, economical models no longer appeal to the European 
consumer and their market share is therefore small. On the other hand, the company's 
performance in the mid-size car segment (C), which is the most popular in Europe, did not 
match that of its competitors. The Fiat Tipo and Alfa 155 failed to win the volumes that had 
been expected of them. Eventually, in the Β segment, Fiat was competing with a model, the 
Uno, which had lost its appeal and was about to be phased out. 
Particularly in Italy, in a seller's market situation, the marketing strategy endorsed by Fiat was 
heavily price-oriented, favouring discounts instead of servicing. In Italy, the number of 
franchised sellers had been increased, whereas in the rest of Europe the sales network was 
regarded as insufficient. 
In 1993, Fiat started launching revamped or totally new models at a fast pace and in three 
years renewed the entire range of products. The renovation began with the basic model, the 
Punto in the Β segment, which boosted Fiat's share in the segment in Europe from 14.7% in 
1993 to 19.5% in 1994. The A segment was easily won with a 82% share in 1995 with the 
Cinquecento model. Also, the mid-size range was targeted with the new Bravo and Brava 
models from October 1995. The range has been widened to include niche models such as the 
Barchetta, the Coupé, the Ulisse, the Lancia Y, the Spyder Alfa Romeo, and others. 
A major overhaul of the distribution system has reduced the number of franchised distributors 
and a more systematic evaluation system to monitor their performance has been developed. 
Furthermore, Fiat has developed a new logistics system and a series of initiatives (such as 
payment, contractual and guarantee terms) which enhance the services provided to customers. 
As to industrial vehicles, Iveco's market share in Europe since the end of the 1980s levelled 
off at 20%, while the share in Italy declined significantly from 68.7% in 1987 to 56.4% in 
1994. However, 1994 signalled a slight rebound in Italy. 
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5.3.2. Launch of new models for the whole European market and the reasons behind this 
Between 1993 and 1996 Fiat has totally renewed its product range. The sales strategy has been 
refocused and Europe is now viewed as the domestic market. 
An extraordinary investment effort was devoted to this goal, totalling LIT 40,000 billion 
between 1993 and 1996. 
The new model range is focused on the mid-size segment, which is the most important in 
Europe as well as the most stable in terms of volumes of sale. The models upon which Fiat's 
strategy for the segment hinges are Bravo and Brava which are two different cars based on a 
similar project. The 18 new models include cars designed to fill niche markets (spyder, coupé, 
family vans), which are able to generate adequate returns and support brand recognition. 
In the industrial vehicle sector, the new 'Euro' model range (1990s) testified that Iveco had 
achieved a pan-European standing. 
5.3.3. Relative effects of recession and exchange rates on the level of access to other 
European markets 
Recession and the weaker lira have had little impact on Fiat's market share position in Europe. 
The market share rebound was achieved with new models, quality improvement and the global 
restructuring in the Italian car 'filière'. 
The slump in the European car market happened when Fiat was in the middle of its plans to 
turn out new and more competitive products and when its manufacturing restructuring 
required huge investments. The weaker lira has had only a limited effect. However, the 
devaluation has been primarily used to restore profitability rather than sell more cars in a 
market already hit by a recession. It has also been used to offer models with a better choice of 
options. This is confirmed by the analysis of prices in the various European markets (although 
comparison is made difficult by the different equipment offered by the same models in 
different markets, and their changes through time). 
Room for price adjustments in the various European countries is limited. The weak lira has 
penalized foreign makes in the Italian market where, to keep prices aligned to the market, 
exporters have had to shave their margins (in hard currencies) significantly, whereas Fiat 
managed to make bigger profits (in lira). 
As already stated, market share has not been modified and Fiat's position did not change 
significantly until the introduction of the new models. 
Many obstacles stand in the way of a realignment of prices following a currency devaluation. 
There is the necessity to defend the brand's image from excessive discounts and too 
aggressive pricing. 
The price lever by itself is not sufficient to lure new customers who also look at the quality 
and novelty of the product (at the time, Fiat was not offering competitive products). It is 
possible to use price only with finely targeted promotions. 
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The weaker lira has had little effect on industrial vehicles, which are characterized by a more 
integrated European network of manufacturing units. Margins were unaffected since 
advantages on parts made in Italy were offset by increases in production costs elsewhere: the 
geographic diversification insulated prices and costs from currency realignments. Market 
shares were unaffected by the devaluation. However, in some European markets Iveco was 
able to make a few gains in 1993: light trucks, manufactured in Italy, could have taken 
advantage of the initial sharp drop in the value of the lira. 
S.3.4. Implications of different tax regimes for market access 
Existing differences in the taxation of the car, peculiarities in the administrative regimes, and 
some policies designed to protect local markets are restricting a truly unified market. 
Some interviews stressed how the implementation of an open, unified market has been under 
way for a long time. Proof of that is the shrinking domestic market share in Italy. This was 
70% in the 1970s and is now around 50%. A true open market is an ongoing process and the 
measures taken since the 1985 White Paper do not appear to have had a great impact on a 
company already engaged in a highly competitive European market. 
Europe has been considered an 'open' market for a long time. On the other hand, if one 
assumes the market as a set of rules (i.e. not 'open', but one single market), the case is 
different and the objective is far from established. The incomplete fiscal harmonization is the 
main obstacle to a fully integrated market. The VAT and excise regimes are mainly to be 
blamed: for them only a minimum threshold has been established and this allows ample room 
for different fiscal regimes. Ownership or usage taxes are levied according to alternative 
parameters (sometimes the various fuels are considered, sometimes the engine size, etc.). The 
differences in the fiscal systems tend to generate a different segmentation of the national 
markets. The fiscal lever is still used as an instrument of discrimination against some foreign 
competitors. 
A blatant case of difficulties arising from the incomplete fiscal harmonization is the fiscal 
treatment of diesel powered cars in Italy. The rules have been reversed so often and 
inconsistently to lure Italian producers away from a lucrative European market by depriving 
them of a home market. Fiscal differences are relevant to establishing the street price of a car, 
hence the wide differences in prices in the European countries and their implications for 
national strategies of manufacturers. 
A significant factor affecting accessibility and performance of the different markets are the 
incentives for the disposal of the very old vehicle population: these can alter the accessibility 
to the various markets independently of prices (e.g. measures adopted in France by the 
Balladur and Juppé Governments). 
The used car market is also very important: its size is twice that of the new car market and car 
makers' activities are influenced by it. Total harmonization in this field is far from achieved: 
cars are considered differently from an administrative point of view in the different European 
markets. In some countries cars almost new are considered used. This way they feed a parallel 
market. 
In Italy, sales of used cars are subject to VAT only in case of purchase by a company, whereas 
individuals are exempt. Furthermore, sales of second-hand cars are authorized on certain 
conditions which vary according to the state: in some countries the prospective dealer is 
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required to join a professional association. 
In the case of vehicles, public procurement is seldom open to non-national manufacturers. In 
Italy, for instance, there are limited examples of foreign cars used by the police or the 
Carabinieri (Toyota, Range Rover). In the case of public procurement, it is easy to make it 
impossible for a foreign bidder by asking for specific technical requirements which are the 
standard specification of the national producer. In addition, the protection against unfair 
practices in public procurement operations shows sharp differences in Europe. In many 
European countries other than Italy, when an appeal is filed by one of the bidders, the contract 
is not suspended. The public administration goes on with the purchase and compensation is 
granted only afterwards. On the contrary, foreign car makers in Italy are advantaged because 
Italian law provides for immediate suspension of the bidding procedure even in the case of 
minor irregularities. Some European administrations require standards which are still debated 
by the EU (for example, the Netherlands, Germany, and the UK ask for ISO 9002). There is 
also a question of reciprocal recognition by the national standards bureaus. 
S.3.5. Introduction of pan-European marketing and distribution networks and the effect of 
the block exemption 
Fiat's reorganization in the course of the 1990s has resulted in changes to the organization, the 
logistics, and advertising/promotion. These transformations were implemented with the 
customer's satisfaction in mind. 
Since the mid-1980s, Fiat's redesigned sales strategy has cut the number of authorized 
exclusive dealers and set up a Europe-wide sales network which should uniformly service the 
area. The sales network is made up predominantly of independent authorized dealers, who are 
co-ordinated by a central unit; a few Fiat-owned outlets account for a small proportion of total 
sales. Also, sales managed by local import companies were eliminated (with the notable 
exception of Austria). Contracts with European dealers have declined from 4,821 in 1992 to 
4,202 in 1995. Cuts were deepest in Italy, but also in other European countries with the 
exception of Greece, Portugal, and France. These numbers hide sharper reductions in the 
number of dealers, because some were awarded more than one contract for different Fiat 
Group makes at the same time (two-contract policy). This policy aims at strengthening the 
dealer's managerial and financial skills and its autonomy by increasing its size. 
Particular care has been applied to logistics. An information network (SIRIO) connecting the 
market (sales network, customers) with production (plants and suppliers) has been set up. In 
the old systems, the company manufactured and distributed through its dealers' warehouses 
(with high costs due to stocks sitting in the yards of both Fiat and its dealers). In the new 
system, production is closely coupled to orders coming via the dealers with ample choice for 
the customers. The authorized dealer used to contact Fiat to transmit the order once a month, 
while, currently, the lag has been cut to once a week. Within the same week, the dealer is able 
to tell the client when the car will be ready. 
This system allows for: 
(a) acceptance of all orders; 
(b) keeping the customer posted about the various production steps; 
(c) modification of some specification of an order already being processed by the 
manufacturer. 
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A system named FOCUS has been implemented to make a virtual stock accessible to all 
dealers made up of all the cars already ordered, but not yet produced, i.e. the full production 
programme. Each dealer can browse through it to pick a car meeting its requirements and not 
yet assigned a client. This system optimizes the flow of orders, easing the exchange of 
1 million ordered (but not yet produced) cars among dealers which may be very distant from 
one another at no added cost for re-shipment. 
The restructuring of the entire distribution network has dramatically reduced the time elapsed 
from acquisition of the order to its processing by the suppliers' manufacturing programmes 
(from 45 to 14 days). 
Advertising appears to be very much uniform throughout Europe. The so-called 'institutional' 
advertising (designed to promote the image of the make or its models) is run by Fiat's 
headquarters, but targets the European customer. Advertising for specific promotional 
campaigns is run at a local level, particularly since promotions do not usually extend over 
borders. The advertising budget is accounted to agencies located in Italy with branches in 
Europe which manage the local adaptations, such as language. 
The block exemption was unanimously considered by Fiat to have favoured dealers at the 
expense of producers and consumers. The new agreement allows multifranchising, although 
with limitations (different makes must be housed in separate showrooms and managed by 
different companies). The possibility of common servicing makes it hard to assess costs with 
reference to each individual make. 
Another point subject to criticism is the liberalization of the radio and television advertising 
which, by allowing promotion beyond the contractual area, can give rise to conflicts within the 
commercial network. (Moreover, it is still unclear if the use of posters beyond the contractual 
area is allowed.) 
The sales strategy of the commercial vehicles industry has been severely affected by transport 
liberalization. The deregulation in the transport service and the elimination of customs 
controls favoured concentration in the sector. The bargaining position of the truck 
manufacturers is dwindling with respect to bigger and more competitive customers. On the 
other hand, direct sales through Iveco's branch offices are growing. 
S.4. Manufacturing plants 
S.4.1. Overview of the location and size of plants over time 
With the exception of the internationalization initiatives on an extra-European basis, Fiat Auto 
has historically concentrated its activities in Italy. In the last decade, a number of changes have 
occurred in the location of production sites. 
Production has shifted from northern Italy to southern Italy. This was in part a response to 
policies aimed at developing such areas. In particular, in the new southern plants, the 
employment trend has been more favourable (or less unfavourable) in the last few 
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years, compared with the other manufacturing sites. 
In 1987, Fiat took over Alfa Romeo and acquired its two plants at Arese (Milano) and 
Pomigliano d'Arco (Napoli). 
The Desio (Milano) and Chivasso (Torino) plants were closed in 1991 and in 1992 
respectively, while Arese (Milano) was partially reconverted. 
In 1994, the Sevel Campania plant (commercial vehicles, with about 1,000 employees) ceased 
production as a consequence of a rationalization by allocating production to another plant in 
the area (Sevel at Atessa). 
In 1994, the new plants of Melfi (Potenza) and Pratola Serra (Avellino), located in southern 
Italy, came into operation, and represent the hub of Fiat's production. 
Fiat targeted for closure not only small plants but also those where the production facilities 
and organization were older. 
It is worth noting that the new plants have considerable productive capacity (Melfi can 
assemble 450,000 cars a year). 
S.4.2. Reasons behind international relocations 
Fiat has not carried out any international relocations within Europe in recent years, while 
additional productive capacity has been expanded in emerging economies outside Western 
Europe. 
In the recent decisions to set up new plants Fiat favoured Italy. Owing to the characteristics of 
the new plants (greenfield investment), other locations in Europe with similar features as to 
cost and manpower availability were eligible. The logistical considerations (a better 
integration with other Fiat operations) as well as a propensity towards Italian locations have 
played a decisive role in choosing Italy. The investment grants which were obtained could 
have been secured in other countries, too. 
With the exception of the various international ventures involving licensing agreements, 
which concern several countries in different regions of the world, Fiat carried out two 
important investments abroad. In October 1992, Fiat bought 90% of FSM in Poland (the 
remaining 10% was held by the Polish Ministry of Labour). This followed a long relationship 
with the firm consisting of many licensing agreements for the production of several Fiat 
models and, finally, the 'Cinquecento'. At present, Fiat Auto Poland has a 50% Polish market 
share and provides the whole 'Cinquecento' Fiat production, and it has recently started 
producing the 'Uno' (which was recently phased out in Italy). The Polish investment brought 
with it a considerable flow of component and equipment exports to the country, which were 
supplied by Fiat Group's companies, in addition to some direct components operations which 
were set up in the country. The reasons for the Polish investment were to take advantage of the 
development of Central and Eastern European markets as well as the opportunity to export to 
western countries from a lower cost production basis. 
In Brazil, Fiat Automóveis was jointly incorporated by Fiat and Minas Gerais State in 1973, 
but, in 1987, the Brazilian partner was bought out by Fiat. In 1995, it reached a 28.3% share of 
the Brazilian market and was an important exporter. 'Uno' is the most important model. In this 
case also, the main reason for Fiat investment is the market perspectives of Brazilian and 
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Latin-American markets, particularly after the start of Mercosur. Some models are also 
imported to the European market from Brazil. 
First Brazil (from April 1996) and then Poland will be the hub of the 'Palio' production, the 
Fiat 'world car' for emerging markets, whose production will be extended to Brazil, 
Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, Morocco and South Africa. As a consequence of the launch of 
the 'Palio', the distribution of Fiat's sales will be 1/3 in Italy, 1/3 in Europe and 1/3 in the rest 
of the world. 
A licensing agreement was signed in 1995 in India for the production of the 'Uno'; in China 
Fiat presented a proposal to the government authorities to produce a family car locally. 
Iveco's strategy is also targeted to further internationalization, taking into account that the 
company has the strongest European productive roots among the other big European 
producers. 
Iveco has recently taken over the International Trucks of Australia (1992). It has also signed an 
engine and gear production agreement with Motor-Sich as well as a light vehicle production 
agreement with Kraz, in Ukraine. It has also developed a 50-50 joint venture with Najing Auto 
Work in China to produce 60,000 light industrial vehicles a year. 
The reasons for such internationalization strategies are: 
(a) the opportunity to exploit economies of scale both at production and at design levels; 
(b) the exploitation of the technical and technological capabilities in high potential growth 
markets; 
(c) more stable business operations through compensation of the different cyclical 
behaviours in the various regions. 
S.5. Production costs and productivity 
S. 5.1. New methods of working 
The reorganization carried out by Fiat since the early 1990s is based, from the productive point 
of view, on the Fabbrica Integrata (Integrated Factory) project, which adopts the Toyota 
framework, adapting it to the specific reality of Fiat. It also takes into account the 
shortcomings experienced in the previous organizational innovations and the rigidities 
embodied in certain kinds of automation. 
Less importance is attributed to automation and greater attention is paid to integration with 
human work to obtain a more flexible production process and an easier control over the 
production variances. These organizational changes try to overcome the shortcomings 
(rigidities) of the high process automation experience in the 1980s at the Cassino (assembly) 
and Termoli (engines) plants. These innovations have found the widest application in the new 
plants (1994) of Melfi and Pratola Serra, though they have been extended to all of the Group 
plants. 
There is a shift away from a functional organization towards a process-like organization 
through the integration of various phases and skills. Fiat's aim is to obtain the prevention, 
variances absorption, self-control and continuous improvement integration at a basic level and 
Appendix S: Case study on Fiat 271 
to reach the objectives of quality, productivity and service. This requires a collaborative 
approach with the workers, a relevant adaptation capability and a significant functional 
integration. This is achieved through a reduction of hierarchical levels. In general, the control 
is decentralized and brought closer to production. These innovations imply a change in the 
qualifications and attitudes required of the workers, and, consequently, different recruitment, 
training and remuneration systems. 
5.5.2. Changes in production costs and productivity 
The productivity gains and the cost reductions achieved through the implementation of 'lean 
production' strategies within the 'Fabbrica Integrata' are significant. 
These improvements can be illustrated by comparing the performances of the new Melfi 
(assembly) and Pratola Serra (engines) plants with the older ones: Cassino and Termoli. In the 
new plants there has been a reduction in the time based manufacturing, measured by the time 
required by the car to go from the start to the end of the line. This indicator is lower at Melfi 
compared with Cassino, by 40% in body welding, by 30% in paint and 8% in final assembly. 
The total time devoted to these operations is 27 hours at Melfi and 38 hours at Cassino. In 
addition, the number of parts stored along the lines has decreased by 32%. 
There are also large savings in terms of the number of cars produced by investment unit: the 
capital turnover index is estimated to be 35% higher in body welding and 115% in final 
assembly. At Melfi 79 cars per worker will be produced, while at Mirafiori's (where segment 
Β cars are also manufactured) only 53 (calculations are made on the basis of IMVP standard 
methodology). Similar performances will be achieved at Pratola Serra (time based 
manufacturing decreases to 18 hours from 25 hours for the older Termoli plant). 
5.5.3. Effect of the single market on productivity and production costs 
The performances in terms of productivity are the effects of the growing global competition in 
the sector, which could have been caused only indirectly by the single market programme. 
However, some measures undertaken, in particular those relating to the environment, have 
generated a considerable increase in costs. The command-control orientation of the set of 
environmental rules implies a cost-efficiency ratio higher than would be achievable with the 
adoption of a 'voluntary regulation'. 
S.6. Purchasing 
S.6.1. Numbers of suppliers used and their location over time (and intra-firm sourcing) 
The main changes occurring in this area are a reduction in the number of suppliers, an 
increased empowerment in the product concept and design, a partnership-like interaction, with 
the implementation of 'assisted growth' ('crescita guidata') and the diffusion of just-in-time 
supply. The component makers owned by Fiat have become more international. The captive 
buying by Fiat is still an important supply strategy. 
Fiat is traditionally highly integrated. This is as a result of the insufficient development of the 
industrial structure in the early industrialization phases in Italy which limited the opportunity 
of outsourcing. This caused Fiat's operations to be integrated, especially those related to 
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'strategical' components. At the same time, Fiat turned to foreign specialists, with specific 
know-how, which have moved some operations in Italy closer to Fiat. 
A great number of small firms have also sprouted up to work as Fiat's subcontractors of 
simple components. These are technologically, financially and market dependent on Fiat. 
The Fiat-owned components production has progressively become more autonomous with 
respect to the Group's automobile production, both in terms of corporate structure and market 
dependency. 
Magneti Marelli and Teksid, the two automotive component affiliated companies of the Fiat 
Group, are considerably oriented towards international markets, though preserving their role in 
Fiat's auto system. 
Fiat's supply reorganization strategy, carried out since the 1980s, caused a rise in the relative 
volume of outsourcing as well as the reduction of the number of suppliers. Some figures 
highlight these changes: the value of components purchased as a proportion of the total cost of 
the car was 62% in 1987, 65% in 1992 and will reach 70% in 1997. 
In addition, the importance of the Fiat-owned suppliers is assessed by the captive proportion of 
supplies: 22.5% of the total in 1987, 27.6% in 1992 and 24.2% in 1997. 
Fiat still directly manufactures a few parts, representing core competence, for the following 
reasons: 
(a) for the strategic characterization/qualification of some parts, such as bodywork and 
pressed parts; 
(b) the high investment in some areas made in the past by Fiat (sunk costs); 
(c) the relevant financial resources required by the development and production of some 
components. 
The reduction of the number of suppliers was significant, from 1,200 in 1987 to 380 now. This 
also reflects qualitative changes in the relationship with suppliers. This relationship is no 
longer based on price and quality, but on service and time to market. 
An important indicator of the qualitative changes is the degree of design activity carried out by 
suppliers. In the 'Uno' model case (1983), 30% of components design was carried out by 
suppliers: a figure which rose to 45% for the 'Punto' (1994), and to 55% for 'Brava' and 
'Bravo' (1995). So the proportion of the supplies manufactured according to the carmaker 
design is rapidly decreasing. 
The suppliers have to grow both technically and economically, to be able to develop and 
manufacture large series of complex components (often entire systems). To achieve this goal, 
it is necessary to cut the number of manufacturers supplying the same component, towards the 
'one component-one supplier' policy (particularly for complex components), so as to allow for 
higher volumes and economies of scale. 
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To shorten the time to market and to satisfy the consumers' taste makes it preferable to 
attribute an entire system to a single supplier (for instance, all the components in the air-
conditioning system, although they are assembled at different times in the assembly line). This 
aspect highlights the changes occurring in working practices: from a functional method at the 
beginning, and matrix afterwards, to 'integrated' methods, through the creation of an 
organizational structure called 'Piattaforma' (platform), as a unit in which the different 
capacities interact for a common project. The 'Piattaforma' of Fiat and that of the suppliers 
work in close relationship. 
In addition, the tasks performed by the 'Piattaforma' are increasingly extended from a single 
model to a whole segment, so as to exploit synergies, and along the life of the product (from 
concept to scrapping), to reach a higher level of effectiveness. 
In 1991, Fiat started a selection and empowerment of their suppliers network programme 
through the so-called 'crescita guidata' (assisted growth), in view of the launch of the 'Punto'. 
The 'Project 15' (May 1991) was based on the collaboration between Fiat and a set of selected 
suppliers with satisfactory levels of competitiveness to identify the wastes hidden in 
operations (in products, industrial and financial management) in order to cut costs by 15%, 
through standardization, cost of non-quality control, warehousing and weight of components 
reduction. As a result of this action, long-term contracts with component suppliers were 
developed for the whole of the model life. 
Both the unique supplier policy and the long-term contracts allow for a lasting and strong 
relationship between the car maker and the supplier (who becomes a 'partner', according to 
Fiat's terminology). 
In addition to the above performances in terms of time to market, market responsiveness, 
quality and costs, the reorganization of the supply base gave rise to sizeable savings in the 
Purchasing Department of Fiat, through the elimination of a few functions, such as market 
research or inspection, as well as the displacement by the suppliers of quality control (all the 
suppliers work according to 'self-certification', so that components could be directly 
addressed the assembly line, and assure homologation of the system when required). 
The integration with suppliers has important consequences as regards the location of suppliers 
because of the need for just-in-time supplies. So the displacement of production towards 
southern regions of Italy has generated a significant relocation of many suppliers to this area. 
The adoption of more sophisticated just-in-time system, the so-called 'kanban synchronous' 
(according to which the orders are sent to the suppliers when the car is at a certain point in the 
assembly line and the components must be delivered a few hours later when that car will be 
positioned at the appropriate point along the line) requires a close physical relation between 
car maker and supplier plants. At Melfi, 16 suppliers are located within the plant site and the 
external supplies will be managed by 'kanban synchronous', which total 80% of the whole 
supply. 
The proximity of suppliers also will be of interest through the launch of the 'Palio' world car 
which will be manufactured in many countries. As happened in the previous 
internationalization experiences of Fiat (Brazil, Poland), the following solutions will be 
adopted (the first being the preferred one): 
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(a) turning to suppliers which assure different productive allocations within their 
partnership relation; 
(b) carrying out joint ventures with existing local manufacturers (when a partnership 
relation can be built up); 
(c) licensing local manufacturers with appropriate quality standards. 
5.6.2. Examples of changes in cross-border sourcing 
The trends described above show a geographical concentration of components suppliers; a rise 
in cross-border sourcing therefore does not seem likely. 
However, one must keep in mind that this trend applies to the more complex components, 
which represent the larger proportion of total supplies, but not all of them. Specific types of 
supply could be subject to a higher degree of freedom as to location choices. 
5.6.3. Effect of exchange rates on sourcing decisions 
While evaluating the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on sourcing flows one must 
consider that: 
(a) the relationship with suppliers tends to be long-standing (partnerships require time to be 
operational); 
(b) the degree of freedom afforded by a multi-supplier sourcing system is considerably 
reduced with a single supplier (for each component) system: the latter can be risky for 
both partners; 
(c) just-in-time methods generate new spatial constraints. 
The currency fluctuations have made the suppliers located in Italy the preferred choice, but 
this trend was established a long time ago. 
The weaker lira may have caused the renegotiation of price conditions with suppliers located 
in hard currency countries. It has also caused a reallocation of the supplies in more favourable 
locations within the suppliers' plants (in the case of multi-country suppliers). 
5.6.4. Views on, and examples of, the internationalization of supply base 
As stated in Section S.6.2, there is not much evidence of the internationalization of the supply 
base through cross-border sourcing. However, there is some evidence of a process of 
internationalization of the supply base with respect to ownership. 
During the second half of the 1980s, the main components makers became more concentrated 
through Europe-wide takeovers. This phenomenon has involved several Italian independent 
component makers as objects of takeovers by foreign companies in the first half of the 1990s. 
Thus, while the supply base remains national, the decisional centres were shifted abroad. 
5.6.5. Effect of the single market programme on these changes 
The single market is likely to have had limited effects on the changes outlined above. 
However, it did play a role in fostering the concentration process in the components industry. 
Appendix S: Case study on Fiat 275 
In addition, the single market has substantially affected the road haulage sector (as to 
transnational haulage), stimulating the competition and lowering prices: however, these 
changes did not have any heavy influence on the cost and the reallocation of the component 
suppliers because of the above-mentioned rigidities in changing the supply base, and because 
of the inadequate European transport system, which is a major obstacle to the cross-border 
just-in-time supplying. 
However, the single market fostered some initiatives throughout Europe, such as the 
agreement among car makers' and component manufacturers' associations of France, 
Germany and Italy to harmonize their suppliers' quality certification systems, producing a 
common quality manual, building a more integrated auto parts industry in Europe. 
S.7. Research, design and development 
5.7.1. Location of RD&D across Europe over time 
Fiat Auto RD&D activity is essentially run in Italy. 
In addition to the various Fiat Departments involved in the design of new models, the main 
research unit is the Research Centre of Orbassano (Torino), which employed 781 people in 
1994. 
As to Iveco, the widespread production operations throughout Europe imply, besides the 
creation of the 'Piattaforma' in Italy for the development of a new product, the redevelopment 
in the various Business Units in Europe for the adaptation of the models according to the 
production specialization patterns (Germany and Spain for heavy trucks, France, Italy and 
Spain for light and Italy and the UK for medium trucks). 
5.7.2. Estimation of cost savings from the whole vehicle and component type approval 
measures 
The implementation of the new European measures has not generated any savings: these could 
be achieved only as a consequence of the harmonization of the administrative procedures and 
especially those relating to the car registration. 
EU directives in the homologation field, in particular Directive 70/156/EEC, have exclusively 
acknowledged the existing standards, which have been in force for a long time (through 
UNECE agreements). The recent Directive 92/53/EEC also refers to particular directives 
which drew on previous existing standards. Up to now Fiat has homologated one model (Fiat 
Coupé) according to the new Directive. This experience pointed out that European 
homologation only set the technical but not the administrative requirements. The technical 
standards were already in force and they were well established. 
Homologation procedures require a conformity control to technical standards by the officials 
of the Ministry of Transport. It is worth noting that Fiat never uses prototypes and, for this 
reason, the cost savings are negligible. 
The new European procedure has caused limited savings because new car models do not have 
to be presented to foreign administrations. However, the bulk of work to be done, i.e. the 
setting of the technical documentation, has not declined. This is because the technical 
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documentation submitted to the national administration for homologation continues to be 
based on the existing separate directives. 
In addition, supplementary documentation is still country-specific, since each administration 
adopts different criteria in order to register the car. The true problem therefore lies with the car 
registration rules which differ widely from one country to another. 
At the same time, the new rules do not have an effect on the number of variants: excluding the 
growing number of variants due to the car makers' market differentiation strategies, the high 
number of variants depends on the specific requirements of each country's administration 
(which are still not harmonized). 
These are the consequence of the existing difference in European fiscal policies, and, in 
particular, the parameters on which taxation is based (for instance, in Austria taxation is based 
on fuel consumption calculated through technical parameters and in France another criteria is 
used based on fuel consumption). 
On the same subject, the emergence of different taxation conditions is also greatly determined 
by the insurance companies' policies: for instance, in Germany Fiat has to homologate a 
model version with a de-powered engine to meet the local insurance criteria. 
Taxation and insurance practices have a great impact on the market segmentation in the 
different countries, and are instrumental in possible protectionist actions. 
Prospectively, EU development as to car registration regulation is likely to adopt a 
'cumulative' approach instead of a 'selective' one: there will be a negative tendency towards 
the accumulation of all the national rules into the new European vehicle circulation document 
rather than their selection and homogenization. 
For components, the technical harmonization and the new type approval rules have little effect 
on the number of variants to be homologated, since they are generally specifically conceived 
to satisfy a single model and thus are not very suitable for standardization. 
As a consequence of the above conditions, no savings in costs (and in resources involved) 
could be obtained by Fiat's Homologation Department. 
S.7.3. Changes in patent policy 
In the patent case the harmonization at a European scale has affected the technical contents, 
but not the administrative paperwork, with little savings and streamlining of procedures. 
The establishment of the European Patent (1973) has unified the technical procedures (through 
the submission to a single Patent Office) but has left substantially unchanged the 
administrative management in each country: it is still necessary to pay the appropriate tax as 
well as the costs of consultants' services in each country (e.g. for the translation of the 
appropriate documentation). 
The costs involved (up to LIT 30 million for each patent) make it very difficult, particularly 
for a small component manufacturer, to adopt an effective policy of patent umbrella to protect 
the investments. 
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As to non-technical components (e.g. body panels, bumpers, lights, etc.), the proposals of 
revision of the European industrial design regulations give a three-year cover rather than 15 
years. Fiat considers that this would increase competition, probably lowering prices to the 
detriment of quality and safety of the spare parts, while discouraging the OE manufacturers' 
investments. Low quality component manufacturers and insurance companies will be the only 
beneficiaries of these measures. 
5.7.4. Key changes taking place in RD&D 
Design operations have been reorganized with the aim of reaching more flexibility in new 
models and a reduction of time to market. The ability to conceive the exact products' 
characteristics which are demanded by consumers and the timeliness in carrying out RD&D 
are the key factors which preserve (or improve) market share. 
Fiat has managed this through specific organizational units, called the 'Piattaforma', designed 
for integrated work, rather than relying on a functional organization. The Piattaforma is 
established at the model and/or segment level and implies parallel engineering work of many 
company centres involved in the design, such as the Style Department and the Technical 
Department, improving common working. This organization model includes the relationship 
with component suppliers (the Piattaforma of Fiat and that of the supplier work together in an 
integrated manner) but also external stylists and equipment producers. In addition, great care 
has been applied to standardization intended as an ability to readopt solutions and components 
previously adopted and which have proved to be reliable. 
There is evidence of the good performances obtained through these methods: between 1993 
and 1996 Fiat launched 18 new models, thus renewing its range of models; time to market 
dropped from 67 months during the 1980s to 32 months for the latest models: the target is 24 
months; and product quality has significantly increased. 
5.7.5. Effect of the single market on these changes 
The single market does not seem to have had an effect on these changes. The effects of the 
regulations on homologation are still limited. The degree of collaboration among car makers is 
still small. 
Fiat participates in various research initiatives at European level, though they are mainly 
focused on pre-competitive research. As regards Italian initiatives, Fiat undertook an 
agreement with the government ( 1994) concerning the development programmes in the field 
of alternative drive systems. 
On the contrary, in the case of industrial vehicles, collaboration is quite developed, 
particularly owing to the low volumes of production with respect to the costs of the new 
models' development. The differentiation of some product characteristics (engines, 
transmissions) is of a lesser importance because of the specific use of commercial vehicles as 
investment goods and since the product 'personalization' is carried out by other functional 
characteristics. However, the single market had only a small specific impact in bringing about 
those strategies. 
In general, the main changes in RD&D do not seem to be caused primarily by the single 
market. 
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S.8. Employment 
5.8.1. Changes in employment levels 
Between 1990 and 1994 the employment of Fiat decreased by about 10%: however, in Italy it 
decreased by nearly 30% whereas employment in extra-European sites has risen significantly 
(also as a consequence of Polish investment). This cut in payrolls is different from those 
experienced previously, when only blue collar jobs were cut: it involved both blue and white 
collar workers. A similar trend is affecting the commercial vehicles sector, where a fall of 30% 
in employment occurred between 1990 and 1994. 
The fall in employment was primarily carried out by turnover management (only partial 
replacement was enacted). 
However, the whole reorganization within Fiat had to be carried out in a short time and in the 
middle of a recession. In this condition, in addition to the ordinary social shock absorber 
(Redundancy Fund) Fiat could resort to the 'Crisis Status of the Sector Declaration' by the 
Ministry of Labour (June 1993) which offered Fiat some facilitations for the out-displacement 
(or displacement within the different sites) of the excess workers. Fiat's plan with the trade 
unions and the government involved 16,000 lay-offs: 8,000 at Torino, 4,000 at Arese (Milano) 
and 1,000 at Napoli, in addition to 3,000 white collar workers mostly from Torino 
Headquarters. 
At the beginning of 1994, an agreement was signed among Fiat, trade unions and government 
involving the reduction in working hours for 3,400 workers, early retirement for 6,500 and 
mobility within the Fiat Group for 2,000, in addition to the use of the Special Redundancy 
Fund for a further 4,100. 
The agreement committed the government to environmental projects in the automobile sector 
to be carried out at the two plants of Arese and Pomigliano. 
However, the subsequent upturn of the market a few months later (and the launch of the 
'Punto') made part of the planned lay-offs unnecessary. 
5.8.2. Changes in conditions of employment 
Fiat's shake-up plan involves significant changes in human resources management. In the new 
plants, innovative contractual conditions have been put into practice. They represent a 
reference for the other plants of the Group. 
They should obtain greater flexibility in the production organization and more co-operation 
from the workers. 
The agreements introduce a scheme based on three daily shifts, six days a week, eight hours 
per shift (for three consecutive weeks, the fourth implying only three working days); the 
workflow in the lines can be stopped to solve quality problems; the working times can be 
redetermined every three years. 
A productivity reward system has been put into effect. In addition, a special trade union-
management commission is in charge to prevent and solve conflicts, safety problems, to 
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monitor the determination of the productivity reward system: the focus is on more 
collaborative relationships within the company. 
S.8.3. Effect of the single market programme on employment levels and conditions 
The changes which occurred in the human resources management in Fiat cannot be pinned 
down to the single market programme. Rather, they seem to be the effect of the growing 
competition in the European car market and of the prevailing conditions of the labour market 
and labour relations in Italy. 
There is no evidence of an increase in cross-border recruitment. 
S.9. Business strategy 
The previous overview shows that the European market is actually considered a domestic 
market by Fiat, which is now focusing on the emerging markets of developing countries. 
Nevertheless, the strengthening of the position on the European market is an essential 
objective of Fiat's strategy, to be secured by gaining a bigger market share in the medium car 
segment. 
However, it is worth noting that the Italian market will remain of great importance, being able 
significantly to condition the whole corporate operation. 
At the same time, an effort aiming at a reduction of the break-even point has been carried out: 
this could be achieved through an intensive investment programme in order to innovate 
products, the processes and the commercial networks. 
The strategies undertaken in the industrial vehicles sector are quite similar to those carried out 
in the automobile sector. 
S.9.1. Key alliances developed and reasons therefor 
There is evidence of a certain reluctance of the car makers, in general, and Fiat, in particular, 
to forge alliances on strategically relevant aspects, although these could appear as the correct 
response to increasing competition, the rise in the resources required for RD&D, the saturation 
and cyclical behaviour of the European market. 
The preferred strategy is to reduce the break-even point (i.e. downsizing), the achievement of 
efficiency along the whole filière and internationalization looking for new and promising, 
though highly competitive, markets. 
Alliances which have been developed are predominantly in manufacturing such as licensing 
agreements in areas outside the EU. 
In the case of the commercial vehicles, the tough market conditions as well as the 'modularity' 
of products favour a greater propensity to reach development agreements in the key product 
areas. 
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S.9.2. Changes in business process strategy 
Purchasing 
The outsourcing of components is increasing. Above all their design is increasingly assigned 
to the suppliers, which tend to become 'partners' of the car makers. 
The supplier is granted supply of complete systems for the whole life of the model. The 
relationship involves co-engineering, i.e. the collaboration between the Fiat 'Piattaforma' with 
the supplier 'Piattaforma' since the first model development stage (just after the concept), and 
co-location, depending on just-in-time methods. 
Manufacturing 
The Fabbrica Integrata (Integrated Factory) is an original application of the lean production 
systems (Japanese style) adapted to Fiat's specific firm background. It is the attempt to link 
together process automation with the human contribution, in order to optimize dynamically, 
through flexibility, control over the whole system. The production operations are integrated 
into a single system which starts with the customer (through the commercial network) and 
ends with the supplier. 
The productive strategy is based on an increasing internationalization of the firm operations, 
mainly towards the emerging markets. 
Sales and distribution 
Within a 'customer pull' system the commercial network has to play a key role in the 
identification of product characteristics, in monitoring its responsiveness to the market 
expectations and enacting a follow-up of the client throughout the vehicle life. Thus, the 
strategies enacted have empowered the sales network mainly through the strengthening of the 
single dealer in the attempt to reach higher quantitative and qualitative selling standards. 
RD&D 
The need to reduce the time to market of the models, to enhance the parts and components 
standardization, to better prevent the problems which could arise in the product manufacturing 
and utilization phases has stimulated the creation of integrated structures, the 'Piattaforma', 
within which the various skills can work together. The 'Piattaformi' are set in relation to a 
specific model but, in effect, they extend to cover a whole segment and the whole set of 
problems which arise during the whole life of the vehicle (from concept to scrapping). 
Working methods are also being extended to component supplier relationships. It allows the 
time to market to be considerably shortened through the implementation of simultaneous 
engineering. 
S.10. Views on future EU actions to help the sector 
Some general considerations have to be pointed out: 
(a) The European market had been substantially open for the car makers for a long time 
before the single market programme was established, though it has been a long process 
with effects felt over a long period which are difficult to assess in detail. 
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(b) After implementation of the single market measures, the market can still be defined as 
'open' but not truly characterized by common rules ('open' but not 'single'). 
(c) This is partly due to the persisting cultural diversities among Member States (from this 
point of view the national systems will continue to exist). 
(d) In this context national specificities and their regulations have weighted on past 
strategies and will condition the future ones (the relevance of the 'country-system'). 
Throughout the case study Fiat made comments and suggestions on the policies for the single 
market to be undertaken in the future. They can be summarized as follows: 
From a general point of view a more active infrastructure policy at European level is deemed 
necessary to allow for a smoother mobility of goods. 
The need for a stronger promotion of European technical standards towards the emerging 
economies. 
It is stressed that the harmonization throughout Europe is progressing too slowly and is not 
transparent enough, sometimes making some national regulations prevail upon EU regulation. 
In this respect, the harmonization could be better achieved through a 'voluntary' approach, 
instead of a 'command-control' one. This latter approach would save the profitability of the 
car makers' past investments and allow for a better planning of future ones. This seems to 
have been the case with the environmental regulations on emissions which gave advantage to 
some producers with respect to others. In addition, the new emissions standards are being set 
with too narrow timing making it difficult to implement the investment required. 
In the future, the harmonization will be harder to achieve, owing to the unanimity criteria, 
because of the resistance of member countries and the new members' inclusion into the EU. 
Since the Maastricht Agreement requires new directives to be submitted to Parliament, a 
conflict could arise between the technical progress and the slow pace of updating regulations. 
Of great importance is the incomplete fiscal harmonization which fragments the European 
markets, forcing the car makers to adopt different segmentation policies at national level. 
The continuing diversities as to the fiscal burden prevent car registration harmonization, thus 
making the savings in the homologation operations impossible to achieve. 
The public procurement deregulation asks for administrative procedures in the different 
countries to be harmonized in order to become effective. 
The intellectual property protection is also subject to substantial administrative complexities 
and duplications which make substantial costs for the firm. 
For the non-technical components the protection is bound to be diminished: this would hit the 
OE producers' investment effort, reducing the quality of products to the detriment of the 
consumers. 
The selective distribution innovations, giving a greater power to the franchisee vendors, could 
be detrimental to the consumer who will be offered a deteriorating after-sales servicing. 
282 Motor vehicles 
S.U. Annex 
S.l 1.1. List of persons interviewed 
Company managers 
Dött. ssa Borsero ­ Research and Studies (Fiat Auto) 
Dott. Damini ­ EU Legislation (Fiat Auto) 
Dort. Pettarini ­ Market Studies (Fiat Auto) 
Dott. Bernardi ­ Sales Network (Fiat Auto) 
Dott. Buscaglione ­ Technical and Legislative Services (Homologation) (Fiat Auto) 
Ing. Degiorgis ­ Technical and Legislative Services (Patents) (Fiat Auto) 
Ing. Iorio ­ Purchasing (Fiat Auto) 
Ing. Tafuri ­ Purchasing (Fiat Auto) 
Dott. Sordi ­ Strategy and Development (Fiat Iveco) 
Experts 
Prof. Giuseppe Volpato ­ Dipartimento di Economia e Direzione Aziendale, Università di 
Venezia 
Dort. Aldo Enrietti ­ Dipartimento di Economia, Università di Torino 
S. 11.2. Articles/other information used 
ANFIA, Automobile in cifre, various years. 
Camuffo Α., Volpato G., 'The labour relations heritage and lean manufacturing of Fiat', in 
Internationaljournal of Human Resource Management, Vol. 6, No. 4, December 1995. 
De Banville, E., Chañaron, J.­J., Poids lourds et partenariat, IREPD, Grenoble, 1994. 
Enrietti, Α., Fornengo G., 'Il gruppo Fiat', La nuova Italia Scientifica, Rome, 1989. 
Enrietti, Α., 'Questione di gamma: per la Fiat svalutare non basta', Politica ed Economia, 
November 1993. 
Enrietti, Α., 'Il veicolo industriale: una industria dal carattere regionale in via di 
globalizzazione', Atti del 10° Congresso AISSEC, Torino, 10­12 October 1995. 
Fiat Annual Reports, various years. 
Qualitas, trimestrale diretto al Sistema Fiat Auto­Fornitori, various issues. 
R&S, Yearbook, various years. 
Sanguineti, R., Zampini Salazar, CF., Iveco Story, Norden Publishing House Ltd, St Gallen 
(CH), 1994. 
Volpato, G., 'Il settore automobilistico', in L'Industria, No. 1, 1994. 
Company's documents. 
Press clippings (Mondo Economico, Il Sole 24 Ore). 
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APPENDIX Τ 
Case study on Renault 
T.l. Introduction 
The following is a report on our case study with Renault. The case study was carried out 
through an interview process with Jean­Marc Lepeu, Director of External Relations, Jean­
François de Andria, Director of Planning, and Philippe Haag, Chargé de Mission. 
T.2. Background to the company 
Renault is split into four main divisions. The following table shows the percentage split of the 
workforce between these divisions: 
Division 
Manufacturing 
Marketing 
Resources/Services 
RD&D 
% workforce 
54 
21 
8 
17 
Source: Renault. 
Renault produces passenger cars ranging from the Renault Twingo to the Renault Espace and 
industrial vehicles (Renault V.l.) through two branches of its business ­ Branche Europe and 
Mack Trucks. 
T.2.1. Geographic markets 
Renault has three major markets ­ Western Europe, North America and Asia Pacific. 
However, Renault has a presence in South America, the former Soviet states, China, Central 
Europe and Africa. 
T.2.2. Number and location of plants 
Renault's passenger car activities in the EU are dominated by France where there are 20 plants 
producing vehicles, components and engines and carrying out RD&D activities. Renault 
prefers to keep the plant numbers high with a medium capacity in these plants compared to its 
competitors, because the smaller plants allow greater flexibility in the production process. 
Renault's remaining EU operations are three passenger car plants in Spain, two in Portugal, 
one in Belgium and one in Italy. In addition to these plants, Renault has four plants in South 
America ­ Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela and Uruguay ­ one plant each in Turkey, Mexico 
and Morocco and four plants in South­East Asia ­ Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia and China. The 
Thailand operation is a joint venture with Volvo. All these non­European plants are passenger 
car manufacturers, except the Mexico plant which produces engines. On the commercial 
vehicle side, Renault V.l. has six plants in France, and one plant each in Spain, Morocco and 
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the UK. Mack Trucks has three plants in the USA and one each in Australia, New Zealand and 
Venezuela. 
T.2.3. Trends in production 
In 1985 total passenger car production was 1.6 million vehicles. Production rose steadily to a 
peak of 1.93 million in 1989. Since then, production has fluctuated around 1.8 million per 
annum. For commercial vehicles, Renault V.l. produced 66,482 vehicles in 1990. This figure 
declined to 47,863 in 1993 but recovered to 64,415 in 1994. It is clear that production is 
greatly affected by the recent recession and has only recently appeared to recover. 
T.3. Effects of the single market programme on market access 
Renault did not wait until the implementation of the single market programme before it treated 
Europe as a common single market. Renault established a Common Market division in 1961 
and views the single market programme as a formalization of the Common Market. 
T.3.1. How sales outside the national market have changed over time and the reasons for this 
Historically, Renault has had a strong consumer base in the south of Europe - Italy, Spain and 
Portugal. This was partly due to production agreements with companies in these countries, 
such as with Alfa Romeo in the 1960s, as well as the location of Renault plants in Spain and 
Portugal. However, over the last ten years, Renault has pursued a policy of balancing its sales 
in the north and the south of Europe. This was as a result of consumer demand changing in 
these Member States partly because of an increase in the level of competition faced by Renault 
in these markets. In order to become less exposed to the fluctuations in demand in these 
Member States and to the intense competition, Renault have sought a more balanced sales 
strategy for the whole of Europe. Throughout all this change, however, the domestic market is 
still the most important to Renault - over 30% of its global sales in 1993 were in France. 
T.3.2. Launch of new models for the whole European market and the reasons behind this 
Renault considers that there is more commonality among the different producers' products 
over the last ten years. For example, there are fewer specific concepts such as the 2CV or the 
R4. However, the models are not viewed as being any more 'European' today than they were 
30 years ago. Thirty years ago, Renault were producing a world car, the Dauphine which had 
the same output as the Clio today. What has changed is the level of competition which has 
resulted in an increase in the number of models in each model class. In the 1950s there was 
usually only one model by class. Now there are usually four models in each class of car 
(coupe, hatchback, estate and saloon). This has resulted in a decrease in share for each model 
as they become increasingly differentiated. As a consequence, instead of becoming more 
European, many manufacturers sell their products based on their national characteristics - the 
'Frenchness' of the Clio or the Germanic efficiency of the Audi. 
For these reasons, Renault consider that the increase in models and variants is more a 
reflection of the long-term increase of global competition in the automotive industry than the 
single market programme increasing the competition and variety available to the consumer. 
Global competitive increases are more to do with the Common Market, a natural progression 
to develop sales in new markets and overcapacity world-wide. This, in turn has led to a more 
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sophisticated consumer who demands more from the automotive manufacturers. This has also 
led to an increase in competition. 
T.3.3. Relative effects of recession and exchange rates on the levels of access to other 
European markets 
Renault, like the rest of the automotive industry was caught out by the depth and length of the 
recent recession. This is one of the main contributors to the increased overcapacity in the 
industry which has led to an increase in the level of competition. Renault considers that the 
recent recession has been made worse by the single market programme through over-
regulation, such as emission limits, airbags and other safety requirements. Renault considers 
that the European Commission has forced the automobile industry to apply the most advanced 
technological equipment regardless of the need. This means that the purchasing power of the 
consumer has been outstripped by the increase in costs of meeting these regulations. This has 
had a big impact on the market, because consumers are buying less cars and retaining their 
existing cars for longer or even looking more at the second-hand market. 
Renault is most concerned with the fact that although the single market programme was 
implemented, there is not an internal market in currency. In 1992 when there was a 
devaluation in the pound, lira and peseta, Renault estimates that it lost FF 4 billion. This 
occurred through the desire of Renault to maintain market presence but also wanting to limit 
the loss in profits. Through this balancing act between market share and profit, Renault has 
had to accept a reduction in its margins greater than the loss in market share. The expectation 
was that over time, inflation in these countries would lessen the impact of the devaluation on 
Renault's business. However, this has not proved to be the case. 
Currency fluctuations have also given rise to a new problem for Renault. Parallel importers 
have been impairing the business of their distribution network. In Renault's view, the 
Commission has been wrong in liberalizing the flow of products in Europe before creating a 
single European currency. The fluctuations in currency across the single market make it very 
difficult for the European automotive manufacturers to plan for the long term. However, the 
fluctuations in currency mean that there is an increased incentive for these manufacturers to 
set up plants in countries other than their national markets. The presence of long-term cheaper 
currencies means that many companies are locating their plants in the UK, Spain and Portugal. 
T.3.4. Implications of different tax regimes for market access 
Renault considers that no progress has been made on the creation of a single tax regime in 
Europe. Despite the fact that VAT is paid in the country where the car is bought, where there 
are severe distortions in the tax regime, problems arise. In Denmark, for example, where the 
purchase tax is nearly 100%, there is a strong pressure on the manufacturers to push the pre­
tax price down or face no market. This, in turn, has a consequence on the price that the 
manufacturers can charge in the other countries of the EU. Renault believes that the 
differences in tax legislation based on requirements for insurance and the size of engines add 
to its production costs because it has to produce different variants for different countries. 
Renault estimates that of the 80 variants it builds for one model, approximately 20% of these 
variants are because of tax differences. The equivalent cost of these differences is FF 20 
million. 
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T.3.5. Introduction of pan-European marketing and distribution networks and the effect of 
the block exemption 
Renault said that although the block exemption was renewed, it is not clear what basis the 
Commission used for this renewal. This means that the incentive for future investment has 
been affected. Renault does not consider that the Commission has the right balance between 
the consumer, manufacturer and dealer. When Renault surveyed consumers, it found that 
dealerships were preferred for servicing and sales. 
Renault does not consider that pan-European marketing is possible even though it produces 
European cars. Pan-European marketing is difficult because of differences in consumers 
across Europe. For example, the people carrier market takes on greater importance in some 
countries than in others, the Megane is a car for Europe but cannot be marketed in the same 
way in the UK as in Italy. Any pan-European marketing campaign often ends up as the lowest 
common denominator, appealing to no one. 
T.4. Changes in production costs and productivity 
Renault considers that the single market programme has not resulted in the principal effect on 
production costs and productivity. Any recent changes in productivity are because of the 
globalization of competition in the automotive industry. The increased competition has 
increased productivity and Renault would have made these improvements whether the single 
market programme was implemented or not. The single market was at most a contributing 
factor to these improvements but the main driver of improvements in productivity was 
growing globalization. 
T.4.1. New methods of working 
All new methods of working came from the growing Japanese threats in the 1970s. At this 
point, all European manufacturers went over to Japan to learn the new methods. However, the 
implementation of these new methods took around 10 years, because it was not only the minds 
which needed to be changed, but also the plants to accommodate these changes. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, the European automotive manufacturers made a huge effort on quality. This was 
more in response to the Japanese than in preparation for the single market programme. This is 
reflected by the fact that the number of customer complaints between 1989 and 1996 have 
fallen by 75%. 
T.5. Employment 
T. 5.1. Changes in employment levels 
There has been a significant decline in employment - as a direct result of productivity 
improvements made over recent years. Renault regards the role of the single market in this fall 
in employment and increased productivity as minimal at most. 
T. 5.2. Changes in conditions of employment 
The conditions of employment have changed with the Social Chapter. Employment conditions 
have also changed as a direct result of recent improvements in plant, such as new production 
techniques, changes in the level of automation and new automation. 
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T.5.3. Degree of cross-border recruitment 
There has been little cross-border recruitment. Plants located in France generally employ 
French people and plants located in Spain generally employ Spanish people. Mobility of the 
labour force has remained unchanged because country-specific social laws, pensions, taxes 
and salaries are all perceived as barriers to mobility. Renault has, however, increased the 
mobility of their labour force at a senior level for world-wide purposes. For example, three 
years ago, the General Manager of the Spanish operation was French, now the General 
Manager is Spanish. Furthermore, the head of Renault's Parts and Service Division is Spanish. 
T.5.4. The effect of the single market programme on employment levels and conditions 
Renault feels that there is still a long way to go before the single market programme has a 
direct effect on the employment levels in the automotive industry. Renault consider that the 
single market programme has had an effect on working conditions in the automotive industry 
through the Social Chapter. 
T.6. Manufacturing plants 
T.6.1. Overview of the location and size of plants over time 
Renault tends to have relatively small plants in comparison to US companies. The reason for 
this is that Renault feels that scale economies are not the sole determinant of the correct size 
for a plant. Renault considers that the smaller plant gives it the flexibility it needs in an 
increasingly competitive market. Renault's plants have traditionally been based in France and 
the south of Europe, where the main markets for their products are located. However, as noted 
above, the market for Renault products has changed from being predominantly based in the 
south of Europe to the north of Europe. This means that the French plants are ideally placed to 
serve these new markets but that the Portuguese and Spanish plants are no longer so ideal. 
Despite these changes in demand for the Renault product, Renault does not consider that the 
single market programme has played a part in the decision for the location of its plants. 
T.6.2. Reasons behind international relocations 
Renault considers that there is a tendency to relocate plants where the currency is cheaper. 
This has been confirmed by the location decisions of Nissan to build plant in Spain and the 
UK. 
As noted above, as Renault's sales patterns have changed from the south of Europe to the 
north, Renault has relocated some of its plants. For example, a plant in Portugal, originally 
located there to supply that market, has been closed because it is not in the right position to 
supply the changing Renault market. Nevertheless, Renault considers that the single market 
will affect the future decisions for the location of plants because of the removal of barriers to 
entry across Europe. Despite this, Renault notes that new entrants to the European market are 
now more likely to locate in Eastern Europe because of the free trade agreements with these 
states and the greater currency stability. Renault would also relocate to this area if it were to 
build a new plant, because of the advantageous salary levels and free trade agreements. 
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T.6.3. Production patterns within plants 
Generally, Renault does not want more than two plants for one of its products. However, this 
strategy far outlives the implementation of the single market programme. 
T.7. Purchasing 
T.7.1. Numbers of suppliers used and their location over time 
In 1989, Renault dealt with 1,163 component suppliers. By 1995, this had fallen to 843, i.e. by 
27.5%. This reduction is more a reflection of a development of 'system suppliers', those 
suppliers that take on a component system for manufacture and pass it on to the automotive 
manufacturer, than as a direct result of the single market programme. This means that Renault 
now has less direct relations with as many automotive component suppliers, even if many are 
still involved in the automotive component manufacture process. The location of suppliers 
used has not been affected by the single market programme. Many of the contracts that 
Renault has with its suppliers are long-term and based on mutual long-term understanding and 
trust. Certainly, Renault is buying in more by outsourcing more of their non-core production. 
Seventy per cent of the cost of the vehicle is now produced by component suppliers, whereas 
20% of the cost of the vehicle was outsourced 20 years ago. The relationship between the 
component suppliers and the manufacturers has also changed, with more responsibility for the 
technological development of the components being placed in the hands of the component 
suppliers. The relationship between Renault and the suppliers has also taken on a quality 
assurance role so that the companies can develop together. 
T.7.2. Examples of changes in cross-border sourcing 
Because of this changing relationship, the contracts between the suppliers and Renault have 
become more long-term. This has actually reduced the degree of cross-border sourcing 
because fewer firms and products are involved in the process of supplying the systems to the 
manufacturers. Renault considers that the single market has not played a part in this process. 
The dominant factor in the reduction in cross-border sourcing is the increase in global 
competition. 
T.7.3. Changes in intra-firm sourcing 
Given that there are fewer components made by Renault, the degree of intra-firm sourcing has 
fallen. 
T.7.4. Effect of exchange rates on sourcing decisions 
Renault tends to buy as much as it sells in a country so that the exchange rate fluctuations of 
recent years are neutralized. Well before the single market programme was implemented, 
Renault had begun a rationalization of their component supply base. Part of this strategy was 
based on the recent fluctuations in exchange rates rather than the single market programme. 
T.7.5. Views on, and examples of, the internationalization of supply base 
The single market is regarded to have had an effect on the component supply base. The single 
market has created supply scale economy opportunities and this has attracted the investors 
from abroad - particularly the US, Japanese and Korean component manufacturers. 
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T.7.6. Effect of the single market programme on these changes 
Renault considers that sourcing depends on 'Quality, technology and cost, not the single 
market'. 
The main factor in the use of component suppliers has been a strategy of partnership against a 
strategy of balancing the impact of currencies. 
T.8. Research, design and development 
T.8.1. Location of RD&D across Europe 
Renault considers that the single market programme allows RD&D to be located in one place. 
Before the single market programme was implemented, Renault had been pursuing a policy of 
centralizing RD&D in France through the closure of some small RD&D operations in Spain. 
Renault is currently building a new RD&D plant in France for 6,000 staff. 
T.8.2. Estimation of cost savings from the component type approval measures 
Renault considers all type approval savings in terms of the whole vehicle. 
T.8.3. Estimation of cost savings from the whole vehicle type approval measure 
Renault considers that the single market programme has had a significant positive effect 
through whole vehicle type approval. The savings have been reflected through reductions in 
the number of hours worked by engineers, a reduction in administration, reduction in time for 
selling products in various markets and fewer product differences across the Member States of 
the EU. Despite the positive effect of the whole vehicle type approval measures of the single 
market programme, the impact on Renault's business is minimal. Renault estimates that the 
cost savings from whole vehicle type approval are less than 1% of the 'entry ticket' (from 
development to production of a new vehicle). The Megane cost approximately FF 8 billion, 
and the savings from whole vehicle type approval were much less than FF 80 million. 
Renault considers that the costs imposed through over-regulation have outweighed the cost 
benefits of whole vehicle type approval. Moreover, despite the whole vehicle type approval's 
reduction in the numbers of model variants required across the Member States, increased 
competition over recent years has increased pressure on automotive manufacturers to produce 
a wider range of variants for one model. 
T.8.4. Degree of European and global intra-firm collaboration in RD&D 
Renault has a clear policy to co-operate with other manufacturers and component suppliers 
wherever it can because of the advantages that this brings to its business. For example, they 
often co-operate with other manufacturers on the development of new, technologically 
sophisticated components. This is partly because of cost savings in development but also 
results in suppliers of the new components being able to exploit economies of scale through 
larger orders than would occur if only Renault had developed the component. Renault does not 
consider this policy to be a result of the single market programme, although it has been a small 
contributory factor. The main reason for this policy is increasingly globalized competition. 
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T.8.5. Key changes taking place in RD&D (particularly joint design with suppliers) 
As noted above, Renault has changed its policy of dealing with the component suppliers and 
other manufacturers regarding RD&D. More responsibility for product development is placed 
in the hands of the component suppliers. More collaborative RD&D with other manufacturers 
is also taking place, as the globalization of competition in the industry increases the pressure 
to lower costs. 
T.8.6. Effect of the single market programme on these changes 
The single market has had a fairly muted effect. The impact of the whole vehicle type approval 
measures has had a significant effect but this has been countered by what Renault regards as 
over-regulation as well as increasing competition. The centralization of Renault's RD&D plant 
has been facilitated to a small extent by the single market programme. The degree of global 
and intra-firm collaboration in RD&D has increased over recent years although this is mainly 
because of the increase in global competition. 
T.9. Business strategy 
The following table shows the key alliances Renault has developed over the last 30 years: 
Who with 
Peugeot 
Peugeot 
Peugeot 
Matra 
VW 
Toyota 
Volvo 
Heuliez 
ABB Robotics 
Karosa 
John Deere 
Massey Ferguson 
Iveco 
Date 
1966 
1966 
1970 
1983 
1983 
1990 
1990 
1992 
1993 
1993 
1994 
1994 
1994 
Activity 
engines 
automatic transmissions 
utility vehicles 
the 'Espace' 
R&D into automatic vehicles 
4x4 vehicle 
components 
autocars and autobuses 
flexible assembly systems 
autocars and autobuses 
tractors 
R&D into transmissions 
R&D 
Source: Renault. 
Business strategy has been covered in detail in the previous sections. However, Renault 
considers that the single market has not had a significant direct effect on any of the areas of its 
business. However, Renault considers that the strategy of the firm has been indirectly affected 
by the single market programme in one area. Renault believes that the single market has been 
of greatest benefit to new entrants into the EU automotive market, particularly the Japanese 
and Korean firms. This has further increased the competitive pressure on the European-based 
automotive manufacturers who have had to adjust their strategies accordingly through closer 
links with the component suppliers, many of whom are owned by 'foreign' companies, and 
greater collaboration in the development and production of vehicles. 
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T.10. Views on future EU actions to help the sector 
Renault is concerned at the level of Community support for publicly funded research 
programmes. Currently, the EU is falling well short of the support provided for the US 
automotive industry. Renault considers that the EC could be used as an engine for co­
operation, but that this is not yet the case. 
Renault would like to see true implementation of the single market through the equalization of 
social laws, subsidies and currencies. For example, in 1992, when the EC put together its deal 
with Japan on the Elements of Consensus, the EC established a set of measures required from 
the Commission and the national governments of the EU to support the automotive industry 
during the transition to a truly open market in 1999. These measures were a list of issues 
setting out the distribution of tax rates, stability in the industry and design protection, amongst 
others. In 1996, very few of these measures have been achieved, and there are only three years 
remaining to carry them out. Renault considers that the Commission has never been able to 
develop a horizontal industrial policy towards the automotive industry, so the Commission had 
replaced what it could not achieve with a policy that it could ­ a customer­oriented policy. Of 
the 15 Member States Renault considers that there are five 'producing' countries and 10 
'commercial service' countries in the automotive industry. Renault considers that the 
Commission has opted for the majority policy of helping the 10 service Member States 
because of its easier implementation. This consumer­oriented policy has therefore been at the 
expense of industry­oriented policy. 
T.ll. Annex 
T. 11.1. List of persons interviewed 
Jean­Marc Lepeu, Director of Exterior Relations 
Jean­François de Andria, Director of Planning 
Philippe Haag, Chargé de Mission 
T. 11.2. Articles/other information used 
Renault Annual Report, 1994. 
Renault Economic Atlas, 1995. 
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APPENDIX U 
Case study on Daewoo 
U.l. Introduction 
Daewoo is one of the largest of the South Korean chaebol companies. It was formed in 1967 
as a textile and clothing exporter. Its total group turnover in 1995 exceeded US$ 57 billion 
from 22 companies, of which the automotive interest is but one. 
Daewoo appears to be following an aggressive expansion strategy at the moment, along with 
the other Korean vehicle producers. Its vehicle interests date back to 1978, when Daewoo took 
a stake in Saehan Motor Co. Ltd, set up as a joint venture between General Motors and Shinjin 
Motor Co. Ltd in 1972. The company was renamed Daewoo Motor Company in 1983. The 
links with GM were severed in 1992 at the instigation of the Koreans, leaving Daewoo Motor 
with an increasingly dated range of GM cars and limited product development expertise. 
However, from 1995 it allows Daewoo free access to any markets it wants. 
As a result it has launched in Western Europe during 1995, as well as broadening its activities 
in Romania and Latin America. Daewoo has retained its link with Volvo Truck under which it 
assembles heavy Volvo F12 trucks in Korea. In the UK, Daewoo has taken over the 
prestigious IAD design and engineering consultancy, providing it not only with a European 
listening post, but with a ready-made European-trained product development team of 415 
running a department equal in size to Daewoo's existing studio in Seoul, but of the highest 
quality and with a world-wide reputation. This has helped in speeding up the acquisition of in-
house expertise. Daewoo's first in-house models will start appearing from 1997. A significant 
move in terms of Daewoo's Europeanization was the appointment of Ulrich Bez as vice-
president for engineering and development13. Bez was involved in a senior product 
development capacity first at BMW and subsequently at Porsche. Another key appointment is 
that of ex-Ford man Ray Everts, who was involved in Ford's Escort, Sierra, Granada and 
Taurus programmes. Daewoo is expected to invest US$ 3.7 billion by the year 2000 on new 
plant, new models and related projects, such as vehicle testing facilities. 
U.2. Daewoo and the Korean automotive sector 
As Table U.l shows, the expansion of capacity by Daewoo is only part of an overall picture of 
growth in output from Korean companies on a global basis. 
Feasr, R. [1994], 'The Koreans are coming', CAR Magazine, December 22-23. 
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Table U.l. Projected Daewoo capacity expansion, 1994, 2000 
(000s units) 
Firm 
Hyundai 
Hyundair Precision 
Kia 
Asia Motors 
Daewoo 
Daewoo Shipbuilding 
Ssang Yong 
Samsung 
Total 
1994 capacity 
1,150 
76 
551 
146 
396 
204 
39 
0 
2,562 
2000 capacity 
2,000 
1,500 
2,200 
60 
40 
5,800 
Source: ERI. 1994; CAIR estimates. 
NB: Group figures. Assumes two-shift pattern and 265 working days per year. All categories of vehicle. A significant 
proportion of the new capacity will be outside Korea. 
In the short term the majority of sales into the European Community market will be direct 
exports from Korea. In aggregate, exports of cars and other vehicles from Korea grew from 
123,000 in 1985 to 737,000 in 1994. Daewoo contributed about 100,000 of those exports in 
1994, well behind Hyundai (392,000) and Kia (210,000). In the period 1992 to 1994 inclusive, 
Korean exports to Western Europe as a whole grew from 109,000 to 138,000 units. 
The largest single national market for Korean exported vehicles is Germany, with just under 
40,000 units in 1994. 
The South Korean automotive industry has followed an aggressive expansion strategy, both 
within Korea and in terms of developing new capacity in other locations. Table U.2 
summarizes these investments outside Korea, where again Daewoo follows a pattern shown by 
the South Korean industry as a whole. 
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Table U.2. International assembly plants involving Korean firms 
Firm 
Hyundai 
Kia 
Daewoo 
Country 
Canada 
Thailand 
Botswana 
Egypt 
Malaysia 
Taiwan 
Philippines 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Iran 
Indonesia 
Uzbekistan 
Iran 
Philippines 
Vietnam 
China 
Romania 
Poland 
Poland 
Capacity (000s) 
100 
10 
10 
15 
11 
25 
15 
7 
2 
100 
50 
200 
50 
20 
20 
5 
200,000 
90,000 
220,000 
Date started 
1989 
1993 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1989 
1989 
1992 
1993 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1995 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1995 
1995 
Comments 
Transplant 
production. Sonata 
Excel 
Elantra, Excel, Sonata 
Excel 
1.25 tonne 
commercial vehicle 
Pride 
Ceres, Pride 
Pride 
Ceres, Pride, Besta 
Pride 
Pride, Sephia. JV 
30% Kia 
Small car. JV 30% 
Daewoo 
Lemans, Espero. JV 
30% Daewoo 
Lemans, Espero. JV 
30% Daewoo 
Lemans, Espero, 
Prince. JV 30% 
Daewoo 
Large bus. JV 30% 
Daewoo 
Purchase of 51% of 
Olcit 
61%ofFSLtomake 
Cielo sedan 
70%ofFSO 
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Table U.2. International assembly plants involving Korean firms (continued) 
Firm 
Asia Motors 
Ssang Yong 
Country 
Czech Republic 
Austria 
India 
Indonesia 
China 
Vietnam 
Capacity (000s) 
75,000 
n.a. 
100,000 
20,000 
5 
2 
Date started 
1995 
1995 
(by 1997) 
1995 
1994 
1991 
Comments 
33% share of Avia 
(Cvs) with Steyr of 
Austria 
Daewoo to take 65% 
share of 4 plants 
Cielo production 
Espero 
Medium bus. JV 30% 
Asia Motor 
Korando 
Source: KERI, 1994; Company Reports; Press. 
U.3. Daewoo globalization 
At group level, Daewoo has ambitious expansion targets. Its goals for the year 2000 include: 
US$186 bn in sales; 
430 sales subsidiaries; 
130 production subsidiaries; 
30 technical and design research centres; 
70 local branch offices. 
The total group sales targets for the year 2000 include: US$ 74 billion trade; US$ 17 billion 
construction; US$ 40 billion motor vehicles; US$ 18 billion heavy machinery and 
shipbuilding; and US$ 28 billion computers and telecommunications. The automotive segment 
is therefore a very important area for the group as a whole. 
Group investments in overseas offices and subsidiaries will be in the region of US$ 4.6 billion 
between 1995 and 2000. 
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Table U.3. Production of vehicles by Daewoo, 1987-94 
Year 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Daewoo 
162,225 
162,788 
161,925 
201,035 
203,792 
179,020 
300,094 
340,707 
Daewoo Ship 
44,251 
90,513 
75,200 
72,460 
Source: KAMA, 1995. 
By 1994 output had reached 413,000 units of all types. The group has a stated strategy of 
wanting to be in the world's top ten manufacturers of motor vehicles by the year 2000 - and 
this will entail an expansion of capacity to over two million units. The company will have a 
global production capacity outside Korea of 500,000 vehicles by 1996. The large plants in 
Uzbekistan and Romania should start production in 1996, though not at full output. 
Daewoo has further sought to expand its global sales network to allow greater levels of 
exports. In 1995 Daewoo exports from Korea were 287,000 units, a 164% increase over 1994. 
Plans for 1996 include 530,000 exports, of which 138,000 would be in the form of kits. 
Western Europe remains the main market region destination; Daewoo has no presence as yet 
in North America. Daewoo have sought to target developing economies in Eastern Europe, 
Latin America and Asia as growth areas for both sales and inward investment. Western Europe 
as a whole currently accounts for about one-third of exports. 
In Western Europe as a whole, the number of dealerships is expected to grow from 1,308 
(1995) to 1,560 (1996) with new markets including Sweden, Denmark, Portugal and Turkey. 
Daewoo has adopted an innovative distribution strategy in the UK market, but has been more 
traditional in other national markets within the European Community. In the UK, Daewoo has 
established a small network of directly owned main sales points, usually in non-traditional 
locations such as mixed retail parks. Daewoo has formed a link with Halfords, an independent 
operator of vehicle service centres in the UK, to provide service support for its vehicles. 
Daewoo has further sought to differentiate itself on the basis of fixed price selling, extended 
warranties and various other 'customer care' features. The company has succeeded in 
obtaining a very rapid growth in market share to about 1% of total UK sales (sales of 13,169 
or 0.93% of the total market). However, in other markets where a more traditional distribution 
approach has been taken, Daewoo has also enjoyed success. For example, in 1995 in the 
Netherlands Daewoo sold 6,150 new cars to hold 1.4% of the market. 
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